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Abstract 
This thesis examines the development of Russian national security and foreign policy 
perspectives towards Central Europe (CE) after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
study focuses on two major aspects of bilateral relations between Russia and four states 
of Central Europe - Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic - military- 
political and economic. 
The ties between Russia and the states of Central European are analyzed within the 
framework of the regional security complex. The regional security complex concept 
helps bring into the analysis both internal and external influences that shape these 
countries' security policies. The concept also allows the idea of mutual perceptions to be 
brought into the analysis that helps explain Russia-CE security dynamics in the post- 
Cold War era. 
Among the key external influences that significantly affected and shaped Russia-CE 
relations were the processes of NATO and EU enlargement. These are analysed closely 
in explaining changes and variations in Russia's CE policy. EU enlargement and the 
consequences for Russian-Polish relations are given particular consideration, with main 
focus on Russia's Kaliningrad exclave. The study is also organised around four periods 
that are marked by shifts in Russian security and foreign policy thinking. 
Evidence presented in this study suggests that Russian foreign policy, having reached a 
"consensus" on the statist, "great power" foreign policy in the mid-1990s, has since 
shown a tendency towards a more economically driven foreign policy, although still 
with a good measure of geopolitical thinking. Thus, the role of Russian economic actors 
in shaping Russian foreign policy towards CE is closely examined. The economic 
interests of Russia's key economic actors - oil and gas companies - have played an 
important part in sustaining and moderating Russia's policy towards CE and Europe as a 
whole. However, it is argued, Russian economic actors encountered a number of 
obstacles in advancing their interests in the region, in part due to the legacy of the past 
and lingering unfavourable perceptions. 
The thesis argues that Russia and the CE states have now left the most difficult epoch in 
their post-Soviet history behind. Completion of the most dramatic and sensitive changes 
- NATO enlargement, and Russia's grudging acquiescence to further growth of the 
11 
alliance - opened the way to a new era in Russia-CE relations. The increasing role of 
economic factors in determining Russian foreign policy, along with improvements in 
Russia's relations with the West in general, with NATO and with the EU, send positive 
signals to the CE states. These changes, it is argued, are bringing about the shift towards 
a more constructive and amicable pattern of relations between Russia and the CE states 
which makes the overall security environment in Europe more positively stable, 
predictable and durable. 
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Theory as a framework 
Analysis of Russian foreign policy requires a choice to be made in favour of one or other 
theoretical and methodological approaches. If traditions in the study of Soviet foreign policy 
are anything to go by, most studies can be divided into two broad approaches - either looking 
at the impact of external factors or studying the nature of the political system and its influence 
on Soviet foreign policy. The rare attempts to combine both approaches were more `research 
topics than efforts to explain or interpret Soviet foreign policy'. ' As Christer Pursiainen 
observes, most of the mainstream theories and interpretations of Soviet foreign policy are 
reproduced in the study of Russian foreign policy, although often in slightly modified forms. 
Pursiainen complains that the mainstream writing on Soviet foreign policy and the spirit of 
the field as a whole was rather `conservative and isolated from the general developments of 
International Relations and other social sciences'. Such approaches predominantly reflected 
the mainstream Realist approach to International Relations theory. 2 
The unit of analysis 
These two approaches are known in International Relations as "third image" and "second 
image" respectively, and are taken to represent different "levels of analysis", as described by 
Kenneth Waltz in his 1959 book Man, the State, and War. 3 The "third image", or 
"international system level" deals with the constraints and opportunities of the international 
1 Christer Pursiainen, Russian Foreign Policy and International Relations Theory (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), p. 
49. 
2 Ibid., p. 35; Celeste A. Wallander, 'The Sources of Russian Conduct: Theories, Frameworks, and Approaches', 
in The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War, ed. by Celeste A. Wallander (Boulder, Colo. 
Oxford: Westview, 1996), p. 2. 
3 Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954). 
1 
Chapter 1 
system, whereas the "second image", or "unit level" focuses on the economic, social, and 
political characteristics of states. 
The "first image", or "individual level" refers to the nature and behaviour of man. In the early 
1970s, a fourth level, that of groups and bureaucracies, emerged as an important level of 
analysis in the study of international politics, to a large degree owing to Graham Allison's 
famous decision-making study on the Cuban missile crisis. 4 Later the field was expanded by 
the addition of sub-system and sub-unit levels of analysis. For more than three decades, 
debate about levels of analysis has been central to much of international relations theory. 
They were central to questions pertaining to security analysis - who or what is the referent 
object for security (individual or state) or to the causes of war (system structure, nature of 
states, or indeed human nature). 5 
These levels, as Barry Buzan explains, are objects for analysis that are defined by a range of 
spatial scales, from small to large, they are `locations where both outcomes and sources of 
explanation can be located'. 6 Theories may suggest causal explanations from one level to 
another, such as top down from system structure to unit behaviour, or bottom up from human 
nature to the behaviour of human collectivities (they could be either firms, states, nations, or 
any other entities). Buzan stresses, however, that there is nothing intrinsic to levels 
themselves that ascribes any particular pattern or priority of relations among them. Levels are 
simply ontological referents for where things happen rather than a source of explanation in 
4 Graham Allison, T., Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1971). 
5 Barry Buzan, Ole Wxver, Jaap de Wilde, Security. A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 5. 
6 Ibid., p. 5. 
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themselves.? The problem, however, is whether the levels should be kept separate, and if not 
of how the levels interact and how this interaction can be explained. 
As K. J. Holsti argues, each level of analysis makes a contribution, but each fails to account 
for certain aspects of reality that must be considered. Writing in the 1960s, Holsti argued that 
one could not understand Soviet foreign policy adequately by studying only the attitudes and 
values of its Foreign Minister, nor was it sufficient to analyse Soviet social and economic 
needs. Various aspects, such as ideological considerations, and the general configuration of 
power, influence, domination, and subordination throughout the world needed to be taken into 
account. Holsti wrote that the main characteristics of the external environment are no less 
important than the state's internal development. His conclusion was that all levels of analysis 
would be employed at different times, depending upon the type of problem to be analysed. 8 
Later studies of Soviet and post-Soviet foreign policy, as Wallander points out, reflect such an 
approach. A framework for the explanation of Russian national security and foreign policy, 
she argues, should include theories of regime type, the role of ideology in foreign policy, 
leadership politics, bureaucratic and interest group politics, the external security environment, 
and the constraints and opportunities of the international economy. 
9 
Security 
The level-of-analysis debate in international relations is connected with the debates around 
neorealism, as its `realities' - whatever one chooses to concentrate on - subunits, subsystems 
or systems - are either within states or made up of states. 
The question of security is 
traditionally thought of in terms of the survival of states in an anarchic self-help system. The 
Ibid. 
8 Kalevi J. Holsti, International Politics. A Framework for Analysis. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J: Prentice-Hall, 
1967), quoted in Christer Pursiainen, Russian Foreign Policy and International 
Relations Theory, (Aldershort: 
Ashgate, 2000), p. 86. 
9 Wallander, 'The Sources of Russian Conduct, ' p. 2-3. 
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straightforward conclusion from this was that the survival of a state in such an environment is 
best served by power maximisation, with the military element pre-eminent. 
Such a `narrow' understanding of the security of states, reinforced by the military and nuclear 
agenda of the Cold War, was increasingly challenged by the rise of economic and 
environmental issues in international relations in the 1970s and 1980s. With the end of the 
Cold War new concerns entered the security debate, giving prominence to problems of 
identity, for example, or to transnational crime. Thus the academic argument unfolded 
between those who traditionally gave preference to a narrow definition of security in terms of 
`the threat of the use of force', and those who campaigned for widening the concept of 
security to allow non-military issues to achieve `security status'. While it is beyond the scope 
of this chapter to offer a detailed analysis of the evolution of the security debate, this study 
draws its analytical foundation from the approach developed by Barry Buzan, a self-confessed 
`widener', who nonetheless argued for retaining a distinctively military subfield of traditional 
security, or strategic studies within a wider security studies field. ' 0 In his influential work 
People, States and Fear: an Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War 
Era, Buzan identified five sets of security issues, or as he calls them `sectors' - military, 
political, economic, societal and environmental. The introduction of sectors keeps the scope 
of inquiry to more manageable proportions by reducing the number of variables in play. 
Buzan gives the following definition of these sectors: 
Generally speaking, military security concerns the two-level interplay of the 
armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and states' perceptions of 
each other's intentions. Political security concerns the organizational stability of 
states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. 
Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance and markets 
necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal 
security concerns the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, 
of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and 
10 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: an Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War 
Era, 2nd edn (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991). 
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custom. Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the 
planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human 
enterprises depend. '' 
Furthermore, in this work Buzan develops a security complex theory, which posits the 
existence of regional sub-systems as objects of security analysis and offers an analytical 
framework for dealing with those systems. His interest in regions stems from the widespread 
assumption that in the post-Cold War world international relations will take on a more 
regionalized character. ' 2 The purpose of Buzan's Security Complex theory was, firstly, to 
provide area specialists with the necessary language and concepts, and secondly to offset the 
tendency of power theorists to underplay the importance of the regional level in international 
affairs. Such a tendency, according to Buzan, was particularly exacerbated by the rise of 
neorealism in the late 1970s (e. g. by the publication of Kenneth Waltz's Theory of 
International Politics in 1979, which almost exclusively focused on the power structure on 
the system level). With the end of the Cold War, Buzan argues, it would be reasonable to 
expect that bipolarity at the system level would give way to a more diffuse international 
power structure. ' 3 
Buzan's observation in this respect is that all states in the international system are `enmeshed 
in a global web of security interdependence'. 
14 And as most political and military threats 
travel more easily over a short distance than over long ones, insecurity is always associated 
with proximity. Most states fear their neighbours more than distant powers. The result of such 
reasoning is that security interdependence across the international system 
is far from uniform. 
The normal pattern of security interdependence in a geographically 
diverse, anarchic 
" Ibid, pp. 19-20. 
12 Barry Buzan, Ole Wxver, Jaap de Wilde, Security 
Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 9. 
13 Ibid., p. 1 1. 
'4 Ibid., p. 11. 
A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, London: Lynne 
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international system, according to Buzan's analysis, is one of regionally based clusters, which 
he calls security complexes. The nature of security interdependence is markedly more intense 
among the states inside such a complex than among states outside them. Security complexes, 
then, according to Buzan, are about the relative intensity of interstate relations that lead to 
distinctive regional patterns shaped by both the distribution of power and historical relations 
of amity and enmity. Buzan defines a security complex as "a set of states whose major 
security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems 
cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another". '' The formative dynamics 
and structure of a security complex, according to Buzan, are generated by the states within 
that complex - by their security perceptions of, and interactions with, each other. 
Sticking to neorealist logic, Buzan views security complexes as miniature anarchies. These 
security complexes are durable rather than permanent features of the overall anarchy. Viewing 
the security complexes as subsystems with their own structures and patterns of interaction 
provides a useful benchmark against which to identify and assess changes in the patterns of 
regional security. ' 6 
The logic of security regions, as Buzan emphasises, stems from the fact that international 
security can only be understood in a relational way. International security is mostly about how 
human collectivities relate to each other in terms of perceived threats and vulnerabilities. 
" 
This echoes some of the key writings in security studies, which have stressed relational 
dynamics connected with the security dilemma, power balances, arms races and security 
15 Ibid., p. 12. 
16 Patrick Morgan, M., 'Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders', in Regional Orders. Building 
Security in a New World, ed. by David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (University Park. Pennsylvania: 
The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p. 3 1. 
17 Buzan, Security, pp. 10-11 . 
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regimes. 18 Clearly, little can be said about the security of an isolated object - for instance 
Russia. Its security must be studied in a wider context or contexts. The study of Russian 
security, or any other state within a system or subsystems, can also best be undertaken using a 
multisectoral approach to security, that is combining a range of security sectors, as suggested 
by Buzan and listed above. 
Although the approach assumes some sense of physical proximity, the members of a security 
complex do not necessarily have to be neighbours in a geographical sense. Although the 
concept of security complexes is normally used in the context of regional security studies, 
what is important for the definition of a security complex is an awareness of `security 
interdependence', defined in both a positive and a negative sense. Security complexes can be 
bound together both by rivalry and by shared interests. Thus, as the Polish specialist Wojciech 
Kostecki notes, in defining a security complex one has to have a prior knowledge of a 
distinctive security dynamic, relating specifically to the suggested security complex: a group 
of states whose primary security perceptions and concerns link together sufficiently closely 
that their national securities cannot be reasonably considered apart from one another. ' 9 
Moreover, analysis of a security complex requires constant attention to its relational nature, 
and awareness of the role that the concept of amity-enmity plays in the evolution and 
dynamics of a security complex. What is more, the patterns of amity-enmity originate from a 
variety of sources that cannot simply be reduced to the consequences of the distribution of 
18 Buzan cites among those Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Relations 
(Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1976); Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962); John H. Herz, 'Idealist Internationalism and Security 
Dilemma', World Politics, Vol. 2. No. 2 (1950), pp. 157-180, see ibid, p. 10-11. 
'9 Wojciech Kostecki, Europe After the Cold War. The Security Complex Theory (Warsaw: Institute of Political 
studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, 1996), p. 33; Buzan, People, 
States and Fear, p. 190. 
7 
Chapter 1 
power. 20 A central role in shaping amity-enmity belongs to historical experience and cultural 
interactions. Other factors might include current mutual relations, propaganda policies, and 
opportunities for direct contacts between people, and so on. 2' 
The degrees of amity and enmity within a security complex mark out a range of possible 
models of security interdependence: chaos (where enmity predominates in relations) - 
conflict formations (where conflictual relations are dominant, yet amity is still possible) - 
security regimes (where the set of states cooperate to address their disputes) - and security 
communities - (where disputes among the members are resolved to an extent that no state 
fears any of the others). 22 The idea of amity-enmity patterns is considered by Kostecki to be 
one of the key advantages of the security complex approach, with a huge potential for 
empirical studies, because the concept allows for the inclusion of social and historical 
substance into a framework which otherwise may be very abstract. 23 
Once the regional level is established, it is possible to proceed with establishing a full range 
of layers to make up a comprehensive analytical framework. At the bottom end lies the 
domestic security environment of individual states and societies. Next come regional security 
complexes. Buzan points out that relations among security complexes also comprise a layer 
within the framework, one that becomes important if major changes in the pattern of security 
complexes are underway. At the top end is the higher complex that constitutes the system 
level. 24 
20 Ibid., pp. 189-190. 
21 Kostecki, Europe After the Cold War, p. 45. 
22 Buzan, 1991, People, States and Fear, pp. 189-190,218; see also ibid., p. 45. 
23 Kostecki, Europe After the Cold War, p. 45. 
24 Buzan, Security, p. 14. 
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Before analysing a security complex, one has to have prior knowledge or implicit assumption 
of the complex's existence. As Buzan puts it, security complexes are theoretical constructs 
that the analyst imposes on "reality". The main value of the security complex theory is that it 
draws attention away from the extremes of national and global security and focuses on the 
region, where these two extremes interplay and where most of the action occurs. Security 
complex theory also links studies of internal conditions in states, relations among states of the 
region, and relations among regions, relations between regions and global powers. Ultimately, 
security complex theory can be used to generate definitive scenarios and thus to structure the 
study of, as well as predictions about, possibilities for stability and change. 25 
Cases 
This study presents a case of security interaction within what is identified as the `Russia- 
Central Europe' security complex. The main focus of analysis is the evolution of Russian 
security interaction with the four states of Central Europe (CE) - Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, 
and the Czech Republic. Following the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO), 
the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of Russia and the CE states as independent of the 
old ideological constraints and free from the prescriptive order of Cold 
War bipolarity, their 
consequent interactions can be classified as those of a security complex. 
Buzan's systems 
approach further posits that regions are composed of states 
in an at least partly autonomous 
network of interactions that constrain and shape their behaviour. 
Buzan calls such a condition 
`intense interdependence'. While actors may be cognised of their interdependence, such 
interdependence is not a necessary condition. 
26 David Lake finds that such identification, 
however, does little by way of distinguishing regional from global 
interactions. One way of 
2 Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
26 Buzan, People, States and Fear, p. 192. 
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determining the existence of a regional security complex according to Lake is by stepping 
back from the level of interactions and looking at the sources of the strategic environment that 
underline regional security systems. 27 Lake introduces a concept of externalities that bind the 
sets of interacting states together; these externalities can be both positive (defined as benefits) 
and negative (costs). Lake explains that the actions of each party impose costs upon the 
others, creating a negative externality that binds the relevant states together as a set of 
interacting units. Virtually all salient security actions taken by one state and not solely 
intended to reduce the welfare of a second can be understood as externalities. 28 As Morgan 
suggests, if states are affected in important ways by an externality over some period of time, 
they can be considered a part of the regional security complex, even though not all of them 
are located within the immediate area from which externality originates. 29 In our case, 
examples of such externalities, conceived of as both negative and positive (not necessarily 
having the same effect on all the units within the complex), are the processes of NATO and 
EU enlargement. These strongly affect and define the security dynamics of the Russia-CE 
security complex. Externalities occur only when one state is not a fully consenting party to 
actions initiated by another (or the mechanism of compensation is imperfect); in such a case, 
the welfare of the first state is improved or damaged by the actions of the second without its 
consent. 30 The logic of security dynamics within a security complex is the classic security 
dilemma, when one state prepares to defend itself, or increase its security, it creates a threat, 
and reduces the sense of security for others. 
31 Focusing on externalities, in addition to the 
27 David A Lake, 'Regional Security Complexes: A Systems Approach', in Regional Orders. Building Security, in 
a New World Orders., ed. by Lake, David A, Morgan, 
Patrick M (University Park, Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), pp. 48-49. 
28 Ibid., p. 49. 
29 Morgan, 'Regional Security Complexes and Regional'. 
31 Opcit., p. 51 
31 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Ken Booth, 'The Security Dilemma', in Dilemmas of World Politics. International 
Issues 
in a Changing World, ed. by Baylis, John, N. J. Rengger 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). 
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other attributes of a security complex, helps to clarify the network of interactions in a security 
complex. 
Thus, in the light of the definition of a security complex and the attributes that qualify a 
certain set of states to be analysed as a security complex, we can be reasonably sure that 
Russia-CE constitutes such a region. Going back to Buzan's definition of a security complex 
(mindful of prior knowledge of the regional developments and externalities that are in place) 
we can state that Russia-CE's primary [major] security [perceptions and] concerns are linked 
together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot be realistically [reasonably] 
considered apart from one another. 
With this in mind, the study proceeds with an analysis of the security dynamics within the 
region across the security sectors. The sectors that are closely examined - military-political 
and economic - are chosen for the reason that these are the sectors that are most prominently 
affected in the regional security dynamics, affected both by internal (state level) security and 
by external influences. These sectoral relations are analysed within the context of an 
understanding of the amity-enmity patterns that are in play in the region. As noted above, 
historical experiences and cultural interactions play a big part in these patterns, although 
consequences of external influences are also very important for them. 
This study uses an inductive method of analysing Russian-CE relations on various levels of 
security cooperation with a view to identifying and assessing the changes that are taking place 




As already mentioned in the previous section the focus of this study is Russian relations with 
the CE countries, rather than Russia's relations with Europe as a whole. It is an analysis of 
the changing nature of bilateral security relations and the relative role of the key security 
sectors in determining the security environment in this security complex. As was also touched 
upon above, the Russian-CE security complex cannot be analysed in isolation from its 
external security environment, which affects both the CE states' and Russia's security policies 
and perceptions of each other and wider European security. For a long period of time, 
Russia's relations with the CE states were viewed in Moscow through the prism of NATO 
enlargement, which eventually saw three of the four CE states analysed here joining the 
alliance. NATO enlargement and Russia's reaction to it proved to be one of the key factors 
determining Russian-CE military political relations. The EU and CE states' integration into it 
has also played a vital part in shaping Russia's policy towards the Visegrad states, both 
politically and economically. One other important area which features prominently in 
Russian-Polish relations and which is worth singling out at this point is Russia's Kaliningrad 
region (oblast). Its exclave location -a constant reminder of the complicated past of the 
region and its position wedged between Poland and Lithuania - causes headaches in Moscow, 
but also in the neighbouring states, NATO and the EU. This is a part of Russia - the only one 
that borders with the CE region directly - where the impact of NATO and EU enlargement on 
Russian-Polish relations is being tested in earnest. The way in which Russia and Poland deal 
with the question of sustaining the Kaliningrad region's existence in the rapidly changing 
security environment could be viewed as a `litmus test' for Russia's wider cooperation with 
the CE states and wider Europe. 
12 
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At the same time the domestic environment must be included in the framework. While the CE 
states' internal debates are analysed, it is Russia's evolving security environment and 
Moscow's process of reconciliation and coming to terms with the dramatic changes at home 
and abroad that is crucial. It forms an important part of the context in which Russia's relations 
with the CE states are analysed. 
In the academic literature the four CE states, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, are often referred to as the Visegrad Four. The four states are the epicentre of the 
historic security transformation in Europe, champions of NATO enlargement and front- 
runners in the process of joining the EU. Although the nature of each state's relations with 
Russia through the period under discussion varies significantly, the above characteristics 
impose a substantial commonality. In addition, the four countries share the experience of not 
having been independent states for many years throughout the last two centuries, being 
dominated by stronger powers in Europe. The most recent experience of being under Soviet 
control for almost half of the last century is still very fresh in both public and elite memories, 
significantly affecting their relations with the successor to the Soviet Union - Russia. As we 
shall see then, negative feelings provoked by past experiences and by the agonising evolution 
of Russia's statehood in the post-Cold War period are among the key reasons for problematic 
Russia-CE relations throughout the period under discussion. At the same time, Russian 
relations with the individual CE states vary greatly in terms of intensity and amity-enmity 
patterns. Such variations give the study valuable comparative cases to test general conclusions 
about the condition and direction of Russian-CE relations and the security interdependence of 




This study concentrates on the period between 1991 and 2001. However, where appropriate, 
due note is taken of historical factors and of developments central to the case studies that were 
still evolving at the time of writing. The years 1991-2001 represent a decade of painful 
political and economic transition in both Russia and the CE states. Apart from having to 
address domestic challenges, the elites in these countries had to deal with the question of how 
to proceed with securing their renewed independence. For Russia, the problem was doubly 
complicated: the whole external environment changed, new borders and new neighbours 
emerged, shifting the CE states and the West even further on the mental maps of the Russian 
political elite. Just as the internal upheavals in Russia demanded adjustments in Moscow's 
security and foreign policy, so the evolution of the external environment - CE's bid to `join 
Europe' and the key European institutions' policy in accommodating CE in the decade under 
discussion - also had a profound effect on Russian-CE security relations. On the whole, the 
time period and region allow us to examine the evolution of security interactions as they were 
evolving from the uncertainties and high expectations of the immediate post-Cold War 
euphoria, to the end result of one of the major events in European security during the final 
decade of the last century - NATO enlargement. 
Structure 
Chapter 2 gives a brief outline of the evolution of the European security landscape since the 
end of the Cold War and of the debates over Russia's and CE's place in the evolving 
European security arrangements. The discussion covers Russian, CE and Western academic 
assessments as well as debates among the main Russian political 
forces and policy makers, 
with a particular focus on the evolving Russian perception of 
Central Europe. It also deals 
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with the evolution of the Russian national security debate and the formation of official 
national security and foreign policy concepts and military doctrines. The evolution of Russian 
national security policy is analysed alongside an examination of the main ideas and schools of 
thought. At the same time, the chapter looks at the evolution of the national security and 
foreign policy process. Here, the role of different interest groups and their foreign policy 
priorities is examined, with particular reference to CE. 
Chapters 3 and 4 build upon the main themes identified in the introductory chapters, and 
analyse the actual security and foreign policy relations between Russia and the four CE states. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the military-political aspect of bilateral relations, where the process of 
NATO enlargement and Russia's reaction to it are central elements affecting bilateral 
relations. Chapter 4 analyses the economic ties between Russia and the CE states from 1991 
to 2001. One of the main themes of this chapter is the examination of the role of various 
economic groups in Russian-CE bilateral relations and the effect that the nature of economic 
ties has on the character of political relations and vice versa. Among some of the other key 
themes of this chapter are the effect of EU enlargement on Russian-CE economic relations 
and the role of the CE region in Russia-EU relations. Within this area, the problem of 
Kaliningrad and the role of Poland are also examined. 
The concluding chapter re-examines the empirical evidence from the preceding chapters from 
the theoretical perspective set out previously. This chapter evaluates whether a shift has taken 
place in the pattern of amity-enmity in Russian-CE relations within the ten years under 
discussion. If a shift has occurred, can we talk about a marked change in the nature of security 




Overall, this study contributes two important findings. Firstly, it adds empirical evidence to 
the debates on Russian national security and foreign policy. It also adds empirical evidence to 
the study of Russian-CE relations, which are lacking in existing contemporary literature on 
Russian regional and European foreign and national security policies. Secondly, it contributes 
important new cases to the literature exploring regional security complexes, and the literature 
looking at the nature of the domestic-international connection. 
Note on methods and sources 
The first type of source used was the vast secondary literature, mainly Western (Anglo- 
American) academic writing, dealing both with general problems of security in Europe and 
specifically with Russian foreign policy and national security. Primary sources used in this 
study included a broad array of Russian academic journals, newspapers and periodicals as 
well as Russian language books, including memoirs, and selected speeches and studies by 
influential specialists, top officials, and researchers affiliated with significant economic actors 
(such as oil and gas companies). A great deal of material was sourced from the Internet, from 
the websites of the key Russian research centres, online libraries, and newspapers. Various of 
these sources were obtained during research trips to Moscow in 1999 and 2000. Material 
relating to CE perspectives was also studied. In many cases, particular statements and reports 
by the Russian side were counter-checked using CE sources, mostly originals translated into 
English, available from the United States Government Foreign Broadcast Information Service 
(FBIS). 
Interviews with well-informed academics, specialising both in general problems of Russian 
foreign policy and national security, as well those with a clearer focus on Central Europe, 
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formed another type of primary source material for this study. Three international affairs 
institutes in Moscow were approached and interviews conducted in them. Discussions were 
held in the Institute of Europe, the Institute of International Economic and Political Research, 
IMEPI (formerly known as the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System), the 
Moscow centre of the Institute for EastWest Studies, and with a number of scholars from 
Moscow State Institute of International Affairs (MGIMO). Those interviewed occupied a 
variety of intellectual and ideological standpoints - from the more conservative `nostalgic' 
attitudes of those interviewed at the IMEPI, to the more liberal views of those from the 
Institute of Europe. One other important point that was taken into account is the international 
environment at the time of the interviews. The two research trips took place in May 1999 and 
April-May 2000. The events of spring 1999 (NATO enlargement and war in Kosovo) were 
clearly reflected in the analysis offered by those interviewed and often informed their views 
on Russian foreign policy conduct towards CE. All this assisted in forming a sharper picture 
of the ongoing Russian foreign policy debate. 
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European Security, Central Europe and Russian National Security 
Thinking and Policy since 1991 
The evolution of Russian national security and foreign policy in the post-Soviet era is a 
subject that has generated a wealth of research and literature both in Russia and abroad. ' 
Although the subject is fairly well-analysed, a brief review of the changes which have taken 
place in Russian foreign and national security policy will be provided here in order to set the 
context in which Russia-CE relations have evolved during the last decade. 
Since 1991 Russian foreign policy has passed through a number of stages. These stages have 
been shaped by domestic political and economic developments and by changes in Russia's 
external environment. At the same time, the boundaries between these stages are not clear-cut 
and one cannot definitively determine the end of one stage and the beginning of another. The 
boundaries between stages sometimes reflect epochal changes in Russia's internal 
environment, and decisive changes in political configurations. Yet periodisation of Russian 
foreign policy evolution does not always coincide with `visible' changes in Russian internal 
politics: it can correspond with points in the evolution of Russian statehood, and the 
composition of political forces, or the dominance of a set of ideas and their co-option into 
state policy. As Andrey Kortunov observed, "Depending on peculiar circumstances at each 
1 The following is a selection of the general literature on Russian foreign and security policy that has appeared in 
the last decade: Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison and Margot Light, Internal Factors in Russian Foreign 
Policy (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Celeste A. Wallander (ed. ) The Sources of 
Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War, (Boulder, Colo. Oxford: Westview, 1996); Iver B. Neumann, Russia 
and the Idea of Europe. A Study in Identity and International Relations (London and New York: Routledge, 
1996); Andrei Kortunov, Contemporary Russia: National Interests and Emerging Foreign Policy Perceptions 
(Köln: Bundesinstitut, 1996); Mette Skak, From Empire to Anarchy. Postcommunist Foreign Policy and 
International Relations (London: Hurst & Company, 1996); Michael Mandelbaum (ed. ) The New Russian 
Foreign Policy (New York: A Council on Foreign Relations Book, 1998); Aleksei Arbatov, 'Natsional'naya 
Ideya i Natsional'naya Bezopasnost', MEiMO, No. 5 (1998), pp. 5-21; Alexei G. Arbatov, Karl Kaiser and 
Robert Legvold, Russia and the West (Armonk, New York, London: M. E. Sharp for EastWest Institute, 1999); 
Mark Webber (ed. ), Russia and Europe: Conflict or Cooperation? (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press 
Ltd, 2000); Mike Bowker, Cameron Ross (eds. ), Russia After the Cold War (Harlow: Longman, 2000); Vadim 
Makarenko, Kto Soyuzniki Rossii? Mental'nost' i Geopolitika: Paradoksy Politiki Bezopasnosti Rossii (Moscow: 
STRADIZ, 2000); Allen C. Lynch. 'The Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy in the 1990s', The Journal of 
Communist Studies and Transition Politics, December (2001), 161-182; Igor S. Ivanov, The New Russian 
Diplomacy (Washington, D. C: The Nixon Center and Brookings Institution Press, 2002): Bobo Lo, Russian 




stage of internal Russian evolution, Russian foreign policy and Russian perception of national 
interests went in a specific direction. " The policies that followed as a result "became 
associated with particular influential government bodies, interest groups, and individual 
policy makers, each of them leaving an inimitable imprint on Russian international stature and 
behaviour". 2 
The subsequent chapters analyse Russia's relations with CE within the framework of four 
such periods: 
" The first period from 1991 to 1993 - was a period characterised by chaos in Russian 
foreign policy following the demise of the Cold War order and by unqualified 
Westernism on Moscow's part was mirrored by neglect of relations with the former 
Soviet republics and bloc states. 
" The second period lasted from 1994 to 1997. It was defined by a shift in Russian 
foreign policy thinking and making towards `presidential foreign policy', the 
abandoning of a `romantic' pro-Western orientation and the emergence of a relative 
national consensus on Russian foreign policy direction and national interests. 
9 The third period, from 1998 to 1999, witnessed a deepening of the Russian economic 
crisis, further alienation from the West provoked by NATO enlargement, Russia's war 
in Chechnya, war in Kosovo and overall stagnation in Russia's relations with the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
" The final, fourth period, from 2000 to 2001, began with the first change of head of 
state in post-Soviet history. It was characterised by the re-establishment of ties with 
the West and all-round improvement and stabilisation of the Russian economic and 
political environment. 
2 Andrey Kortunov, 'Russian National Interests: The State of Discussion', in Russia's Place in Europe. A Security 
Debate, ed. by Spillmann, Kurt R., and Andreas Wenger (Bern: Peter Lang, 1999), p. 25. 
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The evolution of Russian foreign policy thinking in the early stages was accompanied by a 
flowering of public debate on the direction of the state's foreign policy and on what 
constitutes its national interests. Distinctive views and ideologies appeared, as well as variants 
of traditional Russian schools of thought. 3 The debate at the early stages was marked by a 
"spreading lack of orientation and a growing sense of inferiority" amongst the Russian 
political elite. 4 The search for a new Russian statehood and Russian identity proved to be a 
major challenge. The outcome of the conflict of ideas had a major impact on the subsequent 
formation of Russia's policies, both internal and external. It was felt important to resolve this 
issue because of the perception that national identity is closely linked to ideas about statehood 
and sovereignty. 5 It was expected that establishing what identity the new Russia was to 
construct, would allow Russia to build a new stable state with a clear sense of direction and 
purpose. This would have major implications for the formulation of national interests and 
constructing a framework for the state's relations with the world. However, complications 
arose due in part to the fact that Russia with its new borders and new neighbours had no 
history of being a nation state, and no authoritative history of foreign relations upon which to 
build its new role and identity. 6 Therefore it is not surprising that, as one observer noted, 
many gained the impression that the Russian nation was in a stage of neurotic search of 
identity. 
3A variety of terms are used by analysts to distinguish these views. However, they are commonly placed within 
four categories: Westernisers/Atlanticist; Slavophiles/Eurasians; Pragmatic 
Nationalists/Statists 
(Derzhavniki/Pochvenniki); Post-Imperialist/Nationalist/Communists; see also Margot Light, "Foreign Policy 
Thinking", in Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison, Margot Light, 1996, Internal Factors in Russian 
Foreign Policy, endnote 2, p. 88. 
40P. cit., p. 364. 
5 Lisbeth Aggestam, Role Conceptions and The Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy, Paper Presented at the 
Third Pan-European International Relations Conference and Joint Meeting of the ECPR and the ISA, Vienna, 
Austria, 16-19 September, 1998, p. 4. 
6 James Richter, "Russian Foreign Policy and the Politics of National Identity", in Celeste A. Wallender, 
1996. 
(ed. ), The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War, p. 69 
7 Olga Alexandrova, p. 364. 
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As Peter Katzenstein has noted, the process of identity construction is typically explicitly 
political and pits conflicting actors against each other. 8 It is important to note that national 
identity construction is subject to the dual influence of both internal and external forces. A 
state's current position in the world, and the state's interaction with different social 
environments, both domestic and international, have an effect on its identity. 9 As Margot 
Light points out, while on one level the question of identity is an abstract problem which may 
seem to have little bearing on policy, in the post-Soviet context it was closely related both to 
views about Russia's relations with the external world and to domestic policy, particularly in 
relation to the applicability to Russia of Western models of democracy and market 
economy. 10 This is illustrated by the way in which issues of national identity, national 
interests, and Russia's foreign policy priorities came to the fore in the Russian domestic 
political debates of the early and mid-1990s. " 
The problem of Russia's civilisational belonging has been an underlying theme for all schools 
of thought that have entered the debate on Russia's national identity. One of the key elements 
in the debate has been the question of Russia's relations with Europe. An existential 
ambivalence - whether Russia is a part of Europe or apart from Europe - has, according to the 
Russian international relations specialist Vladimir Baranovsky, marked Russia's attitudes to 
Europe for centuries: 
The whole history of Russia is cast in this contradictory feeling: its own 
centuries-long territorial expansion towards Europe - and memories of invasions 
from Europe; all the tormented searching of Russian sociological thought with its 
European-oriented `Westernism' - and the anti-European zeal of both the 
Orthodox church and the communist identity as negation of individualism. The 
8 Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security" in Peter J. Katzenstein, 
(ed. ), 1996, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, p. 6. 
9 Ibid., p. 24; On the question how international and domestic environments shape state identities see Alexander 
Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory", International Organization, 41,3, 
(1987), pp. 335-70; Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics", International Organization, 46,2, (1992), 391-425; Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation 
and the International State, " American Political Science Review, 88,2, (1994), pp. 
384-96; Iver Neumann, 
"Identity and Security", Journal of Peace Research, 29,2, (1992), pp. 221-26. 
10 Margot Light, "Foreign Policy Thinking", pp. 37-38. 
11 Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, "Democratization and Russian Foreign Policy", p. 540. 
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300-year-old record of social experiment from Peter the Great to this day is the 
most painful manifestation of this paradox, when models imported from the West (such as communism until recently or `unrestrained' capitalism nowadays) 
evolved into such grotesque forms that even wider rifts opened between Russia 
and Europe. ' 2 
As Baranovsky observes, Europe has reciprocated with similar ambiguities: Russia, being a 
remote and almost exotic peripheral land with a different lifestyle, fascinated and alienated 
the Europeans; its vast territory put Russia in a unique position in Europe and generated fears 
of its expansionism; possessing enormous resources inspired ideas of Russia becoming 
Europe's most important component - were it not for its anachronistic and corrupted 
economic system, incompatible with European ways of doing business; its impressive military 
capability has been traditionally perceived as threatening Europe, although, eventually, 
redirecting other threats away from Europe and absorbing them. This ambivalence, with its 
clash of perceptions and expectations, persists to today in Russia's relations with Europe and 
informs Russia's debate on its national identity and relations with the wider world. ' 3A 
widespread view amongst the Russian elite concerning Russian-European relations after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union is that the Cold War logic of `keeping the Russians out' seems to 
have mutated in Europe into a double-track policy: keeping the Russians from becoming 
disengaged, without, however, letting them in. 14 This perception of the European logic by 
many in Russia, has become a central argument against `whole-hearted' Westernism in the 
style of the early days of Russian foreign policy that was inspired by the revolutionary 
atmosphere generated by the demise of the Soviet Empire. 
12 Vladimir Baranovsky, 'Russia: a Part of Europe or Apart from Europe? ', International Affairs, Vol. 76. No. 3 
(July 2000), p. 445; For a comprehensive account of the argument as it has evolved historically see 
lver B. 
Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe (Routledge: 1996); see also Iver B. Neumann, "The Geopolitics of 
Delineating `Russia' and `Europe': The Creation of the `Other' in European and Russian Tradition", in Ola 
Tunander, Pavel Baev and Victoria Ingrid Einagel (eds. ), Geopolitics and Post- Wall Europe: Security, Territory 
and Identity, (PRIO: 1997): A. Kara-Murza, "Mezhdu 
Evraziei i Aziopoi" Inoe: Khrestomati: Ya Novogo 
Rossiiskogo Samosoznaniya, 1995, unpaginated website <http: //russ. ru/antolog/inoe/krmr32. htm/krmr32. htm>: 
Elgiz Pozdnyakov, "The Soviet Union: The Problem of Coming Back to European Civilisation", in Paradigms: 
The Kent Journal of International Relations, 5,1/2, (1992), pp. 45-57. 
13 Baranovsky, "Russia: a Part of Europe or Apart from Europe? " pp. 445-446. 
14 Ibid., p. 446 
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Research on contemporary Russian foreign policy has generated a number of works 
describing and analysing domestic debates on foreign policy issues, categorising various 
political, ideological and philosophical schools of thought that have had a significant bearing 
on the formation of Russian foreign policy. The following discussion will briefly describe the 
alternative views on Russian foreign and security policy and review their perception of the 
place of CE in the Russian national interest. 
`Atlanticists' (or Westernisers) dominated the Russian political scene during the first year 
following the break-up of the Soviet Union. The new Yeltsin administration was faced with 
the immediate task of state building, establishing a new Russian identity and finding a 
`worthy place in the world community'. Given the kind of economy and polity the Russian 
authorities hoped to build, thus natural orientation was towards Europe and the West. As 
Yeltsin's political career sprang out of direct opposition to Gorbachev, the new Russian 
leadership was compelled to adopt an even more radical position to contrast with the New 
Political Thinking. To win over more support from the West than Gorbachev had enjoyed, 
Yeltsin's team advocated even closer association with the West in the security realm, even 
extending to Russia's membership in NATO. 15 
The proponents of Westernism advocated Russia's "return to Europe", of which it was a part 
because of its essentially European-Christian civilisation. Russia embarked on a path of 
building a society based on a European (Western) system of values. Therefore, they claimed, 
Russia shared a common identity with the United States and the countries of Western 
Europe. ' 6 The main advocates of this line were officials of the Foreign Affairs and Finance 
Ministries of the Russian Federation, the then Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and Prime 
5 Michael McFaul, 'Revolutionary Ideas, State Interests, and Russian Foreign Policy', in Political Culture and 
Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. by Vladimir Tismaneanu (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 
Inc, 1995). 
16 James Richter, "Russian Foreign Policy and the Politics of National Identity", p. 77. 
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Minister Yegor Gaidar, a large portion of the intellectual elite, and journalists, independent 
trades unions, and new liberal parties united under the umbrella movement Democratic Russia 
(and from 1993 its successor Russia 's Choice) party under the leadership of Gaidar. The main 
purpose of a new direction in Russia's foreign policy, in Kozyrev's words, was: 
to guarantee the entry into the world community [... ] and thereby to help meet 
the internal needs of Russia. [... ] The developed countries of the West are 
Russia's natural allies. It is time finally to say that we are neither adversary 
nor poor little brothers who are following the orders of a rich and malevolent 
West intending to buy Russia. " 
Westernisers argued that Russia should stop worrying about external threats to its security and 
concentrate on resolving internal problems of economic reform and the political transition to 
democracy. Dismissing concerns about Russia's loss of its status as a great power, Kozyrev 
claimed that such concerns were nothing more than a consequence of "imperial inertia" 18 and 
were essentially a symptom of a deeply rooted inferiority complex that resulted from Soviet 
isolation and its obsession with military superiority. ' 9 In the new post-Cold War world order 
cooperation was to become the main tool for resolving international disputes. Therefore, 
Russia should be establishing the institutions that were going to be demanded by such a 
system and should stop worrying about its great power status. 20 As Kozyrev repeatedly 
argued, in the new world order the greatness of a nation was no longer determined by the size 
of its empire, but instead by the general standard of living of its population. Once this simple 
fact was acknowledged - Russia's new national interest as a "normal great power" would 
clearly emerge. 21 
Although domestic problems were identified as the main threat to Russia's security, 
Westernisers admitted the existence of some external threats emanating from Third World 
17 A. Kozyrev, Izvestia, 2 January 1992, quoted in Iver Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe, p. 181. 
18 Quoted in Allison K Stanger, "The Impact of Russia's Constitutional Crisis on Yeltsin's Foreign Policy" 
in 
Russia and Eastern Europe After the Communism: The Search 
for A New Political, Economic, and Security 
S, stems, ed. by Michael Kraus and Ronald D. Liebowitz 
(eds. ) (Boulder, Colo., Oxford: Westview, 1996). p. 298 
19 Cited in Andrei P. Tsygankov, "From International Institutionalism to Revolutionary Expansionism: The 
Foreign Policy Discourse of Contemporary Russia", Mershon International Studies Review, 41, 
(1997), p. 261. 
'0 Ibid., p. 261. 
21 Allison K. Stanger, "The Impact of Russia's Constitutional Crisis on Yeltsin's Foreign 
Policy", p. 299. 
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states. However, these threats could be successfully dealt with through international 
institutions. The key foreign policy objective for Russia should be: 
to prepare the ground for raising itself from the periphery to the core of the world economy and for joining the Group of Seven. This aim cannot be achieved quickl}', either by relying on the military and primarily nuclear assets of the USSR or by 
restoring a new imperial entity with Russia at its core. It can only be accomplished through natural economic processes and in the first instance through deep and 
genuine economic, social and political reforms. Russia faces a difficult choice. Her 
ambitions to assume the role of a new centre of the CIS, connected with a 
commitment to assuming the crippling financial burden of the former USSR, makes the achievement of this objective much more difficult if not impossible. Russia 
cannot afford to pay an exorbitant price to keep the symbolic integrity of the CIS 
and also to keep the military-industrial complex afloat. This would shut down any 
prospect for Russia of raising herself from the periphery to the core of global development, with the result of a national disaster. 22 
Russia's initial pro-Western bias was reflected in the deficit of attention that Central Europe 
received in official foreign policy. The question of how to link CE to Russian security policy 
was not on the agenda. Sergey Karaganov, a supporter of the initial Russian foreign policy 
course wrote: 
The military withdrawal from East Central Europe has done away with the posture 
of direct military confrontation, which was generally useless and counterproductive. 
It was useless because there was no threat or possibility of a Western conventional 
attack and the buffer zone was no protection against nuclear weapons - nor was 
there any Western intention to use such weapons. It was counterproductive because 
it solidified the Western front and fuelled the arms race in the West, and thus put 
additional pressure on an already ineffective Soviet economic system whilst 
strengthening the militarists and conservatives in the ruling Soviet elite. 23 
This was a complete departure from the Soviet assessment of the WTO as a buffer zone and 
the traditional Soviet policy of forward defence. Once a crucial part of the Soviet defence 
system, the "buffer" states of Central Europe faded from the realm of pressing concerns for 
Russian foreign policy. As Alex Pravda has observed, "Developing relations with Eastern 
Europe appeared to Moscow as a necessary if somewhat distant priority. , 24 Yeltsin himself 
22 Andrei V. Zagorski, Anatoly A. Zlobin, Sergei V. Solodovnik, Mark A. Khroustalev, After the Disintegration 
of the Soviet Union: Russia in a New World, Report of the Centre of International Studies, Moscow State 
Institute of International Studies, (MGIMO), Moscow, February 1992, p. 10 
23 Quoted in Wojtek Lamentowiz, 'Russia and East-Central Europe: Strategic Options', in Russia in Europe. The 
Emerging Security Agenda, ed. by Vladimir Baranovsky (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1997). 
24 Alex Pravda, "Relations with Central- and South-Eastern Europe", in Russia and Europe: an End to 
Confrontation?, ed. by Neil Malcolm (London: Pinter Publishers Ltd., for RITA, 1994), p. 144. 
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occasionally mentioned Central Europe and the importance of fostering good relations with 
the region in its own right. 25 As will be seen in the following chapter, although Russia signed 
state treaties with the CE states in 1992-94, relations between the two sides did not progress 
beyond consultations on debt settlements and troop withdrawal. 
However, a new geopolitical situation, and a number of domestic and international 
developments led to a crisis in the `Westernisers' camp and a shift towards more traditional 
strategic concepts. The critics of the Russian government pointed out that Moscow's 
unconditional Westernism was not met with similar enthusiasm from the West: it was not 
responsive to Russia's demands for large-scale economic assistance, and Russia's appeals for 
membership of Western economic and military-political institutions were left unanswered. 
Moreover, opponents of the Kozyrev policy complained that the West ignored Russia's 
concerns with regard to important security issues - the speed and conditions of Russian troop 
withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe, national minorities' rights in the `near abroad', 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia, NATO expansion, and Moscow's proposals to turn the 
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) into an effective security 
organisation. Increasingly more and more Russians came to believe that Kozyrev's uncritical 
pro-Western policy not only reflected the absence of a clear conception of Russia's national 
interests, but had also led to a number of humiliating concessions to the US in the vain hope 
of being admitted into the ranks of the advanced nations. Dissatisfaction with what was seen 
as "patronising arrogance" in the way the US was treating Russia helped to consolidate 
Moscow elites' opposition to Kozyrev's foreign policy. As Margot Light observed, "Western 
policy toward the Russian Federation was, in many respects, inadequate and this affected the 
debate on Russian foreign policy. "26 Similarly, Martin Walker, in his assessment of Russia's 
initial foreign policy, noted, "One of the world's undisputed great powers temporarily 
I' Diplomaticheskii Vestnik, Nos. 4-5,1992, pp. 79-79, quoted ibid. 
26 Margot Light, "Foreign Policy Thinking" in Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, ed. by Malcolm, Neil, 
Alex Pravda, Roy Allison and Margot Light (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 85. 
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subordinated its foreign and domestic policies to the West's capricious preferences. This state 
of affairs was never likely to last long, and was of dubious benefit to Russia and the West 
alike. "27 
The Yeltsin-Kozyrev pro-Western policy evoked a painful reaction from many Russian 
intellectuals and politicians, who embarked on an elaboration of alternative concepts of 
security and foreign policy. By the end of 1992 the Yeltsin leadership policies led to an 
unusual coming together of opposition forces in condemnation of the official foreign policy. 
On 10 March 1992, Sovetskaya Rossiya published a "Declaration of Principles" signed by a 
number of left- and right- wing parties and movements, amongst which were the Russian 
[Rossiiskii]28 all-People's Union, the Russian [Rossiiskii] People's Assembly, the Russian 
Communist Workers' Party, the `Otchizna' Movement and many others. Their criticism of the 
government and its policies was strong and direct: 
Responsibility for what is happening [the crisis] lies first and foremost with the 
ruling circles of the Russian Federation, which once again are carrying out dubious 
experiments on the people. An antipopular government has entirely subordinated 
Russia's national interests to world reaction - the chief architect of the USSR's 
collapse. 29 
As pressure on Kozyrev was increasing, his position and that of other Westernisers was 
further undermined by the defection of many representatives of the democratic current who 
switched to a neo-conservative position, to constitute a new strand - Pragmatic Nationalism. 
30 
After the strong showing of nationalist and conservative forces in the 1993 parliamentary 
elections, the Russian government was forced to modify its foreign policy tack to reflect the 
political mood of the time. Although `monolithic and absolutist' Marxism-Leninism did not 
27 Martin Walker, 'Russia and the West: What Is to Be Done Now? ', World Policy Journal, 1 1.1 (1994), p. 1 
28 There is a difference in meaning of `Russian' as belonging to or of Russian ethnicity - Russkii, and `Russian' 
as a collective world to denote belonging to the Russian Federation - Rossiiskii. 
29 Sovetskaya Rossiya, in Russian 10 March 1992, p. 1, (FBIS-SOV-92-054,19 March 92, pp. 38-40) 
30 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 5 March 1994; The phenomenon of the transition of liberal Westernisers into the ranks 
of anti-Westernisers was relatively frequent, this happened quite often 




re-enter the official discourse, neo-imperialist tendencies appeared in Russian foreign policy. 
These were notably present in Russia's re-discovery of the former Soviet republics as an area 
of vital national interest. This tendency in Russian foreign policy was supplemented by a 
"quasi-ideological melange of nationalism, pan-Slavism, `Eurasianism', and Western-style 
neo-realism". 31 The starting point of the blend of these ideas was that "Russia was and 
continues to be a great power". The pronouncement could be heard now in Yeltsin's official 
statements: Russia should rid itself of the "anti-imperialist syndrome" and not "shy away 
from defending our own interests", even if such actions would be criticised as "imperialist". 32 
One of the strongest supporters of the new foreign policy line in the presidential 
administration was Sergey Stankevich, who saw Russia's mission in the world as one of 
initiating and supporting a multilateral dialogue of cultures, civilisations and states, since 
Russia was "by nature dialogical". 33 In an article in Izvestiya, Stankevich maintained that: 
We must not be eager to dispense with the [status] of world power. [... ] Unlike empire 
power means concentrating on oneself, renouncing expansion, and mobilising internal 
forces and resources to bring about economic and cultural recovery, to bring about 
civilised breakthrough to the level of the great power. 34 
Proponents of the new, balanced foreign policy argued that Europe and the West were 
important for Russia's national interests, since it was where the credits, aid and advanced 
technology were. 35 However, the basis for engaging in cooperation with the West, and with 
the US in particular, should be absolute equality. Kozyrev was criticised for having pursued 
policies that made too many concessions to the West. Rather than putting an emphasis on 
common values, Russia's cooperation with the West should be pursued on the 
basis of 
common interests. Russia should not disregard the advantageous position 
it possessed and 
should adopt proactive polices in the adjacent territories to advance 
its national interests. 
31 Hannes Adomeit, 'Russia as a 'Great Power' in World Affairs: Images and Reality', International 
Affairs, Vol. 
71. No. 1 (1995), p. 45. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Iver Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe, p. 181. 
34 Izvestiya, 8 July 1992, Morning Edition, p. 3. 
3' Iver. Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe, p. 181. 
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Russia's initial period of `unqualified Westernism'36 or, in the words of Kozyrev's outspoken 
critic Vladimir Lukin - `romantic masochism'37 came to an end by late 1992- early 1993. 
Kozyrev, having retreated from some of his earlier convictions, admitted: 
we must abandon certain illusions, [... ] Some people in the West have indeed 
been daydreaming that partnership can be developed with Russia on the principle 
that "if the Russians are good, they must follow us in everything. " [... ] the Russian Federation is condemned to be a great power - aggressive and threatening 
under the Communists and nationalists, peaceful and prosperous under the democrats. But a great power nonetheless! Naturally [... ] it cannot be a junior 
partner but only an equal partner. [... ] partnership based on common values and 
even sympathies does not mean renouncing a firm or aggressive policy of 
upholding your own national interests. 38 
By mid-1992 the issue of foreign policy and national security became more and more a 
subject of political clashes, and also became an issue intertwined with general debates about 
domestic policies. The Supreme Soviet argued that the Foreign Ministry lacked a clear 
"foreign policy concept" -a guiding framework, and called upon Kozyrev to develop such a 
framework. 39 Having resisted from the start, Kozyrev seemed to have adapted to the new 
balance of power, and he reluctantly agreed to develop the concept. Assigning the task of 
coordinating foreign policy to the Foreign Policy Commission of the Russian Federation 
Security Council, the presidential decree of June 1992 charged the Foreign Ministry with 
responsibility of presenting a unified foreign policy to the world. This move might have been 
designed to keep Kozyrev in his job in the wake of increased criticism. However, his personal 
position was progressively weakened. Yuri Skokov's appointment to the post of Secretary of 
the Security Council was a clear signal of the shift in Yeltsin's foreign policy orientation. 
40 
36 Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison and Margot Light, Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, 
(RI IA: 1996), p. 21. 
37 Cited in William Park, "A New Russia in a New Europe: Still Back to the Future? " in W. Park and G. Wyn 
Rees, Rethinking Security in Post Cold War Europe, (Longman: 1998), p. 100. Vladimir Lukin was former 
Russia's ambassador to the United States, and presently State Duma deputy, member of 
Grigorii Yavlinsky's 
centrist right-wing Yabloko party. 
38 Izvestia, in Russian, 11 March 1994, p. 3. (FBIS-SOV-94-048 11 March 1993, p. 8) 
39 Allison K. Stanger, "The Impact of Russia's Constitutional Crisis on Yeltsin's Foreign Policy", p. 300 
40 Skokov was an experienced bureaucrat, who served as 
first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the 
Russian Federation in 1990-91, who could rely on his personal connections within the Soviet military-industrial 
complex, out of which he had emerged. 
It was under his tenure that the Council took the decision to create a new 
Ministry of the Commonwealth Affairs, to take away the control over near abroad policies 




The concept of national interest did not officially play a role in Soviet foreign policy, neither 
was it normally taken on board by adherents of the liberal or Westernisers' camp as the 
concept is normally associated with Realist or geopolitical thinking. But as the shift in 
Russian foreign policy became more apparent, identifying Russia's national interests also 
became one of the key issues of the debate. As Wolfram Hanrieder pointed out, such a "large 
concept" as national interest certainly is, by its very nature is a highly contested one: "[It] 
attains its prominence from sustained diplomatic use, not by virtue of the theoretical invitation 
or analytical manipulation. " The ambiguity of this concept may result from the fact that it is 
"not theoretical but political, abstract, imposed on diplomatic parlance and the public debate 
by the makers and not the observers of historical events". 41 As the debate on Russian foreign 
policy took the centre stage of Russian domestic political struggle in 1992-1993, various 
political forces employed the concept to support their arguments. The context in which the 
first Russian foreign policy concept appeared reflects this process. The first draft of the 
Russian foreign policy concept was published in January 1993 and the final version in 
November 1993. After discussions involving representatives of the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs, Foreign Economic Relations, and Defence, the intelligence service and the Security 
Council, the draft was sent to Parliament and finally confirmed by President Yeltsin in April 
1993.42 This heralded a new, second stage in the Russian foreign policy and national security 
debate and marked a general shift towards Pragmatic Nationalism across the political 
spectrum. 43 
41 Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1989) quoted in Mary M. McKenzie and Peter H. Loedel, The Promise and Reality of 
European Security Cooperation. States, Interests, and Institutions (Westport, London: PRAEGER, 1998). p. 39. 
42 Margot Light, "Foreign Policy Thinking", p. 61 
43 The term `Pragmatic Nationalism' is used to describe those political forces which are often called `statists' and 
`derzhavniki. ' The reason for such generalisation is that although differences exist between the two, they are 
similar in their focus on Russia's great power status and Eurasian identity. However, derzhavniki differ from 
statists in their stronger desire to restore a Union by any means, including military force. Their views are more 
strongly ethnic in their definition of Russian identity. See Celeste A. Wallander, The Russian National Security 
Concept: A Liberal-Statist Synthesis, Program on New Approaches Russian Security Policy Memo 
Series, Memo No. 30, July 1998, unpaginated website 
<http: //www. fas. harvard. edu/-ponars/POLICY%20MEMOS/Wallander3O. html>, accessed 3 November 1998 
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The foreign policy doctrine was a clear manifestation of the shift that had occurred in foreign 
policy thinking. It emphasised that Russia's foreign policy course must be in line with its 
fundamental national interests: preserving the state's sovereignty, independence, and 
territorial integrity; consolidating its security in all directions; reviving Russia as a democratic 
free country; ensuring favourable conditions for shaping an effective market economy to 
match the status of a great power; incorporating the Russian Federation into the world 
community; and exercising Russia's responsibility as a great power for the maintenance of 
global and regional stability. 44 Managing relations with the near abroad was now presented as 
one of the most important tasks of foreign policy. The main elements should be settlement 
and prevention of conflicts within the CIS, protection of its external borders, cooperation in 
key military-political areas, and ensuring individual and minority rights (e. g. of ethnic 
Russians). 45 
Given the deep fragmentation and polarisation of Russian politics at the time, one has to view 
the appearance of the foreign policy concept as a sign of emerging consensus on Russian 
national interests and foreign policy objectives with a degree of scepticism. In the highly 
fluid, unsettled and chaotic environment of that time, the appearance of the first such foreign 
policy document (and even subsequent ones) was the result of a compromise between the 
government and its opponents: a "one-size-fits-all" document, taking into account concerns 
over the excessive pro-Western bias of the official line, yet not discounting the direction 
altogether. As Bobo Lo observed in his study of Russian foreign policy, major foreign policy 
statements like the Foreign Policy Concept have become the spiritual successor to the USSR's 
Five-Year Plan: even though the latter focused on socio-economic priorities, the similarities 
44 "Basic Content of the Draft Concept of the Russian Federation's Foreign Policy", Rossiyskiye Vesti, 3 




are striking. 46 First, like the Five-Year Plan, the Foreign Policy Concept is a long-term 
`strategic' document intended to provide a conceptual framework within which policy is 
formulated and implemented. Second, it reflects the political realities and mood of its time - if 
it is misleading as a guide to action, it is nevertheless useful in pointing to some of the 
pressures and influences on the policy-making process. Third, and this is the most 
underestimated aspect, such statements are to a large extent meant to create an alternative 
reality that is largely divorced from the true state of affairs: some of this is by design, to paint 
the situation as better than it is, but part of it is also genuinely self-delusionary, "a case of 
worthy intentions out of touch with reality". 47 Nevertheless, as Sherman Garnett argues, such 
grand foreign policy statements are worth studying: although they are far removed from 
reality and although the practice of Russian foreign policy is far less consistent than the 
concepts might suggest, such documents are an important guide to the perceptions of Russian 
foreign-policy elites. 48 
In relation to Central/Eastern Europe, the strategic task, according to the concept, was to avert 
its becoming a cordon sanitaire between Russia and the West: 
At present a strategic task is to prevent the attempts to turn Eastern Europe into a kind 
of buffer that would isolate us from the West. On the other hand, the quite tangible 
attempts of Western powers to force Russia out of Eastern Europe must not be 
allowed to succeed. This is an accomplishable task, considering the fact that East 
European countries, despite their noticeable and somewhat artificial endeavours to 
distance themselves from Russia politically, remain oriented to Russia and other CIS 
members in economic, cultural and humanitarian terms. 
49 
Russia's view of CE as reflected in the Foreign Policy Concept gives an interesting 
insight 
into Moscow's newly-found "consensus" on the subject. It is also one that is filled with 
46 Bobo Lo, Russian Foreign Policy in Post-Soviet Era. Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking 
(Basingstoke and New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 67-68. 
47 Ibid., p. 68. 
48 Sherman W. Garnett, 'Europe's Crossroads: Russia and the West in the New Borderlands', 
in The New Russian 
Foreign Policy, ed. by Michael Mendelbaum (New Yorkw: A Council on 
Foreign Relations Book, 1998), p. 68. 
49 "Basic Content of the Draft Concept of the Russian Federation's Foreign 
Policy", Rossiyskiive Vesti, 3 
December 1992, p. 2 
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contradictions, demonstrating a deep degree of misjudgements and lapses into old views of 
the region. The Concept clearly marks the region as one of Russia's spheres of interests, 
which is, according to the document, contested by the West. The Concept also, in a way 
reminiscent of the Soviet period, treats the region as an object, as a passive entity. It pictures 
CE's attempts to distance itself from Russia as temporary and `artificial', because its long- 
term interests supposedly lie in close relations with Russia. Whereas the first assumption can 
be interpreted as derived from the logic of a Realist assessment of Russia's geopolitical 
environment, the latter judgement bears the marks of unreformed perceptions of the region 
and a degree of wishful thinking on Moscow's part. 
The practical irrelevance of the Concept as a guide or plan of action was underscored when 
one year later, even as controversy surrounding NATO enlargement was gaining pace, 
Kozyrev stated that "under the current circumstances, in terms of Russia's priorities, the 
countries of Eastern Europe rank behind the West and the CIS". 50 In practice, Moscow's 
relations with its former Warsaw Pact allies remained reactive and haphazard, not even 
justifying Kozyrev's ranking of them as being just behind the West and the former Soviet 
republics. In the light of CE's domestic developments and the long-term foreign and security 
policy priorities that began to emerge in CE in the last years of the Soviet Union, Russia could 
do little, even if it brought its full political and economic weight to bear, to change the 
direction of CE's Western orientation. The Russian foreign policy specialist, Evegeny 
Bazhanov, observed that even well-wishing Russian democrats who desired to develop good 
relations with the region could not stop CE's flight from Russia. 
51 As will be seen from the 
discussion that follows, Central Europe, despite its subsequent elevation in Russian foreign 
policy debates in the light of the NATO and EU enlargement controversy, never provoked the 
50 Quoted in Iliya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy. Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia 
and Ukraine (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 279. 




elaboration of a coherent policy in Moscow. Russia's policy towards the CE states, therefore, 
can only be gauged in the context of Russia-West relations, or, more precisely, Russia's 
reaction to NATO and EU enlargement. 
The semblance of a growing consensus on the state's major foreign policy directions and 
national interests that marked the beginning of the new period of Russian foreign policy did 
not mean, however, that differences of opinion subsided. Fundamentalist Nationalist and Neo- 
Communist forces still refused to reconcile themselves to the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, neither did they approve of the government's foreign policy. 52 As the results of the 
1993 Duma elections showed, extremist forces such as Zhirinovsky's misleadingly named 
Liberal-Democratic Party won a significant proportion of the seats in the new Duma. By this 
time, Alexei Arbatov, a leading Russian foreign policy expert, and a moderate Pragmatic 
Nationalist, had warned about the consequences of the fact that government officials had 
shifted to an even more nationalist position then the one outlined by Kozyrev. 53 A new 
`Strategy for Russia, ' published in May 1994 by the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy, 
of which Arbatov was one of the authors, warned about dangerous tendencies which had 
become noticeable in Russian policy especially with respect to the countries of the former 
USSR. It noted that the `proclivity of officials to adopt great-power rhetoric', even if it was 
intended for internal consumption, fuelled suspicion that Russia had embarked upon a policy 
of `imperial revenge' in both the near and far abroad. '54 The perception of a renewed Russian 
imperialism was further strengthened by Russia's involvement in peace-keeping or peace- 
making operations in the CIS. 55 
'2 Margot Light, "Foreign Policy Thinking", p. 70. 
53 Ibid., p. 72. 
sa Quoted ibid., p. 73 
55 Although Russia failed to receive a mandate for its operations from the UN, its actions were legitimate, 
Kozyrev argued, since Russia acted on appeals from sovereign states and participants of the conflict. 
Furthermore, Russia acted as a part of the CIS peacekeeping forces, and under CIS auspices. In addition, 




The Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) started to play a more noticeable 
role in Russia's public foreign policy discussion. In a 1994 report, the director of the FIS 
Yevgeniy Primakov, stated that `the Russian Federation FIS could not overlook the fact that 
influential circles in a number of Western countries interpret the role Russia may play in 
uniting the republics of the former Soviet Union as "imperial" and integration as a process 
aimed at the restoration of the USSR, and regards these arguments as ungrounded. '56 The 
FIS's growing foreign policy influence was reflected in the repetition of a number of points 
raised by Primakov in his report that were included in Yeltsin's decree of 14 September 1995, 




By 1994 the proposal that NATO should be enlarged to include some of the former WTO 
members had begun to dominate the Russian foreign policy and security debate. The first 
Russian foreign policy concept of 1992-93 had stated that `Moscow will vigorously oppose 
all attempts to build up the politico-military presence of third countries in the states adjoining 
Russia. '58 Quite predictably the prospect of NATO moving closer to Russian borders 
produced sharp and unanimous criticism from across the whole Russian political spectrum. 
The view prevailed that such an expansion, which failed to take into account Russia's 
concerns, could not be perceived as other than a threat and an attempt to exclude Russia from 
the European security framework. It further confirmed the views of the anti-Westernisers that 
the West was determined to deprive Russia permanently of its `great-power status'. 
Although it was widely admitted by Russian politicians that the problem was political and 
psychological rather than military in nature, the evolution of 
Russia's opposition to NATO 
56 Yevgeniy Primakov, "Russia-CIS: Does the West's Position Need Modification? ", 
Rossiiskava Gazeta, 22 
September 1994, pp. 1,6. 
s' Neil Malcolm, "Foreign Policy Making", p. 126 




enlargement combined with Moscow's claims to be a sphere of vital interests in the CE 
region, alarmed this region's public and thus accelerated their drive to join the Alliance. 59 
Moscow's policy of preventive engagement - leading to the attempts to slow down the 
process of NATO enlargement and a bid for special status in the NATO-initiated Partnership 
for Peace (PfP) -justified in the eyes of the CE leadership's their doubts about Russia's long- 
term development as a `normal' country. Moscow's framing of the argument against NATO 
enlargement in terms of its adverse effect on Russian democratic development and protecting 
its sphere of influence, failed to dissuade CE from pushing for NATO membership. 
Kozyrev's offer to Poland of security cross-guarantees by NATO and the CIS prompted a 
scathing rebuff from Warsaw. Polish national security advisor Jerzy Milewski complained, 
"Russia is returning to the imperialist policy once followed by the Tsars and later the Soviet 
Union. '))60 As Wojtek Lamentowicz, a Polish foreign policy scholar, observed - whether 
Russian leaders wanted to return to imperial policy or not, Russia was strong enough to be a 
genuine threat. In this respect, he continued, "Even a minor error in political judgement in 
Moscow could victimize the ECE". 61 Russia's new-found assertiveness and yearning to be 
seen as `great power' that became part of Moscow's strategy to influence NATO enlargement 
policy failed to deter the Central European states. Russia's proposal of interlocking security 
guarantees for the ECE countries jointly with Western nations, advanced by Moscow as a 
possible alternative to CE's aspirations to join NATO, coupled with the recognition of Russia 
as a "great power with legitimate interests, including security interests beyond its borders", 
had a directly opposite effect. 62 Russia's proposal, once again, failed to take into account CE's 
almost universal consensus on their NATO-centred security aspirations. As Witold 
Pawlowski, a Polish observer, pointed out - interaction between Moscow and Warsaw (this 
59 For a comprehensive study on NATO enlargement and Russia see J. L. Black, Russia Faces 
NA TO Expansion. 
Bearing Gifts or Bearing Arms? (Lanham, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999). 
60 Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy, p. 135. 
61 Wojtek Lamentowiz, 'Russia and East-Central Europe: Strategic Options', in Russia in Europe. The Emerging 
Security Agenda, ed. by Vladimir Baranovsky (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1997), p. 367. 
62 This was a position advanced by V. Viktorov, the head of Russian delegation to the 
North Atlantic Assembly 
in may 1995. Cited in Lamentowiz, 'Russia and East-Central 
Europe', p. 364. 
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could be applied to the other CE capitals) more and more began to resemble "neurotic 
dialogue" between a "rejected big brother" and a "scrappy newly independent state. "63 Such a 
policy towards NATO enlargement on Russia's part, according to Yuriy Davydov. Russian 
CE specialist, was short-sighted as it strengthened anti-Russian sentiment in the CE states, 
potentially making NATO less cooperative towards Moscow in future. 64 Andrei Zagorsky 
also pointed to this flaw in Russian policy towards CE and NATO. He argued that it would be 
in Russia's interest not to resist, given that, whether it liked it or not, the unification of Europe 
was taking place through the expansion of Western European and Euro-Atlantic 
organizations: "Guaranteeing at least non-hostile relations with their old and new members is 
of the utmost significance. "65 As Allen Lynch pointed out, framing its policy towards Central 
Europe almost exclusively in terms of Westpolitik, more specifically NATO expansion, 
Russia ran the risk of finding itself isolated in the region. More substantively, Moscow's 
stance blocked any possibility of developing bilateral relations in the region in such a way as 
"to make their health distinct from the question of institutional forms". 66 
In the period between 1994 and 1997 Russia's relations with the West and the CE states 
continued to be held hostage to Russia's unrelenting objection to NATO enlargement. Just as 
in the first period of the evolution of Russian foreign policy, when Moscow's neglect of the 
CE states was dictated by Russia's focus on relations with `the civilized world', another 
extreme - objection to NATO enlargement - now overshadowed Russia's policy towards CE. 
Circumscribed by the emerging `great power' rhetoric and lingering Soviet perception of CE, 
Russia placed the emphasis in its opposition to NATO expansion on NATO itself and not on 
those who were asking to join it. As Arbatov and Baranovsky commented: 
63 Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy, p. 136. 
64 Davydov Yuriy, 'Russian Security and East-Central Europe', in Russia in Europe. The Emerging Security 
Agenda, ed. by Vladimir Baranovsky (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1997), p. 381. 
65 Andrei Zagorsky, 'NATO Expansion: No Real Threat', PRISM: A Biweekly on the Post-Soviet States, Vol. 3, 
No. 2 (1 February, 1997). 
66 Allen C. Lynch, 'The Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy in the 1990s', The Journal of Communist Studies 
and Transition Politics, 
December (2001), p. 171. 
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It is noteworthy that the countries of this region [CE] were not the major objects of Russia's opposition to the enlargement of NATO: instead of trying to dissuade them from moving westwards, Moscow focused upon dissuading the alliance from moving eastwards. Furthermore, Russia's opposition to this process took no account of the obvious fact that the potential for conflict within East-Central Europe would be 
significantly reduced by the region's involvement in the NATO security zone. 67 
As the above commentators further pointed out, Russia's tasks in its immediate environment 
seem to have been overshadowed by other policy goals related to considerations of status and 
influence. 68 As certain other writers on Russian security and foreign policy have noted, 
Russia's battle for participation in decision-making and implementation of a new European 
security system was entirely misplaced - given its size, resources and potential, it remains a 
vital component of the European security landscape. 69 
Indeed, NATO expansion had a profound effect on Russian foreign policy formation in the 
mid 1990s and heralded the emergence of the new Russian foreign policy "consensus". 
Although the key elements of the consensus predated serious discussion in the West about 
NATO enlargement, many observers argued that it was this process that accelerated it: 
creating a multipolar world system to resist "a unipolar world under the leadership of the US" 
a system in which "great power" Russia would be a pillar of multipolarity. 70 Russian foreign 
policy in this period was shaped by Yevgeni Primakov, Kozyrev's successor as Foreign 
Minister, a man regarded as the main force behind the "consensus" and a strong defender of 
Russian national interests. Aleksei Pushkov captured the essence of "The Primakov Doctrine" 
when he wrote: 
67 Vladimir G. Baranovsky and Alexei G. Arbatov, 'The Changing Security Perspective in Europe', in Russia and 
the West. The 21st Century Security Environment, ed. by Alexei G. Arbatov, Karl Kaiser, and Robert Legvold 
(Armonk, New York, London: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 57. 
68 Ibid., p. 57. 
69 Andrew J. Pierre, Dmitri Trenin, 'Developing NATO-Russian Relations', Survival, Vol. 39. No. I (Spring 
1997), pp. 9-10; Moreover, Pierre and Trenin observed that Russia miscalculated and misplaced 
its priorities 
with respect to the attempts to bolster the Organisation 
for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) - its 
positive aspects notwithstanding, 
few states would willingly entrust their security to such a loose arrangement. 
70 Primakov quoted in Sherman W. Garnett, 'Europe's Crossroads: Russia and the West in the New Borderlands'. 
in The New Russian Foreign Policy, ed. by Michael Mandelbaum (New York: A Council on Foreign Relations 
Book, 1998), pp. 68-69. 
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Given her [Russia's] size, economic potential, nuclear weapons, and membership of the UN Security Council, Russia objectively remains a heavyweight of the European and world politics. Her principal objective in the context of the burgeoning new European order is to be able to make a good use of this position, to "play" it right. For its position in Europe the future of Russia is dependent on herself more than on other power centres. " 
Primakov's "great power" rhetoric conveyed in the framework of a geopolitical or realist 
world view, insisting on the need to defend "national interests", appealed to a broad range of 
political forces in Russia. However, as Sherman Garnett observed and many other analysts 
agreed, the monotony of views on external challenges that emerged with Primakov's 
appointment obscured the link between means and ends in foreign policy - Primakov's 
doctrine connected Russia's national security with the preservation of Russia's status as a 
great power. However, Russia's resources, or means of influence were not adequate to meet 
the new Russian foreign policy aspirations. 72 To Primakov, however, this limitation was not 
to be a bar to an active world role, because Russian policy was being forwarded "by no means 
on the basis of current circumstances but on the basis of [Russia's] colossal potential. , 73 Such 
`forward looking logic' failed however to address the challenges that Russia was facing at the 
time. Its `great power advertising' revealed nothing but contradictory traits that more self- 
assured and self-confident states would not possess. 74 
Russia's `almost obsessive preoccupation with status' was reminiscent of Soviet behaviour 
during the Cold War. But as Lawrence Freedman observed, such conduct by the Soviet Union 
was animated by an inferiority complex vis-a-vis the United States and was echoed in 
demands for equal status and acknowledgement of parity in military strength . 
75 Now, when 
71 Aleksei Pushklov, "'The Primakov Doctrine" and a New European Order', International Affairs, Vol. 44. No. 2 
(1998), p. 13. 
72 Garnett, 'Europe's Crossroads', p. 69; see also Yuri Fedorov, 'Krizis Vneshnei Politiki Rossii: Kontseptual'nyi 
Aspekt', Pro et Contra, Vol. 6, No. 1-2 (2001), pp. 31-49; Dmitri Trenin, 'Nenadezhnaya Strategiya'. Pro et 
Contra, Vol. 6, No. 1-2 (2001), pp. 50-65. 
73 Primakov quoted in Garnett, 'Europe's Crossroads', p. 69. 
74 Hannes Adomeit, 'Russia as a 'Great Power' in World Affairs: Images and Reality', International Affairs, Vol. 
71. No. 1 (1995), p. 35. 
75 Lawrence Freedman, 'The New Great Power Politics', in Russia and the West. The 21st Century Securit 
Environment, ed. by Alexei G. Arbatov, Karl Kaiser, and Robert Legvold (Armonk, New York, London: M. E. 
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Russia's capabilities have shrunk many times, it cannot present itself seriously as the US's 
equal. At the same time, a pure `realist' school of thought, which influenced Russian policy- 
makers at the time, assumes that the threat to security comes from other states and is largely 
territorial in nature. With this in mind, Freedman questions the value of Russia's push for 
great power status: Great power to do what? To whom? On whose behalf? 76 
The explanation of Russia's stance is to be found in its internal political developments and the 
painful reactions to external events on the part of Russia's elites as they readjusted to the new 
realities. As Dmitri Trenin observed, Moscow's ideas of `multipolarity' and `great power' 
status arose from attempts at psychological adaptation on the part of the Russian elite to the 
loss of the status as one of the world's superpower. Thus the role these concepts play is 
largely instrumental -a means to reach a foreign policy consensus. 77 If the function was to 
enable a retreat by the Russian leadership to a more `realistic' position, then the therapeutic 
role that the process played could be welcomed. `Geopolitical determinism' was adopted by 
the Russian authorities, as Trenin puts it, as an unquestionable science to navigate Russia in 
the world. Russian foreign policy was not determined, in his view, by the need to defend 
national interests, but by the desire to establish a certain kind of international system. 78 This 
was especially evident in Russia's position on European security. Moscow strove for an equal 
say with the West in deciding the fate of Central Europeans, in particular determining their 
military-political status. Russia's painful reaction to the West's encroachment on its only 
recently undisputed sphere of influence was understandable. Its frustration with the current 
situation was further deepened by its inability to exercise the option of military intervention 
when unable to arrange things politically as Moscow did on a number of occasions - most 
notably in Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Russia's drive to regain some 
semblance of credible `great power' status was evident in its attempts to consolidate the 
CIS, 
76 Ibid., p. 25. 
77 Trenin, 'Nenadezhnaya Strategiya', p. 53 
78 Ibid., p. 54. 
40 
Chapter 2 
attempts at unification with Belarus, announcement of strategic partnership with China, and 
lowering of the nuclear arms use threshold. 
Russia's efforts did lead to some concessions from the West. The compromise that was 
reached on recognition of Russia's status as great power and influential player in European 
and world security was sealed by granting Russia a place in the "big seven" (now known as 
G8), recognition of Russia's military security concerns in the form of the revision of the 
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty and signing of the Founding Act between NATO 
and the Russian Federation in May 1997, just months before the CE states were invited to join 
the Alliance. 79 
Yet despite extracting a number of concessions from the West, Russian diplomacy failed to 
prevent the first round of NATO enlargement. In fact, Russia's domestic consensus on its 
great power status, the emergence of a `pragmatic' and realistically minded foreign policy 
failed in practice. Neither Russia's `multipolar thrust', its search for counterbalances to 
Western dominance, nor its attempts to strengthen the CIS, produced the desired effects. On 
the contrary, in the instances where Russia attempted to follow up on its rhetoric its policies 
backfired: the greater the pressure Moscow applied on other CIS states to oppose NATO - the 
more those states sought closer ties with NATO. 80 
The 1997 National Security Concept recognised the limitations placed on Russia's 
international clout by its internal weakness. The Concept conceded that the most significant 
threats to Russian security emanated from within - from the political, economic and social 
79 These developments are looked at in more detail in Chapter 3. 
80 Roland Dannreuther, 'Escaping the Enlargement Trap in NATO-Russian Relations', Survival, Vol. 41. No. 4 
(1999-2000), pp. 145-164. 
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crises within Russia and from across its immediate borders, rather than from more distant 
territories. 8' 
As far as the main ideas and perceptions underpinning the document are concerned, it seems 
that the Russian elite had managed to synthesise the views of the liberals and the pragmatists. 
The Concept emphasised that the international system was characterised by a fundamental 
tendency towards the consolidation of a multipolar world system. At the same time the 
Concept stated: "Considering the profound changes in the Russian Federation's relations with 
other leading powers, it can be concluded that the threat of large-scale aggression against 
Russia is virtually absent in the foreseeable future. " In a style characteristic of liberal views, 
the Concept argued that `the main threat to national security is no longer large-scale 
aggression, but an internal threat from acute economic and socio-ethnic tensions threatening 
the country's cohesion. " One way of supporting internal economic reforms was by promoting 
a non-threatening international environment, by joining into international economic 
institutions, and becoming an integral part of the global economy. 82 
However, some statist pronouncements also came through strongly in the Concept. It 
emphasised Russia's Eurasian geopolitical location and identity as a `powerful Eurasian 
power', and insisted that Russia was prepared to play a key role and participate actively in 
solving problems in the political, economic and military spheres. The Concept also reflected 
Russia's frustration with its inability to influence the evolution of European security 
architecture in a way it favoured: `The process of NATO expansion to the East is 
unacceptable since it represents a threat to Russia's national security. Multilateral 
mechanisms for maintaining peace and security at both global (UN) and regional levels are 
still insufficiently effective, which limits Russia's potential when using such mechanisms to 
81 Concept of National Security of Russian Federation, 
g http: //www. maindir. gov. ru/sbrf/Documents/Decree/1300-1. html>; accessed 
23 November 1998 
Ibid; also see Celeste A. Wallander, 'The Russian National Security Concept: A Liberal-Statist 
Synthesis', 
PONARS, Policy Memo Series, Memo No. 30 
(http: //www. fas. fas. harvard. edu/-ponars/POLICY%20MEMOS/Wallander3O. html: PONARS, July 1998). 
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ensure its national security. ' But taking the current international situation into consideration, 
the authors of the concept envisaged for Russia a `leaner' military structure, mindful that 
`until the non-use of force becomes the norm in international relations, national interests 
require a level of might sufficient for our defence', with the emphasis being put on nuclear 
deterrence: `Russia does not seek to maintain parity in arms and armed forces with the leading 
states in the world and is oriented towards the principle of realistic deterrence, based on the 
suitable use of force to avert aggression. ' 
However, behind the veil of Primakov's rhetoric and the 1997 Concept, many observers of 
Russian foreign policy noted that Russian diplomacy was consistently underscoring the 
central importance to Russia of maintaining the best possible relations with the West, both to 
help safeguard regional and international stability and to assist Russia's own economic and 
political transformation. Russia's signing of the Founding Act with NATO meant an implicit 
acquiescence in the Alliance's enlargement to include Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary, even if it did not particularly like the situation. Much of the geopolitical rhetoric 
was, therefore, aimed at setting `red lines' beyond which Russia would deem NATO 
enlargement unacceptable. 83 The economic factor played a significant role in bringing Russia 
to a more compromising position - careful not to alienate the West to an extent that would 
jeopardise Western economic support. 84 Indeed, Primakov was careful to counterbalance the 
affirmation that "Russia has been and remains a great power" with emphasising the "need to 
create an external environment that would, to the greatest extent possible, 
be favourable to 
- economic development and the continuation of the democratic process 
in Russian society. $5 
83 Roland Dannreuther, 'Escaping the Enlargement Trap in NATO-Russian 
Relations', Survival, Vol. 41. No. 4 
(1999-2000), p. 147. 
84 Ibid., p. 148. 




The West, and Europe in particular, had become a major zone of Russian external economic 
activity. During the first years of the post-communist transformation, Russia turned away 
from trading with the former Soviet republics and countries of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA), and reoriented particularly towards the industrialised states of 
the Euro-Atlantic area. By 1997 almost 35 percent of Russian trade was conducted with the 
EU, although at the same time there were signs of a steady recovery of trade with Central 
Europe, reaching 13.6 percent. 86 As much as 70 percent of Russian exports to Europe consist 
of raw materials such as gas, oil and metals. Russia's heavy dependence on the raw materials 
sector for export revenues suggests that its influence on Russian foreign policy is 
considerable. Of course it is difficult to conclusively determine which factor predominates - 
economic interest or political priority. But as some observers noted, when security issues such 
as opposition to NATO expansion threatened their interests in Europe, the coalition of liberals 
within the Russian government and their allies in the Russian economy cooperated 
harmoniously to sustain engagement with the West. 87 
With the appointment of Viktor Chernomyrdin, the former chairman of Gazprom (the Russian 
gas monopoly), as Russian Prime Minister in 1992, the energy industry received a major 
boost to its lobbying capacity. 88 Although Russian oil companies, along with Gazprom, 
constitute the backbone of Russia's trade links with Europe and the West, Gazprom, unlike oil 
firms, is a state-controlled monopoly with an integrated structure. Gazprom, according to Irina 
Kobrinskaya, boasted an impressive list of successes in its foreign activities throughout the 
1990s: creating of a number of joint ventures across Western and Central Europe, persuading 
86 Hans-Hermann Höhman, and Christian Meier, 'Conceptual, Internal, and International Aspects of 
Russia's 
Economic Security', in Russia and the West. The 21st Century Security Environment, ed. 
by Alexei G. Arbatov, 
Karl Kaiser, and Robert Legvold (Armonk, New York, London: M. E. 
Sharpe, Inc, 1999). 
87 Michael McFaul, 'Domestic Politics of NATO Expansion in Russia: Implications 
for American Foreign 
Policy', PONARS Policy Memo 
No. 5 
(http: //www. fas. harvard. edu/-ponars/POLICY%20MEMOS/Mcfaulmemo. 
html: October 1997). 
88 Most experts agree that Chernomyrdin, during his premiership, was a major 
force behind the energy sector 
interests in the government. See Irina Kobrinskaya, `Vnutrennie 
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Postkommunisticheskoi Rossii', in Rossiya Politicheskaya, ed. 
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Poland to agree to the construction of a USD35 billion gas pipeline running from Russia to 
Western Europe through its territory, and overcoming Warsaw's plans to diversify its sources 
of gas imports so as to decrease dependence on Russia. 89 As will be seen in chapter 4, 
Gazprom was the only company to have a long-term strategy of relations with CE, one which 
it succeeded in putting into practice. 
Gazprom's geographic orientation explains its interest in stability and an improvement of 
Russia's relations with western CIS republics, Central Europe and Western Europe. 
Gazprom's unique position as almost exclusive supplier of gas to a number of Central 
European countries, and supplier of up to a third of the needs of some West European states, 
makes Gazprom an important instrument of influence. Indeed, on several occasions Russian 
politicians did resort to threats to stop supplies if NATO enlargement were to take place. 
Gazprom's interests suffered as a result, making it more important for the company to work 
with government to project the image of a reliable and stable supplier and to resist its use as a 
stick to punish its opponents. In such a way it exerted a stabilising role on Russian foreign 
policy. 9o 
By late 1990s one could observe a tendency to try to strike a balance in Russian foreign policy 
between great power pretensions and preserving links with the West. This approach was 
evident even at such a dramatic time as the Kosovo crisis in 1999. While some officials 
expressed outrage over NATO's `aggression against Yugoslavia', others continued to work 
with the international financial institutions and individual states to seek economic assistance 
in the wake of Russia's August 1998 financial crisis. This combined approach 
demonstrated 
an underlying understanding that despite Russia's unhappiness with the geopolitical situation 
in Europe and discontent over US influence in the region, and despite Moscow's attempts to 
89 Ibid., p. 283. 
90 Amy Myers and Robert A. Manning Jaffe, `Russia, Energy and the West', Survival, 
Vol. 43. No. 2 (Summer 
2001), pp. 139-140. 
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create a balance and build counter weights in the East (China and India). the West remained 
the vital target of Russian foreign policy as a source of financial support and as a partner in 
economic development. In other words, Russia's geopolitical `bark' was bigger than its bite: 
its position was significantly undercut by economic weakness and a lack of the resources 
needed to buttress its `great power' claims. 
However, while Russia's foreign policy was presented as pragmatic and realistic - "Russia is 
not anti-Western, yet it will stand up for its national interests" - the appeal of international 
prestige associated with great power status and exaggerated hopes for restored influence 
clouded Russia's perception of institutional developments in Europe. This in turn led to a 
misguided understanding of its interests in Europe and misplaced policies in response to the 
changes there. The most visible example of misunderstanding and lack of foresight was the 
evolution of Russia's Perception of the EU and Moscow's relative calm in response to, and 
even support for, EU enlargement. Because of Russia's lack of knowledge about the EU and 
its perception of it as a purely economic association, the EU was relatively favourably looked 
upon in Moscow, and seen as a non-threatening institution. 91 The place of the EU in Russia's 
European policy was further enhanced by Moscow's opposition to NATO enlargement. In a 
sense, Russia's calculation in supporting the enlargement of the EU and opposing that of 
NATO was based on a direct association of NATO with the USA. Thus `more EU' in 
Russia's realist world of geopolitics and zero-sum-game thinking meant `less NATO'. 
91 lt is beyond the scope of this chapter to give a detailed account of the evolution of Russia's relations with the 
EU. For the most recent and exhaustive study of Russian perspectives on the EU see Vladimir 
Baranovsky, 
Russia's Attitude Towards the EU: Political Aspects (Helsinki: Ulkopoliittinen instituuti/The Finnish Institute of 
International Affairs / Institut für Europäische Politik, 2002); other studies on Russia-EU relations include: Igor 
Leshukov, 'Rossiya i Evropeiskii Soyuz: Strategiya Vzaimootnoshenii', in Rossiya i Osnovnye Institute, 
Bezopasnosti v Evrope: Vstupaya v XXI Vek, ed. by Dmitri Trenin (Moscow: Moscow 
Carnegie Center, 2000); 
Stanislav Tkachenko, 'Rashirenie ES i Voprosy Bezopasnosti Rossii', in Rossiya i Osnovnye Instituty 
Bezopasnosti v Evrope: Vstupaya v XXI Vek, ed. by Trenin, Dmitri (Moscow: Moscow 
Carnegie Center. 2000), 
David Gowan, How the EU Can Help Russia (London: Centre for European Reform, 2000): Igor 
Leshukov. 
'Beyond Satisfaction: Russia's Perspectives on European Integration', ZEI Discussion Paper 
C 26 (Bonn: Center 
for European Integration Studies, Rheinische Fridriesche-Wilhelms-Universität, 1998); Timofei 
Bordachev, 
'Terra Incognita, ili Evropeiskaya Politika Rossii', Pro et Contra, Vol. 6. No. 4 (2001), pp. 
23-32; Margot Light, 
John Löwenhardt and Stephen White, 'Russian Perspectives on European Security', 
European Foreign Affairs 
Review, Vol. 5. No. 4 (2000), pp. 489-505. 
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Moreover, Russia's support of the EU also fitted well with its vision at the time of a 
multipolar world order. From the mid-1990s, Russian support for CE states' entry into the EU 
was seen as an alternative to their membership of the Transatlantic Alliance, without any 
analysis or understanding of the far-reaching implications for Russia of CE membership in the 
EU. Although the Russian authorities and many analysts saw the EU overwhelmingly as a 
multinational regional economic institution, their linkage of EU enlargement to that of NATO 
was based on the political aspects of both processes. 
Such a narrow reading of the situation led many in Russia to underestimate the potential 
consequences of EU enlargement on Russia's relations with CE candidate member states and 
Russia's relations with Europe more broadly. As Vladimir Baranovsky has pointed out, 
whereas NATO enlargement was opposed on the grounds of isolating Russia from Europe 
and creating dividing lines, the robustness of the EU accession process and strict accession 
criteria, compared to that of NATO, bring with them far more complex and irreversible 
changes to the CE states, potentially turning `dividing lines' created by NATO into an abyss 
once they acceded to the EU. 92 Among the first visible and tangible challenges that EU 
enlargement brought home to Moscow was the problem of Russia's Kaliningrad exclave and 
the adoption of Schengen regulations by the CE candidate states. 
The appreciation of the challenges that EU enlargement could bring to Russia was not 
fully 
understood in Moscow, yet such ignorance was not without benefit. As Vladimir 
Baranovsky 
concluded, whatever the origin of Russia's benign vision of the EU - sophisticated calculation 
or ill-grounded illusions (or a mixture) - the result in any case supported the 
`pro-EU' logic in 
foreign policy making. Moscow's benevolent perception of the EU was not undermined even 
during the Kosovo war. Some Russian observers were quite surprised at the almost complete 
92 Baranovsky, Russia's Attitude Towards the EU, pp. 131-132. 
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lack of criticism in Russia of the EU or its member states during the war in the Balkans, with 
NATO and the US bearing the brunt of Russia's outrage, despite the largely overlapping 
membership and the EU's unanimous support for the military action against Serbia. 9' One 
Russian observer called Russia's separation of the so-called `good West' from the `bad West' 
a "foreign policy schizophrenia" that ignored the fact that when united Europe was faced with 
the choice, its commitment to Transatlantic solidarity has never failed the test. 94 In favouring 
EU enlargement over that of NATO Russia refused to accept the fact that all of the candidates 
to both organisations were decisively pro-American and somewhat anti-Russian. Thus if 
Russia omitted to cultivate relations with these states, both organisations could become less 
rather than more forthcoming in developing relations with Moscow. 
The Kosovo crisis became one of the turning points in Russian foreign and security policy 
during the third phase of Russian foreign policy. Relations with NATO were reassessed and 
there was increased attention to Europe. Some political analysts, such as Andrei Fedorov, 
declared that NATO's Kosovo war had done Russia one great favour - it disillusioned many 
Russians, including highly placed ones, with the West as a strategic partner. 95 For many 
Russians, NATO's campaign in Kosovo, which commenced just weeks after the three CE 
states formally acceded to the Alliance, served to justify their prior suspicions and led to a 
new conviction that NATO is not an institution or instrument of security but one of war, 
murder and aggression. 96 NATO's New Strategic Concept adopted at the height of the crisis, 
created more concerns for Russian strategic planners, even though Russia was no longer 
mentioned as a potential security threat. This time anti-NATO rhetoric was backed by Russian 
actions - Moscow froze its ties with the alliance, and, more 
importantly, NATO air strikes 
93 As Timofei Bordachev has pointed out, Russia's differences with the EU were much deeper than Moscow was 
prepared to discuss openly - the EU members adopted an anti-Serb position and 
favoured US involvement in 
settling the Kosovo crisis. See Bordachev, 'Terra Incognita', p. 
30. 
94 Bordachev, `Terra Incognita, ili Evropeiskaya Politika Rossii', p. 28. 
95 Andrei Fedorov, 'New Pragmatism of Russia's Foreign Policy', International Affairs, Vol. 45. No. 5 (1999). 
pp. 47-52. 
96 Oksana Antonenko, 'Russia, NATO and European Security After Kosovo', Survival, Vol. 41. No. 4 (Winter 
1999-2000), p. 131. 
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triggered a revision of Russia's foreign policy doctrine, provoking changes in the country's 
nuclear posture. The Russia Security Council meeting in April 1999 adopted three 
programmes, all of which were classified. However, some of the reports that emerged in the 
press shed light on possible changes to nuclear weapons policy - extending the life of 
Russia's intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and possibly equipping its strategic 
bombers with non-nuclear cruise missiles. 97 In addition, in June of the same year, Russia 
conducted one of the largest military exercises in its post-Soviet history, "West-99", that 
involved five military districts and a unified Russian-Belarusian group of forces that 
simulated a response to an attack from "an unspecified military alliance". 98 
As Baranovsky's comment cited above hinted, however, Russia's re-focusing on the EU, for 
geo-political as well economic reasons, led in the end to the development of a more balanced 
and holistic foreign policy. As was noted above, Russian foreign policy makers who asserted 
`great power' status for Russia (whether for reasons of sincere belief or domestic political 
necessity), have never advocated a complete breakaway from the West or a return to Cold- 
War style anti-Westernism. Developing a structured and institutionalised dialogue with the 
EU offered Russia an opportunity to maintain political and economic ties with a part of the 
West it was not allergic to. Russia's growing dependence on economic ties with the EU also 
played an important part in bringing Russia closer in. 
The launch of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as part of the 
EU's 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), coincided with a period of sharp 
deterioration 
in relations between Russia and NATO. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that Russia's response 
Ibid., p. 135. 
98 Ibid. For an analysis of Russia's 
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to what many pictured as Europe's (geo-strategic) coming of age was very supportive. 99 In its 
response to the EU Strategy on Russia, Moscow's `Mid-Term strategy on relations with the 
EU', had quite blatantly expressed its vision of the emerging EU security role - "the provision 
of pan-European security based on the capabilities of the Europeans themselves, without 
isolating the US and NATO, but without allowing the latter a monopoly [over security] on the 
continent'. ). 100 
From 1999 Russia and the EU moved to develop an unprecedented level of institutionalisation 
of relations both in the economic and the political spheres. Even vociferous criticism from the 
EU of Russia's conduct in Chechnya, something that Russia would normally reject as 
scandalous interference in its domestic affairs, failed to provoke any dramatic gestures on 
Moscow's part. On the contrary, in response to Western demands Moscow reacted by 
permitting a degree of openness in the region. ' 01 
This trend in Russian foreign policy heralded a new stage in its evolution under the new 
presidency of Vladimir Putin. The foreign and security policy outlook of the country that 
Putin inherited started (as described above) to change gradually towards a more `realistic 
realism', reflected in a growing emphasis on the economic dimension of Russian security 
policy and the gradual re-establishment of ties with NATO. This came at the same time as 
new policy documents such as the National Security Concept, the Military Doctrine and the 
Foreign Policy Concept were issued, reflecting concern over alarming developments in 
international relations, such as a weakening of the OSCE and the UN, as well as a weakening 
of Russia's political, economic, and military influence in the world and the consolidation of 
99 For an overview of the evolution of Russia's views on ESDP and 
CFSP see Clelia Rontoyanni, 'So Far, so 
Good? Russia and the ESDP', International Affairs, Vol. 78. No. 4 (2002), pp. 813-830. and also 
Baranovsky. 
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military-political blocs and alliances (particularly the further eastward expansion of 
NATO). 102 Similarly, the Foreign Policy Concept drew attention to the problems Russia was 
facing in promoting a multipolar word system at the time of the growing tendency by the US 
to establishing a unipolar world. In its list of regional priorities, the Concept for the first time 
mentioned the EU and placed it second only to the CIS. 103 According to the Concept, Russia 
saw in the EU one of its most important international political and economic actors. 
Many observers of Russian foreign policy noted a gradual shift in Russian rhetoric away from 
what Trenin called an `unreliable strategy' of multipolarity, towards a more pragmatic, 
economically-driven foreign policy. ' 04 Some noted that Putin shied away from invoking the 
`loaded term of multipolarity'. As Lo has pointed out, part of the reason is presentational -a 
desire to avoid gratuitous irritation, but more important is the apparent belief that the West, 
for good or ill, must continue to be the principal point of reference for Russian policy-makers: 
In place of uncertainty and accompanying angst about whether the international 
environment is benign or hostile, there is an appreciation of the need for a more 
even approach to international developments, one that avoids the twin extremes of 
excessive expectations and an intemperate and quasi-confrontational prejudice. 'os 
This dramatic turn in Russian foreign policy, accompanied by the re-instatement of relations 
with NATO, was christened by some Russian analysts as hard-line or authoritarian 
Westernism. 1 06 One of the driving forces behind Putin's foreign policy was to project an 
image of Russia as a predictable and responsible country. The new Russian President 
has not 
abandoned the ambition of reinstating Russia as a great power. 
However, in a change of 
tactics rather than a change of strategy, the methods have changed. 
One of the key lessons that 
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the Russian authorities appear to have learned was that Russia's international weight is 
directly contingent on the state of its economy. 
The growing rapprochement with the West and the US seen at the start of Putin's presidency 
received a major fillip in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 2001 in the USA. 
The improvement of relations with the West has given Putin's foreign policy direction more 
legitimacy at home and in the fight against international terrorism has given Russia and the 
West common ground for cooperation. At the same time, the more economy-driven foreign 
policy remains intact. The revitalised and re-invented NATO-Russia partnership in the new 
forum "NATO-Russia Council" or "NATO at 20" has reduced the high-politics profile of 
Russia-EU relations, leading them to concentrate on more urgent issues between the two 
sides, particularly concerning the economic dimension and the effects of enlargement on 
Russia. 
Russia's foreign policy in the last decade has come full circle in its relations with Europe - 
from unqualified Westernism to a more pragmatic, realistic style of relations guided by 
considerations of national interest. The debate is still open as to what constitute Russia's 
interests, yet it seems that the foreign policy is driven predominantly by the need to rebuild 
the economy, a task in which the West and Western-dominated institutions play the key role. 
While geopolitical concerns still remain in the background of Russian security thinking, there 
has been a noticeable change in Russia's approach to achieving its geopolitical objectives. 
Russia's relations with the CE states have also benefited from the change. 
As the following chapters will demonstrate, the evolution of Russian 
foreign and security 
policy could not but affect Moscow's ties with 
CE. During the initial period of re-adjustment 
to the new international environment and search for 
its post-Soviet identity, Russian foreign 
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policy suffered from a pro-Western bias at the expense of other foreign policy directions, CE 
included. In reaction to the inflated expectations of partnership with the West and domestic 
response to the hardship brought by the reforms, the pendulum of Russia's foreign policy 
swung almost to the other extreme. The memory of Russia's superpower status, the rise of 
geopolitics amongst the majority of the Russian political elite as the organising theory, 
seemed to offer the best guidance in solving Russian foreign policy and national security 
problems, but threatened to pit Russia against the West once again. CE moved to the centre- 
stage of Russian foreign policy, yet only as a variable of Russia-West dialogue. The burden of 
the past and unfriendly perceptions that both Russia and the CE states had towards each other 
re-appeared again with new force, making practical steps in settling differences all the more 
difficult. Moscow's hostile reaction to NATO enlargement and the Alliance's actions in 
Kosovo vindicated the views of many in Russia who remained suspicious of the West. It was 
not surprising, therefore, that Russia's relations with CE fell to a new low. 
However, as we have seen, since the end of 1999, Russia's new leadership has gradually 
moved to rebuild pragmatic ties with the West and steered its foreign policy to serve the 
country's economic needs. Such a pragmatic approach, as we shall see, 
has also benefited 
Russia's ties with Central Europe. Putin's leadership, unburdened 
by the legacy of the Soviet 
imperial past, gave Russia a foreign policy that is notable 
by its balanced approach free of 
great power ambitions. Such an approach has allowed 




Russia's Relations with Central Europe: `Hard Security' Aspects 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to trace the development of Russia's policy towards the states of 
Central Europe (CE) - Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the four members of 
the Visegrad group, since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This chapter is mainly concerned with 
what is traditionally understood as the `conventional' aspect of security relations, dealing 
primarily with military and political issues pertaining to state security, or `hard security'. The 
analysis attempts to explore and explain how developments in European security, changes inside 
Russia and Central Europe, and changes in Russia's perception of its national interests, 
influenced Moscow's policies towards CE. 
The chapter begins with an assessment of the main factors influencing Russian national security 
policy. A number of factors determined the character of security relations within the Russia-CE 
regional security complex at various stages in the last decade: the external security environment 
of the security complex, internal developments within Russia and 
individual CE states, and the 
role of history and (mis)perception of each other in shaping security and 
foreign policies. The 
main external factors in this respect are Russia's relations with the 
West, the processes of NATO 
and EU enlargement, its ties with the European 
Union (EU), the role of the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, formerly 
CSCE), Russia's policy towards the ex- 
Soviet Republics, and various regional and subregional cooperation projects. 
In their turn. a 
number of internal factors also influenced 
Russia's policy and the process of identification of its 
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national interests, such as the turmoil associated with reforms, changes in elite and public 
security perceptions and national identity (self-perception), attitudes and the legacy of the past. 
In the case of Russia, ambiguity surrounding the official position on its national interests is a 
reflection of the instability of Russia's self-conception (identity) in the first years after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. In its turn, this ambiguity is supplemented by factors such as the 
weakness of state institutions, and the decrease in material capabilities translated into loss of 
international influence. This all had a direct impact on the way Russian national interests and, 
therefore, policies were formulated. State identity is often formulated, among other things, 
through evocation of historical experience as a frame of reference. As will be demonstrated, this 
often informed Russia's position with respect to CE, the West and the process of NATO 
enlargement. This is true not only of the way Russia's perceptions of CE and the wider world are 
constructed, but also (through the reference to the past experience) of the way Russia is perceived 
outside its borders. I This historical dimension constitutes an important part of the dynamics that 
drives Russian-CE relations at the bilateral and multilateral levels. 
The subsequent discussion is organised around four time periods. As with any periodisation, 
there is no clear-cut boundary between the periods of Russia's post-Soviet development, but 
rather gradual shifts marked by changes in the political balance of power, and changes 
in the 
international environment leading to adjustments in the formulation of national interests and 
foreign policy. 
1 As Peter J. Katzenstein noted: "History is a process of change that 
leaves an imprint on state identity". See Peter J. 
Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National 
Security, " in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed. ) The Culture 
of National Security: Norms and Identity 
in World Politics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). p. 23. 
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Russian National Security and Central Europe - 1991-1993 
Central Europe and the Evolution of the Russian National Security Debate (1991- 1993) 
Despite the fact that Moscow has no common borders with the CE states region, with the 
exception of the Kaliningrad oblast, in the period between 1991 and 1993 Russia still viewed the 
region as being important to the country's national security, as an important element in an all- 
inclusive European system of states. Russia's initial pro-Western orientation and belief that a new 
pan-European collective security system based on CSCE could replace Cold War institutions like 
NATO placed CE within such a framework. Such foreign policy thinking, which was a 
continuation of Gorbachev's `European Common Home' line, saw no need for CE to join 
security structures like NATO. A European security system based on collective security ideas 
would also be sure to include Russia as an integral part. 
The subsequent evolution of Russia's strategy and formulation of its national interests relating to 
the Visegrad states through the 1990s was a controversial and not always very straightforward 
process. The evolution of Moscow's vision of the region in its new security environment was 
affected by transformations taking place in Russia's domestic affairs, and by changes that were 
taking place within the CE states and in the wider Europe. The changes in the security landscape 
forced them to make strategic choices in relations with each other and with the remaining 
Western security institutions. These strategic choices, however, and their incompatibility, 
defined 
and set the dynamics of Russia's bilateral relations with the 
Visegrad states. 
Russia's relations with the states of Central Europe were 
further affected by initial inconsistency 
and disorder in Russia's overall security thinking and perception 
of its national interests. The CE 
states did not have a special place in the 
list of the country's top priorities. This fact is explained 
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by Russia's overall international orientation at that stage and its pre-occupation with domestic 
transformation. The narrow circle of the Russian elite was quite indifferent to and uninterested in 
Russian relations with the ex-Soviet republics, let alone the former Eastern bloc states, joining 
the club of civilised democratic nations (in other words Western states) was its prime national 
security and foreign policy objective. 2 According to Alexei Arbatov, the pro-western attitude of 
the then Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, with general support coming from President 
Yeltsin and his close associates and advisors, suffered from "a heavy bias towards economic 
determinism, universal democratic values and a general neglect of the competitive geopolitical 
and strategic elements of international politics". 3 Although the `post-imperial' stage of pro- 
Western idealism proved to be transitory and short-lived, in the eyes of Russia's wider foreign 
policy, security and political elite this became a period of important missed and wasted 
opportunities, with unpredictable consequences for the country's national security. In retrospect, 
some Russian analysts noted that "Russia's relations with the former allies in East-Central 
Europe represent one of the most significant failures of post-Soviet Russia in the international 
arena, reflecting above all the deficiency in strategic thinking in Moscow. "4 
The former allies in Central Europe had nothing to offer the Russian authorities in their efforts to 
reform Russia's economy and consolidate its statehood, except for a possible model of economic 
reform. The Gaidar government resorted to advice from Polish economic reformers like Leszek 
Balcerowicz and Marek Dombrowski. For Russian technocrats from the Gaidar entourage, as 
Agnieszka Magdziak-Miszewska observed, Poland was of interest only as a test site for market 
2 Andrey Kozyrev, "Transformed Russia in a New World", Izvestia, 2 January 1992, p. 3. 
3 Alexei Arbatov, `Russian Foreign Policy Thinking in Transition, ' in Vladimir Baranovsky 
(ed. ), Russia and 
Europe: the Emerging Security Agenda. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
for SIPRI, 1997), p. 136. 
4 Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Baranovsky et. al., `Introduction', in Vladimir Baranovsky, 
Ibid., p, 11. See also Igor 
Orlik, `Tsentral'no-Vostochnaya Evropa mezhdu Rossiyei i Zapadom', 
in Vestnik nauchnoi informatsii, no. 5, 
(Moscow: IMEPI RAN, 1997), pp. 3-11; Irina Kobrinskaya, Rossiya i 
Tsentral'na. va Vostochnaya Evropa poste 
"kholodnoi voiny ", (Moscow: Moskovskii Tsentr Carnegie, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997; 
Aleksei Pushkov, `Vostochnaya Evropa - vremia sobirat' kamni, 




reforms. 5 The West, on the other hand, seemed a key source of expertise, financial assistance, 
and, more importantly, political support to the Yeltsin regime. The states of CE, for their part, 
were confronted with similar problems and perceived cooperation with the West as the best 
chance of improving their socio-economic situation. Having proclaimed their strategic objective 
of a `return to Europe', they saw little value in maintaining relations with Russia beyond what 
was seen as reasonably sufficient. Most of the states in CE, even in the face of the considerable 
negative impact of the collapse of the CMEA trading system on their production levels, did not 
actively seek to secure stable receipts of Russian oil and gas. Some of the most ardent reformers 
at the time, such as the then Czechoslovak Prime Minister Väclav Klaus, considered the collapse 
of the old Soviet trading system a useful part of shock therapy which would force a rapid 
reorientation of trade to the West. Hence there was no motive for re-establishing economic 
cooperation with Russia. 6 
Both Russia's and Central Europe's re-orientation towards the West resulted in rivalry 
between them for the West's attention and support in the shape of aid, credits, investments and 
other preferences. Owing to its sheer size, remaining influence, nuclear status, and its potential 
for creating security risks, the West had bigger stakes in supporting a peaceful transition in 
Russia. 7 The West's courting of Russia at the time upset many in Central Europe, who felt that 
the West devoted too much attention to that country. 8 As one Russian observer noted, their elites 
therefore tried to persuade the West that Russia could hardly become a European state in the 
5 Agnieszka Magziak-Miszewska, `Calkowita asymetria', Rzeczpospolita, 4 March, 1997, cited in Irina Kobrinskaya, 
1997, p. 119. 
6 Alex Pravda, 1994, p. 146. 
7 John Dunn, "Russia's Foreign Policy Concerns and the Implications for Western Security, 
" in New Forsts or 
Security: Views from Central, Eastern and Western Europe, Dunay, Pal, Gabor Kardos, 
Andrew J. Williams 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995), pp. 78-79. 
8 Nikolai Bukharin, A. P. Yershov, "Russia-Poland, " Vestnik Nauchnoi Informatsii (Moscow), no. 
12 (IMEPI RAN. 
1994), p. 55. 
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future, and that Russia's loyalty to the West was tactical in nature. 9 Although many in CE did 
not share this point of view, it nevertheless became one of the factors that contributed to the 
alienation of Russia from the region. In general mutually negative perceptions played an 
important role in the developing alienation between the two sides and hampered the 
establishment of positive relations between Russia and the CE states. 
The shift in the domestic alignment of forces and the influence that they exerted on foreign policy 
in the aftermath of the 1993 Duma elections failed to produce a clearer policy towards CE. With 
the rise of geopolitical views of the national interests, the CE region came to be viewed simply as 
a `battle ground' for influence with the West, with Russia's security thinking tending to slip into 
`besieged fortress' mode. In practice, therefore, Russia's relations with the CE states were usually 
narrowed down to questions of how to prevent eastward NATO enlargement. 1° 
The growing distance between Russia and CE and the disjuncture in their vision of the European 
security system translated into unstable bilateral political relations. This was reflected in Russia's 
official position with respect to the states of CE region. The print media and official documents 
examined in the course of the research revealed little evidence of the existence of a Russian 
Central Europe policy. One of the few early statements that could qualify as an attempt to express 
Russia's position on relations with its former allies was articulated 
by Andrey Kozyrev at his 
address at a seminar on the future of the CSCE in Budapest 
in December 1992: 
Yuri Davydov, "Russia and Eastern Europe, " Security for Europe 
Working Paper no. 4, Discussion paper, Center 
for Foreign Policy Development. Brown University, Winter 1993, p. 
8. 
10 Alexander Duleba, "The Slovak-Ukrainian-Russian Security Triangle, 
" inn Margarita Balmaceda (ed. ), On the 
Edge. Ukrainian-Central Europe-Russian Securiti- Triangle, (Budapest: 
Central European University, 2000), p. 95. 
59 
Chapter 3 
In its relations with East European states, Russia is adhering to a principally new strategy-ov of inter-state relations. It [the strategy] is totally devoid of the imperial arrogance and egocentrism characteristic of the Soviet Union, and is based on the principles of equality and mutual benefit. " 
President Yeltsin himself, a little earlier, in a speech in October 1992, stated that the CE region 
was of considerable strategic importance to Russia. This assertion seemed to imply a more active 
Russian role in the area. 12 However, Russia's actual policy with respect to CE under Yeltsin's 
first administration made some observers conclude that CE had become the region of forgotten 
neighbours, as Russia continued to concentrate on relations with the West and the near abroad. ' 3 
Others concluded that Moscow had adopted a policy of `benign neglect' and had made little 
effort to develop an overarching policy toward the region. 14 
In accordance with their stated policies outlined above, the new political elites of the CE states 
continued to pursue a rapid about-face to the West and close integration with their West 
European neighbours. NATO, for instance, was seen in the CE capitals as the only existing 
structure in post-Cold War Europe that could guarantee security and stability to its members. '' 
The main political groups in Poland, for example, had come to a consensus by 1993 that their 
country's security should be linked to a new European order based militarily on NATO and the 
11 Quoted in Boris Shmelev, "Otnosheniya Rossii so stranami tsentral'noi Evropy i interesy ee natsional'no- 
gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti, " proceedings of the international conference Rossiya i tsentral'naya Evropa i' no''i kh 
geopolitcheskikh real'nostiakh, (Moscow: IMEPI RAN, 1995), p. 329. 
12Rossiiskie vesti, 29 October 1992, p. 1. 
13Mike Bowker, `Russian Policy Toward Central and Eastern Europe, ' p. 71. 
14F. Stephen Larrabee, `East Central Europe, ' in Zalmay Khalilzad (ed. ), Strategic Appraisal 1996, (Santa Monica: 
RAND, 1996), p. 132. 
15 Wojciech Kostecki, `Poland', in Hans Mouritzen (ed. ), Bordering Russia - Theory and Prospects for Europe's 
Baltic Rim, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 210-214; Adrian Hyde-Price, 1994, pp. 238-257; Vladimir V. Kusin, 
`Security Concerns on Central Europe, ' RFE/RL Research Report, Report on Eastern Europe, vol. 2, no. 10, March 
1991, pp. 36-37; Alfred A. Reich, `Central Europe's Disappointments and Hopes', RFE/RL Research Report, \ cal. 3, 
no. 12,25 March 1994, pp. 18-37; Michael Radu, `Why Eastern and Central Europe Look West', 
Orbis, Winter 1997, 
pp. 39-57; Piotr Dutkiewicz and Slawomir Lodzinski, `The "Grey Zone" - Poland's 
Security Policy Sincc 1989', in 
Piotr Dutkiewicz and Robert J. Jackson (eds. ), NATO Looks East, (London: PRAEGER, 1998), pp. 87-98; Jane M. O. 
Sharp, 'Security Options for Central Europe', in Beverly Crawford (ed. ), The Future of European Security-, 
(Berkeley: International and Area Studies, Center for German and European Studies. University of California at 
Berkeley, 1992), pp. 54-78. 
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Western European Union (WEU), politically on the CSCE, and only to a lesser degree on 
bilateral links and small coalitions within the surrounding sub-region. 16 Russia was still perceived 
as an important element of the CE states' foreign and security policies, but not to the same degree 
and not in the same positive light as the Western nations. In such circumstances, some Russian 
analysts concluded, Russia could hardly conduct an active policy in that region - Central 
European nations, "like released prisoners, scattered in various directions, as soon as the doors of 
the Soviet Empire were suddenly opened wide before them". 17 
Moreover, as was observed earlier, the legacy of the past and elite and public perceptions played 
an important role in the way Russian and CE governments formed their policies towards each 
other. In the perception of the Russian foreign policy elite, CE remained a kind of `post-Soviet 
constituency' and it took a long time for many Russian elite and foreign policy cadres to get used 
to the fact that CE countries were sovereign and independent states. The traditional perception of 
the CE states as pawns in a broader struggle for dominance and hegemony by the great powers of 
Europe was still deeply entrenched in the minds of Russian policy makers. ' 8 This perception, in 
part, manifested itself as the debate about NATO enlargement was gaining momentum and 
Russia's ideas and half-hearted proposals for future security arrangements in Europe were not 
responded to adequately elsewhere in Europe. The CE states regained their prominence in 
Russian foreign and national security, if only indirectly, and became a crucial element in Russia's 
worsening relations with the West as plans to enlarge NATO started to take shape. 
16 Hieronim Kubiak, p. 70. 
17 Yevgeniy Bazhanov, `Top Priorities of Russian Foreign Policy, ' New Times, 
October 1995, p. 32. see also i"estnik 
nauchnoi informatsii, no. 13, (Moscow: IMPEI, 
1994), pp. 37-38. 
18Gerhard Mangot, `Russian Policies on Central and Eastern Europe: An Overview', 
European Securiti", vol. 8, no. 3, 
Autumn 1999, p. 46. 
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The Russian press at the time gave some insight into what other viewpoints on these issues 
existed within the country. A report, "Strategy for Russia: Strategy-I", prepared by the non- 
governmental Council on Foreign and Defence Policy (SVOP), appeared in Ne: avisimal-a gazeta 
in August 1992. The report, which, as it was subsequently claimed by its authors, exercised 
significant influence on official foreign policy, paid some attention to the CE region and 
signalled the beginning of the shift from Kozyrev's pro-Westernism to a more "pragmatic" 
foreign policy. Complaining that Russia had failed to produce a coherent foreign and military 
policy and overarching long-term national security strategy, the report called on the Russian 
authorities to make greater efforts to bring about an active policy towards Central Europe. The 
report argued that Russia would not benefit from the CE states becoming members of a security 
organisation that did not include Russia. Russia's isolation would increase if the CE states joined 
Western security structures such as the WEU and NATO. At the same time, the report was 
realistic in its assessments, arguing that the CE states would not occupy a first priority place in 
Russian foreign policy: 
The West is their priority; they are separated from Russia geographically; they do not 
have the means and technology to play a significant role in Russia's revival. Therefore, 
any attempts to place the CE states amongst Russia's top priorities are not realistic. 
Poland, because of its geopolitical position, has the biggest importance for Russia in the 
region (Slovakia can be named here as well). 19 
Following the start of this unofficial public debate and subsequent widening criticism of the 
current foreign policy line, a draft version of "The Concept of the Russian Federation's Foreign 
Policy" was published for public discussion in December 1992. It also represented a first attempt 
in post-Soviet Russia to produce an official foreign policy doctrine. 
Drafted by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Concept, after extensive reviewing and redrafting in the Security Council, 
was legally endorsed by President Yeltsin 
in April 1993.20 Generally domestically focused, 
19 Nezavisimaya Gazeta (19 August, 1992), The URL address of the text 
is http: //svop. ruldoklad 16. htm. 
20 The final version signed into law was never officially released. 
The draft v crslon appeared in Rossiti-. skie vc'sti, 3 
December 1992, p. 2. 
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emphasising that the main tasks of the country's foreign policy should be reviving Russia as a 
democratic and free country, creating conditions for shaping a market economy to match the 
status of a great power, the Concept marked a shift in Russia's foreign policy. What was striking 
about the Concept was that it gave unprecedented prominence to the former Soviet states and the 
protection of ethnic Russians in them, by military means if necessary. Commenting on the draft 
Concept, Foreign Minister Kozyrev emphasised that one of Russia's main priorities was creating 
a zone of good neighbourliness along all of Russia's borders. The Concept also articulated 
Russia's view of the role the CE region in this process. It called for: 
... reaching a qualitatively new level of political and economic relations with East European countries, utilising the positive experience accumulated in practical 
questions of cooperation. The strategic task is to prevent East Europe's transformation 
into a kind of buffer zone isolating us from the West. At the same time, we cannot 
allow Russia to be squeezed out of the East European region by Western powers. 2' 
The Concept revealed that Russia still perceived Central Europe as an important region for its 
national security, albeit in the context of a wider effort to avoid becoming isolated from the West. 
The Concept appeared to reflect a realisation that the current state of affairs between Russia and 
the CE states might lead to such isolation, and a concern that Russia was being pushed out of 
Central Europe and denied its say on the future of a region vital to its national security. For 
Russia, CE was only of secondary importance compared to the West and was still seen as an 
`object' rather than a `subject' of national security, a region whose future was to 
be decided 
between Russia and the West. 
The arrival of the Concept marked a move towards consensus 
in Russian national security and 
foreign policy thinking, the conclusion of the 
first and beginning of the second phase of post- 
Soviet Russian foreign policy. In a more energetic and active 
defence of national interests, the CE 
region was seen as a sphere of 
interests which required an active foreign policy. 




Russia's relations with the states of CE during the first phase of Russian foreign policy reveals, 
by contrast, a very inconsistent and reactive, rather than pro-active and coherent policy. The 
fluidity of the domestic situation, various state agencies competing for their say on foreign policy 
matters, as well as the complicated legacy of the Russia-CE mutual past, and systemic 
geopolitical changes in Europe are the main factors that shaped bilateral relations. The next part 
of this chapter looks into the development of bilateral relations between Russia and the Visegrad 
states in the period from 1991 to 1993. 
Russian National Security Policy and Russia-Central Europe bilateral relations - 1991- 1993 
The new treaties governing Russia's bilateral relations with the CE states were concluded at a 
time when Russia had not yet achieved consensus on its `realistic' foreign and security policy. 
That is why the new treaties between Russia and the Visegrad states, in most cases, were signed 
without any major obstructions or procrastinations in the course of 1992. The new Russian 
authorities did not insist on the inclusion of `security clauses' in the new bilateral treaties with the 
CE states, unlike their Soviet predecessors in 1990 and 1991, adopting an approach that was later 
labelled the `Kvitsinsky doctrine'. 22 In May 1992, a fundamental treaty was signed with Poland; 
the Czech and Slovak Republic signed a treaty in April 1992, and a Russian-Hungarian treaty 
followed in November 1992.23 In these treaties, the sides distanced themselves from the Soviet 
past and expressed an interest in developing economic relations designed in the interests of both 
sides. In negotiating the new treaties with Russia, the Visegrad states adhered to a coordinated 
standpoint that they had worked out while negotiating new treaties with the 
USSR in 1991. 
22 Yuliy Kvitsinsky at that time was the first deputy Foreign Minister under 
Shevardnadze and Bessmertnykh and the 
head of the Soviet delegations in the negotiations on new 
bilateral treaties with CE states in the 1990-91. Under that 
doctrine the Soviet side insisted on the introduction of a paragraph 
in the text of the agreements to the effect that the 
sides undertook not to enter into far-reaching alliances aimed against 
the other side and should coordinate with the 
USSR their foreign and security policy. See Akino Y. and Smith A. 
A., Russia-Ukraine- L isegrad Four: The Ko: V i-ev 
Doctrine in Action (Prague, New York: Institute for East-West Studies, 1993), p. 
4. 
`'' Andrew Cottey, East-Central Europe after the 
Cold U ar: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary in 
Search of Securitv. (Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
1995), p. 130 
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However, with the disintegration of the Czechoslovak Federation in January 1993, new treaties 
had to be negotiated with the Czech Republic (CR) and Slovakia, and they were signed in August 
1993. Whereas the Russian-Czech treaty was based on the old Russian-Czechoslovak agreement, 
the Russian-Slovak treaty differed in one significant area. The new Slovak leadership chose not 
to adhere to the common policy of the other Visegrad states in its relations with Russia. At the 
same time, by 1993 a more confident Russian foreign policy had emerged, based on wider 
domestic consensus that declared a more assertive policy towards the CIS and Central and East 
Europe. The emergence of Slovakia as an independent actor with an 'independent' foreign and 
security policy in the CE region presented Moscow with an opportunity to test its new found 
assertiveness. The new Russian-Slovak treaty proved to be a success in this respect. Although the 
kind of wording that the `Kvitsinsky doctrine' favoured was not to be found in the text of the new 
treaty, nevertheless, its basic tenets are clearly reflected in the document. The treaty stated that 
"the signatories to this treaty confirm that the security of Europe... is connected with the CSCE", 
that they should "assist in the creation of a unified all-European space in all of its dimensions", 
that they "shall individually face down any respective attempts to once again divide Europe in the 
economic and social spheres", and that they will develop "mutually convenient cooperation and 
contacts in the military spheres". 
24 According to a Slovak analyst, Svetoslav Bombik, the new 
treaty would make it more difficult for Slovakia to try to join the WEU or NATO. 
25 Slovak 
President Michal Kovac, however, took a different line, arguing that the treaty would enable 
Russia and Slovakia to cooperate in creating an all-European security system, and that 
it did not 
conflict with the Slovak Republic's goal of acceding to 
European economic, political and security 
24 S. Bombik, SME, 26 August 1993, cited in Alexander Duleba, From Domination to 
Partnership: The Perspectives 
of Russian-Central-East European Relations, 
Final Report to the NATO Research Fellowship Programme. 1996- 
1998 (unpublished monograph, 1998), p. 31. 
2 Ibid., p. 31. 
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structures. 26 The events in Moscow, in October 1993, however, led the Slovak President to 
revise his opinion on relations with Russia: as a consequence of a coup attempt in Moscow. he 
declared, "Bratislava considers it inevitable to obtain security-political guarantees from NATO. 
Unless democratic conditions in Russia and Ukraine are reinforced, the need for increasing 
security remains topical. X27 Russia's reaction was predictable. Yuri Ambartsumov, Chair of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee of the Russian Parliament, reacting to a Slovak MFA statement that 
the aim of Bratislava was to join NATO, bluntly drew attention to the wording of the bilateral 
treaty, which, in his view, excluded the possibility of Slovakia becoming a member of any 
regional pact, and "NATO is in that category". 28 
Russia managed to sign a treaty with Slovakia that was more ambiguous and open to 
interpretation than those it signed with Hungary, Poland and the CR. The latter started on the 
basis of the same text as the Russian-Slovak treaty. However, whereas the Prague diplomats 
neutralised their bilateral treaty with Russia by changing the wording of "to face down a new 
division of Europe" into "contribute to overcoming the divisions in Europe", Slovak diplomats, 
perhaps due to their inexperience, failed to notice the consequences that the ambiguity implied. 
29 
Apart from signing the new basic treaties, the first two years of post-Soviet Russian-CE 
diplomacy had to tackle other unsettled issues inherited from their Socialist past: issues related to 
Russian troop withdrawal and transit, claims for compensation for their stationing 
in Central 
Europe, and questions of Russian debt payments. In some cases the 
CE states made the 
successful resolution of these problems a precondition 
for signing state bilateral treaties. 
26 Narodna obroda, 27 August 1993, cited in 
Duleba, From Domination to Partnership, p. 31. 
27 SME, 26 November 1993, quoted ibid., p. 31 
28 SME, 23 September 1993, quoted ibid., p. 31. 
29Akino and Smith, Russia-Ukraine- Visegrad 
Four, p. 7. 
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In line with Russia's early attempts to portray itself as an entity different in political nature to its 
Soviet predecessor, Moscow strove to start relations with the CE states from a clean slate. Thus. 
Russia agreed to include in the preamble to the Russian-Hungarian treaty a condemnation of the 
Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956.3° Similarly, during Yeltsin's visit to Budapest in 
November 1992 (which became Yeltsin's first trip to the region), Russia and Hungary were 
supposed to take further steps to `close the book on a stage in their relations that was burdened 
with numerous problems'. 31 As a gesture of goodwill, President Yeltsin turned over to the 
Hungarian authorities a large packet of documents from the KGB and CPSU Central Committee 
archives. 
Yeltsin and the Hungarian leader Joszef Antall called the visit a "historical turning point" in 
Russian-Hungarian relations. 32 The two leaders managed to resolve the issue of mutual claims for 
compensation for the stationing of Soviet troops on the basis of renouncing their mutual claims. 
Yeltsin overruled his military and financial advisors, who had opposed such a deal on the basis 
that compensation to Russia would cover the cost of housing the returning Russian soldiers. As a 
part of the deal, Hungary agreed to provide "humanitarian aid" to Russia in the form of USD 10 
million worth of medicines for the Russian Army and to examine the feasibility of using its own 
resources to alleviate the housing problem. 
33 
Moscow and Budapest also reached a partial solution on settling the 
debt to Hungary that Russia 
inherited after the break-up of the USSR. 
34 Russia proposed to pay almost half of its USD 1.7 
30 The Russian Duma refused to ratify the treaty. In June 1994, the 
Duma took a decision that prohibited the 
inclusion of statements of an ideological character 
in treaties between the Russian Federation and other countries. 
The Russian-Hungarian treaty was amended and finally only came 
into force in February 1991. See Legislation in 
Russia Data Base, at http: //law. optima. ru 
31 Fyodor Lukyanov, `Zakryvaya knigu proshlogo, ' Izvestia, 
12 November 1992, pp. 1,4. 
32 Reisch, "Hungarian-Russian Relations Enter a New Era, 
" p. 6. 
33 Ibid.. p. 7. 
34 The issue of Russian-Hungarian debt settlements 
is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
67 
Chapter 3 
billion debt to Hungary in the form of spare parts and equipment for the Hungarian Army. 
Hungary requested a modern S-300 air-defence system which Russia turned down, offering NliG- 
29 combat aircraft and T-72 tanks instead. In June 1993, the Hungarian side accepted a deal 
which led to it acquiring twenty-eight MiG-29 aircraft worth USD 750 million and USD 50 
million worth of additional weapons (armour-piercing missiles), almost equivalent in value to 
Hungary's entire 1993 defence budget. 35 Russia also agreed to train pilots and ground crew to 
operate the new MiG-29s. Budapest's acquiescence to swapping a part of Russia's debt for MiG 
fighters marked a sizeable achievement for Moscow: Hungary had been the only state among the 
Visegrad four that did not have MiG-29 aircraft in its armed forces. The outbreak of military 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia in July 1991 revealed the weakness of Hungary's air force after 
the withdrawal of Soviet forces. Commenting on the deal, a Hungarian official from the Ministry 
of Industry and Trade said that the MiG-29 acquisition was a temporary expedient imposed upon 
Hungary by its dire lack of funds and that, in the long run, Hungary still wanted to equip its air 
forces with Western airplanes. 36 For Moscow, this meant that for the foreseeable future Hungary 
would remain dependent on Russia, making it more difficult for Hungary to achieve 
interoperability with NATO. 37 
Another important document signed during a visit to Hungary by President Yeltsin in November 
1992 concerned cooperation between the two countries' Defence Ministries. The accord included 
plans to train Hungarian officers at Russian military schools and allow the use of 
Russian firing 
ranges by the Hungarian Air Force and air defence units. 
38 Yeltsin's visit to Hungary, which also 
3 Alfred A. Reisch, "Hungary Acquires MIG-29s from Russia, " RFE/RL Research 
Report, Vol. 2. No. 33 (20 
August, 1993), p. 52. 
36 Ibid., p. 54. 
37 However, not everyone in Moscow saw this development 
in a positive light. Krasnaya zvezda voiced concerns that 
such large deliveries of military equipment to a country 
bordering the crisis zone of the former Yugoslavia 
constituted a serious matter and warned about the possibility of some of 
these deliveries finding their way to Croatia. 
Krasnava zvezda, 14 November 1992, quoted 
in Reisch, "Hungarian-Russian Relations Enter a NeýN Era, " p. 9. 
38 Ibid., p. 8. 
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saw the signing of an inter-state Treaty was heralded in the Russian mass media as a promising 
start for developing stable and cooperative relations between Russia and Hungary. Just before the 
visit, President Yeltsin declared that he deplored the delay in "reordering" Russia's relations with 
its neighbours in Central Europe and singled out Hungary as a positive exception. -'9 The 
agreements were concluded at the time when Budapest was attempting `non-confrontational 
distancing' from Russia in favour of closer ties with the West. Russia made an attempt to build 
on a common important problem that it shares with Hungary - about 25 million ethnic Russians 
and 3.5 million Hungarians live outside their country of origin. Both sides signed a Declaration 
on the Principles of Cooperation in Guaranteeing the Rights of Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic 
Minorities, condemning all measures aimed at forcibly assimilating minorities or altering the 
ethnic composition of areas inhabited by minorities. 40 The two countries declared their intention 
to promote the international codification of minority rights and to coordinate their actions in fora 
such as the UN and the CSCE. Moscow also emerged as an important ally for Hungary during its 
stint on the UN Security Council . 
41 Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev hailed the agreement as a 
contribution to containing "aggressive nationalism" and ethnic cleansing in Europe . 
42 Some 
Hungarian officials believed that the two countries' common stance on the minority issue might 
also prevent the formation of alliances directed against Hungary or 
its minorities that would seek 
to obtain Russia's support, e. g. by states such as Slovakia. 
43 Russia, for its part, hoped that 
Hungary would support its position with respect to Moscow's policy towards 
the Baltic states and 
protection of Russian minorities in this region. 
However, much to Moscow's disappointment, 
Budapest neither took `an active position' nor cooperated with 
Russia on the issues relating to 
what Russia called the `protection of rights of 
the minorities in the Baltics and Moldova'. 
44 As 
39 ITAR-TASS, 8 November, 1992, quoted ibid., p. 5. 
40 Reisch, "Hungarian-Russian Relations Enter a New 
Era, " p. 8. 
41 Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Societe' (London: 
Routledge, 1993), p. 305. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Radio Budapest, 12 December 1992, cited Reisch, 
"Hungarian-Russian Relations Enter a New Era, " p. 8. 
44 Yuri Monich, and 0. Volotova, "Russia-Hungary, 
Vestnik Nauchnoi Informatsii, No. 12 (1994), p. 40. 
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Hungarian observer Läszlö Pöti argued, the Hungarian side did not want to be associated with 
growing Russian assertiveness. 45 
The new stage in Russian-Polish relations also began with the signing of a groundwork treaty 
during President Lech Walesa's visit to Russia in May 1992.46 Unlike Russia's agreements with 
other CE states, Russian-Polish negotiations on the new treaty came up against some difficulties 
as both sides made resolution of various outstanding issues a precondition for signing the new 
treaty. Both Moscow and Warsaw had financial requirements of each other - Moscow wanted 
compensation for its investments in Polish military infrastructure, whereas Warsaw wanted 
Moscow to pay compensation for the use of Polish territory by the Soviet/Russian troops. 47 The 
Russian side insisted that the timetable of troop withdrawal would depend on reaching an 
agreement on financial obligations. 48 Various proposals on joint use of former Soviet military 
bases provoked objections by some Polish government officials. 49 Furthermore, some members 
of the Polish government were said to have demanded that a condemnation of past Soviet crimes 
against Poles during and after World War II, such as the Katyn massacre, be included in a 
preamble to the Russian-Polish treaty. Various influential political figures in Poland claimed that 
since Russia was a legal successor to the USSR it bore responsibility for all totalitarian 
excesses. 50 The Russian authorities, however, refused to include any such reference in the treaty. 
4' Läsl6 P6ti, "The Hungarian-Ukrainian-Russian Triangle: Not Like Rubik's Cube, " in Margarita Balmaceda (ed. ) 
On the Edge. Ukrainian-Central European-Russian Security Triangle, (Budapest: Central European University 
Press, 2000), p. 135. 
46 The treaty under discussion was based on a draft agreement reached between Poland and the USSR in October 
1991 and then amended during a series of negotiations between Russian and Polish diplomats. See Jan B. de 
Weydenthal, "Poland and Russia Open a New Chapter in their Relations, " RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 25 
(19 June 1992): p. 46. 
47 Jan B. de Weydenthal, "Polish-Russian Relations Disturbed by Troop Dispute, " RFEIRL Research Report (13 
March 1992), pp. 32-34, p. 34. 
48 Ibid., p. 34. 
49 Many members of the Polish government opposed some aspects of a suggested 
financial settlement regulating the 
cost of the Soviet military withdrawal that allowed establishment of private 
Polish-Russian joint ventures to be set up 
in some of the vacated Soviet garrisons. The profits 
from these joint companies would be used to build housing for 
returning Russian soldiers. See op. cit., p. 47. 
50 Ibid. p. 47. 
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Eventually, in a joint declaration issued after the signing of the Treaty, the two Presidents 
condemned totalitarianism and stated their resolve to overcome the negative heritage of the past. 
Nezavisimaya gazeta commented that in light of the stagnation in bilateral relations the signing of 
the treaty was not a breakthrough in itself but was a sign that such a breakthrough was possible. ,1 
At least Russia had confirmed the timetable for troop withdrawal and a `zero option' been agreed 
on compensation: Poland dropped claims for environmental damages and Russia agreed to hand 
over its military installations on Polish territory free of charge. 52 The Polish side linked 
improvements in bilateral relations with the completion of Russian troop withdrawal. 53 A year 
later an agreement was reached on the supply of Russian spare parts to the Polish Army and on 
training of military personnel in each other's military academies. 54 The military cooperation 
agreement was significant in its timing. While it came last in a series of deals with Poland's 
neighbours and with some Western countries, it also closely followed a controversial tour of 
Central Europe by President Yeltsin in late August 1993, when he appeared to accept Poland's 
membership in NATO. 55 This episode is dealt with in more detail later in the chapter. The 
controversy that followed Yeltsin's declaration and subsequent backlash in Moscow led to a 
cooling of bilateral relations with Poland and the rest of CE. 
51 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 23 May 1992.; A popular Polish paper Gazeta 
Wvborcza, on the other hand, described the 
event as `a great breakthrough' see Weydenthal, "Poland and 
Russia Open a New Chapter, " p. 48. 
52 Hieronim Kubiak, "Poland: National Security in a Changing Environment, " in Central and 
Eastern Europe: The 
Challenge of Transition, Regina Cowen Karp (ed. ) (Oxford: 
SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 80. Later, 
during his first official trip to Russia as Polish President in March 
1996, Aleksander Kwasniewski renewed Polish 
claims for compensation, see "Poland: Polish, Russian 
Priorities for Negotiations Differ, " FBIS, EEur, March 18 
1996, p. 53, quoted in Michael Radu, "Why Eastern and 
Central Europe Look West, " Orbis, Winter (1997), p. 51. 
53 Weydenthal, "Poland Free of Russian Combat Troops, " p. 35. 
54 Nikolai Bukharin, A. P. Yershov, "Russia-Poland, " Vestnik Nauchnoi 




Russia, NATO and the Role of Central Europe 
The problem of post-Cold War security arrangements in Europe and the role of the surviving 
European security institutions were at the centre of both academic and policy-related debates in 
the early 1990s. By 1993 Russian and Central Europeans' ideas on the European security 
architecture increasingly diverged and this divergence directly affected bilateral relations. 
Pragmatic nationalists, or Statists, espousing a more hard-line Realist approach to international 
relations, advocating a multi-polar world-system and insisting on an independent, pragmatic 
foreign policy, increasingly came to dominate the Russian political sphere. This marked a shift 
from a previously more idealist, Kozyrev-defined Westernism, and led to a more hard-line 
posture on the international arena. The increasingly widely shared opposition in Russia to the 
NATO enlargement championed by CE leaders became progressively more marked and 
encouraged the rise of the region's prominence in Russian foreign and security policy, but only as 
an indirect variable in Russia's debate with the West over the issue of NATO enlargement. 
The distrust and alienation that characterised Russia-CE relations at the start of the decade only 
deepened and became more profound as the CE states' insistence on NATO membership 
intensified and as enlargement started to be seriously considered as an option by the Alliance 
leaders, mainly Germany and the USA. To start with, Russia did not seem to have a coordinated 
and consistent standpoint on NATO enlargement. In his article written for NATO Revieit' 
in 
February 1993, Foreign Minister Kozyrev voiced implicit opposition to NATO membership for 
Central Europe, emphasising that the region's future "lies in its transformation - not 
into some 
kind of buffer zone, but into a bridge linking the East and the 
West of the continent. 56 Speaking 
to the Danish Foreign Policy Society in Copenhagen later the same month, 
Kozyrev spoke 
56 Andrey Kozyrev, `The New Russia and the Atlantic Alliance, ' N TO 




strongly against the prospect of NATO enlargement and questioned the logic of expansion by 
NATO: 
We are not allergic to NATO... But we do not understand the discussions to the effect that NATO must give security guarantees to the countries of Central Europe and in the long term accept them as members of the alliance. How are these states threatened and by 
whom? 57 
Before Yeltsin's trip to Central Europe in late August 1993, Kozyrev warned that if Poland 
became a member of NATO it would strengthen the position of hard-liners within Russia - one 
of a string of reasons Russia used to justify its opposition. 58 Russian officials appealed to NATO 
member states' leaderships, arguing that the enlargement of the Alliance that Russians 
traditionally saw as hostile would endanger Russia's democratisation and reforms. 
All these manoeuvrings were undermined, however, during Yeltsin's subsequent state visit to 
Central Europe. When asked by a reporter how Russia would react if Poland decided to seek 
NATO membership, the Russian President responded that the days of 'big brother-little brother' 
relations were long past and that it was not Russia's place to approve or oppose Poland's decision 
on such membership. 59 The Russian-Polish joint declaration signed at the end of the visit was 
more explicit: 
The presidents touched on the matter of Poland's intention to join NATO. President 
[Lech] Walesa set forth Poland's well-known position on the issue, which met with 
understanding from President B. N. Yeltsin. In the long term, such a decision taken 
by a sovereign Poland in the interests of overall European integration does not go 
against the interests of other states, including the interests of Russia. 
6o 
57 Diplomaticheskii vestnik, nos. 5-6, March 1993, cited in Suzanne 
Crow, `Russian Views on an Eastward 
Expansion of NATO, ' RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 
41, October 1993. p. 23. 
58 Michael Mihalka, `Squaring the Circle: NATO's Offer to the East, ' RFE/RL 
Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 12,2S 
March 1994, p. 3. 
5" Suzanne Crow, `Russian Views on an Eastward Expansion of NATO, 
' RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2. No. 41, 
October 1993, p. 21. 
60 ITAR-TASS, 25 August 1993, quoted Ibid. 
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The next day, in Prague, when Yeltsin was asked about his views on the Czechs joining NATO. 
the President reiterated his position: "Russia does not have the right to prevent a sovereign state 
from joining a European organization. 5561 
Yeltsin's statements and the joint declaration, although they did not explicitly declare Russia's 
approval of NATO enlargement, were interpreted in the CE capitals as reflecting a shift in 
Russian policy, one that removed the major objection that NATO had been using to ward off 
those states wishing to join the alliance. As a result, Poland renewed its appeal to join NATO, 
mobilising the Polish American Congress to lobby for its case in the United States. 62 Later, in 
apparent response to Yeltsin's remarks, former German Defence Minister and then NATO 
Secretary-General Manfred Wörner for the first time stated that NATO was not `a closed shop: 
In my view, the time has come to open a more concrete perspective to those countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe which want to join NATO and which we may consider 
eligible for membership.... Even if there are no immediate plans to enlarge NATO, 
such a move would increase the stability of the whole of Europe and is in the interest 
of all nations, including Russia and Ukraine. I am happy that President Yeltsin also 
sees it this way. 63 
Russian officials, alarmed by such interpretations, moved quickly to reinterpret the official 
Russian position. 64 Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, a member of the Presidential Council and chairman 
of the Parliamentary Committee for International Affairs, dismissed Yeltsin's comments and 
actions in Warsaw as improvisations, saying that they would be "reinterpreted" at a later date. 
65 
The Russian media largely ignored the matter, while Russian diplomats started to backtrack on 
Yeltsin's statement. In mid-September the Russian Ambassador to Poland stated that Yeltsin's 
61 Michael Michalka, op. cit., p. 3. 
62 Rev/cii, of the Role of the Polish American Congress in Bringing Poland into NATO, Polish American Congress, 
http: //www. polamcon. org/nato/chron2. html 
63 G. Wörner's speech at a meeting of the International Institute for Strategic Studies cited in M. Mihalka, `Squaring 
the Circle.., ' p. 3. 
64 Some observers argued that Yeltsin's statement was nothing more than improvisation on his part. Several of his 
foreign trips were characterised by such off-the-cuff remarks and each time his advisors went down to great lengths 
to tone down his statements and reinterpret them. 
See Suzanne Crow, `Russian Views..., ' p. 21. 
65 ̀Europa', Austrian Television, 12 September 1993, cited in Suzanne Crow, `Russian Views.... ' p. 21. 
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comments were "oversimplified and misunderstood". 66 Some commentators insisted that there 
had been misunderstandings of key phrases such as "long term" and especially "in the interest of 
overall European integration", which for the Russian side implied the inclusion of Russia. 67 
Foreign Minister Kozyrev followed up with his own vigorous campaign to `clarify' Yeltsin's 
statements. The Foreign Minister noted that Russia appreciated the CE states' sovereign rights to 
choose their own alliance partners, but at the same time expressed the belief that Russian security 
interests also had to be taken into consideration. Kozyrev argued that NATO should become a 
new type of organisation reflecting the security concerns of post-Cold War Europe: "It is not a 
matter of increasing the number of NATO team members playing on the European field but of 
reconstructing the field itself and adjusting the rules of the game to apply to the new 
conditions. "68 A few days later in an interview with Stern he emphasised the importance of the 
need to integrate Russia into international organisations, NATO included. 69 Kozyrev also called 
on NATO to make establishing real contact with the Russian armed forces its top priority, while 
noting that "for the security of Europe this is of much greater importance than a hasty expansion 
of NATO to include Poland or Hungary". 70 
This shift in official rhetoric can be attributed, in part, to the deeply negative assessment of 
possible NATO enlargement shared by the Russian military establishment and civilian military 
analysts, who feared that Russia would become isolated next to an overwhelmingly dominant 
military bloc. 7' During Yeltsin's visit to Warsaw, Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev made 
66Cited in Michael Michalka, p. 3. 
67 Allen Lynch, `After Empire: Russia and Its Western Neighbors, ' RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 12, March 
1994, p. 14. 
68 Moskovskie novosti, no. 39,26 September, 1993, p. 7. 
69 Stern, no. 40,30 September 1993, cited in Suzanne Crow, `Russian Views, ' p. 22. 
70 Ibid. 
71 The Russian Ministry of Defence was created only in March of 1993, however its political influence increased 
after the storming of the White House 
in October 1993. See Mike Bowker, Russian Foreign Policv and the End of 
the Cold War (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997). p. 209. 
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it clear he had his own opinion about Poland's aspirations to join NATO. 72 In October of that 
year Grachev stated: "It would be unfortunate if the former Warsaw Pact states joined NATO in 
the near future, because this step would relegate Russia to a much more isolated position. "73 
Faced with increasingly consolidated opposition at home to NATO enlargement, President 
Yeltsin sent a letter to the leaders of the United States, France, the United Kingdom and Germany 
in late September 1993, stating that any expansion by NATO must give due consideration to 
Russia's security concerns. Instead of pushing through NATO enlargement the Russian President 
proposed setting up joint arrangements for guaranteeing the security of Central Europe. 74 He also 
insisted that these states could become members of NATO only if Russia did so too. 75 This 
episode marked a turning point in the solidifying of Russian official opposition to NATO 
enlargement. It also caused the NATO Secretary-General to backtrack on his previous position on 
the possible opening up of NATO, stating that granting NATO membership to the Central 
European states could occur only "in a way which takes into account the legitimate security 
interests of our partner, Russia". 76 
Later, in November 1993, an unprecedented official public commentary on the prospect of 
NATO enlargement was issued by Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) headed by 
Yevgeniy Primakov. The text of the report was approved by the President, who recommended 
that it was "topical, all the "I"s should finally be dotted; it is felt at the same time that the 
intelligence service does not `stir up passions', quite the opposite, it stands for strengthening 
72 Alfred A. Reisch, "Central Europe's Disappointments and Hopes, " RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 3, no. 12 (25 
March, 1994), p. 24. 
73 Reuters, 1 October 1993, cited in Crow, `Russian Views... ', p. 14. 
74 David White, `Nato Allies to Reassure Yeltsin', Financial Times, 2 October, 1993, p. 2. 
75 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 October 1993, cited in Crow. `Russian Views... ', p. 22. 
76 Cited in Mihalka, 'Squaring the Circle..., ' p. 3. 
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stability and contributes to the improvement of our relations with the West. "77 The report, 
entitled "Prospects for Expanding NATO and Russia's Interests", presented with great fanfare in 
Moscow, argued that NATO expansion would adversely affect Russia's military security, foreign 
policy, and geopolitical interests in Central and Eastern Europe. According to FIS head 
Primakov, the report later became the basis for the official Russian stand on enlargement. 78 The 
report stated: 
In the circumstances of the post-confrontational period and the absence of the so- 
called `bloc discipline' which existed until the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty 
Organization, Russia has no right to dictate the states of Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) whether they can join NATO or any other international organisation. 
However, the report went on to suggest: 
The process of Central and Eastern Europe states' joining NATO, its nature, 
deadlines, responsibilities and duties of new members, should take into account the 
position of all states affected by the process, Russia included, ... and [the process 
should take into account] the obligations to comply with all international 
agreements that aspiring NATO candidates are signatories to. The fulfilment of the 
aforementioned factors could create conditions conducive to upgrading NATO- 
Russian relations to the level of real partnership. 79 
Primakov commented that Russia could not be "indifferent to the fact that the world's biggest 
military grouping plans to reach right up to our border. " He asserted that NATO expansion would 
lead to retaliatory military measures on the part of Russia. Such a response, Primakov, argued, 
would entail a radical rethinking of Russia's defence concepts, a change in operational plans, and 
a reworking and redeployment of the armed forces. 80 Although "we are a long way from making 
a direct statement that NATO expanding into the East is the same as the bridgehead for making a 
strike at Russia, " Yevgeniy Primakov argued, "Russia has every reason to weigh up the course of 
77 Yevgeniy Primakov, Gody v bol'shoi politike [Years in Big Politics], (Moscow: Kollektsiia "Sovershenno 
Sekretno", 1999), p. 229. 
78 F. Stephen Larrabee and Theodore Karasik, Foreign and Security Policy Decisionniaking under Yeltsin (Santa 
Monica: RAND, National Defense Research Institute, 1997), p. 27. 
79 Primakov, p. 228. 
80 `Primakov Presents Report on NATO, ' Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian, 1050 GMT 25 
November, 1993 (FBIS-SOV-93-226), p. 4. 
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events affecting its interests against possible changes in the geopolitical and military 
situation. "81 A reformed Russia, he concluded, had the right to count upon its view being taken 
into account. 82 
Immediately after Primakov's press conference the Russian Foreign Ministry staged its own 
briefing, at which a spokeswoman announced that the FIS report was purely an opinion of that 
agency: 
The position of the Foreign Ministry, which reflects the opinion of the President, is 
that NATO does not threaten Russia; any state can choose any means of strengthening 




The confusion was only ended when President Yeltsin's press spokesman Vyacheslav Kostikov 
announced that the President shared the intelligence service's point of view. 84 The episode 
demonstrated yet again the degree of disorder that reigned in Russian foreign policy, and the way 
various agencies competed for influence in communicating their views. There was also evidence 
of an emerging consensus around essentially anti-NATO expansion thinking. Yet, the common 
stand on how Russia should respond to a possible incorporation of the CE states into the Alliance 
was still only in the process of emerging. 
A new national security concept was put forward for public discussion in November 1993, re- 
evaluating the dangers from the West in the light of the possibility of NATO incorporating the 
CE states. The "Basic Provisions of Russian Federation Military Doctrine, " were marked by the 
withdrawal of a long-standing Soviet pledge of no first nuclear strike. The shift reflected not just 
the decline of the Russian armed forces' conventional capabilities, but also the deep-seated 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Primakov, p. 229 
84 Ibid, p. 230. 
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negative attitude of the Russian military towards NATO and its plans to enlarge. 85 The 
consolidation of Russian political groupings around the policy of firm resistance to NATO 
enlargement, supported by the military, further complicated prospects for productive bilateral 
relations with the states of CE. Moscow's strategy on the issue was to concentrate its efforts on 
the key NATO member-states. 
Russia's internal political developments in the period, the evolution of its policy towards the 
states of the former Soviet Union, and its position vis-ä-vis Serbia and the West, further damaged 
Russia's image in Central Europe. Central Europeans' fears about the future of their Eastern 
neighbour seemed justified in the light of Yeltsin's handling of political crisis in October 1993, 
which ended in the shelling of the Russian parliament. The subsequent rise in popularity and 
strong presence in the new Russian Duma of the extreme nationalist party of Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky and of a re-invigorated Communist party also did not bode well for the new Russia. 
Russian foreign policy adjusted in response to the changed political situation at home. Yeltsin's 
flirtations with the West were replaced by disagreements over the handling of the war now raging 
in Yugoslavia. 86 Even some of Russia's prominent liberal reformers at the time, such as 
Ambartsumov, and presidential advisors Sergey Stankevich and Andranik Migranyan criticized 
Kozyrev's handling of the Yugoslav crisis. They called for Russia to stop blindly duplicating the 
US position. 87 
85 ̀Osnovnye polozheniia voennoi doktriny Rossiikoi Federatsii" Krasnaya zvezda, (4 Novemeber 1993), quoted in 
J. L. Black, Russia Faces NATO Expansion. Bearing Gifts or Bearing Arnis? (Lanham, Oxford: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, INC., 2000), p. 156. 
86 Allen Lynch and Reneo Lukic, "Russian Foreign Policy and the Wars in the Former Yugoslavia, " RFE/RL 
Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 41 (15 October, 1993), pp. 25-32. 
87 Lynch, "Russian Foreign Policy and the Wars in the Former, " p. 29. See also Mike Bowker, Russian Foreign 
Policy and the End of the Cold War (Aldershot: 
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Russia's `near abroad' policy also showed a more traditional colouring: Moscow succeeded in 
bringing the majority of the CIS member-states into a Collective Security Pact, which came into 
force in 1994.88 Russia dismissed allegations that its efforts to deepen CIS integration were in 
response to NATO expansion plans. 89 These efforts, nevertheless, further helped fuel the 
arguments in CE about Russia's imperial ambitions. 90 
This consolidation of Russian opposition to NATO enlargement followed an initial post-Soviet 
period in Russia-CE relations during which, as we have seen, new groundwork state treaties were 
signed and Russian armed forces withdrew from the region in an orderly and peaceful manner. 
State relations, however, were reduced, in most cases, to negotiating repayment of debts inherited 
by Russia from the Soviet Union. When it came to the security problems and anxieties that both 
sides had, including that of the possibility of NATO enlargement, there did not seem to be any 
will on the part of either Russia or the CE states to discuss them with each other. This state of 
affairs was not surprising in view of the historical legacy. Diverging views on post-Cold War 
security became the fundamental theme in relations between Russia and the states of Central 
Europe. 
This more or less neutral period was followed, from 1993, by one in which the issue of NATO 
enlargement gradually overshadowed all other aspect of relations. As Russian observer Aleksei 
88 Only six members of the ten strong CIS signed the Collective Security Pact on 15 May 1992 in Tashkent (Russia, 
Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan). The Pact was confirmed in "Section III. Collective 
Security and Military-Political Cooperation, " Articles 11-15, of the CIS Charter, signed in Minsk, 22 January 1993, 
by the above six states, plus Belarus. Azerbaijan and Georgia joined in 1994. See "Ustav Sodruzhestva 
Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv" [Charter of the CIS], Rossiyskaya gazeta (12 February 1993), and "Reshenie Soveta glav 
gosudarstv Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv" [Decision of the Council of the Heads of the CIS states], 
Rossiystia_vva gazeta (12 February 1993), cited in J. L. Black, Russia Faces NATO Expansion, p. 221 f. 
89 Andrey Zagorski, "Regional Structure of Security Policy within the CIS, " in Security Dilemmas in Russia and 
Eurasia, Roy Allison and Christoph Bluth (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Russia and Eurasia 
Programme, 1998), p. 298. 
90 Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition. American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War 
(Washington, D. C: The Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 789-790. 
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Pushkov put it, the latter had by 1994 assumed the character of "controlled mutual antipathy". 91 
Pushkov listed the main grievances that official Moscow had with respect to Central Europe. The 
former allies, he complained, built their policies of rapprochement with the West on the basis of 
pitting themselves against Russia - supposedly historical enemy likely to turn hostile again at any 
moment. The radical changes in Russia's political system, the new nature of its foreign policy 
and its numerous apologies to the Central Europeans, dating from the Gorbachev era, were 
discounted. As Pushkov saw it, the Central Europeans considered this to be no more than a 
consequence of Russia's temporary weakness, and as such something to take advantage of. The 
Poles in particular, he claimed, played the `new Eastern threat' card to the utmost in order to 
secure membership of NATO. After first two years of a restrained attitude towards the region's 
countries, the Russian authorities had become increasingly irritated, he commented, with CE 
states' behaviour, especially with that of Poland. Russia's negative attitude towards NATO 
enlargement was reinforced by the fact that NATO's would-be new members were anti-Russian 
by disposition. However, Pushkov acknowledged, Moscow helped along this process of 
alienation by cultivating exclusive ties with the West and arrogantly ignoring CE. Official 
statements to the effect that Eastern and Central Europe were a priority for Russia never had any 
practical consequences. The appointment of a deputy foreign minister with responsibilities for the 
region in an attempt to bring more substance to Russia-CE relations came too late and had only 
limited effect. 92 
Yeltsin's visits to the region described above (the only ones undertaken during the two terms of 
his presidency), as well as subsequent visits by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to 
Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, and Foreign Minister Kozyrev's meetings 
91 Aleksei Pushkov, `Vostochnaya Evropa - vremia sobirat' kamni, ' Moskovskie novosti, July 30 - August 6,1995, 
p. 8. Alexei Pushkov was at the time chief editor of 
Moskovskie novosti, and member of the presidium of the Council 




with his CE counterparts, can be interpreted as attempts to improve relations. Those exchanges, 
however, failed to resolve fundamental differences over security. The Russian side made only 
half-hearted attempts to reach an understanding with the region's states. This could be interpreted 
as a demonstration of residual `big power' arrogance. As before, Moscow's overall approach to 
its relations with Central Europe was not systematic, and state visits remained isolated events 
which failed to raise bilateral relations to a new level. 
Moscow and the Central Europeans' uncompromising positions on NATO enlargement and the 
alliance's post-Cold War mission made it doubly difficult to achieve a rapprochement. Moreover, 
Russia's arrogance and inability to view the former allies on equal terms, as well as the Central 
Europeans' biased attitude towards Russia, were significant barriers to the development of 
productive dialogue. High-level communication between Russia and the CE states deteriorated to 
an unprecedented level. As one of Russia's leading specialists on Central Europe, Irina 
Kobrinkskaya, has commented, for Russia the period from 1991 onwards was not only one of 
withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe and a weakening of its position, but also one 
without a dialogue. It was a period of monologues, solo arias by two competing soloists deaf to 
each other. 93 Discussions of Russia's relations with the former `fraternal' states in CE were 
sparse inside Russia, and appeared to cause fatigue and irritability among Russian politicians and 
analysts, evidence according to Kobrinskaya of their inability to rid themselves of old 
condescending attitudes. 
94 
Russian National Security and Central Europe - 1994-1997 
In Central Europe, despite the changes in political leadership, a foreign and national security 
policy consensus had emerged which called 
for rapid integration with Western security and 
9; Irina Kobrinskaya, Rossiya i Tsentral'naya Vostochnaya Evropa posle "Kholodnoi Voiny" (Moscow Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Carnegie Moscow Center, 1997), p. 95. 
94 Ibid, p. 97. 
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economic institutions. A different kind of consensus begun to emerge in Russia by 1994. The 
shift in Russian national security and foreign policy that had started to appear from 1992 came to 
be clearly articulated on an official level and supported by Russia's major political groupings. 
The major thrust of the new Russia's conceptualisation of its national security was the insistence 
on being a great power, with a responsibility to uphold its interests vigorously, especially in the 
area of the former Soviet Union, and on developing pragmatic and competitive rather than 
subordinate relations with the West. Russia categorically opposed the creation of security 
structures in Europe of which it would not be a part. Moscow's attitude towards NATO 
enlargement was encapsulated in Foreign Minister Kozyrev's statement that NATO enlargement 
"does not answer either the interests of Russia's national security or the interests of European 
security as a whole". 95 As a result of NATO enlargement, Russian leaders believed, the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe would be weakened. It was the CSCE that 
should play the main role in making the system of Euro-Atlantic collaboration truly stable and 
democratic. 96 Russia's proposals regarding the upgrading and reform of the CSCE evoked only 
criticism in the West, and went against CE's hopes of getting security guarantees from NATO. 
The CE states played an important role by lobbying against Russia's ideas about changing the 
CSCE. 97 The West's refusal to heed Moscow's proposals and take its interests into account only 
fuelled resentment among Russia's conservatives and nationalists that the West was taking 
advantage of their country's weakness to further weaken its regional and global influence. Such a 
frame of mind was certain to put the West and Russia if not on a collision course then on a steady 
path that would drive them further apart. The Central Europeans' drive to be admitted into 
9' Kozyrev's statement in Noordwijk, quoted in Black, Russia Faces NATO Expansion, pp. 12-13. 
96 Izvestia, 1l March 1994, p. 3. 
97 Kirill Benediktov, "Rossiya i OBSE: Real'nye i Mnimye Vozmozhnosti Sotrudnichestva" in Rossiva i Osnovnve 
Institutv Bezopasnosti v Evrope: Vstupava i' XXI Vek, ed. by Dmitriy Trenin (Moscow: Tsentr Kamegi, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2000), pp. 188-189. 
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Western security organisations, which unequivocally put them on the wrong side of Russia's 
vision of European security, was one of the prime reasons for the developing schism. 
In January 1994, NATO announced the PfP, which offered all existing North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council (NACC) member-states and members of the CSCE extensive military 
cooperation with the alliance, but no security guarantees. To begin with, the Visegrad states' 
leaders embraced the idea. However, they later expressed disappointment about the absence of 
collective security guarantees in the PfP and about its broad membership. The CE leaders saw the 
PfP more as a "placebo" rather than a step towards eventual membership of NATO. They 
interpreted NATO's failure to open its doors to ex-Warsaw Pact countries as a consequence of 
the West paying too much attention to Russia's sensibilities and objections. Poland's President 
Lech Walesa, in particular, could not conceal his disappointment, arguing that `the West is trying 
to tame the Russian bear and it is a lost cause. '98 
Russia's initial reaction was to embrace the PfP formula. However, later a debate erupted in 
Moscow, with some claiming that Russia should only sign up to the agreement on terms that 
would underline Russia's special status as a great power. After prolonged deliberation and 
attempts to seek a special status within the programme that NATO refused to assign it, Russia 
formally joined the PfP. The government justified its move as a way of avoiding NATO 
enlargement but there were dissenting voices. Many saw the PfP as a form of `creeping' NATO 
membership. Russian Defence Minister General Grachev called the PfP "NATO expansion by 
hook or by crook" aimed at establishing strategic influence in Central and Eastern Europe and 
moving NATO's forward lines up to Russia's western borders. 
99 The very fact of Russia's 
membership of the PfP, which was intended to reassure Moscow and establish a more 
98 Segod»va, 25 February 1994, p. 3. 
99 Rossiyskaya gazeta, 25 March 1994. p. 6. 
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institutionalised cooperation between NATO and Moscow, `boomeranged by discrediting the 
structure and speeding up the race to join NATO'. 100 Russia's participation in NATO's PfP «was 
viewed by some in Central Europe as part of an attempt by Russia to prevent NATO enlargement 
by portraying the PfP as an alternative. 101 It is doubtful that Moscow really saw participation in 
the PfP as a way of preventing NATO enlargement. It rather reflected Moscow's fear of being 
marginalised and downgraded to the level of the other post-Soviet states. 102 Russia's insistence 
on special status highlighted the psychological dislocation of the Russian political elite, and the 
whole process underlined Moscow's sense of insecurity and distrust of the West's intentions. All 
this made the `political distance' between Moscow and CE even more difficult to bridge. 
As a result, in the course of 1994, just as the debates on NATO enlargement were reaching a 
crucial point, Russia's political relations with the states of CE precipitously declined and 
`stabilised' at the level of open `mutual antipathy'. 103 Russian observers and policy-makers 
repeatedly complained that nearly all the aspiring NATO members were harping on the potential 
threat from Russia. ' 04 Such references, coupled with what Russia saw as the West and Central 
Europeans' lack of understanding regarding its security concerns, helped to further ingrain the 
hostile attitude towards NATO enlargement in Moscow. 
The CE states' bid for NATO membership came at a very inopportune time from the point of 
view of their relations with Russia and Russia's wider relations with Europe and the West. The 
NATO enlargement debate took place at a time when Russia's post-Soviet revolutionary liberal 
ideas were being re-appraised and were coming under attack from a wide spectrum of nationalist 
100 Radu, "Why Eastern and Central Europe Look West, " p. 47. 
10' Ibid. 
102 Baranovsky, "The Changing Security Perspective in Europe, " p. 61. 
103 Slovakia, for various reasons, made an exception to the rule. 
104 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 23 February 1994, p. 4. 
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and conservative forces in the Russian political establishment. Liberal-internationalists' or 
Westernisers' ideas about a `natural alliance' with the West were discredited, largely due to the 
severe socio-economic dislocation brought about by liberal reforms implemented on advice from 
the West. The backlash against rapid changes, associated with general disillusionment with the 
West, brought to power and influence forces that saw the world and Russia's position in it 
through a Realist lens, emphasising Russia's geopolitical situation as the point of departure in 
assessing and pursuing its national interests. Russia's new geostrategic vision of the CE region 
was of a belt of de facto neutral and militarily weak states, one of the advantages that Russia 
emerged with from the Cold War confrontation. 105 The CE states became a buffer zone separating 
Russia from NATO. Preservation of the status quo, therefore, served Russia's security interests 
best. 106 It was from this point of view that the Russian military argued against NATO's advance 
towards Russia's borders. Russia's deputy Defence Minister at the time Andrey Kokoshin, 
argued that 
The existence of the non-aligned neutral states in the very centre of Europe, according to 
our repeatedly checked estimates, considerably reduces the offensive potential of the 
sides in the event of a hypothetical armed conflict. To this we should add the fact that 
NATO's advance to the East will deal a painful (and perhaps fatal) blow to many spheres 
of arms limitation and reduction. 107 
Russia's assessment that NATO enlargement would invalidate the Conventional Forces in 
Europe Treaty (CFE) and threaten stability in Europe became one of the key propositions in 
advancing military-political arguments against enlargement. Even 
before NATO enlargement 
was considered a possibility, Moscow was unhappy with the 
CFE Treaty arrangements that were 
reached as the Cold War was ending and 
demanded revision of a Treaty that it deemed unfair in 
105 "Russia and NATO", The SVOP report, 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 21 June1995. 
Vostochnaya Evropa, p. 106 On the criticism of such a perception of 
CE see Kobrinskaya, Rossiya i Tsentral'nava 
101. 




the new security environment. 108 With NATO enlargement becoming more likely, the Russian 
military threatened to abandon the Treaty entirely. A high-ranking Russian Foreign Ministry 
official declared that "in the case of former Warsaw Pact members Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic entering the alliance, the arms balance would change in NATO's favour" and 
thus `blow up" the CFE treaty. 109 The Study on NATO Enlargement, among other things, 
indicated a possibility of meeting Russia's security concerns through adaptation of the CFE to the 
new geopolitical realities. ' 10 Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev rejected the offer: "Russia may 
not accept any treaty in exchange for NATO enlargement. We reject NATO enlargement, and 
there cannot be any trading on the issue. ""' Kozyrev's successor Primakov, however, turned the 
CFE Treaty into the main bargaining issue in the negotiations on NATO enlargement, and at the 
December 1996 OSCE Lisbon summit, the treaty parties agreed on the "scope and parameters" 
for adapting the treaty. Negotiations on details commenced in January 1997 and continued for 
almost three years, surviving NATO expansion. The provisions of the new adapted treaty 
satisfied Moscow's main conditions - replacement of the original group and zone limits with 
national and territorial ceilings, and restrictions on the building-up of forces in specific zones 
108 The original 1990 CFE Treaty was based on limiting conventional military equipment, or Treaty Limited 
Equipment (TLE), for each of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO alliances, which in their turn were further 
circumscribed by a series of geographic `zones' and flanks to prevent the massing of forces in specific regions. At 
the time, the introduction of TLE ceilings led to an even distribution of forces in Europe and elimination of the WT 
conventional arms superiority over those of NATO. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the 
WT and accession of CE states and seven former Soviet Republics to the Treaty (the three Baltic states remained 
outside the Treaty), Moscow became increasingly unhappy with the flank zones restrictions. By 1995, at the end of 
the 40 months period of reduction, Russia failed to meet limits set by the Treaty in its flank zones, which consisted of 
Leningrad Military District in the north and the North Caucasus Military District, where it amassed large forces due 
to the Checken conflict. Thus Russia pushed for the revision of the Treaty to reflect both post-Cold War security in 
Europe and its own domestic security needs. See Wade Boese, 'Pragmatism in Practice: CFE Seeks to Secure 
Europe's Future', Jane's Intelligence Review (February 2000), pp. 14-19; Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 'The 
Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Adapts to a New Ear', Focus International (London: An FCO 
Network Feature, http: //www. fco. gov. uk, July 2000); Douglas L. Clarke, 'Russia and the CFE Treaty', Post Soviet 
Prospects, Vol. III, No. 6, June 1995 (http: //www. csis. org/ruseura/psp/pspiii6. html: accessed 11 December 2000); 
Jeffrey D. McCausland, 'NATO and Russian Approaches to 'Adapting' the CFE Treaty', Armscontrol 
(http: //www. armcontrol. org/ACT/august/cfeadapt. html: 07 August 2000). 
109 "Monitor: A Daily Briefing on the Pos-Soviet States", Vol. 1, Issue 138,21 November 1995, The Jamestown 
Foundation, (http: //www. jamestown. org/pubs/view/mon/001/138_008. htm). 
110 Studh" on NATO Enlargement. Brussels, 1995. 
SME, 22 September 1995, cited in Alexander Duleba, From Domination to Partnership: The Perspectives of 




(particularly in Central Europe). 112 In Russia-NATO negotiations leading up to the signing of 
the Founding Act in May 1997, the Russian delegation insisted on adaptation of the CFE Treaty 
to put legally binding limits on the foreign (i. e. NATO) military presence on the territory of the 
new member states. This traditional `talking behind their backs' alarmed the CE NATO 
candidates who feared that Moscow's conditions might in effect render them 'second class' 
alliance members. 113 A compromise was reached, clearly spelt out in the Founding Act. NATO 
pledged not to deploy substantial additional permanent combat forces on the territories of the new 
member states; the Alliance would carry out its missions by "ensuring necessary interoperability, 
integration and capability for reinforcement". 114 Nevertheless, it would still be possible for the 
new NATO members to `host' foreign forces using revised territorial and national limits. To do 
so, however, a country would have to ensure that the total of its own equipment plus that of the 
`outsider' did not exceed the new territorial ceiling. In the case of the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland, the territorial limits would be set at or below their own entitlement levels; they 
would not be able to permanently station significant Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) from other 
NATO members without first reducing their own forces. ' 15 
To assuage Russia's concerns even further, NATO proposed to insert into the Treaty a definition 
of "temporary deployments" for military exercises and create a new stabilising zone that would 
include the Visegrad four, western Ukraine, Belarus and Russia's Kaliningrad oblast' - with 
greater restrictions on stationed forces. 
16 NATO's willingness to respond to Russia's concerns 
and negotiate a new CFE Treaty was used by Moscow as a way of determining 
NATO's future 
112 Clarke, 'Russia and the CFE Treaty', pp. 14-15. 
113 The Czech Republic's Foreign Minister Zielenec expressed such concern to US Secretary of State Albright to 
which she responded by saying that 
NATO will not admit any negotiations or solutions which would bypass the 
backs of the new member countries and that the agreement with 
Russia might decrease their defence capabilities or 
touch upon their sovereignty. 
See Jan B. de Weydenthal, "Russia: NATO's Solana Meets Primakov For Tense 
Talks", RFE/RL, 15 April 1997. 
114 Clarke, 'Russia and the CFE Treaty', p. 16. 




military make-up. Moscow tried to insert further conditions, controlling categories of combat 
aircraft, and limiting infrastructural developments in the new member states (airfields, harbours, 
railways). Predictably, NATO refused Russia's conditions, arguing that it was not a party to or 
signatory of the new CFE Treaty. NATO members insisted on negotiating temporary exceptions 
to territorial ceilings, allowing any country to host temporary deployments or military exercises 
up to a level of 153 tanks, 241 ACVs (armoured combat vehicles) and 140 artillery pieces in 
excess of its territorial ceilings. Moreover, NATO pushed for an `exceptional circumstances' 
clause, under which countries not part of the old `flank zone' could host deployments of up to 
459 tanks, 723 ACVs and 420 artillery pieces. Russia opposed the move, but eventually agreed, 
on condition that any such deployments were preceded by a conference of all interested states for 
explanation and discussion. 117 
Table I CFE Treaty Entitlements/Holdings (E/H) for NATO Invitees (Actual holdings as of January 1997) 





H_ý__ H Eý H 
Czech 957 952 767 I 767 j 1367 1367 50 36 230 144 Re ublic 
Hun ar 835 797 j' 840 _ 840 1700 1300 [Y 108 59 180 141 
Poland 1730 1729 1610 1581 2150 1422 130 94 j 460 384 
ý Total 3522 3478 3217 3188 3 5217 4109 288 189 870 699 
Table 2 NATO and Russian CFE Treaty Entitlements/Holdings (E/H) (actual holdings as of January 1997) 
NATO Russia NATO+3 
1 Tanks 20000 14101 6400 5541 23522 _ 17579 
Artillery 20000 14101 6415 6011 23217 J 17198 
ACVs 30000 21464 11480 10198 J 35217_]l 25573 
Helicopters 2000 1221 890 812 2288 1410 
Aircraft 6800 4218 3416 2891 J 7760 4887 
Total 78000 55014 28601 25453 91914 66647 
Source for Table 1&2: Jeffrey D. McCausland, 'NATO and Russian Approaches to 'Adapting' the CFE Treaty', 
Arnzscontrol (http: //www. armcontrol. org/ACT/august/cfeadapt. html: 07 August 2000). 
117 Boese, 'Pragmatism in Practice', p. 17. 
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Russia also won an increase in TLE holdings in its flank zone: up to 1300 tanks, 1380 ACVs 
and 1680 artillery pieces could be deployed in a smaller area and 1800 tanks, 3700 ACVs and 
2400 artillery pieces could be stationed in the original zones. ' 18 Apart from agreeing on the above 
basic parameters, Russia succeeded in making the CFE adaptation one of the major issues in the 
preparation of the Russia-NA TO Founding Act, and one of the main matters dealt with by the 
NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. ' 19 
Primakov's appointment in January 1996 as Russian foreign minister marked a shift, as we have 
seen, in overall strategy towards enlargement, reflecting Moscow's realisation that NATO 
enlargement was inevitable and that engagement with NATO was required in order to minimise 
possible `damage' from the imminent expansion. Concurrently, Primakov switched from a 
`group' approach to the CE states to a more individualised one. Primakov told Polish television 
before his visit to Poland in March 1996, that Russia was activating its foreign policy in Eastern 
and Central Europe, and that this was a new priority for Moscow. ' 20 Primakov's declared 
objective was to convey to the Visegrad states Russia's stance on the issue of NATO 
enlargement. ' 21 "Russia does not intend to impose anything on anybody. Simultaneously, it 
would not be an easy thing to impose anything on us. Therefore, talks are necessary, " Primakov 
stated. ' 22 He argued that by constantly repeating its opposition to the CE states' orientation to 
NATO, without making any alternative proposals, Moscow ran the risk of completely losing CE. 
In Poland, Primakov revived the old plan to provide joint NATO and Russian security guarantees 
to the CE countries. If CE did not like the idea, the Foreign Minister conceded, Russia would 
118 Ibid, p. 17. 
11 9 Founding Act, Part IV. 
120 ]TAR-TASS, 13 March 1996, (FBIS-SOV-96-050). 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid. In September 1993 President Yeltsin proposed cross-guarantees of security 
instead of the Visegrad states' 
membership in NATO. 
In March 1994 Andrey Kozyrev revived the idea but with the same end result - the CE states 
wanted nothing less than 
full membership in the Alliance. See Segodn}"a, 25 February 1994, p. 3. 
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consent to guarantees from the United States and NATO. Poland predictably followed the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia in rejecting his offer. 123 
Primakov's `reactivation' and subsequent visits failed to bring any noticeable changes in policy 
towards NATO, or a breakthrough in bilateral relations. The visits, however had considerable 
symbolic value: after almost two years of `controlled mutual antipathy', Russia was attempting to 
`build new bridges' and talk directly to CE. However, towards the end of 1996, Russia's Foreign 
Minister, while conceding that in `our relations with these states [the CE states] we made many 
mistakes, ' reverted to criticising the CE states for pushing for NATO entry. Primakov also put 
the poor state of bilateral relations down to the breakdown of economic ties, which, he felt, put 
the CE countries in a difficult situation: they were trying to anchor themselves in European 
structures, such as the EU, through membership of NATO. However the final decision, Primakov 
concluded, was up to NATO, implying that that was where Russia's efforts should be 
concentrated. ' 24 
Moscow's policy of reasserting influence in the post-Soviet space was another factor that 
continued to affect Russia's relations with CE, especially Poland. An allusion by some Russian 
analysts and officials to `the usefulness' of Russia-Belarus integration as a possible response to 
NATO enlargement, and especially as a means of influencing Poland, alarmed Poland's political 
elite and its security community. The SVOP report on the subject concluded: 
123 "No Break in Eastern Ice, " The Warsaw 
Voice - News, No. 12 (387), 24 March 
1996, 
http: //www. warsawvoice. com. pi/v387/NewsOO. 
htm 




The unification brings undisputed advantages in the sphere of foreign and defence policy: it gives us immediate access to the borders of Central Europe ("a window to Europe"); 
elimination of the potential threat of establishing a so-called Black Sea to Baltic Sea "belt" isolating Russia; gaining additional powerful means of influencing relations with Ukraine: counteracting attempts to turn Ukraine into an anti-Russian "buffer" state; and strengthening our position in the dialogue with Poland and the Baltic states. 125 
This kind of analysis highlighted the absence of any constructive, cooperative perspective that 
might help to lower tensions. The expected advantages proved to be miscalculated and brought 
almost the opposite results by 1997.126 Russia's albeit formal unification with Belarus, as well as 
Moscow's CIS policy at large, was negatively received in Kiev. Ukraine started to seek 
alternatives to the CIS, intensifying its ties with Europe and Poland in particular. 127 Polish 
President Aleksander Kwasniewski, while visiting Ukraine, stated that Poland supported all 
Ukrainian initiatives aimed at strengthening its cooperation with Central Europe and the 
European Union. Kwasniewski asserted that Ukraine, like Poland, should not fall into the spheres 
of influence of `big empires, which used to treat our countries as pawns in their big power 
politics. ' 128 Closer Russian-Belarusian relations also accelerated Lithuania's rapprochement with 
Poland. Vilnius hoped that Warsaw would become Lithuania's advocate for its EU and NATO 
membership. Russia, however, did not believe that decisions on membership of the two 
organisations would depend on the CE states. Therefore, the ways of mitigating any possible 
12 "Rossi isko-Belorusskii Soyuz: vygody fundamental'ny, negativnye posledstviya minimal'ny: ["Russian- 
Belorusian Union: Advantages are Fundamental, Disadvantages are Minimal"], SVOP report, NG-stsenarii, 
No. 
(14), 29 April 1997. 
126 Russia was shocked by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Udovenko's speech at 
NATO headquarters where he 
announced that he hoped "NATO will back Ukraine 
in its efforts to achieve its strategic goal of complete integration 
into European and Euro-Atlantic security structures, including NATO. " Amongst the reasons 
behind Ukraine's 
sudden about-face Udovenko cited `unpredictability of 
its neighbour to the east. ' See Segodnya, 22 March 1997. 
127 Arkadiy Moshes, "Geopoliticheskie Iskaniya Kieva. Tsentral'naya i Vostochnaya Evropa v 
Politike Ukrainy, " Pro 
et Contra, Vol. 3. No. 2 (Spring 
1998), p. 96. 
12 8 "Kiev rasshiryaet sotrudnichestvo s Varshavoi, " Nezavisimava gazeta, 
23 May 1997, p. 3. 
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damage to Russia's interest should be sought in places where those decisions are taken - that is 
amongst the member-states of NATO and the EU". 129 
In practice, as was observed above, the appointment of Primakov as Russian foreign minister did 
bring about a gradual shift in relations with the CE states. On the whole Russia persisted with its 
passive, reactive policy, yet changes occurred reflecting a realisation that if the impasse were to 
be overcome it was necessary to establish direct dialogue with the CE countries. There was also a 
recognition of the extent of the diversity amongst the countries of the region and of the fact that 
different approaches were needed to deal with individual states. Gradually, Moscow started to 
identify problems in its relations with each Visegrad state and tried to keep the issue of NATO 
enlargement separate from other matters. One sign of Russia's more pragmatic and realistic 
approach to the region (as we shall see in Chapter 4) was that in second half of the 1990s the two 
sides began to concentrate more on economic issues and on the mutual benefits to be derived 
from economic cooperation. 
Overall, therefore, the period from 1994 to 1997 saw a continued increase in mutual 
apprehensiveness towards to European security issues. The two sides found direct dialogue over 
the major issues difficult and fruitless. The question of NATO enlargement was raised at every 
meeting of the heads of Russian and CE governments and their respective Foreign Ministers, yet 
no progress was evident. Nevertheless, despite this fundamental difference over NATO 
enlargement, Russia and the Visegrad states did not sever bilateral relations completely, 
but 
continued consultations designed to resolve outstanding and emerging 
bilateral problems (mostly 
in the realm of trade and the economy) and worked to improve the 
legal base for bilateral 
129 Pavel Kandel (ed. ), `Tsentral'naya I Vostochnaya Evropa I Interesy 
Rossi]. ' Russian, 
http: //www. svop. ru/doklad03. htm: Sovet po vneshei i oboronnoi politike 
(SVOP); The report, however, insisted on 
the need to develop bilateral ties with the countries of the region. 
In a private interview in May 1999, one of the 
authors of the report admitted that 
his assessment had changed since its appearance in early 1997. 
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cooperation. A number of factors helped the two sides maintain a relatively high level of 
contacts. Russia and the Visegrad states' mutual interdependence in the energy sector, remaining 
issues connected with Russia's debt repayments and the need by the Visegrad states to maintain 
operability of their armed forces were the factors of common interest. The following section 
looks at the way Russia's relations with the region developed in the period from 1994 to 1997 at 
the inter-state level and how each side's national security and foreign policy preferences affected 
and influenced the character of bilateral ties. 
Russia's Bilateral Relations with the CE states, 1994-1997 
Russia-Poland 
The years from 1994 to 1997 saw further widening of the `asymmetry of priorities' in Russian- 
Polish bilateral relations at a high political level. 130 To its credit, Moscow took practical steps 
aimed at stabilising bilateral ties. In February 1994 Russia and Poland signed an agreement in 
Krakow which committed the two states to maintain cemeteries on each other's territories. In 
June 1995, Polish President Walesa laid the foundation stone of a memorial to the Polish victims 
of the 1940 NKVD massacre in Katyn. Russia ran its own investigation into the atrocity, and 
cooperated fully with Warsaw in establishing the truth about those events, correct handling of 
which was essential if a new relationship was to be built between Moscow and Warsaw. 
President Yeltsin made an appropriate public statement to mark the start of the construction work 
on the Katyn military cemetery. 
131 Russia's policy made possible a gradual process of 
incremental improvements in Russian-Polish relations. A number of inter-governmental 
consultations took place, which concentrated on economic issues 
(more details in Chapter 4). 
However, because of the sensitive state of relations, small incidents were able to undermine trust, 
for example, when an incident with Russian tourists at Warsaw 
East train station resulted in the 
"3o On `asymmetry of priorities' see Agniezska Magdziak-Miszewska, "Calkowita asymetria. 
" Rzeczpospolita, 4 
March 1997, cited in Kobrinskaya (1997), p. 116. 
131 INTERFAX, 3 June 1995, (FBIS-SOV-95-107). 
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cancellation of the Russian Prime Minister's official Visit. 132 The leader of the Polish Christian 
National Union (ZchN) argued that the cancellation of the visit showed that for Russia, relations 
with the West and the former Soviet states were far more important than Polish affairs. ' 33 Russian 
commentators, on the other hand, displayed increased irritation with Poland and blamed the 
Solidarity leadership for playing the anti-Russian card. The Russian press commonly featured 
anti-Polish articles, while Vladimir Zhirinovsky never missed a chance to insult Poland. At the 
same time, in Poland Russia was portrayed as the reason why NATO postponed the decisions to 
include Poland. ' 34 
In 1994, Poland attempted to formulate a long term Eastern policy under the heading `Partnership 
for Transformation'. Some Russian analysts claimed that it was purposefully far-fetched, and that 
it had been drawn up so as to accuse Russia of not being willing to cooperate. 135 On the whole, 
Poland's Russia policy was circumscribed by its Western policy - the drive for NATO and EU 
membership. One Polish expert on Russia and the Prime Minister's advisor on Eastern affairs 
from 1995 to 1997, Andrzej Drawicz, stated in 1997 that from 1992 until 1995 Poland had 
maintained a policy of `tough semi-cold peace' towards Russia. ' 36 Polish Deputy Foreign 
Minister, Andrzej Towpik, put the blame on the real divergence of interests between Poland and 
Russia. Nevertheless, Poland's officials criticized Russia for not seizing opportunities and for 
failing to accept a number of Warsaw's proposals for cooperation. At the same time, some 
members of the Polish Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee admitted that reluctance to overcome 
132 For details see Izvestia, 3,4 and 5 November 1994. 
! 33 Warsaw PAP, 2 November 1994. (FBIS-EEU-94-213-A) 
134 Nikolai Bukharin, "Russia-Poland, " in Rossiya i Tsenti-al 'no-Vostochnaya Evropa v pervoi polovine 90-kh godoi'. 
Vol 2, (Moscow: IMEPI RAN. 1997), p. 60. 
135 Ibid, pp. 60-61. 
1361bid, p. 61. 
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established stereotypes and lack of coordination of Polish foreign policy contributed to the lack 
of positive initiatives in Polish policy towards Russia. ' 37 
Despite setbacks, Russia's relations with Poland improved somewhat during 1995.138 There were 
a number of reasons for this, including the need of the growing Polish economy for export 
markets. ' 39 In September NATO released the Study on NATO Enlargement, which emphasised 
developing good relations with bordering states. 140 The arrival of a new government and a new 
president in Poland also lent impetus to bilateral relations. 141 Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's 
official visit in February 1995 was accompanied by important agreements on debt settlement and 
gas pipeline construction (see Chapter 4). The `Yamal-Western Europe pipeline' project elicited a 
big debate in Poland about the strategic and political as well as economic expediency of having 
such a major pipeline running through Polish territory. Some Polish experts and politicians, 
especially those associated with the opposition, raised concerns about a new "Russian 
expansion". They argued that the construction of the pipeline and continued dependence on 
Russian gas would undermine Poland's economic independence and allow Russia to manipulate 
prices and set political conditions. 142 
By 1995, moreover, Russia seemed to have tacitly accepted the inevitability of NATO 
enlargement, although it continued to express unhappiness at the decision of the CE states to join 
the alliance. The Russian Premier still raised the question of enlargement during his meeting with 
137 Warsaw PAP, 3 January 1995, (FBIS-EEU-95-003-A). 
138 Among some of the setbacks were the creation of the non-governmental "Poland-Chechnya Committee", which 
staged protests in front of the Russian Embassy in Warsaw and consulates across the country and the setting up of 
the Chechen Information Centre in Krakow. "The Oleksy Case" -a scandal around Prime Minster Jozef Oleksy's 
alleged cooperation with Russian intelligence, and other `cases' of Russian spy networks 
in Poland - further strained 
the relations. See INTERFAX, 2 January 1995 (FBIS-SOV-96-002). 
139 Bukharin, (1997), p. 61. 
140 Study on NATO Enlargement, September 1995, http: //www. nato. int/docuibasictxt/enl-9501. 
htm 
141 Warsaw PAP, 30 January 1995, (FBIS-EEU-95-021-A). 
142 Segodn. va, 2 November 1995, p. 1. 
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President Walesa, repeating Russia's opposition to NATO enlargement. Walesa responded: 
`You know our position: we will make every effort to join NATO and we will not ask Russia 
about doing so. ' 143 However, the effort which was made during the visit to decouple political 
disagreements from cooperation in the economic sphere marked an important shift in Russia's 
approach to CE. While the head of the Russian government concentrated on economic relations 
with former CMEA states, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev took on the discussion of foreign 
and security issues. At a meeting in Moscow on 16 November 1995, Kozyrev and his Polish 
counterpart made their positions on European security clear. Predictably enough, neither side 
gave ground. The event was significant, nevertheless, because Russia and Poland appeared to be 
beginning to debate their differences rather than simply ignoring one other. 
Not for the first time anti-Russian sentiment in Poland, this time connected with the Chechen 
conflict, cast a shadow on gradually improving bilateral relations. In Poland, and throughout CE, 
the Chechen conflict was seen by some as evidence of Moscow's inability to rid itself of imperial 
and non-democratic practices. Russia for its part saw the establishment of a Chechen Information 
Centre in Krakow and the December 1995 conference held under the title "International Law and 
the Chechen Republic" as a provocation. The event, according to Russian Foreign Ministry 
spokesman Grigoriy Karasin, was "clearly intended to represent Chechnya as a subject of 
international law and international relations". The very fact of the Chechen Centre's existence in 
Poland was part of "a successful attempt to darken developing Russian-Polish relations and to 
interfere in Russia's internal affairs". 144 Relations with Moscow were put under further strain, 
143 PAP Warsaw, 17 February 1995, (FBIS-EEU-95-034). 
144 INTERFAX, 14 December 1995, (FBIS-SOV-95-241). 
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when, despite Russian objections, the Polish Sejm called on the Council of Europe to place 
restraints on Russia's activities in Chechnya. 145 
`Spy rows' became a common feature of Russian-Polish relations. In May 1995, the Russian 
Federal Security Service (FSB) announced that it had evidence that Poland's security services 
were trying to recruit Russian nationals visiting Poland as spies, and this activity was linked to 
Poland's drive for NATO membership. 146 Accusations of spying for Russian and Soviet 
intelligence were common in Polish domestic politics. In early 1996 a political crisis erupted in 
Warsaw over allegations that Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy had been a KGB spy, and he was 
eventually forced to resign. 147 The newly elected President of Poland was also accused of having 
worked with Soviet and Russian intelligence. 148 In February 1997, Zbignew Siemiatkowski (head 
of Poland's Intelligence Service) alleged that Russia was endeavouring to compromise the Polish 
elite by portraying it as either corrupt or still devoted to its old Soviet masters. 149 Foreign 
Minister Dariusz Rosati declared: "It would be naive to think that Russia will not make use of the 
means and tools at the disposal of that sovereign and powerful state, " and added that he "did not 
rule out any scenarios" where Russia's behaviour was concerned. 150 Some Russian newspapers 
commented that it seemed as though the Polish authorities feared Russia was prepared to take 
extreme measures to prevent their country from joining NATO. 
i'u Monitor. A Daily Briefing on the Post-Soviet States, Vol. 2, Issue 157, August 26,1996, The Jamestown 
Foundation, http: //www. jamestown. org/pubs/view/mon/002/157_004. htm 
146 ITAR-TASS, 25 May 1995, (FBIS-SOV-95-102), and also ITAR-TASS, 7 June 1995, (FBIS-SOV-95-1 10). 
147 "Back against the Wall. Interview with the former Polish Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy, " Polityka, 27 January 
1996, pp. 15-18, (FBIS-EEU-96-025). 
148 Monitor: A Dailey Briefing on the Post-Soviet States, Vol. 2, Issue 109,10 June 1996, The Jamestown Foundation. 
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149 Monitor: A Daily Briefing on the Post-Soviet States, Vol. 2, Issue 108,5 June 1996, The Jamestown Foundation, 
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While Russophobia was principally part of Polish internal politics, such events demonstrate the 
difficulties that Russia faced in improving relations. Polish political groups viewed major 
bilateral economic agreements with Russia through the prism of a "potential threat from the East" 
and inevitably became politicised as in the case of the Yamal pipeline project. President Yeltsin's 
unfortunate choice of the term `transport corridor' in relation to Russia and Belarus' joint 
proposal to build a motorway and railway, accompanied by gas and oil pipelines, from Grodno in 
Belarus across northeast Poland to Russia's exclave in Kaliningrad, also brought strong negative 
reaction from Warsaw in March 1996. The idea for the project had first emerged in 1992, and it 
was endorsed by the Council for Russian-Polish transborder cooperation founded by Kaliningrad 
and Poland's northern voevodships, only to be denounced in March 1996 as a part of Russian 
plan to deprive Poland of a common border with Lithuania. ' 51 President Kwasniewski announced 
that there could be no transit corridor through Poland from Belarus to Kaliningrad, citing 
technical and environmental reasons for the refusal. He agreed, however, that Warsaw would 
work with Moscow to modernize the existing routes. 152 
As one Polish analyst noted, "Apart from real or would-be intentions and political games, the 
incident once again brought home to Poland (and others) the specific character of the Russian 
exclave and the political implications of its existence. " 
153 There were also the ominous historical 
echoes of the Danzig corridor, and there were environmental objections. However, there were 
151 In Poland, the very term `corridor' implied a degree of extraterritoriality or other privileges that Warsaw 
interpreted as an attempt to impinge upon its sovereignty. Such a transport corridor reminded the Poles of the pre- 
World War II Danzig corridor, and was severely criticized by high government officials. See Algirdas Gricius, 
"Russia's Exclave in the Baltic Region: A Source of Stability or Tension?, " in Kaliningrad: The European Amber 
Region, ed. by Joenniemi, Pertti, Jan Prawitz (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), p. 161; Yuriy Zverev, Kaliningradskaya 
Oblast' Rossii v Novoi Sisteme Geopoliticheskikh Koordinat (http: //pubs. carnegie. ru/CRS/yzverev. htm: 1996), 
Antoni Z. Kaminski, "Polish Perspectives on Baltic Security" in Stability and Security in the Baltic Sea Region. 
Russian, Nordic and European Aspects, ed. by Olaf F. Knudsen (London: Frank Cass, 1999), p. 135; Monitor:. 4 
Daily Briefing on the Post-Soviet States, Vol. 2, Issue 45.4 March 1996, The Jamestown Foundation, 
http: //www. j amestown. org/pubs/view/mon/002/045_009. htm 
152 Zverev, (1996). 
1'' Zdzislaw Lachowski, "Kaliningrad as a Security Issue: An Expert View from Poland, " in Kaliningrad: The 
European Amber Region, ed. by Joenniemi. Pertti, Jan Prawitz (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), p. 139. 
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three more immediate reasons for Warsaw's negative stance, and they underline the complexity 
of Russian-Polish relations. Firstly, Poland did not want to cause trouble with Lithuania, which at 
the time handled the bulk of Kaliningrad-mainland Russia transit. Poland worked hard to improve 
its relations with Lithuania, and both countries shared one objective - to join NATO. Russia, 
however, had become increasingly displeased with Lithuania's handling of its freight, especially 
military consignments, and Russian citizens' access to the region. ' 54 Had the `corridor' idea been 
implemented in any form, transit through Lithuania would have decreased with significant 
financial losses for Vilnius. Secondly, the leftist government in Warsaw was under constant 
scrutiny from the opposition, which criticised its `loyal' attitude towards Russia. Finally, military 
strategic considerations played an important part, particularly in the context of Russia's stem 
opposition to NATO enlargement, its continued rapprochement with Belarus, and the calls being 
made by some Russian politicians and defence spokesmen to preserve Kaliningrad's military 
capabilities. The then Russian Security Council Secretary Ivan Rybkin declared, "In the context 
of NATO enlargement the Kaliningrad region is becoming a key element in guaranteeing the 
security of Russia and its ally Belarus. "1 55 Poland also regarded the proposed corridor as 
potentially compromising its chances of joining NATO. As Marek Karp from the Centre for 
Eastern Studies in Warsaw argued, Moscow could advance the argument to NATO that its lines 
of military transportation passed through Poland, and that the presence of NATO in Poland 
would threaten those lines and Kaliningrad's garrisons. 
' 56 
On his first official visit to Warsaw in March 1996 as Russian Foreign Minister Primakov tried to 
explain Russia's position with regard to the `transit corridor'. The question was not officially 
discussed. However, answering journalists' questions, Primakov said: 
154 Mikhail Urusov, "Kaliningrad Special District: Where Does the Danger Lie? " Moscow News, 16 October, 1997, 
p. 4. 
155 INTERFAX, 7 May 1997, (FBIS-SOV-97-127). 
156 Report by Warsaw RPB Television First Program Network, 17 March 1996, (FBIS-EEU-96-156) 
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This is a topic that unnecessarily stirred up anti-Russian attitudes. Russia has never believed, and never will believe, that it is possible to run a corridor through another 
country's territory without the host country's supervision. The Russian side has never 
even mentioned the possibility of building such a corridor. 157 
Primakov further noted that the discussion was only about extending the existing transportation 
system to cater for increased traffic. However, irreparable damage had been caused, partly by an 
unfortunate choice of words. As Russian observer Dmitri Trenin noted, "the very idea of another 
`corridor' - even the word itself - made the Poles allergic and suspicious [of Russia], " and 
vindicated their decision to join NATO. '58 
Primakov's renewed proposals during the visit that NATO and Russia provide joint, or, 
alternatively, only the US and NATO provide security guarantees for Central Europe were 
predictably rejected. 159 Some Polish analysts accused Moscow of deliberately making proposals 
that were not acceptable to Warsaw. Jacek Poplawski, an expert at the Centre for Eastern Studies 
in Warsaw, argued that the Kaliningrad transport corridor was from the same rank of Russia's 
ploys, and a reflection of how Russian politicians were becoming subtler in their bid to block 
Poland's membership of NATO: 
There're hoping for a negative reaction to their offers so they can tell the world 
they're meeting these countries, offering them something, perhaps even some 
alternatives, but that all Poland does is act indignantly and demonstrate a fear of 
anything to do with Russia... Russia exploits this in their propaganda directed at the 
West, asking the West to reconsider with whom it wants to integrate. 160 
In Moscow, however, Warsaw's categorical `no' to its proposal was interpreted as proof that 
Poland's distrust of Russia was the main reason for its NATO push. To dispel any such 
15' Warsaw Voice, No. 12 (387), 24 March 1996, http: //www. warsawvoice. com. pl/v387/News00. htm 
158 Dmitri Trenin, The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization (Moscow: 
Carnegie Moscow Center, 2001), p. 156. 
"9 This proposal by Primakov was nothing new 
in the way in which Russia attempted to find a compromise with the 
Central Europeans on future security arrangements in Europe. Andrey Kozyrev, Primakov's predecessor put forward 
the same idea in December 1994, which 
the CE states were quick to reject. 
160 op. cit. 
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perception, the Polish authorities initiated a proposal for Russian-Polish military-technical 
cooperation. Some Russian commentators suggested that Warsaw was acting with the approval of 
the West, in whose opinion "arms deals [with Russia] of moderate proportions do not undermine 
Warsaw's reputation. "161 In April 1996 the then Polish National Defence Minister Stanislaw 
Dobrzanski took to Moscow a package of proposals for military cooperation. Similar agreements 
reached in 1993 had failed to come to anything. Subsequently, Polish military officials 
complained that they made 20 to 40 proposals to Russia annually, but Dobrzanski complained 
that Moscow declined greater bilateral military cooperation, citing financial problems. 162 
Immediately following the Minister's visit to Moscow, a Russian delegation arrived in Warsaw to 
sign a separate agreement on arms deliveries, military technology, and the provision of defence- 
related services. Around 80 percent of the Polish armed forces' equipment at the time was of 
Russian origin and urgently required spare parts and servicing. The Polish defence industry still 
mainly produced weapons developed in Russia. Previous talks on military-industrial cooperation 
had stumbled on disagreements over Poland's export of Russian designed arms to third 
countries. 163 Only in May 1996 did the Sejm set up a commission to tighten up the law on 
military-technical cooperation, or `trade in special production'. Until then, Russian officials 
complained, Polish companies had re-exported Russian arms without regard to earlier agreements 
161 Segodnya, 6 April, 1996 
162 Among the proposals that Dobrzanski handed over to his Russian counterpart, Pavel Grachev, were plans for joint 
military exercises within the PfP framework to take place in July 1997, and training of Polish military officers in 
Russian military academies -a group of Polish officers were taking courses at the time in Russia's Frunze Military 
Academy in Moscow. See Bukharin (1997), p. 64; Cooperation with Kaliningrad Special Defence Region (KOOR). 
ThePolish Defence Minister suggested increased exchanges between Poland and Kaliningrad Region and swapping 
agricultural products that Kaliningrad was short of 
for spare parts. The Polish officials also wanted to secure supplies 
of spare parts for Su-22, MiG-21 and 
MiG-29 fighter aircraft, establishing Polish-Russian joint ventures in Poland to 
manage repairs of aircraft engines and 
Russian military ships built at Polish shipyards. See Irina Kobrinskaya, and 
Peter Litavrin, "Military-Technical Cooperation Between Russia and Countries of East-Central Europe, " in Russia 
and the Arms Trade, ed. by 
Ian Anthony (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1998). pp. 188-189. 
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on re-transfer. 1 64 In the light of Poland's bid to join NATO, Russia became reluctant to grant 
Warsaw licenses to produce equipment arguing that Russian military-technical security could be 
compromised. Moscow was also wary of allowing Poland to compete with Russian-made 
products on the world arms market. Eventually an agreement was reached that levels of exports 
of Russian-designed equipment manufactured in Poland would be spelt out in each contract 
signed with Russia. ' 65 
Needless to say, intensified dialogue with Russia, particularly in such a delicate area as military 
cooperation, provoked critical commentary from the opposition in Warsaw. Commenting on 
Dobrzanski's visit to Moscow, a member of Poland's Defence Commission, former Deputy 
Defence Minister Bronislaw Komarowski, argued that Poland should not take on risky 
obligations at a time when from the point of view of its role in Eastern Europe and NATO, 
Poland's main partner should be the United States. 166 Some argued that Poland should try to 
replace military-industrial cooperation with Russia by imports from other post-communist states, 
notably Slovakia and Ukraine. In March 1994, Polish Defence chief Piotr Kolodzejczik signed an 
agreement with Kiev worth USD 150-200 million for the repair in Ukraine of T-72 tanks as well 
as MiG and Sukhoi fighters. 167 Polish military officials, nevertheless, were the most pragmatic 
when it came to cooperation with Russia. They argued that it was needed to preserve the 
operability of their equipment, and that cooperation with Russia in the defence sector would not 
in any case extend the life of Russian-made arms beyond 2000-2005.168 Russian officials, on the 
other hand, failed to re-assure the Polish political elite about Russia's longer-term commitment. 
After signing the documents Dobrzanski expressed the hope that the agreements would guarantee 
164 Kobrinskaya, "Military-Technical Cooperation Between Russia and, " p. 187. 
165 Op. cit. 
166 Op. cit., p. 187. 
167 Kommersant Daily, 12 April 1994. 




the supply of Russian spare parts even after Poland's entry into NATO, but Russian Defence 
Minister Grachev declared that Moscow might review military and military-technical contacts 
with Poland if the latter joined the Western Alliance. ' 69 The development of relations between 
Russia and Poland was constantly monitored by the opposition. Russian officials often added 
complications by making controversial statements, such as Grachev's remark, demonstrating the 
absence of any long-term vision of Russian-Polish relations. At the same time, from Russia's 
point of view, it was hard not to see the difference in Poland's relations with the West and to 
accept the justifications Warsaw offered for refusing to pursue some projects with Moscow. 
Russian observers noted that while environmental reasons had been cited as obstacles to joint 
projects on Polish territory, such as the Kaliningrad motorway, in June 1996 the Poles agreed to 
lease to the British armed forces a shooting range at Drawska Pomorski and Usce, the first of 
which is located on a nature reserve. 170 
Poland's new President Aleksander Kwasniewski was more well-disposed towards cooperation 
than his predecessor. During his first official visit to Moscow on 7-9 April 1996 he commented: 
"Poland does not want to be in NATO against Russia. "171 Kwasniewski also argued that 
"Warsaw had no objections to CIS integration or the Russian-Belarus union because every nation 
has the right to act according to its interests", and urged Moscow to display the same respect for 
Warsaw's interests. ' 72 However, not everyone in Warsaw agreed with their President. There were 
growing concerns in Poland over the security implications of Belarus' growing political and 
military alignment with Russia. The Russian Defence Minister's threats to take countermeasures 
in Belarus if Poland joined NATO provoked a response from Janusz Onyszkiewicz, at the time a 
169 Monitor: A Daily Briefing on the Post-Soviet States, Vol. 2, Issue 67,5 April 1996, The Jamestown Foundation, 
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senior parliamentarian and a former defence chief, who warned Russia that if it introduced its 
forces into Belarus along Poland's border, NATO could respond by taking steps to right the 
military balance. 1 73 Yet stable relations with Russia, as many Polish politicians admitted, were 
essential conditions for eventual membership of NATO. According to Polish Foreign Minister 
Rosati, "Western states do not want to accept a country which is in the state of antagonism with 
such a superpower as Russia. "174 
The Russia-Byelorussian association, meanwhile, grew closer. Belarusian President Lukashenka, 
even more hostile to NATO enlargement than the Russians, pointed out that unification with 
Russia was vital for Belarusian security as "Poland and the Baltic countries are more and more 
linking their interests to NATO and Belarus may soon find itself in a dangerous frontier 
neighbourhood. " As a result, Lukashenka argued, Belarus would find it difficult to maintain its 
western borders at an up-to-date level without Russia's aid. 175 During President Kwasniewski's 
visit to Belarus, while expressing concern about Poland's plans to join NATO, Lukashenka stated 
that Belarus had no right to interfere in Poland's decision to integrate with NATO. 176 
Kwasniewski for his part stated that he believed that the recently signed Russian-Belarusian 
treaty on the creation of a union state would in no way undermine Belarusian statehood. 
' 77 
Despite this diplomatic politeness, Poland became increasingly concerned with Belarus' pro- 
Russian leanings and Lukashenka's authoritarian leadership style. As the Polish academic, 
Antoni Kaminski, observed, the problem was not so much the fact that the two states strove 
173 Monitor: A Daili Briefing on the Post-Soviet States, Vol. 2, Issue 94,15 May 1996, The Jamestown 
Foundation, 
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towards `unification' as the circumstances under which it was happening. 178 Kaminski 
commented that, as a result of the priority that military interests were given in the process of 
integration, Lukashenka's provocative moves both internationally and inside Belarus could 
destabilise the region. For Poland, the problem lay not only in the potential growth of Russian 
military influence on its doorstep, but also in the way Russia turned a blind eye to Lukashenka's 
neo-Soviet leadership style, might recourse to magnifying international tensions to justify his 
internal policies. Even liberal forces within the Russian political elite regarded closer military ties 
with Belarus as a response to the `geopolitical imperative' to counter the advance of the West at 
the expense of Russia's influence in its immediate vicinity. 179 Belarussian willingness to `unify' 
with Russia for economic, political and security reasons presented Russian authorities at the time 
with an opportunity they could not miss. What Vladimir Baranovsky and Alexei Arbatov call 
`Russia's deficiency in allies', coupled with growing suspicion of the West, anti-Russian 
positions in CE and the open unfriendliness of the Baltic states made Russia overlook any 
reservations with respect to Lukashenka's regime. 1 80 Yet, as Polish academic Kaminski 
underlined, it is what is seen as Russia's drive to regain control over the former Soviet republics 
for (geo)-political reasons at the expense of democratic and market reforms that fuels the idea of 
the `Russian threat' in CE. 181 
Russia's progressive integration with Belarus was expected to play an important part in one other 
important dimension in the geopolitics of the region. The two states drawing together somewhat, 
it was hoped, could at least alleviate Russia's Kaliningrad problem. 
178 Kaminski, "Polish Perspectives on Baltic Security, " p. 136. 
179 Rontoyanni, "A Russo-Belarusian 'Union State', " p. 6. 
180 Vladimir Baranovsky, and Alexei Arbatov, "The Changing Security Perspective in Europe" in Russia and the 
West: The 21st Centum, Security Environment, ed. by Alexei G. Arbatov, Karl Kaiser, Robert Legvold (New York, 
London: M. E. Sharpe for EastWest Institute, 1999), p. 48. 
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The Kaliningrad oblast in Russian-Polish Security Relations 
After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet troop withdrawal from Eastern Germany, 
Central Europe, and the Baltic states, the Kaliningrad region, a highly militarised and closed zone 
in the Soviet Union, temporarily became home to the returning Russian troops. After 1993, 
however, the number of troops and amount of equipment gradually decreased and by 1997 the 
figures reached levels below those allowed by the CFE limits. ' 82 While Poland was generally 
patient and understanding towards the difficulties in Kaliningrad region, Warsaw nonetheless 
kept voicing through diplomatic channels its anxiety over Russia's large military presence close 
to Poland's borders. These calls intensified and became more pronounced as Russia's opposition 
to NATO grew and Moscow's official foreign and security policy shifted towards a more hard- 
line statist approach. With the shift away from liberalism in Russian domestic politics came a re- 
assessment of the future plans for Kaliningrad and the rise in prominence of opinions favouring 
the retention of its military character. The announcement on 21 March 1994 of Russia's intention 
to create a `special defence region' (Kaliningradskiy osobyi oboronitel'nyi raion, KOOR) in the 
area, which would contain large groupings of ground forces, military aviation, air defence forces 
and naval units from the Baltic Fleet, under the command of the Baltic Sea Fleet Admiral, 
prompted a negative reaction from neighbouring states - Poland in particular. 
183 During his visit 
to Lithuania in February 1994, Polish President Walesa described the number of Russian troops 
in Kaliningrad region as an `alarming phenomenon' and wondered aloud why such a powerful 
grouping was stationed there in peacetime. He also called on the West to respond to this 
excessive militarization. Poland also proposed the launch of a new agenda for arms control in 
Europe at the CSCE on 7 September 1994 with the implicit aim of avoiding excessive arms 
concentrations in areas such as 
Kaliningrad. ' 84 Later in the year, however, Polish officials 
182 Ingmar Oldberg, "Kaliningrad: Problems and Prospects, " in Kaliningrad: The European Aniber Region, ed. by 
Joenniemi, Pertti, Jan Prawitz (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), p. 5. 
183 Lachowski, "Kaliningrad as a Security Issue, " p. 138. 
184 CSCE document CSCE'FSC/SC. 29, Vienna, 7 September 1994, cited ibid. p. 146. 
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reportedly did not press hard for this in bilateral talks with their Russian counterparts. While 
stating that no country was interested in "having other states' major military groupings close to 
their borders", Poland was not going to consider the issue a serious bilateral problem. 185 
The level of military concentration in the region, nonetheless, raised justifiable concerns amongst 
Kaliningrad's neighbours. According to Jakub Godzimirski, the perception of Kaliningrad as a 
problem in geostrategic terms was to a great extent due to the obvious disparity of military 
potential concentrated in the area: 
Even if one compares the quantity of military hardware deployed on the whole 
territory of Poland with what is concentrated only in the Kaliningrad oblast, the 
situation is rather disadvantageous to Poland. 181 
Table 3. The strategic balance of power: Poland, Russia and Kaliningrad in the light of the CFE limits (percent) 
Category: Poland's CFE limits as a Kaliningrad 1995 holdings 
percentage of Russia's CFE to Poland's CFE limits 
limits 
ACV* 19 54 
Artillery 25 31 
Attack helicopters 15 40 
Combat aircraft 13 7 
Manpower 16 ** 
Tanks 27 57 
Source: Adapted from Jakub M. Godzimirski (1999), p. 49. 
* Armoured Combat Vehicle 
** Russia released no official data on manpower figures, due to their constant change. 
As the above table shows, there was a disproportionate concentration of military equipment 
deployed near Poland in general and in the Kaliningrad region in particular, and this 
disproportion continued to be a source of concerns in Warsaw. Bronislaw Geremek, Poland's 
Foreign Minister, complained in August 1996: 
185 Izvestia, 9 December 1994, cited op cit., p. 135. 
186 Jakub M. Godzimirski, "Soviet Legacy and the Baltic Security: The Case of Kaliningrad" in Stability and Securitl 
in the Baltic Sea Region. Russian, Nordic and 
European Aspects, ed. by Olaf F. Knudsen (London: Frank Cass, 
1999), p. 48. 
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Russians explain the concentration of troops and military materiel in that region by 
the fact that they had nowhere to place the personnel and equipment after the pullout from the then German Democratic Republic. However, with more and more time 
passing and no changes in sight, this explanation hardly has a leg to stand on... This immediately raises the question, who is this military base is aimed against? To 
counter what countries bordering Kaliningrad oblast is the military power being amassed? ' 87 
Geremek urged Europe to `raise the problem of demilitarisation of the oblast. The current 
situation was `unacceptable' from the standpoint of peace in Europe, according to the Polish 
Foreign Minister. ' 88 
Poland and other Baltic states' calls for Kaliningrad's demilitarisation at a time when they were 
campaigning for membership of NATO were interpreted in Moscow as duplicitous and aimed at 
weakening Russia's presence in the region. As Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Krylov pointed 
out, any further demilitarisation of the Kaliningrad region would not be possible if NATO 
accepted Poland and the Baltic states without having established constructive relations with 
Russia, taking into account its national security concerns. 189 Russian military officials accused 
the Baltic states and Poland of using the military presence in the Kaliningrad region as an excuse 
to integrate quickly into NATO structures. Chief of the Russian Navy, Felix Gromov, argued that 
the tempting `peace-creating' ideas concerning demilitarisation of KOOR had a hidden agenda - 
to withdraw the Russian Fleet from the strategically important region of the Baltic Sea and send it 
to the closed and frozen waters of Kronstadt and St. Petersburg. 
' 90 The Admiral also pointed to 
the increasing military cooperation of the Baltic states with the USA. Poland and the United 
States, he noted, conducted negotiations with each other and with the Baltic states aimed at 
187 Zycie Warszawy, 8 August 1996, (FBIS-EEU-96-156) 
188 Ibid. 
189 Krylov commented: "Our neighbours wish to join NATO, and at the same time are not 
happy with allegedly large 
military grouping in Kaliningrad region", cited 
in Zverev (1995). 
190Adm. F. N. Gromov, "Znachenie Kaliningradskogo osobogo raiona dlya oboronosposobnosti Rossiyskoi 
Federatsii, " i'oennaya Mvsl', No. 4, July-August, 1996, p. 12. 
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creating an air-control system in those states. 191 Subsequently, Russian officials complained 
about Poland concentrating its forces close to Kaliningrad's borders. Sergey Glotov, member of 
the Duma and head of the Coordination Council of the Duma cross-party "Anti-NATO" 
association, called on the members of the Russian Defence Council to "respond to pressing issues 
of national security in the Kaliningrad region. " Glotov complained that impending NATO 
enlargement sharply aggravated the military and political situation on the borders of the KOOR. 
The situation was worsened, according to the deputy, because Poland and Lithuania were 
concentrating their armed forces in the Kaliningrad direction. Glotov claimed that since 1994 
Poland had doubled the numerical strength of its forces in that quarter, amassing a stable force of 
22,000.192 General Fyodor Krisanov complained about the increase in air reconnaissance activity 
in the vicinity of the Kaliningrad region, especially in the first months of 1997, and voiced 
concern that Poland had permitted NATO reconnaissance flights over its territory. 1 93 This verbal 
war was in all likelihood aimed at scoring political points and, possibly, at attracting attention 
and raising the stakes in a campaign to sustaining KOOR's military potential. 
Kaliningrad region's specific geographic location and the strategic value that the Russian 
authorities placed on it, especially in the light of NATO enlargement, became a subject that both 
Russia and Poland used in their arguments respectively against and in favour of the enlargement. 
NATO enlargement inadvertently made Kaliningrad region a `security issue'. Poland used it as 
an argument to express its security concerns, which Russia interpreted as a propaganda ploy to 
gain membership of the alliance. Moscow, on the other hand, on the level of rhetoric at least, was 
using Kaliningrad to blackmail Poland and Lithuania not to seek NATO membership, threatening 
Ibid, p. 12. 
192 Glotov gave further figures for the group's military hardware numbering 370 tanks, 400 armoured personnel 
carriers and 250 guns and trench mortars, which, 
he claimed, signified a threat to Russian national security from that 
potential NATO member. 
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to step up its military presence in the region should the alliance expand eastwards. ' 94 
In many other respects, the Kaliningrad region presented Russia with a number of problems, and 
maintaining its military strategic character was only one of the ranges of issues, including 
economic, social and environmental ones, that Moscow had to deal with and that provoked 
anxieties in the neighbouring states. ' 95 Despite disagreements in the hard security sphere during 
the period under discussion, Russia and Poland found more common ground and areas of 
cooperation in the non-military security domain. Although the debate regarding the future of 
Kaliningrad region was largely dominated by geopolitical concerns, by 1997 there were signs 
both in Russia and even more so in Poland of a desire to link it with the new, EU-oriented 
agenda. 196 The role of the EU and other soft security issues pertaining to these aspects of 
Russian-Polish relations are discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
Russia-Hungary 
Russia's relations with Hungary in the 1994 and 1997 period resembled to a large extent these 
with other Visegrad states during that time. Hungary's new socialist government, which came to 
power in 1994, announced a policy of continuity in implementing the country's previous policy 
of a `return to Europe', and declared that Hungary's relations with Russia would develop within 
that framework. ' 97 Like their counterparts elsewhere in Central Europe, the Hungarian political 
elite and foreign and security policy specialists overwhelmingly believed that the security 
interests of their country would be better guaranteed through membership of NATO, rather than 
194 The Russian military speculated that Russia might react to the enlargement by deploying tactical nuclear weapons 
in Kaliningrad and/or by targeting new members. See Godzimirski, "Soviet Legacy and the Baltic Security, " p. 53n. 
'95 See various chapters in Pertti Joenniemi and Jan Prawitz (eds. ), Kaliningrad: 
The European Amber Region 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998). 
196 Joenniemi, "Kaliningrad, " p. 235. 
197 O. G. Volotov, "Rossiya-Vengriya" in Rossiya i Tsentral'no-Vostochna, "a Evropa v Pervoi Polovine 90-kh Godov. 
Chast' 11- Dvustoronnive Otnosheniua, ed. by Igor Orlik, Svetlana Glinkina, Boris Shmelev (Moscow: IMEPI RAN, 
1997), p. 41. 
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by any other kind of new organisation (or one based on the OSCE). As Csaba Nagy, a 
Hungarian observer, put it 
For nations that have re-possessed independence, there are only three choices: either to live in Russia's shadow, to become neutral, or to join the West European integration 
process. There is no fourth option in the European space. 198 
This categorical judgement conveys the prevailing mood amongst Central Europeans at the time 
and sent Russia a clear message as to what position it was facing with regard to these countries 
and showed Moscow where they saw themselves in the European security system and their 
position relative to Russia. 
When judged against the record of Russia's bilateral ties with Poland in this, Russian-Hungarian 
relations are marked by fewer problems and by their relative stability despite Budapest's 
unequivocal pro-Western orientation. One of the reasons for this is that the history of bilateral 
relations between the two countries is less burdened with negative episodes than is the case with 
Poland. Hungary occupies a far less significant place in Russia's geopolitical thinking due 
Hungary's remote geographical position, absence of common borders, and the fact that Hungary 
was not seen as a strong regional leader. Another important factor was that Russia attached a 
different degree of importance to various states' possible membership of the NATO alliance. As 
Poland's former defence chief Janusz Onyszkiewicz observed after Russian-Polish consultations 
in February 1996, Russia would probably agree to Hungary and the Czech Republic's 
membership in NATO as long as Poland did not join. 
199 
Thus the intensification of the debate on NATO enlargement, even though Hungary was one of 
the three most likely candidates to join in the first wave, did not significantly disrupt the process 
198 Nagy Csaba, "Variaciök a NATO-temära, " Magyar Hirlap, 16 December 1994, quoted ibid., p. 44. 
199 Kobrinskaya, Rossii"a i Tscntral'naya Vostochnaya Evropa posle, p. 109. 
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of building the legal base for bilateral relations. In January 1995 the Russian Duma ratified the 
State Treaty on Cooperation and Friendly Relations that was originally signed in 1991. Russian 
and Hungarian officials drew up more than twenty treaties and agreements that laid a legal 
foundation for regulating future bilateral relations. A number of high-level official exchanges 
took place in the period under discussion. Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin visited Hungary 
in 1994 and Hungary's Prime Minister Gyula Horn paid an official visit to Russia in March 1995. 
During the visits progress was made in resolving the issue of Russia's outstanding debts to 
Hungary. 
The evolution and institutionalisation of the OSCE coincided with the rise of the debate on 
NATO enlargement and the role that the OSCE would have in the ongoing transformation of the 
European security system. Hungary's leadership of the OSCE at the time gave Russia another 
opportunity to air its views on Budapest's bid to join NATO and present its view on the roles of 
the OSCE and NATO. At the 1996 Lisbon OSCE summit Russia initiated the development of a 
new Model for Security in Europe. Kozyrev presented Hungary with a working memorandum 
containing Russia's official position, stating that "Moscow is proposing that a dialogue be 
conducted on the basis of existing structures in the interests of a unified Europe". This statement 
underlined, once again, Russia's fear of being isolated and excluded from European processes if 
the North Atlantic Alliance was to enlarge. After his talks with the Hungarian leadership - 
President Arpad Goncz, Prime Minister Gyula Horn and Foreign Minster Lazslo Kovacs - 
Kozyrev stated: "We are against solving Europe's questions without considering the interests of 
other states. "200 However, Russia failed to find in Hungary an ally for its earlier proposal to 
reform the CSCE so that it would acquire an "executive agency with a limited membership", 
modelled after the Security 
Council of the United Nations. Russia's calls to enhance the overall 
200 ITAR-TASS, 24 March 1995, (FBIS-SOV-95-058). 
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role of the CSCE and turn it into a kind of counterbalance to NATO met with resolute 
opposition, especially from Hungary and the Czech Republic . 
201 All subsequent Russian- 
Hungarian discussions on the future of the European security system were restricted to exchanges 
of opinions and reiteration of the two sides' positions. 
In November 1997, Hungary held a referendum on the subject of NATO membership. Nearly 85 
percent of the 50 percent of the population who cast their votes said `yes' to membership. 
Commenting on the results, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Avdeyev stated that a 
stronger NATO presence on the European continent "makes no constructive sense and leads 
Europe nowhere intellectually" and that Russia's opposition to the expansion of NATO would 
not be weakened by "the desire of a specific European state to join that organisation". 202 
Nevertheless, despite Russia's strong opposition to NATO enlargement, Moscow managed to 
sustain pragmatic and businesslike relations with Budapest in most spheres. As Chapter 4 will 
show, Russia and Hungary reached a number of agreements on various other levels - from 
economic and trade ties to the fight against organised crime. An agreement was reached on arms 
trade and related services, which was particularly significant, as Russian Deputy Prime Minister 
Vladimir Bulgak pointed out, "in light of Hungary's intentions to join NATO". 
203 Hungarian 
Chief of the General Staff Lt. Gen. Ferenc Vegh commented that Budapest 
had to sign the 
agreement simply to keep the mainly Russian-made military equipment 
in Hungary's armed 
forces operable. However, Russian-Hungarian cooperation 
in this sphere was not limited just to 
the trade. In addition, according to Vegh, Hungary continued to send some of 
its army officers for 
training at the Russian General Staff Military 
Academy and the graduates received good 
201 Izvestia, 12 October 1994, p. 3. 
202 Interfax, 17 November 1997, 
(FBIS-SOV-97-321). 
203 Interfax, 11 November 1997, (FBIS-UMA-97-315) 
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placements in the Hungarian armed forces afterwards. 204 The Russian and Hungarian defence 
leaderships, Russian Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev and Hungarian Minister of Defence Gyorgy 
Keleti, also stated their intention to work on measures to improve "trust and understanding" 
between the two nations' armies. 205 
As the above account of Russian-Hungarian relations in the period between 1994 and 1997 
demonstrates, the two countries managed to sustain and develop balanced and amicable relations 
on a high political level. Disagreements on the fundamental issue of NATO enlargement did not 
bring any major fallout between Moscow and Budapest. By the end of 1996 Russia acquiesced to 
the inevitability of NATO enlargement to include three states and the signing of the face-saving 
Fundamental Act with NATO allowed Russia to pursue more balanced and multi-focused 
relations with the candidate member states, and Hungary in particular. The positive trend in 
Russian-Hungarian relations was helped by the ability of the two sides to compromise, 
particularly by agreeing to accept Russian arms in payment of Russian debts. The sensitivity of 
such a deal is hard to underestimate. Russia was keen to sustain its share of the arms market 
in 
the region and retain some dependence in CE on its military products. In 
light of the across-the- 
board switch of CE states towards the West, their desire to join NATO, and the 
CE states' fear of 
compromising their pro-Western orientation by dealing with 
Russia in the military sphere, the 
delivery of 28 MiG-29 fighters worth USD 8000 million and subsequent 
deals for the delivery of 
spare parts and related services to Hungary was a major achievement 
for Russia. The increase in 
the pace of military-technical cooperation 
between Russia and some of the CE states, and 
Hungary in particular, demonstrated that, despite the existence of real constraints, mutual 
interest 
had dominated over mistrust and prejudice, although on a more primitive and 
less ambitious level 
204 Nezavisimava gazeta, 28 November 




then initially hoped for in Russia. 206 Russian policy-makers and advisors on military-industrial 
cooperation agreed that, looked at realistically, the export prospects to CE would be limited by 
political considerations. However, Russian military industrialists hoped that they would be able 
to offer a reasonable and economically attractive programme to modernise the CE states' armed 
forces to NATO standards. Russia's Rosvooruzhenie concern calculated that Hungary would have 
to pay USD 6 billion to develop NATO-compatible infrastructure and procure 70 new Western 
combat aircraft. Rosvooruzhenie offered to upgrade the existing fleet of Russian made fighters 
deployed in Hungary and deliver other types of MiG fighters at a cost of USD 400 million or five 
times cheaper than buying equivalent hardware from the West. 
In general then, Moscow's relations with Budapest and their major economic deals with 
potentially significant political implications were less subject to political scrutiny and antagonism 
in Hungary than was the case with Poland, where ties with Russia more often became a matter for 
domestic political in-fighting. Russia was able to pursue more stable and pragmatic relations with 
Hungary. Budapest actively supported the signing of the Russia-NATO Founding Act, which it 
saw as a factor increasing stability and trust in Europe, and was careful to emphasize that Russia 
was an integral part of the European security system. 207 
Russia-Czech Republic 
If Russia's relations with Poland in the period between 1994 to 1997 could be characterised as 
controlled mutual antipathy and Russian-Hungarian ties as generally pragmatic and business-like, 
then Russia's relationship with the Czech Republic falls somewhere in between. Moscow's 
relations with Prague, predictably, were 
disrupted by the strength of the Czech leadership's desire 
206 Kobrinskaya, Irina and Peter Litavrin, "Military-Technical Cooperation Between Russia and Countries of East- 
Central Europe, " in Russia and the Arms Trade, ed. by Ian Anthony (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 
1998), p. 183. 
207 Nezavisima), V gazeta, 28 November 1997, p. 1. 
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to join NATO. From his side, Jiri Payne, Chair of the Czech Parliament Foreign Affairs 
Committee, saw in Russia's opposition to Czech membership of NATO a reflection of a lack of 
interest in developing relations with Prague. 
208 Russia's anti -enlargement rhetoric was perceived 
by the candidate member-states as evidence of Moscow's inability to rid itself of old thinking. 
Czech President Vaclav Havel characterised the trend in Russian foreign policy as "a return to the 
209 bi-polar world view of the Cold War years" . He claimed that yielding to Russia's opposition to 
NATO enlargement could lead to "Europe being threatened with a repetition of the 1938 `Munich 
Agreement', which was a prelude to the World War II" and warned the Western democracies of 
the erroneous path of making concessions to the forces of evil. 210 Havel, however, also called for 
a "widening" of NATO's relations with Russia. 
The Czech Republic, perhaps more than any other CE country, felt that its foreign policy 
orientation and national security priorities pointed firmly towards the West. 21 Compared with 
other CE states, the Czech Republic's geopolitical location made it feel more distant from Russia. 
The experience of Soviet occupation left an important mark on perceptions. The events of August 
1968 and earlier experiences of external domination have often been cited by Czech politicians as 
the result of failures by the West to protect their country. 
212 The violent Russian intervention in 
Chechnya in late 1994 stirred old memories and strengthened Prague's resolve to join NATO. 213 
The shift was evident in opinion polls. In 1992,39 per cent of the population felt threatened by 
208 Quoted in M. Kopytina, "Rossiya -Chekhi ya" in Rossiya i Tsentral'no-Vostochnaya Evropa v Pervoi Polovine 90- 
kh Godov. Chast'11 - Dvustoronniye Otnosheniya, ed. by Igor Orlik, Svetlana Glinkina, 
Boris Shmelev (Moscow: 
IMEPI RAN, 1997), p. 107. 
209 Quoted, ibid., p. 107. 
210 Quoted ibid., pp. 107-108. 
211 Magda Boguszakova and Ivan Gabal, "The Czech Republic, " in Richard Smoke (ed. ), Perceptions of Securitv. 
Public Opinion and Expert Assessment in Europe's New Democracies, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1996), P. 66. 
212 Ibid, p. 70. 
213 Miloslav Had and Valdimir Handl, "The Czech Republic, " in Richard Smoke (ed. ), Perceptions of SecuritY. 
Public opinion and Expert Assessment in Europe's New Democracies, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 
1996), P. 140. 
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Russia, and this increased to 51 percent in 1996.214 In Hungary, by contrast, only 13 percent of 
those polled felt threatened by Russia in 1992, and 30 percent in 1996.215 
The Czech leadership often took the moral high ground on the Chechen issue, criticizing Russia 
for using armed forces against its own people. In May 1995 Vaclav Havel protested to the 
Russian ambassador that servicemen who had fought in Chechnya took part in the 9 May Red 
Square World War Victory parade. 216 The Russian media called the incident `a storm in a 
teacup', and the Russian Defence and Interior Ministries denied the story. The incident provoked 
some commentary in Rossiyskaya gazeta on the state of Russian-Czech relations, which noted 
that by May 1995 the Czech parliament had still not ratified the bilateral Treaty on Friendly 
Relations and Cooperation, whereas the Russian Duma had done so in July 1994.2 17 Bilateral 
political relations were further damaged when only two out of seven members of the Czech 
delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) voted in favour of 
Russia's joining the Council. 218 This deterioration in bilateral relations went as far as to cause 
concern among Czech politicians. The Czech Prime Minister, Vaclav Klaus, declared in May 
1996, "It is necessary to build rational, wise and equal relations with Russia. " Those who 
preferred to distance the country further from Russia, in his opinion, were making a big 
mistake. 
219 
Top-level contacts between Russia and the Czech Republic during 1994-1997 were extremely 
infrequent. Of course, frequent official visits can easily become a triumph of process over 
214 Christian Haerpfer, Claire Wallace and Richard Rose, Public Perceptions of Threats to Securit ,v 
in Post- 
Conimunist Europe, SPP 293, (Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1997), p. 
7. 
215 Ibid, p. 6. 
216 Rossiyskaya gazeta, 30 May 1995, p. 7, (FBIS-SOV-95-104). 
217 Ibid. The Czech Republic did finally ratify the treaty in September 1995. 
218 See Kopytina "Rossi ya-Chekhi ya" (1997), p. 108. Russia was still voted to become a member of the 
Council of 
Europe. 
219 Pup s planeýy, ITAR-TASS, 
8 May 1996, quoted ibid. 
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substance. However, in this case one cannot interpret the dearth of contacts as a sign of benign 
neglect. There was a complete and fundamental divergence of political and geo-strategic vie", s. 
Russia's foreign and security policy of the day, bent on projecting a 'great power' image, 
concentrated on sorting out geopolitical challenges with those whom it saw as 'equal'. Moscow 
often snubbed Prague for its excessive pro-Westernism and scaled down relations to what was 
needed for restructuring Soviet-era debts, very reluctantly at that. 220 Further attempts to give 
Russian-Czech relations a degree of normality failed to bear any fruit. Writing in the Czech daily 
Lidove noviny, Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec argued on the eve of a visit to Moscow in 
March 1996: 
[the Czech authorities aim] to develop good and intensive relations with the East, 
[ 
... ]but we want to develop them as a firm part of the West. ... we maintain pragmatic 
working relations with the Russian Federation, which certainly is for the Czech 
Republic by far the most important country in this region. At the same time, we keep 
constantly in mind that these must be relations between two independent sovereign 
states, symmetrical and equal relations. Therefore, a certain easily understandable 
caution can be detected on our part. [ ... ] Our joining NATO is an issue that can be 
subject to discussion only between NATO and ourselves. On the other hand, we 
consider it a matter of fact that Russia cannot be ignored when fon-ning a security 
system in Europe and the world. 221 
The visit to Moscow did not produce any breakthrough on reconciling the two sides' views on 
NATO enlargement. On the contrary, even more problems followed. On 16 March 1997, Nikolai 
Ryabov, Russian Ambassador to the Czech Republic, stated in a TV interview that Czech 
membership of NATO could have a negative impact on Russian deliveries of gas and nuclear 
technology. Ryabov declared that "prospective membership is already causing problems for the 
220 Vaclav Klaus visited Moscow in June 1994 keen to settle USID 3.5 billion of Russian debt to the Czech Republic. 
Unlike Hungary, the Czechs refused to swap Russian debt for military goods as Russia proposed. The two sides 
agreed on a schedule of debt repayments to 
be completed by 2003, by paying in hard currency on the terms of the 
Paris Club, as well as by shipment of Russian goods and raw materials in part payment of the debt. See Izvestia, 10 
June 1994, p. 3. See also Kopytina (1997), pp. 113-114. 
221 Lidove novitq, 9 February 1996, (FBIS-EEU-96-034). 
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future between our countries. "222 The statement provoked an unprecedented stream of 
commentary from the Czech authorities. The Czech Prime-Minister Vaclav Klaus stated that 
unless the Russian government disassociated itself from the remark the Czech Republic's resolve 
to join NATO would only strengthen. 223 Czech Industry Minister Vladimir Dlouhy warned 
ý24 2 Moscow that the Czech Republic was an important transit country for Russian natural gas, and 
President Havel declared that his country was prepared to stop using Russian gas entirely and to 
buy Norwegian gas instead . 
225 Needless to say, the prospect unnerved Gazprom - at the time 
Russia's gas monopoly was contracted to supply the Czech Republic with nearly 88 percent of its 
gas requirements. 226 Nezavisimaya gazeta commented that Russian economic interests were 
suffering in the Czech Republic, and everywhere else in Central Europe, thanks to its own 
government and 'amateur' diplomats like Ryabov. The paper argued that Russia needed to 
(activate' its CE policy not only in response to NATO enlargement, but also because of the way 
in which Russian economic interests were being challenged in the region. 227 
Within a month, on 20-22 April 1997, Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin visited the Czech 
Republic, at, in the words of Prime Minister Klaus, a "charged political moment". 228 When the 
question of NATO enlargement was brought up during the visit, the two leaders of the 
governments chose to "keep to their positions". It would be difficult to imagine any other 
outcome, as Russia was not offering anything radically different and the Czech Republic was not 
prepared to accept anything that would preclude full membership of NATO. Earlier, when 
Russian Foreign Minister Primakov had suggested that the countries of CE only join NATO's 
122 jolyon Naegele, "Czech Republic: Norvegian Gas Deal Final Step in Energy Independence, " RFEIRL, 20 March 
1997, http: //www. rferl. org 
223 Jolyon Naegele, "Czech Republic/Russia: Ambassador Draws Ire in Prague and Abroad, " RFEIRL, 19 March 
1997, http: //www. rferl. org 
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political and military structures the Czech Republic, as well as all other aspiring member-states 
rejected the idea. 229 However, Chernomyrdin's visit was important in itself. it brought about a 
certain 't aw' in bilateral relations and introduced a degree of stability and manageability. 
Russia-Slovakia 
Under the second premiership of Vladimir Meciar (1994-1998) Slovakia became known as 
'Belarus on the Danube' . 
230AIthough Meciar did not go to the same length in forging close ties 
with Moscow as did Minsk, Bratislava's record of creating an extensive economic and political 
relationship with Moscow between 1994 to 1997 gave sufficient reason for the West and 
Slovakia's neighbours to doubt the seriousness of its aspirations to join NATO and the EU. 
Moscow took full advantage of the favourable situation by establishing a framework of bilateral 
agreements that would serve its interests. Russia's ties with Slovakia were portrayed in Moscow 
as an example of what relations with other states in the region could be like if it were not for anti- 
Russian prejudice. 
Slovakia's relations with Russia remained a low priority throughout 1994 during the short-lived 
government of Josef Moravcik (March-December 1994). However, from December 1994 the new 
coalition government of Vladimir Meciar, even as it reiterated the continuity of the country's 
strategic choice - gaining membership of the EU, NATO and the WEU - 
intensified relations with 
Moscow. Slovakia was amongst the first states of the former Warsaw Pact to join the PfP in 
February 1994, and lodged an official application to join the EU in June 1995. In its 1995 
programme the Slovak government stated that 
it would continue to work towards membership in 
229 Lidove novilly, 23 March 1996, p. 
3, (FBIS-EEU-96-060). 
230 Many observers in Slovakia and abroad 
likened his leadership and policies to those of President Aleksandr 
Lukashenka of Belarus, who is known 




NATO and the EU . 
231 Yet in December 1995 Foreign Minister Schenk argued that along with 
NATO, the EC and the VVEU, an important role in the European security system should be given 
to institutions that might be created by the CIS. While arguing that Slovakia's path towards 
security lay through membership of NATO and the WEU, Meciar stated that the process of 
joining NATO should take into account the position of Russia, which remained an important 
232 factor in international relations . Bratislava's 'balanced' policy led to a rapprochement with 
Moscow unparalleled in the CE region. Prime Minister Chemomyrdin's visit to Slovakia, the 
country which the Russian Prime Minister described as "friendly, close and dear to us exceeded 
all expectations", according to Rossiyskaya gazeta, and "created a pattern for new interstate 
relations" for the countries of the region. 233 Although the main focus of the visit was economic, 
the agreements that were reached had serious political implications, both from the point of view 
of increasing Russia's influence in the country, and the future positioning of Slovakia with 
respect to the rest of Europe. 234 When Russia's newly appointed Foreign Minister Primakov new 
to Bratislava in February 1996, Slovakia's Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk stated that his country 
235 would continue to strive for "full integration in western structures". By then, however, it 
became increasingly clear that Slovakia would be the least likely candidate to join NATO in the 
first wave of enlargement. Close ties with Russia and its poor human rights record were widely 
perceived as the main reasons for Slovakia's exclusion. 
Slovak officials defended their country's position and ties with Moscow by noting that "the West 
231 M. Kopytina, "Rossiya-Slovakia" in Rossiya i Tsentral'no-Vostochnaya Evropa v Pervoi Polovine 90-kh Godov. 
Chast'Il - Dvustoronniye Otnosheniya, ed. 
by Igor Orlik, Svetlana Glinkina, Boris Shmelev (Moscow: IMEPI RAN, 
1997), p. 128. 
232 Kopytina, "Rossiya-Slovakia" (1997), p. 130. 
233 Rossi); skaya gazeta, 16 February 1995, pp. 1,6. (FBIS-SOV-95-033). 
234 The range of agreements varied from settling outstanding Russian debt to the Slovak Republic with shipments of 
arms and gas, to joint production of military equipment and a establishing joint 
Russian-Slovak bank to fund both 
countries' entrepreneurs. Moscow also extended 
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and Slovakia Ibid. 
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demands that the countries interested in NATO membership have normal relations with Russia: 
we are following this line. This is a contribution to achieving economic, political, and security 
stability in Europe. -)ý236 Yet many observers commented that statements made by Prime Minister 
Meciar suggested that he had ceased counting on the Slovak Republic's rapid admission to 
NATO by mid-1996.237 Attention was drawn by Meciar's statement that if the West turned its 
238 back to Slovakia, then Slovakia would have to look for understanding in the East. 
Some officials from the Meciar coalition government and the left-wing opposition party (the 
Communist Party of Slovakia) even started to explore the possibility of Slovakia adopting 
neutrality. When an official delegation of the Slovak government held talks in Moscow in early 
May 1996, Jana Cemy, Meciar's advisor, stated that a one-sided orientation to the West was too 
big a risk for Slovakia. 239 Peter Stanek, another government advisor, also present, offered to 
create a joint Russian-Slovak corporation which would modemise Soviet-made armaments. 
Stanek suggested that other CE states like Poland and the Czech Republic could take part. 
Nezavisimaya gazeta speculated that Slovakia was prepared to bargain with Moscow over its 
membership of the Alliance in order to secure its economic interests, one of the reasons being 
that in its trade with Russia Slovakia showed a constant significant negative balance. 240 Such a 
negative balance significantly affected Slovakia's current accounts, resulting in a balance of 
payments deficit and undermining its ability to service sovereign debts. For Russia, Slovakia's 
negative image in the West and the growing likelihood that it would not be amongst the first to 
join NATO gave an opportunity to signal to the West that if NATO expanded then Russia would 
use everything at its disposal to counter-balance the alliance and to re-establish a sphere of 
236 Narodna obroda, 17 December 1996, p. 9. (FBIS-EEU-96-224). 
237 Ibid. 
238 Nezavisimay'a gazeta, 29 April 1997, p. 2. The paper claimed that the statement was made some time In the past. 




influence. The Meciar government, in the face of domestic opposition, sought political support 
in Moscow by entering into long-term and not always equal deals "ýith it. The trust it 
demonstrated towards Russia, was not reflected, however, among a majority of the Slovak 
population. Quite the opposite. According to one study, compared to 1992, when 26 percent of 
Slovaks felt threatened by Russia, by 1996 51 percent did so, a figure almost as high as that for 
the Czech Republic - 55 percent, but significantly higher than Hungary - 30 percent. 241 
Despite the growing opposition in the country, the Slovak government continued to enter into 
agreements with Russia. On 28'hApril 1997 Chemomyrdin visited Slovakia again. The Russian 
official press called Slovakia "Russia's number one partner in Central Europe". 242 By 1997 one 
analyst and an authority on Slovak relations with Russia Alexander Duleba counted over 130 
bilateral agreements signed since Slovakia's independence in January 1993, against an officially 
reported 80.243 According to Duleba, Russian-Slovak relations under Meciar were based on 
personal rather than national interests and could harm Slovakia's national interests simply 
because the two states were unequal partners. They would result simply in a one-sided 
dependence on Russia. Due to its ever closer relations with Russia, he argued, the Meciar 
244 
government was both unwilling and unable to lead Slovakia into NATO. In April 1997, when 
it had become apparent that Slovakia was not going to be among the first wave of NATO 
enlargement, Chernomyrdin stated that Russia was prepared to support Slovakia's neutral status 
and repeated an offer made earlier by the Russian ambassador to the Slovak Republic Sergey 
Zotov to guarantee the country's neutral status. 245 As a commentary in the Russian daily 
241 Christian Haerpfer, Claire Wallace and Richard Rose, Public Perceptions of Threats to Security in Post- 
Communist Europe, p. 7. 
242 Ross 1. vs kaYa gazeta, 30 April 1997, p. 2. (FBIS-SOV-97-120) 
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Segodnya noted at the time, "As long as the Meciar government is in power, there is no need to 
worry about Russian-Slovak friendship. , 246 
With membership of NATO off the immediate agenda, the Russian military-industrial complex 
was set to benefit even further from Slovak arms procurement decisions. During a visit to 
Moscow on 5'h December 1997, a State Secretary from the Slovak Ministry of Defence 
announced Slovakia's intention to make Russian MiG29s the backbone of the country's air 
force. 247 He also revealed that Bratislava planned to modemise older fighters and buy 
248 multipurpose SU-30 fighters to replace the air force's existing SU-22 S. In addition, Slovakia 
expressed the desire to buy Russian Ka-50 helicopters and continued talks with Moscow to 
acquire the S-300 PMU- I rocket system, with all purchases to be financed by deductions from 
the Russian debt to Slovakia. 249 The intensity and depth of Russian-Slovak bilateral relations in 
the period under discussion was unprecedented, and unique for the region. Although the situation 
reflected the preferences of Meciar and his group rather than of the population as a whole, 
Moscow could not hide its satisfaction. Ambassador to Slovakia Sergey Zotov conu-nented that 
Russia had never had such good cooperation with any of the Eastern European countries. 250 
Russia's political ties with Slovakia, which had a pronounced economic dimension, increased 
Slovakia's dependence on Russia and cast doubt on Slovakia's pro-Western credentials, a 
development mainly due to the activities of Slovak internal political forces. Moscow supporters 
represented a very powerful lobby in Slovakia, both politically and economical ly. 
'ý' Meciar's 
Movement for Democratic Slovakia became the richest of all Parties as a result of a "controlled" 
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privatisatIon, which left almost 80 percent of the privatised sector in the hands of Meciar 
supporters. 252 Russian policy towards Slovakia, on the other hand, was more reactive than pro- 
active and was based on personal ties between the two leaderships. Various structural problems 
that the Slovak Republic inherited after the separation from the Czech Republic encouraged it to 
seek closer ties with Russia. Slovakia had to build its armed forces almost from scratch, which 
required substantial spending that the country could ill afford, especially in the light of re- 
orientation to the West and the need for interoperability with NATO anned forces. Slovakia's 
disproportionately large military-industrial complex was at a virtual standstill, adding to 
unemployment and generating social backlash. All these factors coupled with the offer of Russian 
military equipment as part payment of Moscow's large debt, Meciar's pro-Moscow stance and 
the dubious practices of his government, to which Moscow was willing to turn a blind eye, were 
the basis for close relations between the two states. Slovakia's growing dependence on Russia, 
therefore, should be seen more as an anomaly favourable to Moscow. As later developments will 
demonstrate, the situation changed with the departure of the Meciar coalition government. 
However, what Moscow managed to achieve under the favourable conditions of the Meciar 
government allowed it to resolve a number of outstanding problems in bilateral relations. 
Slovakia's agreement to accept Russian military equipment and other special deliveries (e. g. 
civilian aircraft) as a fon-n of debt repayment, not only allowed Russia to reduce its debt quickly, 
but also laid the basis for further economic involvement in Slovakia through servicing, upgrading 
and supply of spare parts for exported equipment. Ensuring that Russia remained a major supplier 
of gas to Slovakia, through the signing of a long-term contract and establishing a joint venture, 
was another important victory for Moscow (see Chapter 4). 




welcomed in Moscow. However, the fact that one of the key reasons for its exclusion, as 
understood by the Slovak opposition, was close ties with Russia and increased dependence on it, 
meant that relations between the two states were not as stable and predictable as one might 
expect. Such a state of affairs was only certain to last as long as Meciar and his party controlled 
the government. 
The discussion which follows focuses on the development of relations between Russia and the 
CE states in the changed political situation during the last two years of the Yeltsin presidency. 
Russian National Security and Central Europe - 1998-1999 
The end of 1997 and beginning of 1998 marked the start of a new period both in the history of 
Russia's post-Soviet development and in that of post-Cold War Europe as a whole. In July 1997 
an important decision was taken on the enlargement of NATO, and three of the four Visegrad 
states were invited to join the alliance. Russia grudgingly accepted the inevitability of NATO 
moving closer to its borders and negotiated a face-saving Founding Act with the alliance. In 
Russia's internal development, 1998 became a year of mounting political and economic crisis, 
further weakening liberal and pro-Western politicians and generally damaging Russia's 
international standing. The crisis, political instability and frequent changes of government in 
Russia equally affected the development of policy and relations with the four Visegrad states. 
The actual joining of NATO by the three states, the adoption of the new NATO Strategic 
Doctrine, events around Kosovo in the spring and summer of 1999, and Russia's second Chechen 
War launched in August 1999 could not but negatively affect Russia's position vis-a-vis the CE 
states and NATO, Europe and the West as a whole. These factors and events provide the 
background and wider framework, which any analysis of Russia's policy towards Poland, 
Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic has to take into account. 
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Relationships that had been marred by various problems in the preceding years became even 
more problematic in 1998-99. As aspiring NATO members, Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic, as well as Slovakia (with its new pro-Western government) were seen in Moscow as 
anti-Russian. In the words of the Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Avdeyev, these states 
appeared to be trying to emphasise their pro-Western orientation and marking their distance from 
Russia. 253 Izvestia captured the prevailing view of the region among the Russian elite when it 
claimed that CE wanted to be seen as 'a better Catholic than the Pope'. 254 
Exacerbated by the events described above, Russia's relations with the CE states between 1998 
and 1999 continued to be politically highly charged. The anticipation that relations between the 
two sides would improve with the CE states' eventual admission to NATO proved to be wrong, 
in large part due to NATO's campaign in Kosovo, which Russia categorized as an act of 
aggression against a sovereign state. In the words of one anti-Western and 'pragmatically' 
minded analyst Andrei Fedorov, "The war against Yugoslavia has done Russia at least one favor: 
many people, including those placed high enough, grew disappointed with the West as a strategic 
partner... The Yugoslav crisis put an end to our somewhat romantic attitude to NATO and our 
recent urgent desire to regard the alliance as a partner rather than a potential danger. , 255 Of 
course, Russia's romantic view of NATO had been a thing of the past for a long time. What the 
Kosovo crisis did, however, was to bring to the surface a degree of frustration on Moscow's part 
at the West's disregard of its 'great power' rhetoric. Russia's angry reaction to NATO's actions 
in Kosovo reflected not so much its support for Milosevic and the Serbs in the conflict as a cruel 
realisation of its diminished influence in Europe. The Balkan conflict that came on the heels of 
253 RosBiznesKonsulting - Novosti, 13.06.2000, Moscow, 13: 09: 10, <http: //www. rbc. ru>, accessed 
13 June 2000. 
2ý4 Izvestia, 14 February 1998. 
255 A. Fedorov, "New Pragmatism of Russia's Foreign Policy, " International Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 5,1999, Moscow, 
pp. 47,5 1. 
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NATO enlargement only added insult to iqjury, leading to a predictable, yet unproductive, 
freezing of relations with NATO. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic's support of the 
conflict, as the new members of the alliance, signalled another period of difficulties in relations 
with Moscow. 
Russia-Poland 
Russia's relations with Poland in the period 1998-1999 developed generally along similar lines to 
previous years, but was enriched and supplemented by events within and outside the two states. 
The legacy of the past and mutual perceptions continued to exercise significant influence on their 
actions. In Poland, for example, the persistent view of Russia was clearly articulated by the 
Polish Foreign Minister in his annual speech to the Sejm on the basic direction of the Polish 
foreign policy in 1998. Bronislaw Geremek stated, "Good-neighbourly relations with the Russian 
Federation... are permanent elements of our approach to Eastern Europe. " However, Geremek 
went on to complain, "We cannot fail to notice that from time to time there are tendencies in 
,, 256 Russian policy to treat Poland and other countries of the area as things to be used. Although 
this was true to a degree, it was also true that official Polish foreign policy, despite the stated 
desire to have dynamic and friendly relations with Moscow, often continued to be a hostage to 
domestic political struggles between left and right. This was commented on in a statement in 
2001 by Leszek Miller, chairman of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) of Poland: 
There is a trend in Poland... toward expressing a belief that in our relations with 
Russia we have a certain mission to complete. This reportedly stems from our alleged 
cultural and economic superiority and from religious reasons. This is disastrous. It leads 
to the deterioration of relations with Russia and to losing the asset, with respect to EU 
countries, as a country with better relations with the East than they have. 
257 
Miller attributed frictions between Poland and Russia to two further factors. First, the Polish 
256 "Poland's Foreign Minister Addresses SeJm on Policy", Warsa-pt, PAP, 9 March 1998, (FBIS-EEU-98-068). 
257 "Does Brussels Want Us? " The Polish Voice, No 7, March 2001, 
<http: //www. thepolishvoice. pi/MarOl/PVOO. html> accessed 22 August 2001. 
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right, which is anti-communist and anti-Soviet, brings memories of past actions to the present 
day and becomes anti-Russian. On the other hand the left fears that if it goes too far in warming 
relations with Russia it will be accused of continuing the dependence on Russia that existed 
under the Polish People's Republic. In this context, neither side wants to start a new dialogue 
with the Russians. Many in Poland had hoped that with their country joining NATO, relations 
between Warsaw and Moscow would improve. Polish President Kwasniewski expressed the view 
that Poland's membership of NATO would enable his country to have relations with Russia 
258 similar to those of the rest of the North Atlantic Alliance. One of Poland's leading experts on 
Russia, Agnieszka Magdziak-Miszewska, argued that "the more we [Poland] are in the West, the 
more open we are to the East; NATO membership is not a retreat from the East or Russia. It is a 
way out of the geopolitical trap of our geopolitical location between Russia and Germany. A 
,, 259 Poland that is stable and secure is open for a dialogue with Russia. 
In Russia, media commentators and state, political and public figures often reacted in a highly 
emotional and provocative way to problems in Russian-Polish relations in the period, often 
criticising the Polish side and its policies. 260 Such an approach undoubtedly provoked a circle of 
accusations, taking bilateral relations on a political level from one 'mini-crisis' to another, 
sustaining a chilly atmosphere. 
In Russia the mainstream academics, politicians and military figures did not react Positively to 
Poland's accession to NATO. In their view NATO continued to be a primarily military alliance 
whose main mission was collective defence from external threat. In Moscow's opinion, the only 
258 plasS Planeýv, 23 March 1999, quoted in Nikolai Bukharin "Rossilsko-Pol'skie otnosheniya, " in Rossýva i 
Tsenti-al'no-I'ostochnava Evropa: i, --ainiootnosheni*i, avkontseXXveka, (Moscow: 
IMEPI RAN, 1999), p. 66. 
259 Quoted in Nikolai Bukharin "Rossi i sko-Pol'skie otnosheniya", 1999, p. 66. 
260 Sec for instance a selection of articles during the period: "Razvorot na 180 gradusov, " NVO - Nezavisimaya 
gazeta, No 4,30 January 1998, "Rossiya v prave ozhidat' izvinenii ot Varshavy, " NVO - Nezavisimaya gazeta, 
No 
25,2 July 1999, "Pol'sha tol'ko dlya 'Belykh', " Nezavisinia. va gazeta, 16 September 1999; "Khamstvo po-pol'skl, ", 
Ne.: uvi'Simaýva gazeta, 25 February 2000. 
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possible 'threat' that could justify the existence of NATO and its expansion was the hypothetical 
one emanating from Russia. In such a perspective, Poland's or any other CE state 's incorporation 
into NATO was clearly an unfriendly step. Regretting thefait acconipli of the enlargement, and 
the loss of even a remote possibility of regaining a sphere of influence in the region, General 
Leonid Ivashov, Chief of the International Cooperation Department of the Russian Defence 
Ministry, commented that by joining NATO the CE states had lost their freedom of manoeuvre, 
0'as NATO is a military regime, even in political questions". 261 Such a perspective left little hope 
for improvements in relations between Poland and Russia. 
Russia's preoccupation with internal problems and its concentration on battling around 'big 
issues' with 'big players' left no room for a creative and pro-active approach towards the CE 
states. Apart from the general cooling of relations, the instability in Russia had a bad effect on 
262 bilateral relations and on perceptions of Russia in Poland . However, Polish President 
Kwasniewski, generally more pro-Russian and open to compromise than Poland's right wing 
government led by Jerzy Buzek from 1997 onwards, was keen to give a boost to bilateral 
relations between the two states. Kwasniewski arranged a private visit to Russia and a meeting 
with President Yeltsin in June 1998, receiving an assurance that Yeltsin would pay an official 
visit to Warsaw later that year. It was important for the future of Russian-Polish relations and 
also for Kwasniewski's voters that the agreement was reached on building a memorial to the 
Polish soldiers executed at Katyn. 263 However, on the issue of NATO both sides stuck to their 
positions. Kwasniewski, while pointing out that "Polish membership of NATO is an irreversible 
fact, " noted that "being in NATO does not mean being opposed to Russia. We are neighbours, 
26 1 Nezavisimcýya gazeta, 5 June 1999. 
262 Political developments within Russia - the financial crisis of August 1998, frequent changes in the Russian 
government and Yeltsm's poor health became 'physical' obstacles that prevented the development of relations. 263 Novve Izvestia, 30 June 1998. 
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,, 264 and therefore intend to develop friendly relations. And perhaps to put the record straight and 
prevent any illusions amongst Russian diplomats, Kwasniewski asserted that rapprochement with 
Moscow would not be allowed to damage in any way Warsaw's relations with the West. 265 
However, the "breakthrough" in bilateral relations that Kwasniewski had hoped for did not 
follow. Yeltsin cancelled his visit to Warsaw scheduled for December 1998 due to health 
problems. Visits by Russian Premier Primakov planned for April 1999 and later by Primakov's 
successor Stepashin also did not take place because of 'the complicated situation in Russia'. On 
the contrary, Poland's eventual entry to NATO and the start of what Moscow called 'NATO's 
aggression against sovereign Yugoslavia' in March 1999 ushered in a new chill. With the start of 
the bombing Russia announced it was freezing relations with NATO. Poland's active support of 
NATO actions in Yugoslavia meant that bilateral relations suffered. In addition, Russia reacted 
negatively to Warsaw's aspirations to act as a spokesman for Ukraine's interests in Europe an its 
support for the aspirations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to NATO membership. 
266 Russian 
officials once again chose to put themselves in a comer by issuing threats that the border of the 
former Soviet Union was a 'red line' beyond which Russia would not tolerate further NATO 
267 
expansion and that Moscow would have to reappraise its relations with the alliance . Moscow 
called on Warsaw 'to speak in NATO in its own voice' rather than be a 'Trojan horse' 
for 
American interests in the region. 
268 
Russia's policy with respect to integration with Belarus continued to cause tension 
between 
Warsaw and Moscow. Poland preferred Belarus to be more Western, and would 
have liked to 
264 Rossivska. IV gazeta, 2 July 1998. 
265 Ibid. 
266 PAP, 17 February 1999, (FBIS-EEU-1999-0218). 
267 AFP, 7 February 1999. 
268 Politi, ka, 18 September 1999, pp. 20-22, (FBIS-EEU- 1999-0920). 
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establish a strategic partnership with Belarus, bringing it closer to Western structures. 269 In 
Poland, according to Agnieszka Magdziak-Miszewska, close relations between Moscow and 
Minsk were interpreted as an outcome of Russia's neo-imperial policy. In view of the nature of 
Lukashenka's regime, declarations about such integration being freely chosen by Belarus are 
doubtful 
. 
270 At the same time, she argued, Poland's strategic partnership with Ukraine was seen 
in Moscow as an attempt by Poland to re-establish a buffer line between Russia and Europe. 
27 Russia views Poland's support for the Baltic states' membership in NATO in the same light .I 
For their part, Russian political analysts and officials demonstrated their lack of understanding of 
the complexity of the arrangements and procedures undertaken by Poland and other Visegrad 
states in order to advance towards membership in the EU, a step to which Russia, on the official 
level, did not express any objections. Burdens of distrust and the more recent past continued to 
inform Russia's perception of Poland. Russia reacted angrily to the introduction by Poland of 
stricter border-crossing rules and visas for Russian and Belarussian citizens in January 1998, and 
of some further regulations in January 1999. One Russian commentator called the move 
4overzealous loyalty to the EU' (vernopoddanicheskaya pozitsiya). 272 In most cases, compliance 
with the EU acquis communautaire -a strict checklist of readiness for joining the Union - is not 
a matter of bargaining but a measure of readiness to take on the responsibilities and functions of 
EU membership. Nevertheless, Russian officials interpreted the move as anti-Russian and hasty. 
Had the Russian side been better informed of the developments and procedures of the EU 
enlargement process and therefore possessed a clearer picture of possible implications for 
Russia's relations with the candidate states, many misunderstandings could easily have been 
avoided. Quite typically, Moscow took a persistent view that all questions of EU, as well as 
269 Ibid. 
270 Dipkui-'er - Nezavisimaya gazeta. No. 9,18 
May 2000. 
271 Ibid. 
272 Bukharin, 1999, p. 68. One of the pre-requisites for all candidates for EU membership is to comply with the 
Schengen agreement on EU external border control. This means the imposition of stricter 
border controls with non- 
EU neighbour states. 
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NATO enlargement should be resolved with Brussels, rather than with the CE states' capitals, 
thus closing a door to compromise. 
A similar unconstructively critical attitude to Poland was in evidence in Russia in the aftermath 
of the expulsion of 15 Russian businessmen from Poland in March 1999 for allegedly 
'conducting incompatible activities'. The Russian government daily newspaper Rossiyskalva 
gazeta published an article entitled "NATO Recruits, Right Dress Front! " asserting that the 
expulsion was a display of Warsaw's loyalty to NATO on the eve of joining the organisation. 
The paper did not miss an opportunity to quote the Polish press as saying that "a state that should 
become an alienable part of Western structures cannot remain Russia's wild frontier". 273 The 'spy 
mania' which continued to be a central feature of the Russian-Polish media war, became an 
important factor in bilateral relations. 
With the changes which occurred in Russia surrounding the early 2000 election of the new 
President, Russian foreign policy and national security thinking underwent important 
readjustments. These changes had a direct impact on Russia's relations with the CE states and 
Poland in particular. The development of Russian-Polish ties in the hard security realm from 
2000 will be looked at in the next section. 
Russia-Hungary 
If the pattern of Russia's relations with Poland in 1998-99 was one of relations often reaching a 
'danger mark', the pattern of Russia's relations with Hungary, on the other hand, was what 
Hungarian observer Poti Laslo called a 'third way'. Balancing between the two extremes, 
Hungary, unlike Poland, avoided long-lasting confrontations with Russia, yet, unlike Slovakia, it 
273 Rossivskava gazeta, 12 March 1999. See also Vremia-MN, 3 March 1999 and 12 March 1999. 
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was not too eager to develop special relations with Russia. 274 This model of relations continued 
to be in place between 1998 and 1999. However, various developments, as just described in the 
case of Poland, did leave their mark on Russian-Hungarian relations. First of all, the final stages 
of Hungary's entry into NATO left their mark on the bilateral political environment. Second, the 
financial crisis in Russia in August 1998 significantly affected bilateral trade and economic 
relations. Third, parliamentary elections in Hungary and the change of government in May-June 
1998 with the accession to power of the right-wing coalition government of Viktor Orban had 
their effects. The fourth factor that affected bilateral relations was the frequent change of 
goverm-nents in Russia. And finally, the Kosovo crisis and the position that Hungary took during 
it brought relations with Russia at one point to a crisis level. These factors had a negative impact 
on various levels. 
Russian Foreign Minister Primakov's visit to Budapest in February 1998 was the last before 
problems began to develop. He stated that despite the evident desire of Hungary to join European 
structures, Moscow believed that a "Russian direction" was still very important for Hungary. 
275 it 
is worth recalling that during the whole period leading up to Hungary's invitation to join NATO, 
Hungary had always emphasised the importance of good relations with Russia and the 
impossibility of building a security system in Europe without Russia Is participation. Primakov 
told the Hungarian authorities that Moscow counted on Hungary to do everything possible to 
prevent the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe and "any new threats to Russia ensuing 
from a departure from the main provisions of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, 
Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russia". 
276 Primakov further expressed his 
belief that 'the attitude of new NATO member states towards these problems will certainly play 
274 Poti Laslo, "Otnosheniya Rossii s Evropoi v XIX veke, " Natsional'nve interesýv, 
No. 4(5), 1999, p. 52. 




an important role in our relations with them". 277 These statements were evidence of Russia's 
final acceptance of the CE states' membership of NATO, which Moscow had spent so much time 
fighting against. However, Primakov did not fail to note that Russia's stand on NATO 
enlargement remained negative, and that any further enlargement, especially to include any 
former Soviet republics, was "absolutely unacceptable to us". 278 
However, Russia's unrelenting expression of concerns about NATO enlargement was interpreted 
in Hungary as the persistence of old attitudes. As Hungary's ambassador to Russia Nanovsky 
commented, "in Russia, old ways of thinking and the habits of seeing NATO as an 'aggressive 
anti-Soviet bloc' are still very strong. We are confident that life, common sense and experience 
,, 279 will change this outdated perception. Ironically, weeks after the visit of Hungary's State 
Secretary Herman to Russia, where he and Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Avdeyev expressed 
their "satisfaction with the pragmatic and adequate character of bilateral relations, and the 
absence of serious irritants", 280 the war in Kosovo broke out. Moscow reacted angrily to the steps 
that Hungary took to demonstrate its "faithfulness to the new allies at the expense of relations 
with Russia. , 281 When a Russian and Belorussian humanitarian convoy bound for Serbia was 
detained at the Ukrainian-Hungarian border Moscow recalled its ambassador and postponed the 
Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos Martonyi's visit to Russia. 282 
Russia interpreted Hungary's decision to allow US air forces to be deployed on its territory on the 
aerodromes built by the Soviet Union as a hostile act. More significantly, 
it saw the step as 
"'inconsistent with a key clause in the Russian-NATO Founding Act". The MFA noted that 
277 Inteifax, 18 February 1998, (FBIS-SOV-98-050). 
278 Ibid. 
279 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 7 July 1998. 
280 Diplomaticheski), vestnik, No. 3 March 1999, p. 34. 
2 81 M. Uslyevich, "Rossi ysko-Vengerskie Otinosheniya, " in Rossýva i Tsentral'no-Vostochnoqya 
Evropa: 
vzaimootnosheniva v kontse XXveka, (Moscow: 
IMEPI RAN, 1999), p. 5 1. 
282 lnteýfax, 21 April 1999, (FBIS-SOV- 1999-042 1). 
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temporary reinforcement in the territory of the alliance's new members is possible for 
protection against the threat of aggression and for maintaining peace In accordance with the U. N. rules and OSCE principles... -NATO's operation against Yugoslavia does not 
correspond to a single one of the aforementioned requirements. 283 
In addition to this, the Hungarian authorities refused to open their airspace to the passage of 
planes carrying Russian peacekeeping troops to Kosovo -a step that Moscow interpreted as 
being taken on Washington's recommendation. Darchiev, a long-time Consul at the Russian 
embassy in Budapest, argued: "New dividing lines are being created on the continent and 
Hungary is given the dangerous role of a buffer outpost in the Balkans. , 284 Geopolitical and 
geostrategic categories began to play a more important role in Russia's perception of Hungary in 
the region. As a result of the Kosovo conflict, Hungary became quite an important player in the 
Balkan region and, by default, in Russia's calculations of its interests in South-Eastern Europe. 
With Hungary's accession to NATO, it became a more confident actor in the region, but it also 
had to act within the boundaries set by the alliance. The crisis in Kosovo became the first test 
both for the new NATO members, and for Russia in dealing with the enlarged NATO and its new 
members in a crisis situation. As we have seen, incompatibility of interests and views on how the 
conflict could be resolved soured relations not only between Russia and NATO, but also between 
Moscow and the new NATO member states. 
The Hungarian authorities reacted calmly to most of Russia's protestations and the recalling of its 
ambassador. Soon after the end of hostilities in Kosovo, Moscow and 
Budapest restored 
nonnalitY, avoiding any protracted chill in relations. A recent past that was notable 
for the 
absence of any major crisis in bilateral relations perhaps allowed 
Russia and Hungary to avoid 
any deterioration. Hungarian Foreign Minister 
Janos Martonyi, who visited Russia on 28"' 
November 1999, emphasised that 
283 Inteýfax, 3 June 1999, (FBIS-SOV-1999-0603). 
284 Obschaya gazeta, II- 17 March 1999. 
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Hungarians do not have hostile intentions toward Russia and the Russians... our 
entry into NATO is not directed against Russia... Russia plays a very substantial 
role in the creation of the European security architecture. Without Russia, as the Balkan crisis proved yet again, it is impossible to safeguard security on the European continent. 285 
Given the general emotionally charged atmosphere at the time, it was perhaps hardly surprising 
that Russia would take deep offence at Budapest's actions. More significantly, the incident 
proved to be an important lesson and another reality check for Moscow that highlighted the 
changed geopolitical situation in the region where its former clients were no longer under its 
control. However, the traditionally pragmatic, non-confrontational nature of Russian- H ungari an 
ties provided for quick recovery from the turmoil. 
Russia - Czech Republic 
Russian-Czech relations in the period between 1998 and 1999 developed along lines similar to 
Russia's relations with Hungary and Poland. If one were looking for similarities, then a 'Polish 
model' would be more applicable to Russian-Czech ties, although they were not marred by crises 
of similar proportions to those that occurred in Russian-Polish relations. The former Czech 
Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec has commented: "Czech relations with Russia are certainly 
simpler than Russian-Polish relations... In Poland there is a much longer and more dramatic 
history". 286 However, compared with the other three CE states, Russian-Czech relations were the 
least intensive at the top and medium levels. The explanation lies not only in the factors that 
universally affected Russia-CE states' relations, such the issue of NATO enlargement, the 
financial crisis in Russia in August 1998, changes in the Russian government, and the Kosovo 
crisis. The Czech Republic continued to pursue an unapologetically one-sided pro-Western 
foreign policy. Its distance from Moscow continued to inform Prague's policy towards 
Russia. A 
285 Rossýyskq, ya gazeta, 30 November 1999, (FBI S-EEU-1 1 
999-1202). 
286 "Between Scylla and Charybdis. " An Interview with Josef Z, elenec, <http: / www. new- 
presence. cz/00/02/between. html>, accessed on 
20 July 2001. 
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similar reasoning could be applied to the way Russia perceived the Czech Republic. There a 
new government of social democrats came to power in June 1998 and declared that it was not 
going to change the main direction of Czech foreign policy. The main tenets of its foreign policy 
were declared to be the continuation of the process of European integration, and widening of 
cooperation in the Central European region. However, Czech officials stated their desire to 
287 increase contacts with Russia and the CIS, primarily in the economic sphere . 
It was perhaps extraordinary, given the circumstances, that Czech Prime Minister Milos Zeman 
visited Moscow on 15 April 1999, just weeks after the Republic joined NATO and the Kosovo 
crisis broke out. Zeman's ambiguous statements regarding the conflict in the Balkans, 
inconsistent with his country's new status and criticised by other Czech leaders, could explain his 
warrn reception. 288 Zeman assured Moscow that his country would not put up any barriers to the 
passage of humanitarian assistance to Yugoslavia through its borders. 289 Despite the fact that his 
talks in Moscow concentrated on bilateral economic and trade issues, Russian Foreign Minister 
Ivanov declared that Zeman 1) s visit was a 44 potential turning point 11) in Russian-Czech relations. 
290 
However, as we shall see in the section dealing with Russia-Czech relations in 2000-2001, 
despite the new leadership in Russia and general rapprochement with NATO and the West in 
general, the 'turning point', to which Ivanov referred, did not materialise. 
Russia - Slovakia 
Russia's relations with Slovakia in the period in question underwent serious changes. 
If between 
287 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 September 1998. 
288 Monitor: A Daiýy Briýfing on the Post-Soviet States, Vol. 5, Issue 75,19 
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1994 and 1998, during the government of Vladimir Meciar, one could talk of a distinctly 
'Slovak model' of bilateral relations, contrasting with the 'Polish model', by the end of 1998 
Bratislava's mode of close cooperation with Moscow came to an end. The change of government 
in Slovakia brought a reappraisal of foreign policy and revealed the highly personallsed and 
temporary nature of Russian-Slovak relations during the Meciar governments. 
During his last visit to Moscow in his capacity as Slovak Premier in May 1998, Meciar had 
sought political support for the upcoming elections in Slovakia. President Yeltsin took the 
opportunity to support Meciar's 'balanced' foreign policy, expressing the hope that Meciar's 
Movement for Democratic Slovakia would win the next parliamentary elections. Support for the 
Slovak government was widespread among the Russian political elite. During a visit to Bratislava 
in March 1998, the then head of the Russian Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Vladimir Lukin, 
also one of the leaders of liberal Yabloko party, said: "I will never vote for a resolution at any 
international forum that would criticize Slovakia in any way for its imperfections. We ought to 
help each other, not swear at each other. , 291 Russia was interested in supporting the Meciar 
leadership, whose official policy of integration with Western structures, NATO in particular, was 
in practice undermined by its strong pro-Russian orientation and its domestic policies. Such a 
state of affairs was very much in Russia's favour, and had enabled it to expand its economic 
presence and influence in the country and to 'restore' lost geopolitical influence. 
However, the victory of the opposition in the September 1998 parliamentary elections led to the 
appointment of Mikulas Dzurinda as Slovakia's new Prime Minister, someone who while 
in 
opposition had strongly criticized Meciar's policy towards 
Russia. This led to marked changes in 
Russian-Slovak relations. In one of its first statements on the subject, the new government 
, ()I TASR, 25 March 1998, (FBIS-EEU-98-084). 
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292 announced that bilateral treaties signed by the Meciar government could be revised . Eduard 
Kukan, who was to become Slovakia's new Foreign Minister, declared that he saw "no reason for 
above-standard political relations with Russia since Slovakia considers its integration with 
NATO and EU entry to be a priority". 293 At the same time, the new Slovak authorities were 
careful to emphasise Bratislava's interest in "strengthening friendly multifaceted and mutually 
beneficial cooperation with Russia", and stated that the Prime Minister would pay his first 
official visit to Russia. Indeed, the changes that took place in Slovakia seemed sometimes to have 
little effect on the way the country was perceived in Russia. For instance, the Chair of the Upper 
Chamber of the Russian Parliament Yegor Stroyev, declared in April 1999 that he would like to 
see Slovakia as a member of the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the CIS. After Ukraine decided 
to participate, he argued, it would be suitable for Slovakia to be invited. The Slovak inforination 
agency TASR commented that such a statement was a demonstration that some Russian officials 
still regarded Slovakia as a possible sphere of influence in Central Europe. 294 More likely, 
however, it was a sign of ignorance about developments in Slovakia. 
As it happened, the review of treaties did not lead to any cancellation or renegotiation. The 
Slovak Foreign Minister Kukan stated that the main problem was not the number or content of 
the treaties, but Slovakia's foreign policy towards Russia and the lack of transparency while the 
295 
treaties were being negotiated . However, the 
Slovak government decided to stop the practice of 
settling Russia's debts with deliveries of military equipment. Bratislava also decided to pull out 
of the deal agreed by Meciar for the delivery of the Russian S-300 missile system as part 
payment for debts, since its acquisition would needlessly complicate accession to 
NATO. 296 The 
292 TASR, 13 October 1998, (FBIS-EEU-98-286). 
293 Ibid. 
294 TASR, 3 April 1999, (FBI S-EEU- 1999-0406). 
295 Jolyon Naegele and Marian Bednar, "Slovakia: Government Refuses To Cancel Any 
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296 Narodna obrada, 30 January 1999, (FBIS-EEU-99-032). 
141 
Chapter 3 
announcement of withdrawal from this deal led to serious complications between Russia and 
Slovakia in subsequent negotiations on debt settlement. Despite the frictions, relations between 
the two states remained stable, but the special attention that Slovakia used to pay Russia was a 
thing of the past. 
Russian National Security and Central Europe - 2000-2001 
With the election of a new president in Russia in March 2000 a fresh phase began in Russian 
internal and external policy. The coming to power of President Putin marked a turning point in 
Russia's post-Soviet development. The new phase was characterized not only by change but also 
by continuity with the Yeltsin era. The events of the preceding years had a major influence on the 
evolution of perceptions of national interests and security, and, consequently, on the phrasing of 
the official documents articulating the country's foreign and security policies. The adoption of 
the Concept of National Security (January 2000), The Military Doctrine (April 2000) and the 
Concept of Foreign Policy (July 2000) clearly reflected a reassessment of Russia's security 
threats and policies in the aftermath of NATO enlargement, the adoption of the new NATO 
Strategic Concept and the Kosovo crisis, and the continuing dominance of a geopolitical 
perspective on international relations. Re-assessment of conventional military threats to Russia, 
downgrading of the role of international structures such as the UN and the OSCE in the wake of 
the Kosovo crisis, and replacement of the notion of 'partnership' with the more cautious 
6cooperation' with the West in the above documents, was followed, however, by the adoption by 
President Putin of a pragmatic and balanced foreign policy, with a strong emphasis on the 
primacy of economic goals - integration into the world economy and creating conditions 
for 
297 
attracting inward investment. One of Putin's 
foreign policy initiatives was to re-start relations 
with NATO after they had been put on 
hold as a consequence of actions in Kosovo. The new 




Russian president described Russia as a "part of European culture" and as "being within the 
298 mainstream of the Western civilization" . Such pronouncements, of course, as the Russian 
scholar Andrei Melville points out, could simply reflect the pragmatic realization that Russia is 
299 dependent on the West in many respects and needs its help if it is to succeed with reforms . 
Russia's opposition to further NATO enlargement remained intact and it was identified as a 
challenge to Russian national security in the Concept of National Security and the Concept of 
Foreign Policy adopted in January 2000. However, Putin's speedy rapprochement with NATO, 
the West and the USA in particular in the aftermath of II September terrorist attacks led to 
Russia reassessing its policy towards NATO and softening criticism of NATO's further 
enlargement. 
At the end of the 1990s Russia's relations with the four Visegrad states had been seriously 
harmed by the Kosovo crisis. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary's support for enlarging 
NATO beyond their borders continued to be a significant irritant. However, in what can be seen 
as a sign of Moscow's new pragmatism and "selectivism" (as Andrei Melville calls it), the 
Concept of Foreign Policy identified relations with CE as vital in the realm of sustaining existing 
human, cultural and economic ties, and called for an overcoming of existing problems, to 
Russia's benefit. 300 
The following section examines in detail the evolution of bilateral relations between Russia and 
the CE states between 2000 and 2001. It will be seen that Russia's ties with Poland proved to be 
far more active than those with the other three states. Due to its location, size, geopolitical and 
298 Quoted in Andrei Melville, "Putin's Russia in Search of its Place in the World", paper presented at the Second 
Convention of the CEEISA, Warsaw, 15-18 June 2000. 
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economic weight, and the generally more complex nature of relations, Poland continued to be 
the most important country in the region for Moscow. 
Russia-Poland 
Another spy scandal broke out in Warsaw in January 2000 when Poland announced the expulsion 
of nine Russian diplomats, who, according to the government, were "involved in active espionage 
activities against Poland's interests in 1999. )9.30 1 The incident set in motion a chain of mutual 
reprisals and accusations, further harming bilateral relations. Russia reacted angrily, accusing 
Poland of taking an "unfriendly and provocative step... aimed at undermining relations" between 
302 the two countries and warned that any worsening of bilateral relations would be Poland's fault . 
Polish Defence Minister Onyszkiewicz responded by saying that Russian espionage activities in 
Poland had increased since Warsaw joined NATO a year earlier. The Polish government warned 
Russia against retaliatory moves that would create "unnecessary tensions" between Russia and 
Poland. 303 Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov commented that the expulsion of the Russian 
diplomats had come soon after Moscow resolved to improve relations with the states of CE. A 
Russian Foreign Intelligence Service representative declared that the timing and scope of the 
Polish action was a demonstration of Poland's desire "to radically revise the nature of Russian- 
Polish relations" and "to isolate Russia in the international arena". 304 Russian experts pointed out 
the advantages that Poland derived from going public over the spy row: the Polish special 
services "proved their professionalism to the West and its domestic public, and Poland made an 
305 
important step towards winning trust as a reliable partner in NATO". Russia reacted by 
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demanding that nine Polish diplomats leave Moscow within a week, 306 a move that Poland 
called 'unfriendly'. 307 In addition, the Russian government cancelled Foreign Minister Ivanov's 
308 visit to Warsaw, and a planned visit by the Russian Prime Minister was put off indefinitely. 
One month later another scandal led to the Russian ambassador to Poland being recalled. On 23 rd 
February 2000, representatives of the pro-Chechen organisation "Free Caucasus" broke into the 
premises of the Russian consulate in Poznan, vandalised the building, tore up the Russian flag 
and hoisted a Chechen one instead. According to Russian sources, the Polish authorities in 
Poznan deliberately turned a blind eye. On the same day a cemetery for Soviet soldiers at 
Bielsko-Byala was vandalised. According to one commentary in Nezavisimaya gazeta, after 
joining NATO the Polish authorities had become "unreasonably overzealous", and "possibly out 
of a wish to be seen as good allies started methodically to emphasize Russia's aggressive nature, 
without giving consideration to how such actions could affect Russian-Polish relations". 309 
In general, Russia's second military campaign in Chechnya led to further tensions between 
Russia and Poland, even more than in 1994-96. The Polish government took up a moderate 
stance on the conflict similar to that adopted by the Western powers, yet ordinary Poles 
repeatedly took to the streets in protest against Russia Is actions. 
310 According to Magdziak- 
Miszewska Poles view Russian actions in Chechnya through the prism of their past experience: 
"Deeply rooted consciousness of a small people struggling with a powerful empire 
for its 
independence brings up a black-and-white stereotype, overshadowing all the complexity of 
reality. 1131 1 This soured bilateral relations even 
further. Russian officials' and politicians' 
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comments certainly did not help. Russian Vice Consul in Poznan Igor Ostchepkov commented 
in an interview with a Polish reporter: "When a lion is sick, even a monkey can beat him... But 
what happens when the lion gets better? "312 Gennadiy Zyuganov, the Communist leader, made a 
scathing statement about "banditry" in Poznan, while Ella Pamfilova, a prominent left-wing 
politician, spoke disparagingly on television about Poland . 
313 Vladimir Lukin, a fon-ner 
ambassador to the United States and a liberal 'Yabloko' member of the Duma, described the 
situation as a "continuation of a certain line, trend and mood harking back to the worst traditions 
in Polish-Russian relations". He further explained that "there is a widespread belief in Russia that 
by expressing such an attitude toward Russia, Poland is trying to repay the West for letting it be 
one of the first [former Soviet-bloc] states to join NATO" . 
314 
Unlike in Russia, in Poland there was evidence of critical reflection on policy towards Russia. In 
the aftermath of the spy row and the attack on the Russian consulate President Kwasniewski 
described Poland's relations with Russia as being on a "very low level". Kwasniewski also 
reproached the Polish government for repeatedly failing to take advantage of opportunities to 
improve relations with Russia. 315 The accusation drew an angry reaction from Foreign Minister 
Geremek, who reprimanded the president, saying that the Polish national interest required that the 
government speak to Russia with one voice. 
316 
As well as criticizing the Polish government for failing to give "any new impulses to the Polish- 
312 The Washington Post, 20 April 2000. Online edition <http: //www. washingtonpost. com/wp-dyn/articles/A47988- 
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Russian relations free of the burden of history", Kwasniewski placed a large share of the blame 
for the poor state of relations on Russia: 
Traumas and the distance after our entry to NATO, the changing government - all that of course is true. But just such a situation requires activeness, original ideas. That is in very 
short supply. A pity, because good relations are in their and in our interests. 317 
Despite the scaling down of top-level Russian-Polish relations a number of positive 
developments emerged in the second half of 2000 and in early 2001, although, as before, the 
vexed burden of history played a big part. An unlikely individual calling for reconciliation was 
the popular and authoritative bishop, Jan Zycinski. On the eve of the 60th anniversary of the 
Katyn massacre he declared that "an ordinary Russian does not bear any responsibility for the 
fratricidal policies of Communism" and called on the Poles to pray for the unity of the Polish and 
Russian peoples. 318 Prime Minister Buzek echoed his sentiment, saying: "One must state that we 
do not tie communist genocide to the Russian nation, as Russians themselves have suffered 
extremely at the hands of the same communist butchers. , 319 Kwasniewski remarked that the 
Katyn massacre was "an atrocity committed by an inhumane system for which we cannot and we 
do not want to blame the entire [Russian] nation". 320 Russia's then acting President Vladimir 
Putin used the occasion to re-establish top-level contact with Poland. He telephoned 
Kwasniewski and spoke of "the discovery of new graves near Smolensk", inviting Polish 
prosecutors to "participate in actions that will lead to uncovering the truth". The two presidents, it 
321 
was repeated, agreed to give a boost to Polish-Russian relations. 
Kwasniewski's working visit to Moscow on 10 July 2000 was hailed as a 'breakthrough' in 
bilateral relations. The Russian media commented that the improvement in relations was in 
large 
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part thanks to the new Russian President Putin, who had "abstained from the policy of enhanced 
, 322 confrontation with a close and strategically important neighbor' . Putin also appeared keen to 
put his predecessor's wrath over Poland's NATO entry behind him: "We proceed from the fact 
that Poland takes independent decisions in foreign policy, but this does not prevent our fruitful 
cooperation. 99323 In other words, Russia seems finally to have registered that Poland was a fully- 
fledged member of NATO, and it did not bring up the issue at the talks. 
By this time Russia had moved to re-establish its own ties with NATO. A month before 
Kwasniewski's visit, Russian Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev and his Polish counterpart Janusz 
Onyszkiewicz, who participated in a meeting of the Russia-NATO council in Brussels, agreed to 
restore contacts between the two ministries. A Polish Defence Ministry spokesman quoted 
Sergeyev as saying that for Russia, Poland was not a France, a Britain or a Germany but hope, 
love and pain. 324 Such a poetic expression from the mouth of the Russian Defence chief captures 
the difficulties the Russian political and military establishment had in coming to tenns with the 
changed geopolitical and geostrategic environment in Europe. Nevertheless, the new 
administration in Moscow was able to leave many grievances and mindsets of the previous 
regime behind. Putin's new foreign policy, emphasising Russia's rapprochement with the West 
on pragmatic, economically detennined principles, opened the way to a fresh start in re ations 
with Poland, and with other states. 
Results of the resumed contacts and changed priorities began to emerge soon after. 
One of the 
most remarkable examples was a visit 
by the commander of the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet Admiral 
Yegorov to Poland aboard the destroyer Nastoichivyi - the flagship of the Russian Baltic Sea 
322 SAILRU, II July 2000, <http: //smi. ru/2000/07/11/963299564. 
html> accessed on 19 September 2000. 
323 Inteýfax, 10 July 2000, (FBI S-EEU-2000-071 
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Fleet. The Baltic Fleet's main base in Baltiisk is only three hours away from Gdynia, the Polish 
naval base. 325 However, the short geographical distance was overshadowed by the political 
distance that had emerged between the two states in the years since the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union. Contacts between the two militaries were also re-established at the level of military 
training. After a one-year break, Poland sent some of its officers to Russia to train at the Frunze 
Military Academy. Likewise, officers from Russia were trained at the Polish National Defence 
Academy. Moreover, the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet and the Polish Navy agreed on a 10 year 
cooperation plan (2000-2010) covering at least 10 joint activities, including visi setting up a 
permanent political-military dialogue on security, regular contacts between the headquarters of 
the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet in Kaliningrad and the Pomorski Military District of Poland, and 
regular exercises with other fleets in the Baltic Sea region. 326 Such a level of cooperation, even 
the intention to achieve it, is a far cry from the previous state of relations. 
High-level political exchanges accelerated as well. The Russian Foreign Minister visited Warsaw 
for the first time in four years in November 2000. Some Russian commentators attributed the 
change in the Russian-Polish atmosphere to the changes in the Kremlin. Sergey Markov, Director 
of the Institute of Political Research in Moscow, commented that the new president brought a 
new, more energetic and pragmatic foreign policy: the revitalisation of Russian-Polish relations 
was a direct consequence of the changes in Moscow. 327 Foreign Minister Ivanov stated in 
Warsaw that the development of stable relations was Russia's strategic line. 328 Poland's Foreign 
Minister for his part expressed the hope that in a few years visits of Russian politicians to Poland 
would be commonplace. 
329During Russian Prime Minister Kasyanov's visit in Warsaw in May 
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, he described the trip as one of a number of steps his government was taking to "finish the 
330 period of cool relations between Poland and Russia". By mid 2001 relations seemed to have 
entered a stable phase, where the removal of tension at a high level paved the way for improved 
relations at other levels: the political overlay was removed from economic and other contacts. 
President Putin visited Poland in January 2002, the first visit by a Russian leader since 1993. 
International events, Russia's renewed alignment with the West, the change of government in 
Poland, and Putin's overall pragmatic foreign policy approach, all helped to facilitate Russian- 
Polish rapprochement. In an interview for Polish television Putin argued that it was a "blatant 
error" to dwell on past grievances. 331 Of course, as recent history has demonstrated, Russian- 
Polish relations can easily be upset. The past exercises a very powerful influence, often a 
negative one, on mutual perceptions. The signs of an improvement in bilateral relations that 
emerged in 2000-2001 under a new leadership in Russia and a moderate President in Poland 
came once the question of NATO membership for Poland was settled. The new round of 
enlargement to include the Baltic states, which Poland strongly advocates, and which Russia 
strongly opposes, and used even stronger threats to prevent than it did in regard to the first wave 
of enlargement, remained an irritant in Russian-Polish relations. By late 2001, however, with 
Russia moving closer towards cooperation with NATO in the new Post_ II 
th September 
environment, Moscow scaled back its anti-enlargement rhetoric and the issue disappeared from 
the Warsaw-Moscow dialogue. 
Russia's relations with Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic 
As already noted, Russia saw the other three Visegrad states as less important than Poland due to 
their size and geographical distance. However, the shift in Russian foreign policy that took place 
130 Informatsionn. vi b., vulleten', 28 May 2001, <http: //www. mid. ru>, accessed 4 June 2001. 




in early 2000 was also evident in Russia's policy towards these states. Although bilateral 
relations were not rich with events, some general conclusions can be drawn about the approach to 
them of the new Russian leadership in the security field. 
Russian-Hungarian relations, which had entered a stable phase at the end of 1999, after the 
turmoil associated with the Kosovo crisis, continued to improve. As in the case of Poland, 
Moscow appeared to have accepted the reality that CE states were now NATO members. Russian 
MFA spokesman Aleksandr Yakovenko said, "Russia, in its practical policy, takes into account 
that the CE states are members of NATO ... .. We do not intend to emphasise our differences, " he 
,, 332 continued, "Central and Eastern Europe were and remain a Russian Foreign Policy priority. 
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Avdeyev commented in Budapest in October 2000 that 
Moscow should accept that Hungary is a NATO member and Budapest should accept that as a 
NATO member state it should have its own say within the alliance on questions affecting 
Russia. 333 The Russian position now seems to have been to influence the new NATO members 
not to promote the Alliance's further enlargement. Nevertheless, Hungary, like Poland and the 
Czech Republic, remained a firm advocate of further NATO expansion. Hungary's commitment 
to such a policy increased as a result of the Balkan crisis, when it found itself a NATO frontier 
state bordering a conflict zone. However despite these pronouncements Russian-Hungarian 
relations developed constructively. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov visited Budapest in 
January 2001, describing his visit as a successful one, which gave further impetus to bilateral 
relations and paved the way for further top-level exchanges. 
334 
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The warmth of Russian-Slovak relations under the Meciar government never returned after the 
election of the new government in 1998. Slovakia adopted a new one-sided orientation towards 
the West at the expense of ties with Russia. Apart from a brief visit by the Russian Foreign 
Minister to Bratislava in January 2001, no other high level meetings took place after 1998. 
However, while in Bratislava, Igor Ivanov was careful to emphasise Russia's pragmatic view of 
relations with Slovakia. Ivanov emphasised that, despite the fact that Russia sees NATO's 
enlargement plans as a mistake, Slovakia's NATO entry would not slow the development of 
bilateral cooperation. 335 He stated that Moscow wanted dynamic relations with Bratislava in all 
spheres. After all, Ivanov argued, "Russia cannot forbid other countries to make their choice, but 
,, 336 Russia too cannot be forbidden to think of its own security. The Foreign Minister offered, 
instead, to concentrate efforts on minimising the possible negative consequences for bilateral 
relations of Slovakia joining the EU. 
337 
The promise of a 'turning point' in Russian-Czech relations held out by the Czech Prime Minister 
during his visit to Moscow in April 1999 was followed by an almost two-year-long period 
without any contact between the Russian and Czech governments. Russian ambassador to the 
Czech Republic Nikolai Ryabov even commented that the development of relations between the 
two states had acquired a confrontational nature, complaining about measures taken by Prague to 
introduce visa requirements for Russians, and about the general cooling of relations between 
Moscow and Prague: "We were alarmed by the fact that political dialogue between us has 
practically stopped. , 
338 The Czech side reacted strongly to such comments. Czech commentators 
described relations with Russia as "normal and stable, although they could be more intensive in 
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the political and particularly economic spheres" . 
339The 
Russian MFA stated that Ryabov was 
not expressing Russia's official position: the official stance was that relations between the two 
states were good. 340 If Ryabov's comments could have been an exaggeration, and after all he did 
backtrack from his statement, the description of relations between the two states as good did not 
reflect reality. A latent conflict persisted throughout the period, with Czech President Havel's 
statements about excessive use of force and human rights abuses in Chechnya causing significant 
friction with Moscow. In November 1999 Russia reacted angrily when Chechen Foreign Minister 
Ilyas Akhmadov visited Prague and was received by representatives of the Presidential 
Administration, the Parliament and the Czech Foreign Ministry. Similarly, in response to remarks 
made by Vaclav Havel that Chechnya had not always belonged to Russia and that actions in 
Chechnya were carried out against people, not against terrorists, the Russian Foreign Ministry 
issued a note of protest accusing the Czech President of questioning Russia's territorial 
integrity. 341 Czech Premier Zeman followed up with a statement that he considered Chechnya to 
be a part of Russia. 342 Remarkably, the Czech delegation at the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe disregarded Havel's recommendations, and voted against Russia's suspension 
from membership of the Council of Europe. 343 
The events described above, coupled with the continuing advocacy by President Havel of ftirther 
NATO enlargement, angered Moscow. In his argument for further NATO enlargement 
irrespective of Russia's view Havel stated that yielding to Russia's resistance to Baltic expansion 
would "amount to returning to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact" of 1939. Russia protested, arguing 
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that such statements created an enemy image. 344 Not surprisingly, according to an opinion poll, 
a big proportion of the Czech population still perceives Russia as the most likely threat to the 
Czech Republic's security. 345 Joining NATO did not seem to have changed this threat perception. 
The low level of contacts between Russia and the Czech Republic reflects the general poor state 
of bilateral relations, which in its turn is a reflection of the way the two states perceive each other 
in security and national interest terms. The fact that Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov's five-hour 
visit to Prague in January 2001 was the first visit by a Russian Foreign Minister in seven years, 
can be seen as a clear demonstration of the 'distance' between the two states. 
Conclusion 
The evolution of Russian security and foreign policy towards the four states of Central Europe in 
the ten years since the collapse of the Soviet Union has passed through four identifiable periods, 
with associated changes in the dynamics of bilateral relations. The first period reflected the 
dramatic changes the Russian state was undergoing in the aftermath of the collapse of the USSR 
and its search for an identity and a role in Europe and the wider world. Moscow's initial heavy 
focus on the West and the general weakness of the executive branch of the Russian government, 
meant that little attention was allocated to the four Visegrad states. One needs to bear in mind 
that at the time even Russia's immediate neighbourhood, the former Soviet Republics, did not 
play a prominent part in Russian foreign policy and national security priorities. In such 
circumstances, it would be unrealistic to expect Moscow to have had a coherent policy towards 
CE. 
The issue of NATO enlargement changed the status of the CE states as Moscow's "forgotten 
neighbours". In the period between 1994 and 1997 Moscow started to pay more attention to the 
344 The Prague Post. 16 May 2001, <http: //www. praguepost. cz/news05l6Old. html>, accessed on 20 June 2001. 
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region. However, the policies that evolved during that ti d the nature of relations between me an I 
Russia and the CE states only demonstrated the degree of mistrust that existed between the two 
sides. Public and elite perceptions were heavily influenced by the experiences of recent decades. 
The delicate nature of relations required a very careful approach in forinulating policy. Yet, 
Russia quite often failed to understand the reasons behind the apprehension of the CE states 
towards Russia. Moscow's 'big power' rhetoric and threats of reprisals in the event of NATO 
enlargement only helped fuel fears in CE. The record of bilateral relations between Russia and 
Poland, Hungary and the Slovak and Czech Republics provided a clear demonstration of Russia's 
poor understanding of what was driving security thinking in CE. This worked both ways. Russia 
was far from having established its role and place in the new international environment. Its sense 
of insecurity, during a period of change, was considerably fuelled by imminent NATO 
enlargement. The continuity of the Russian political elite, with its residual Cold War thinking, 
meant it could not have reacted in a different way - for them NATO continued to be a military 
alliance with the sole purpose of repelling a hypothetical threat emanating from Russia. The CE 
states' drive to join NATO was, according to this logic, an anti-Russian step. These feelings 
received a major boost with the unfolding of war in Kosovo: NATO's action came just a few 
weeks after the first wave of enlargement. Few in Russia believed that NATO, primarily a 
military institution, a remnant of the Cold War, would undertake an action in Kosovo in response 
to humanitarian crisis. At this emotionally charged moment, the widespread belief took hold that 
NATO was striving to take advantage of Russia's weaknesses and further undennine its influence 
in the world, possibly even getting involved in conflicts on Russia's periphery. 
346 Thus the third 
period in Russian-CE relations described in this study became, in the light of international events 
and developments in Russia and the CE states, one of the tensest in the Post-Cold War history of 
bilateral cooperation. 
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As for the question of whether Russia's relations with CE could have developed in any other way 
in the post-Cold War environment - the answer rests on the interpretation of the events in 
Russia's and CE states' internal politics. It is worth noting that the CE states first started to 
express a desire to join NATO when Russian foreign policy was pronouncedly pro-Western and 
did not seem to be threatening to CE. The CE states' desire to anchor themselves firinly with the 
West was one of the key reasons for the growing distance from Moscow in the early 1990s. The 
end of 'romantic Westernism' in Russia, and its shift towards a pragmatic, self-assertive foreign 
policy partly in response to the political pressures within the country, made it easy for CE 
political elites to evoke Russia's imperial image. Afterwards, this played an important role in 
justifying their drive to gain entry to NATO. Russia's new-old approach of talking with the West 
over the CE states' heads rather than with them was seen in Central Europe as a continuation of 
Russia's unreconstructed perception of their region as a subsidiary factor in its national security 
policy calculations. 
As has been shown, the emergence of the issue of NATO enlargement had the effect of 
narrowing down Russia's relations with CE to the question of how to avoid the enlargement. 
Moscow thus denied itself any room for manoeuvre. Russia's and the CE states' shared past did 
not become a basis for constructive relations and sharing of transition experience. On the contrary 
- the negative experience of the past played a crucial role 
in detennining new perceptions. The 
fact that Russia and the CE states could not be seen as equal partners in world affairs, due to 
Russia's size and remaining influence, coupled with the residual distrust towards it on the part of 
the CE elites meant that relations between the two sides were bound to be negatively affected. 
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However, changes in the Russian leadership in 2000 - the election of a new President and 
changes in the government associated with it - brought to power a new generation of Russian 
politicians. A new approach towards the CE states, even though is far from being completely 
installed, has already produced a new style of relations. Putin's Western-centric foreign policy, 
and a new level of cooperation with NATO in the afterinath of the terrorist attacks on the USA, 
have facilitated changes in Russian-CE relations at a political level. Although it is far too early to 
draw firm conclusions, relations with the CE states seem to have become more economically 
deten-nined, in line with the general direction of Russian foreign policy and national security 
priorities. The next chapter will look into the evidence of Russia's relations with the CE states on 




Russia's Relations with Central Europe: 'Soft Security' 
Aspects 
Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the development of Russian policy towards and relations 
with Central Europe in a 'soft' security milieu on the bilateral and multilateral level since 
1991. The broadening of the security agenda after the end of the Cold War was clearly 
reflected in the formulation of Russian national interests and security threats that emerged 
with the lifting of the bloc based security system in Europe. Russia's internal development 
and coming to terms with the new attributes of statehood and its geopolitical context was 
reflected in the process of formulation of national interests and security perceptions. This 
process, which is far from finished today, has produced significant changes in the way 
Russia's place in the world and national interests are perceived and the emphasis Russia 
puts on various national security threats and challenges. ' However, one constant was the 
absence of a serious immediate military threat to Russia. Although the degree of possibility 
of such a danger re-emerging in the long-term has been shifting under the influence of the 
events surrounding NATO enlargement and the alliance's involvement in the Balkans and 
the subsequent rapprochement with the West, the emphasis on noný-mllitary and internal 
security threats has remained consistently prominent. As one well known Russian 
academic noted, 
Economic factors, for the first time in Russia's history, are playing a leading role in 
shaping the country's foreign policy. Autarky is no longer feasible, let alone desirable. 
Security considerations are still strong and have been strengthened as a result of 
1 For a recent critical assessment of Russian foreign and national security policy see Nikolai Kosoplapov, 
"Stanovienie sub'ekta rossiiskoi vneshnei politiki, " [Formation of the subject of Russian foreign poloicy]; 
Yuri Fedorov, "Krizis vneshnei politiki Rossn: kontseptual'nyl aspekt, " [Crisis of Russian Foreign Policy: a 
Conceptual Aspect]; Dmitri Trenin, "Nenadezhnaya strateglya" [Unreliable strategy] In Pro et Contra, Vol. 
6, No. 1-2, Winter-Spring 2001, pp. 7-30, pp. 31-49, and pp. 50-65. 
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Kosovo and the North Caucasus conflicts, but they are no longer unquestioningly 
dominant. 2 
In one of the first documents that attempted to articulate Russian national interests on the 
official level, submitted to the Russian Parliament in early 1992, the Russian Foreign 
Ministry defined Russian national interests in terms of achieving a "dynamic economy", 
"concern for human rights, " "democracy, " and "integration into the world economy". It 
stated that "Russia sees no state as hostile to it and will not use force for any purpose rather 
than defense". 3 Detailing Russia's preferred stance toward countries and regions, Central 
Europe was singled out to be given more attention, primarily due to a steep erosion of 
economic ties with the region. 4 With the shift towards a more conservative and 
geopolitically defined version of national interests conceptualised in terms of "Russia as a 
great power", the emphasis on the absence of direct large-scale aggression and prominence 
of non-military threats to Russian statehood was nevertheless sustained. 5 Even the latest 
National Security Concept of 2000, formulated in the aften-nath of NATO enlargement and 
the Kosovo crisis, despite listing a number of external threats arising from deliberate 
actions and aggression (a clear reference to NATO), stuck to the fundamental argument 
that Russia's national interests and security wo uld only be secured through the 
development of Russia's economy in conjunction with eventual integration into the world 
econom . 
2 Dmitri Tremn, "Russia-EU Partnership: Grand Vision and Practical Steps, " Russia on Russia: Russia in the 
New World, Issue 1, February 2000, < http: //www. msps. ru/eng/libr/r - rl. 
htm] > accessed 16 June 2001. 
3 Suzanne Crow, "Russia Debates Its National Interests, " in RFEIRL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 28,10 July 
1992, p. 44. 
4 Ibid., p. 44. 
5 See, for example, "Rossiya: Chelovek, Sem'ya, Obstchestvo, Gosudarstvo. lz Programmy deistvii na 1996- 
2000 gody Prezidenta RF B. N. Yelstina, " in Diploniaticheskii Vestnik, No. 7, July 1996, pp. 3-5; See also 
The Concept of National SecuritY of the Russian Federation, 
http: //www. scrf-gov. ru/Documents/Decree/1997/1300. htm], accessed on September 10,1998; "Iz Poslaniya 
Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii Federalnornu Sobranjyu, Diploniaticheskii Vestnik, No. 4, April 1999, p. 6. 
6 The National Security Concept was signed into law by Presidential decree in January 2000. The text of the 
Concept can be retrieved at http: //www. serf. gov. ru/Documents/Decree/2000/24- I. html 
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As the above brief account of Russia's official perceptions of its national interests has 
demonstrated, and as was discussed in Chapter 2, the Russian government has been greatly 
concerned with the nature of the new threats that have emerged in the last decade. Through 
all the changes taking place in Russian foreign policy and threat perceptions, Russia's 
internal economic and political weakness has been seen as one of the major concerns, 
along with the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation, international terrorism, drug 
trafficking and environmental degradation. As one commentary in Nezavisimaya gazeta 
noted, despite Russia's criticism of NATO's new strategic doctrine of 1999, parts of that 
doctrine calling for a fight against international terrorism, drugs trafficking and organised 
crime echoed the challenges mentioned in the Russian National Security Concept of 2000. 
According to the newspaper this overlap pointed to the interests Russia and the West had 
in common. 7 
But what relevance and significance does Central Europe have to Russia's response to 
those non- military security threats? Russia and Central Europe do not constitute 
contiguous geographic areas and are separated by a belt of post-Soviet states, with the 
exception of the exclave of the Kaliningrad oblast bordering Poland. Soft security 
concerns, with the rise of globalisation interdependence, demand concerted bilateral and 
multilateral efforts on the part of governments and non-governmental actors. Although the 
pressure on either side from any major non-military calamity (such as, for example, illegal 
migration, refugee flows or environmental disasters) could be limited, the indirect effect on 
either side could be significant. In the economic sphere, both Russia and Central 
Europe 
remain significantly interdependent due to the energy infrastructure. Russia continues to 
be 
the main energy supplier of the CE states. What is more, all existing and expanding energy 
7 Nezavisinzqva gazeta, 19 January 2000. 
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export routes from Russia to the West run through the territories of these states. In 
addition, Russia's exclave region of Kaliningrad, as already mentioned brings another 
dimension to Russian-Polish security ielations in a number of areas. Apart from being a 
major 'hard' security concern for Poland and the Baltic states, the Kaliningrad region 
remains one of Europe's most problematic areas, especially in light of the impending EU 
enlargement. The oblast presents a shopping-list of every possible societal, economic and 
environmental problem. For Russia, in addition, the region poses the problem of how to 
sustain its existence as an integral part of the Russian Federation within the rapidly 
changing situation in the region. On the whole analysis of Russian policy towards CE in 
the soft security area, which took on a greater salience after the end of the Cold War, could 
provide an indication of the degree of qualitative change in Moscow's perception of the 
world outside its borders and of how it is adapting to such changes, and what consequences 
these have on the foreign and national security policy formation process in Russia. 
When judged against Russia's relations with the CE states in the 'hard' security domain, 
ties in the 'soft' security dimension seem to be marred by fewer contradictions and 
underwent a relatively dynamic development for most of the last decade. This chapter 
attempts to find an explanation for such uneven dynamics on the two levels of relations 
and looks at whether cooperation in the non- conventional security sphere helps support 
stable relations on a high political level and shape changes in the 'hard' security sphere. 
The chapter is organised thematically around the main areas of common ground that 
Russia and the Central European states under discussion find in their 'non-political' 
bilateral relations. The analysis begins with the examination of economic cooperation 
between Russia and CE in the last ten years, from 1991 to 2001, and proceeds with a 
discussion of the implications of CE joining the EU for Russia and its relations with the CE 
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region and an enlarged EU. EU enlargement - unlike the relatively inconsequential NATO 
one - can create very serious problems for Russia. These range from a dramatic change in 
the terms of trade with some of Russia's traditional commercial partners, to the virtual 
isolation of the Kaliningrad enclave, which could be cut off from the rest of the country by 
a "Schengen curtain". As Dmitri Trenin wrote, "Real and painful division from the rest of 
Europe is looming, unless the enlargement takes Russia into consideration. "8 The second 
part of this chapter looks at the way Russia has dealt with the challenges and promises of 
EU enlargement. This aspect of Russia-CE relations may prove to be pivotal to the future 
of Russia and Europe. 
Russia-CEE economic relations in the 1990s 
Economic factors in Russian foreign and security policy 
With the end of the Cold War economic security issues are playing an ever more important 
role in both political perceptions and international relations. 
9 A widened security agenda 
goes beyond military-political aspects, and now incorporates a much more complex set of 
security threats. The new security concept assigns particular importance to trade and 
financial relations and to institutional integration. In Russia, as was demonstrated above, 
the importance of economic security was continuously underlined in a string of 
discussions, declarations, statements and documents. 
Despite the short-lived character of Kozyrev and Gaidar's international institutionalism as 
the determining analytical concept underlying Russian national security priorities and 
8 Dmitri Trenin, ', Russia-EU Partnership: Grand Vision and Practical Steps. " 
9 Hans-Herman H6hmann and Christian Meier, "Conceptual, Internal, and International 
Aspects of Russia's 
Economic Security, " in Alexei G. Arbatov, Karl Kaiser, and Robert Legvold (eds. 
) Russia and the West. Th e 
2 Ist Centur. v Securit. v Environment, (New 
York, London: M. E. Sharpe for EastWest Institute, 1999), p. 77. 
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foreign policy, Moscow has continued to place significant emphasis on integration into the 
world economic system and cooperation with international financial and trade 
organisations as a means of transforming the Russian economy. In practical terms, opening 
up the Russian economy to the outside world and liberalising foreign trade has helped 
Russia 'stay afloat' after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the break up of internal 
and intra-CMEA trading patterns. 10 
The arrival of a new stage of Russian foreign policy and the period of stabilisation on 
Russian political and economic arena by 1997 was largely based on the relative 
4 consensus' of various actors on future direction of the Russian state. The emphasis, 
however, remained on cooperation and integration with the outside world, albeit with a 
good measure of 'great power' rhetoric, lending the policy a more traditional cast. II Thus, 
according to Russia's first National Security Concept issued in 1997, Russia's internal 
threats arise from economic decline, instability and associated societal problems, which 
must be addressed through economic reforms. 12 While economic reforms are primarily an 
internal problem, their implementation could be eased by a noný- threatening external 
environment and through hard currency earned from trade, the attraction of foreign direct 
investments, and Russia's integration into international economic institutions. This logic 
was prominent in all Russia's major foreign and domestic policy directives and national 
security and foreign policy concepts. In his 1998 annual address to parliament, President 
10 The share of exports in GDP, for instance, grew from 15 percent In 1992 to 20 percent In 1996. By 1997, 
as much as 40 percent of food stuffs were imported, which raised concerns of a 'dangerous' dependence on 
food imports, and that such a degree of dependence could constitute a national security threat. See Andrei 
Kondakov, "Vneshnetorgovye rychagi Ill kostyll? " in Pro et Contra, Vol. 2, No. 3, Summer 1997, 
http: //pubs. camegie. ru/p&c/Vol2-1997/3/06kondakov. asp, accessed on 04 November 1999. 
1 Celeste A. Wallander, "Russian National Security Policy in 2000", Memo No. 102. Program on Nevi, 
Approaches to Russian Securit ,v 
Policy Memo Series (PONARS), January 1999. 
12 Rossiiskaya gazeta, 26 December 1997, pp. 4-5. 
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Yeltsin, for example, demanded the "economisation of Russian foreign Policy.,, ] 3 In March 
1999, addressing the Russian parliament, Yeltsin noted that: 
Russia's authority in the world, its foreign policy stature depends upon Russia's 
internal stabilisation and overcoming of economic crisis. At the same time, the 
success in achieving these goals depends upon an active foreign economic policy 
of Russia. ... It 
is impossible to create a solid economic foundation without 
integration of the Russian economy with the world market. " 
Russia's newly elected President Putin, in his first annual address to the parliament, also 
concentrated heavily on the need to improve economic performance and on the dangers are 
in persistent Russian economic weakness. Putin warned, "The growing gap between 
industrialised countries and Russia is pushing us into the ranks of Third World 
.,, 
15 oreign policy must be based countries The Russian president also stated that Russian f 
on pragmatism and economic efficiency. 16 In his 2001 address to the parliament, Putin 
underlined the need for urgent implementation of wide-ranging structural, financial, legal 
and judicial refon-ns in line with international nonns, joining international organisations 
such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) - the achievement of Russian men-bership 
of which was proclaimed a priority - attracting investments and promoting trade. 
17 
While analysing the formation of Russian foreign economic priorities and the effect of 
these on Russia's wider national security and foreign policy throughout the 1990s and 
especially within the context of Russia-CE relations, it is necessary to take into account 
changes that took place in the ownership structure after privatisation and the make-up of 
political and economic elites in Russia and their influence on the evolution and 
13 Poslanie Przsidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii Federal'nomu Sobraniyu. Obschimi silami -k pod'emu Rossii. 
(Moscow, 17 February 1998). 
14 Iz Poslaniya Prezidenta Rossilskol Federatsii Federalnomu Sobraniyu, Diplomaticheskii Vestnik, No. 4, 
April 1999, p. 6 
15 Vladimir Putin's State of the Nation Address to the Federal Assembly "The State of Russia: A Way to an 
9ftective State ". RIA Novosti, 8 July 2000. 
16 Ibid. 
17 President Vladimir Putin's Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 
Moscow, 3 April, 2001, <http: //www. russiaeurope-mid. ru/RussiaEurope/speech7. html> 
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implementation of the country's foreign economic policy. The decision- making process in 
Moscow, among other things, was affected by the emergence of powerful new economic 
players, as well as the interests of new regional actors. 18 Among the new economic actors 
able to influence national policies were financial and industrial groups (FIGs) (some led by 
major banks), export-oriented gas and oil firms whose export lines were rapidly extending 
to Europe, internationally competitive enterprises in the armaments and aerospace 
industries, and a number of export-oriented and border regions. 19 These new economic 
actors are interested in modernisation and internationalisation of the Russian economy, 
which in its turn depends on a peaceful and cooperative htemational enviroment and 
closer, institutionalised ties with the West. Their support for international integration is 
driven by the profits they expect to receive from trade. According to their logic, the level 
of economic cooperation and the nature of relations with the West is important in that 
Russia's participation in multilateral fora and institutions such as the G8 and WTO gives 
Russia's relations with the outside world a more predictable and stable character and lends 
Russian exporters a voice h the decisions made at that level. As the interests of these 
actors are profit related rather than political or ideological, and support a 'peaceful' foreign 
policy, they have a stabilising effect on Russia's overall foreign policy. 
20 
In light of the above factors, the next section of the chapter looks at the development of 
Russian-CEE economic relations and their influence or relevance for the evolution of 
18 Perovic, Jeronim, Internationalisation of Russian Regions and the Consequences for Russian Foreign and 
SecuritY PolicY, Working Paper No. 1, Project on "Regional ization of Russian Foreign and Security Policy, " 
(Zilrich: Centrer for Security Studies and Conflict Research, April 2000), p. 37. 
19 Hans-Hen-nan Hbhmann and Christian Meier, "Conceptual, Internal, and International Aspects of Russia's 
Economic Security, " p. 78. See also Nikolai Sokov, "Domestic Structure, Economic Growth, and Russian 
Foreign Policy, " in Program on New Approaches to Russian Security Policy Memo Series (PONARS), 
Memo No. 23, October 1997, 
<http: //www. fas. barvard. edu/-ponars/POLICY`/`20MEMOS/Sokovmemol. html>, accessed on 18 December 
1998. 
20 Nikolai Sokov, "Domestic Structure, Economic Growth, and Russian Foreign Policy", see also "Business 
Elites and Russian Foreign Policy, " in Russia Beyond 2000, ed. by Medvedev, Sergei (Helsinki: 
The Finnish 
Institute of International Affairs, 2000). 
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Russian national security and foreign policy and the country's total security environment 
since 1991 
CE and Russian Economic Interests 
Unlike bilateral political affairs, relations between Russia and the CE states in the 
economic sphere, despite various problems and chilly political relations, generally 
developed steadily in a positive direction, following the initial short period of steep 
decline. The decline was associated with the collapse of the CMEA trading regime in the 
aftermath of political and economic reforms in the socialist bloc, and transition to market 
based relations and re-orientation of trade by both Russia and the CE states towards the 
West. The speed with which trade between the former CMEA members collapsed and the 
obvious lack of any determination in the late 1980s to coordinate and smooth the effects of 
disengagement by the CMEA member states, was evidence of the artificiality and 
inefficiency of economic relations within the Soviet-era CMEA area. 21 The lack of a pre- 
Soviet tradition of significant trade ties and the primitive structure of that trade also 
highlighted the defectiveness of the Soviet- imposed trade system. In the period between 
the two World Wars Central and East European trade flows were heavily concentrated on 
the current EU member states. Trade with the Soviet Union, on the other hand, was 
negligible, accounting in 1928 for less than one percent of the total trade turnover of 
Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, and for just over one percent of the trade of Poland and 
Czechoslovakia. Trade with Central and Eastern Europe accounted for only 2.5 percent of 
21 Vladimir Drebentsov, "Impediments to Recovery of Russia's Trade with East European Small Economies", 
in Richard N. Cooper and JAnos 
Gdcs, Trade Growth in Transition Economies - Export Impediments fior 




Soviet exports and 2.8 percent of Soviet imports (mainly from Czechoslovakia) in 1927- 
28. By 1938 these shares had fallen to 1.6 percent and 1.5 percent respectively. 22 
Table 4 Trade of the CMEA members in 1928 (percentage breakdown by trade partners) 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA HUNGARY POLAND 
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Western Europe 63.9 66.3 63.1 52.8 75.2 66.3 
Eastem Europe 16.1 14.3 27.1 35.2 17.2 9.9 
USSR 1.3 1.0 0.4 0.3 1.3 1.0 
Other 18.7 18.4 9.4 11.7 6.3 22.8 
Germany 26.8 38.7 11.9 19.6 34.7 27.0 
Austria 14.7 7.4 34.0 16.2 12.4 6.6 
Czechoslovakia 17.6 22.4 11.8 6.3 
Total 41.5 46.1 63.5 58.2 58.9 
Source: Alan Smith, International Trade and Payments in the Former Soviet/CMEA Area: Reorientation or 
Reintegration? (London: RIIA, 1994), p. 24. 
In the aftennath of World War 11 a radical shift occurred in both the political and the 
economic relations of the CE states. While their ties with Western Europe were 
significantly weakened, their links with the Soviet Union strengthened rapidly. In the trade 
sphere this manifested itself in the geographic reorientation of flows away from Western 
Europe towards the Soviet Union. Such a drastic change was one of the results of policy 
measures that led to the consolidation of the Soviet Union's sphere of influence in Central 
and Eastern Europe. By the mid- 1980s, towards the end of the socialist period, intra- 
CMEA trade accounted for approximately 60 percent of its members' foreign trade. 
23 As 
Table 5 demonstrates, in 1987 the level of dependence of the economies now constituting 
the Visegrad group on trade with the USSR and the other CEE partners was quite 
substantial. 24 These calculations show that exports to CMEA stood at 50.37 percent of total 
22 Alan Smith, International Trade and Payments in the Former SovietlCMEA Area: Reorientation or 
Reintegration? (London: RHA, 1994), p. 11. 
23 Data from Lavigne, M., International Political Econom-1, ' and Socialism, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991). 
24 Alan Smith points out methodological problems in calculating CMEA trade data. The use of different prIce 
systems for measuring domestic national 
income, intra CMEA trade and trade with world markets makes it 
difficult to assess quantitatively the dependence of the Central East European economies on trade with other 
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exports to the countries of what is now known as the Visegrad Four, of which exports to 
the Soviet Union were 29.7 percent. 25 Such a disproportionate dependence on exports from 
the Soviet Union (mainly energy resources) put the CE economies in a disadvantageous 
position. The effect of such imbalance became particularly obvious when the CMEA 
system collapsed resulting in widespread energy shortages in CE with a knock-on effect on 
industrial production in the region's economies and rapid decline in trade with the former 
Soviet Union area. 
Table 5 Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia: exports by area of destination, 1987 
DESTINATION (IN BN USD) CMEA AS PERCENT OF EXPORTS 
Country Total CMEA* USSR Total USSR CEE 
Czechoslovakia 12.36 6.69 4.00 54.1 32.3 21.8 
Hungary 9.58 4.79 2.94 50.0 30.7 19.3 
Poland 14.09 6.63 3.66 47.0 26.0 21.0 
Total 36.03 18.11 10.60 50.37 29.7 20.7 
* Excluding Mongolia, Cuba and Vietnam 
Source: Aggregated from data in Alan Smith, International Trade and Payments in the Former Soviet/CMEA 
Area: Reorientation or Reintegration? (London: RIIA, 1994), p. 25. 
The relaxation of the Soviet political grip over the CE states in the late 1980s had already 
allowed CE to intensify trade and integration with the West. Similarly, Moscow was keen 
to benefit from trade with the West and to end the system of subsidies it administered in 
intra-CMEA trade. For Russia, in light of the deteriorating economic situation at home and 
in the CE region in the early 1990s, the Western energy market was seen as particularly 
attractive, with stable demand and high profits from oil and gas exports. For instance, in 
partners and the Soviet Union during the communist period. Even comparisons of relative 
degrees of 
dependence on intra-CMEA trade are difficult, as individual CMEA countries used different methodologies 
to record the value of trade with CMEA partners. The United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE) has tried to overcome these problems by re-estimating intra-CMEA trade flows at a common 
rouble-dollar rate. These calculations provide a 
far lower estimate of the significance of intra-CMEA trade 
than would be derived from Soviet or CEE trade statistics, and can 
be treated as lower bound estimate. See 
Alan Smith, 1994, pp. I 1- 12. 
25 A 'true' difference between degrees of export and import dependence may be greater, in that the import 
figures as calculated are more likely to underestimate 
dependence than the export data. Imports of energy and 
raw materials from the USSR have 
been effectively 'devalued' by the UNECE methodology, which used a 
common depreciated exchange rate 
for both imports and exports, reflecting the low quality specification for 
CMEA -area manufactured goods. 
See Allan Smith, 1994, p. 12-13. 
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1988 the Soviet Union already took advantage of this and increased its exports of crude oil 
to the West by ten million tonnes at the expense of exports to CE. This step was taken to 
alleviate the mounting hard currency balance of payments crisis in the afterinath of the fall 
in world oil prices earlier in 1986. The Soviet Union's commitments to deliver needed oil 
supplies to CE was further compromised over the next three years as a result of a general 
slump in total Soviet oil production (which fell from a peak of 624 million tonnes in 1988 
to 515 million tonnes in 1991, and only 449 million tonnes in the former Soviet area in 
1992) and redirection of oil exports. 26 
The decision that as of I January 1991 all intra-CMEA trade would be conducted in 
convertible currencies would, it was believed, result in significant ten-ns-of-trade 
advantages for the USSR and losses for Central Europe. In reality, intra-CMEA trade was 
destroyed. Oil deliveries were cut further and Soviet enterprises became reluctant or unable 
to buy manufactured goods from CE for hard currency. The CMEA was formally wound 
up in 1992. Table 6 demonstrates the extent of decline in Russian imports from the current 
Visegrad states, 27 which on average shrank by a factor of three and half by 1995.28 The 
export of Russia's main commodity to the region - oil, had also substantially declined, 
reaching its lowest level in 1992 . 
29 The result of these changes was a steep decline in 
Russia's overall bilateral trade Wth the CE states and rapid re-orientation of trade flows 
from both sides towards the OECD area. 
26 Alan Smith, 1994, p. 13. 
27 Within the Soviet Union, the RSFSR accounted for about 80 percent of the USSR's imports. This disparity 
has been taken into account when comparing current Russian trade with the Visegrdd states and their trade 
during the communist time. 
28 As Table 4 demonstrates, the contraction has been uneven among the countries. These differences in the 
standings of the countries are attributed to each nation's speclalisation in the Soviet/Russian market. See 
Vladimir Drebenstov, 1997, p. 267. 
29 N. 1. Bukbarin, "Russia -Poland, " [Rossiya-Poisha], in Russia and Central-Eastern Europe in thefirst haýf 
Qf 1990s [Rossiya i Tsentralno-Vostochnaya 
Evropa v pervoi polovine 90-kh godov], (Moscow: Russian 
Academy of Sciences, Institute for International Economic and Political Studies, 1997), p. 69. 
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DECLINE BY FACTOR 
(A)/(B) 
Czechoslovakia 10.48 1.32/0.88 a 4.8 
Hungary 7.60 2.50 3.0 
Poland 12.50 5 2.5 
Total 30.58 9.7 3.5 
%_, LUU11 mupumic/ý5jovaf(ia 
Source: Aggregated from data in Vladimir Drebentsov, "Impediments to Recovery of Russia's Trade with East 
European Small Economies", in Richard N. Cooper and Jdnos Gdcs, Trade Growth in Transition Economies - Export Impediments for Central and Eastern Europe, (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, HASA, 1997), and N. I. 
Bukharin, "Russia -Poland, " [Rossiya -Polsha], in Russia and Central-Eastern Eutope in thefirst hal(of 1990s [Rossiya i Tsentralno-Vostochnaya Evropa v pervoi polovine 90-kh godov], (Moscow: Russian Academy of 
Sciences, Institute for International Economic and Political Studies, 1997). 
Return to a West-oriented pattern of trade and economic relations was determined by the 
same factors as the pre-CMEA era trade between the current CE states and the West and 
between Russia and the West. For Russia the prosperous West is the only source of stable 
and predictable trade relations, a region where Russia could competitively sell its natural 
resources, but also a source of much needed investments and know-how. The ideological 
factor has also played an important role in determining foreign economic relations in 
Moscow and the CE states since the end of the Cold War. For Russia, especially during the 
early 1990s, economic relations with the West and participation in multilateral economic 
fora (such as IMF, G7 summits) were a very important symbolic factor -a manifestation 
of Russia's belonging to the civilized world and of the irreversibility of democratic and 
market reforms. For CE states, orientation to the West had a similarly important symbolic 
and practical value. However, the political factor had another dimension for CE in its 
relations with the West. First of all, economic integration with Europe (mainly with the 
EC, later the EU) was an integral part of the declared policy of a "return to Europe" 
Redirection of trade flows and the lack of political will to minimize the effects of the 
collapse of the CMEA trading system in the early 1990s also reflected CE states' long-term 
strategic preferences with regard to Russia. Yet turning away from each other 
did not mean 
that Russia and CE severed their economic ties completely. The legacy of the socialist past 
170 
Chapter 4 
created a network of dependencies that could not be abandoned overnight and basic 
economic rationality and the difficulties associated with finding a niche on highly 
competitive and saturated Western markets led to continuation and re-establishment of 
some old economic ties. Russia almost completely dominated the oil and gas market in CE 
due to the legacy of the Soviet energy infrastructure, established dependencies, and the 
lack of alternative sources at the time. For Russia, the CE region remains the only transit 
route for oil and gas exports to Western Europe. 
The end of the CMEA era and the reforms that ensued produced further regional economic 
differentiation: the CE states become more disparate economically amongst themselves, 
and even more so when compared with Russia. However, despite being far harder hit than 
Russia as a result of trade disruption, CE managed to overcome economic slump faster, 
redirect foreign trade, and achieve better results than Russia in modemising their 
economies, increasing productivity and income. 30 Such disparities, and the changes that 
were taking place in both Russia and the CE states, affected economic cooperation. As the 
analysis that follows demonstrates, Russian officials, on many occasions, failed to 
appreciate the extent of the changes that were taking place, and continued to call for the 
restoration of old fonns of cooperation. 
While analysing Russian economic interests in CE since 1991, one has to take into account 
not only the changed geo-political and economic situation of both sides in relation to each 
other. Any such analysis also has to consider the specific interests of Russian economic 
actors and their influence on the direction of foreign policy, the specific features of each of 
the CE economies, the role of the region in Russia's broader policies of relations with the 
30 Gerhard Mangott, "Russian Policies on Central and Eastern Europe: An Overview, " European Security 
Vol. 8, No. 3 (Autumn 1999), pp. 55,61. 
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rest of EU, and how the accession process of the CE states and their eventual membership 
of the EU have affected and are likely to affect Russian economic interests. 
The states of CE also represent a diverse group of states with different geo-economic 
characteristics, economic potential and therefore economic interest for Russia. Russia 
pursued distinct economic policies towards each individual CE state. Economic ties 
between Russia and Poland, for example, were notably free fTom the upheavals present in 
their political relations, although the overall dynamics of economic cooperation were 
affected by slow progress on the political level and, from a Russian point of view, at times, 
excessive influence of political considerations, over economic expediency in the case of 
Poland. In the case of Slovakia, on the other hand, close political ties with Russia during 
most of the 1990s were strongly determined by economic considerations and led to 
atypically close (when compared with the rest of the CE states) political ties between 
Moscow and Bratislava. Hungary and the Czech Republic pursued a middle course, 
managing to avoid big political crises in bilateral relations with Russia, and negotiated 
pragmatic economic relations with it. 
An overall glance at economic relations between Russia and the CE states in the ten years 
since 1991 reveals uneven development in bilateral ties, largely reflecting the state of 
political relations between the two sides: from a gradual recovery after the upheavals of the 
late 1980s and changes in the political and economic system, to a gradual 'settling of the 
dust' and re-assessment of mutual economic interests and establishment of relations based 
on economic pragmatism. The road towards relations deten-nIned by economic expediency 
proved to be difficult, burdened by a number of problems: lack of trust in Russia as a 
reliable partner, unresolved issues of Soviet debt, fear of political motives behind some 
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Russian proposals, unequal progress in economic reforms, Inadequate Infrastructure, and 
the poor legal and financial base for bilateral economic relations. On many occasions, as 
will be illustrated below, Russian officials demonstrated a lack of knowledge of the 
progress the countries concerned had made in reforming their economies, of their 
integration into the global economic system, of structural and systemic changes that took 
place within those states and, as a consequence, of their changed economic interests and 
preferences. Calls by some Russian officials for restoration of CMEA-era levels of 
cooperation with the CE countries, apart from being far- fetched and unrealistic, often 
provoked a negative reaction in the CE states, seeing in Russia's Proposals 'imperial' 
ambitions. As the SVOP report on Russia and Central Eastern Europe commented, any 
suggestion of restoration of the former level of economic relations with the countries of the 
region looks comical, especially if one compares the economic potentials of the EU and the 
Russian Federation, their ability to be poles of attraction, and the intensity of economic and 
political ties with the CE countries. 31 
One explanation for the 'poverty' of Russia's knowledge of Central Europe, especially in 
the mid- 1990s, lies in the fact that the Russian MFA lacked experts on the region, while 
the Kremlin and the Government as a whole were pre-occupied with domestic problems 
and relations with the more 'significant' West. 32 The old Soviet era staffers of the MFA 
operated on out-dated assumptions about the CE states, whose aspiration to join the EU 
and NATO fuelled Russia's indignation and contributed to the lack of clear foreign 
economic policy and of a realistic assessment of CE's potential for the Russian economy. 
33 
31 Pavel Kandel, report, "Tsentralnaya i Vostochnaya Evropa i Interesy Ross". Tez'sy Doklada, " Sovetpo 
I`neshnei i Obot-onnoi Politike, 1997 (http: //www. svop. ru/doklad03. htm: accessed 28 July 1998), § 4.1. 
32 Aleksei Pushkov, "A Time for Gathering Stones, " Moskovskie novosti, July 30-August 6,1995. 
33 Waldemar Gontarski, "A Policy of Bluff. Do the Kremlin and the MFA View Poland Differently? " 
Nezavisimava gazeta, 20 December 1995. 1 
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A number of Western and Central European scholars and policy-makers characterised 
Russia's policy towards the CE countries in the period 1989-97 as a 'mixture of dialogue, 
attempts to affect the NATO expansion process and efforts to re-assert and exploit 
Moscow's economic influence in the region for political ends. , 34 Margarita Balmaceda 
argues that the first main objective of Russia's economic policy during the period was to 
prevent or delay the CE countries' integration into Western structures such as NATO or the 
EU. According to her analysis, when Russia realised that that goal looked increasingly 
unrealistic, Moscow's policy shifted to creating 'bridgeheads' of Russian state and private 
capital as springboards for subsequent expansion into Western Europe. 35 The above 
author's account of relations between Russia and CE provides no evidence of Russian 
policy explicitly or implicitly directed at undermining CE's bid to integrate with the West 
through economic levers. 36 In fact, in isolated cases where Russian officials alluded to 
possible economic reprisals if the CE countries proceeded with their bid to join NATO, 
both Russian officials and economic executives unambiguously distanced themselves from 
such statements. 37 The survey of primary source material and interviews with Russian 
experts conducted for this project likewise revealed no evidence of any policy directed at 
undermining CE's efforts to integrate with the West. From the mid- 1990s Russia explicitly 
dropped its objections to CE countries' ambitions t) join the EU. By the late 1990s 
Moscow started to call for joint Russia-CE-EU efforts to hold consultations to minimise 
the possible negative effects of EU enlargement for the Russian economy. As the following 
34 Margarita M. Balmaceda, "Economic Relations and the Ukrainian- Central European-Russian Triangle, " 
chap. in On the Edge. Ukrainian -Central Europe-Russian Security Triangle (Budapest: Central European 
University Press, 2000), p. 166. 
35 Ibid., p. 166. 
36 Margarita M. Balmaceda, "Economic Relations and the Ukralm an- Central European-Russlan Triangle. " 
37 Well-publicised examples include a remark by Russian ambassador to the Czech Republic Ryabov 
threatening to sever gas supplies if Prague joined NATO. This was followed by rejections and distancing 
from the statement by Russian officials and re -assurances from Gazprom. (More on this event see Chapter 3). 
Waldemar Gontarsky reported another example, when the Kremlin reprimanded an unnamed Deputy Foreign 
Minister for threatening Poland with military force. See Waldemar GontarskI, "A Policy of Bluff. Do the 
Kremlin and the MFA View Poland Differently? " Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 December 1995. 
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analysis demonstrates, on the whole Russia's economic Policy towards CE in the period 
under discussion was reactive, rather than proactive. An exception can be made for the 
isolated case of Gazprom's policy of expansion in Europe, by default involving all the 
countries in CE. And even in the cases where controversy surrounded various inter-state 
economic or financial projects or deals, any suspicion had its roots in the shady dealings of 
various interest groups, rather than arising over some state policy of the Russian 
government. As chapter 3 of this thesis demonstrated, the period between 1991 and 2001 
was a period of a number of shifts in Russian national security and foreign policy. None of 
these shifts produced a comprehensive Central Europe policy. Quite the opposite, relations 
between Russia and CE, on the whole, were of secondary importance, trailing behind the 
CIS, the EU/developed countries. The CE region's promotion to the centre stage of 
Russian foreign policy in the mid- 1990s occurred by default, as a derivative of Russia's 
anti-NATO expansion campaign. Arguments to the effect that Russia tried to use its 
economic influence to obstruct the CE states' entry in NATO go against basic facts about 
Russian foreign policy and the degree to which Russian economic clout over the region 
diminished in the period under discussion. As Russia's conservative and authoritative 
SVOP think-tank concluded in its report on Russia's interests in Central and Eastern 
Europe, "Russia's internal situation [i. e. meaning its economic and political weakness], 
does not allow it to embark on any ambitious foreign policy mission, where the decisions 
were taken not on an economic but on a political basis. ,38 As the authors of the report saw 
it, Russia's task was rather unambitious from an economic and political point of view: to 
38 Pavel Kandel, report, "Tsentrainaya i Vostochnaya Evropa i Interesy Rossn. Tezisy Doklada, " § 4.2 The 
SVOP, whose ambition is to influence Russian foreign policy, boasts a significant share of business 
representatives, see Hans-Henning Schroder, "El'tsm and the Oligarchs: The Role of Financial Groups in 
Russian Politics Between 1993 and July 1998", Europe-Asia Studies, September 1999, (retrieved from 
http: //www. findarticies. com accessed 10 October 2001). 
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preserve and strengthen the existing position in the region, preventing it from turning into a 
'belt of estrangement ,. 39 
The following discussion of Russian economic relations with the region focuses on four 
main areas of Russian economic policy towards CE that feature prominently in bilateral 
economic relations and are significant elements in the economic policies of both sides: 
energy resources, trade, banking and finance, and annaments. These areas are closely 
interlinked, and the distinction is made for analytical purposes. Within the discussion of 
the identified sectors, the analysis is carried out on a country- by- country basis. It is 
important to note that the degree of prominence in Russia-CE relations of the individual 
sectors identified above varies, as does the prominence of one sector in Russia's bilateral 
relations, with individual states of CE. It is also worth mentioning that developments that 
took place within each sector were not necessarily detennined by any specific objectives of 
the Russian government, but may rather have been brought about by the key actors within 
the identified sectors. The influence of some of the key players, especially those in the 
energy sector, such as Gazprom, for instance, is very considerable. 
Energy Resources and Raw Materials. The Role of Energy Exports in 
Russia-CE Relations. 
The export of energy resources and raw materials plays an important role in Russian 
foreign economic relations, constituting more than 50 percent of all Russia's exports. 
40 By 
definition, this export-oriented sector of the Russian economy is interested in maintaining 
and developing export routes and a client base beyond Russian borders. Gas and oil sectors 
`9 Ibid. 
40 M. E. Yakovenko, "Ekonomicheskie Aspekty Intergratsii Rossii v Mirovoe Khozyaistvo, " Rossiya i 
Mezhdunamdtýye RezhimY Bezopasnosti (http: //www. mpsf-org/pub/intem/07 html: Moskovskii 
Obstchestvennyl Nauchnyi Fond, accessed 27 March 2000). 
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are particu arly significant export-oriented players in the Russian economy and are 
believed to be Russia's most pro-European in outlook, advocating closer ties with the 
Eu. 41 
Russia's gas industry is represented by a monopoly Gazprom, which unlike the highly 
fragmented oil sector holds a strong position in ten-ns of its influence in the country and 
ties with the government. It is a joint stock company with 38 percent of shares belonging to 
the Russian government. Gazprom's chairman, at the time of writing is Dmitri Medvedev, 
is also deputy chief of the presidential administration. 42 The concern controls 95 percent of 
Russia's gas production and virtually all gas transportation infrastructure. The corporation 
is a world leader in gas production and export, controlling 35 percent of proven world gas 
reserves and produces up to 25 percent of world gas OUtpUt. 
43 Due to its sheer size and 
volume of production and exports, Gazprom is Russia's main foreign currency eamer, 
receiving about USD8 billion annually from gas exports, and reportedly contributing 25 
percent of the country's tax revenue. 44 Because of its weight in the Russian economy and 
its active role in domestic politics, Gazprom exercises considerable influence on the 
Russian government. As one study concluded, the interests of the Russian state and 
Gazprom are often seem as interlinked: "What is good for Russia is good for Gazprom", 
and vice versa. 
45 
Europe is one of the most important areas of Gazprom's foreign economic activity. In the 
mid- 1990s, when Russia's gas exports regained their pre-crisis levels, 63 percent of 
41 , Business Elites and Russian Foreign Policy, ' pp. I ]- 15. 
42 The St. Petersbul-g Times, 4 May, 2001 (http: //www. sptimesrussia. com). 
43 Aleksandr Shkuta, Rossiiskii Gaz v Tsentralnoi i Vostochnoi Evrope (Moscow: Delo I ServIs, 1999), p. 69 
44 Floriana Fossato, "Russia: Government Pressure On Gazprom to Pay Taxes May Bring Results, " Radio 
Frec Eut-ope/Radio Liberýy (3 July 1998). See also "Kosovo May Trigger Gas War with Europe, " The Russia 
Jout-nal, Vol. 3 No. 10 (http: //www. russiaj*ournal-com/printer/weekly9l9. htm]: 05-11 April 1999). 
45 'Business Elites and Russian Foreign Policy', p. 12 
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Russian gas was &livered to Europe. More than 60 percent of this gas was exported to 
Western Europe and the remainder to Central Europe. 46 The level of overall dependency of 
the various regions of Europe on gas imports from Russia varies. In 2000, the European 
Union on ave rage received 22 percent of its gas from Russia, whereas Central Europe's 
dependence on Russian gas was much higher - 63 percent on average. 47 At the same time, 
for individual countries, such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia, for instance, Russian 
gas accounts for 95-96 percent of all natural gas needs. 48 Overall, the four states of Central 
49 Europe under discussion take a delivery of almost 30 percent of Russia's gas exports . 
Apart from being some of Gazprom's most important customers, the CE countries are a 
major transit zone for Russia's gas exports to the rest of Europe. Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic handle as much as 50 percent of Russia's natural gas exports delivered to 
Western Europe. The role of Poland in transit of Russian gas is due to increase when a new 
Yamaý Europe pipeline becomes fully operational. 50 
The Russian energy sector as a whole, and Gazprom in particular, therefore have a major 
interest in Central Europe. CE's role as a large importer of Russia's gas can only grow, if 
Gazprom manages to preserve its current presence in the region at the time when the CE 
states are moving closer to EU environmental norms and energy security standards. CE 
states' consumption of gas is predicted to grow as their economies are expanding and the 
new more energy- efficient technologies are used more widely. According to the Gazprom 
46 Sbkuta, Rossiiskii Gaz v Tseno-alnoi i Vostochnoi Evrope, pp. 65,69 
47 Irina Reznik, "Gazprom igraet cbuzhuayu igru, "Kommersant, 03 October 2000, p. 4. Within the EU, 
Gazprom controls approximately 35 percent of German gas market, 24 percent in Italy, 28 percent in France, 
72 percent in Austria, 100 percent in Finland. See Vremya novostei, 22 March 2001, p. 6. 
48 Aleksandr Shkuta, "Chtoby ne Oboshli Konkurenty. Rossilskii Gaz v Tsentralnoi i Vostochnoi Evrope, " 
Faktor, No. 5 (http: //www. factor-online-com: GazOllPress, 2000). 
49 Calculations are made on the basis of data provided in Shkuta (see ibid). In 1999, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Poland and Hungary imported 36.8 billion cubic metres of Russian gas out 126.8 billion cubic 
metres exported by Russia to 'far abroad'. 
50 Shkuta, 'Chtoby ne Oboshli Konkurenty. ' 
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calculations, the share of natural gas in the energy consumption of the CE states will reach 
34 percent, compared to 23 percent in 1989 .51 This 
in turn means that absolute levels of 
natural gas as main source of energy would increase. Gazprom has calculated that by 2010 
CE will import 75-80 billion cubic metres of gas, almost twice the current level of gas 
imports. 52 In order to secure its presence in the region, Gazprom's policy is to negotiate 
long-term contracts with the countries concerned. However, in the long run, such a policy 
will start to encounter various problems as the CE countries' new energy security policy 
demands diversification of energy supplies. With this in mind, Gazprom predicts that its 
share in the CE gas market, despite the rise of absolute volumes of Russian gas consumed 
there, will decline. In order to secure its current levels of export to the region, Gazprom has 
pursued a comprehensive policy of developing is infrastructure in the region and securing 
long-term contracts. 
Gazprorn can be singled out as the only major Russian player in Central Europe that 
pursued a comprehensive long-tenn policy in the region. Starting in the early 1990s, 
Gazprorn embarked on establishing its own Central European Industrial- Financial Group. 
53 
A main objective of this strategy is to secure a stable flow of Russian gas to the region and 
beyond, as well as to secure Gazprom's long-term presence in the rapidly changing energy 
market of Central Europe. This strategy has three main elements: 
first, the creation of joint 
ventures or trading houses in the countries to which gas 
is exported, so that gas can be 
delivered directly to the consumers; second, maintaining a safe, stable and guaranteed gas 
supply with the ability to control the volume of gas and its routes according 
to demand; 






sources in Russia. Central Europe, as will be seen, plays an important role in Gazprom's 
overall long-term strategy of expansion in Europe, a strategy that is strongly supported by 
the government. 
However, Gazprom's strategy of expansion and take-overs in Central Europe, coupled with 
its lack of transparency, scant regard for minority shareholders and close ties with the 
Kremlin, provoked serious concern about a 'new threat from the East'. Some Central 
Europeans view Gazprom's policy in the region as a revived Russian drive for control, this 
time through corporate muscle and backroom deals. 54 However, as will be seen below, it is 
the very resistance offered by Central European governments, and their attempts to 
obstruct Russia's energy companies from tapping into the area's growing economies and 
open capital markets, which makes companies such as Gazprom less open about their 
moves in Central Europe. One example is Gazprom's acquisition of a quarter of the shares 
in Hungary's petrochemical company Borsodchem through an Ireland -registered 
subsidiary Milford Holdings Inc., without disclosing its connection to the company. 55 
Actions like this also fuel Central Europeans' suspicions that Russian investments in the 
region may be linked to organised crime. 56 In a move to prevent the Russian giant 
increasing its influence in CE economies, some of the region's governments have resorted 
to blocking Gazprom's participation in privatisation processes, risking angering the EU by 




The St. Petersburg Times, 4 May, 2001 (http: //www. sptimesruss'a. com). 
"Russians' Westward Drive Provokes Resistance in Hungary, Poland, " Bloomberg, posted on Johnson's 
Russia List No. 4678 (9 December 2000). 
56 Ibid. 
57 Jamie Dettmer. "European Dependence on Russia's Gazprom, " Insight on the News 
(http: //www. findarticies. com/cf-1/ml571/29-17/77074787/printjhtmi: News World Communications, Inc., 
August 6,200 1 
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While the Russian energy monopoly's expansion in CE provokes concern, according to 
Russian officials and industry officials largely due to 'emotional' memories rather than for 
economic reasons, Gazprom pursues successful expansion and alliance- building elsewhere. 
58 in the recently liberalised gas markets in Western Europe, where it is not seen as a threat . 
Gazprom's partners in Western Europe (Germany, France, Italy) were instrumental, as will 
be seen , in persuading some CE states to accept the Russian giant's plans to diversify its 
gas transportation routes. 59 
The issue of the diversification and liberalisation of the European energy market is 
expected to play a pivotal role in Gazprom's relations with the current and future member 
states of the EU. The dual process will also define Russia's overall economic ties with the 
EU and CE. Russia's reinvigorated dialogue with the European Union under Putin's 
presidency gave substance to various policies and provisions that were included in the 
1994 EU-Russian Federation Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). The 
October 2000 EU-Russia Heads of State Summit in Paris saw the initiation of a regular 
Energy Dialogue between Russia and the EU. The ultimate aim of this dialogue is the 
signing of the EU-Russia Energy Partnership Agreement, to facilitate Russian energy 
export to the EU and promote transfer of EU technical assistance and investment for the 
Russian energy sector in return for its reform and increasing openness. 
60 ne 
institutional i sation of the energy dialogue has become one of the most solid aspects of 
Russia-EU relations so far, and is a manifestation of the importance that the EU attaches to 
Russia as a long-term energy supplier. A series of high-level Russia-EU meetings (May 
58 Kommersant, 03 October 2000, p. 4. See also "Changes Ahead for U. S. -Russian Relations, " Insight 
magazine, June 25,2001, posted onJohnson's 
Russia ListNo. 5284,6 June 2001. 
59 Moskoi,, skie novosti, No. 42,24-30 October 2000, Internet version, http: 
//www. mn. ru/2000/42/122. htmi 
accessed on 30 October 2000. 
60 "The EU-Russia Energy Partnership", The EU Commission Energy and Transport Website, 
http: //europa. eu. int/comni/energy-ýtransport/en/lpl-en-3. htmi . accessed on 
09 January 2002. 
181 
Chapter 4 
2001 in Moscow, October 2001 in Brussels) produced a number of documents establishing 
a framework for Russia-EU interaction. Russia and the EU recognise the 
complementarities of their economies and changes that are taking place on both sides. 
Moreover, Russia and the expanding and reforming EU view their cooperation in the 
energy sphere not as an isolated process, but rather as a contribution to the building of a 
Common European Economic Area, a further decision on which was taken at the EU- 
61 Russia Moscow Summit in May 2001 . In the light of the 1998 EU decision to move 
towards a common EU energy policy and single gas market62 and the importance which the 
EU attaches to Russia as a vital energy supplier, all this means that Russia will retain its 
place as one of the major players in the region's energy market in the foreseeable future. 
While Gazprom expands its presence in Europe, creates alliances with other European gas 
companies and takes advantage of the liberalised European gas market, there are various 
things that worry the Russian gas giant. Gazprom is rather nervous about the possible 
consequences of energy market liberalisation and the coming into force of the Energy 
Charter Treaty. 63 It is worried about the shift towards short-term contracts and third-party 
access to its gas networks, which in its opinion would mean the erosion of external 
64 investments for the development of new gas deposits and infrastructure in Russia. In this 
connection, it is interesting to note the EU's careful response to Russia's sensitivities when 
it comes to the energy sector. Despite the obvious preference that the EU Gas Directive 
61 The Joint Declaration, The Seventh EU-Russia Summit (17 May 2001, Moscow), 




62 Directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 concerning common 
, 
ficial Journal, L 204,21.07.1998, p. 000 1- 00 12 rules for the market in natural gas, Qf 
http: //europa. eu. int/eur-lex/en/li f/dat/ I 998/en_3 98 L003 O. html 
63 This treaty provides for the rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to be applied to energy related 
trade with and among non-WTO countries which are not party to the Treaty. See "Energy Charter Treaty" in 
Collection. lui-is Intet-national, (http: //wwwjurisint. org/pub/Ol/en/doc/224 - 
I. htm: accessed 28 August 2001 ). 
64 Yuri A. Komarov, "Diplomatiya i Ekonomika. Gazprom na mezhdunarodnom rynke, " Diplomaticheskii 
Vestnik, No. 12 (December 2001), pp. 181-184. 
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gives to short-term contracts aimed at lowering gas prices and increasing gas supply 
65 security, the EU recognises the importance that Russia attaches to long-term agreement . 
In the Joint Statement on Future Direction of the Energy Dialogue between the European 
Union and Russia, the EU acknowledges the importance of new transport infrastructures, 
among which are the interconnection of the European electricity networks, as well as the 
northern trans-European gas pipeline and the YarnaýEurope pipeline network through 
Belarus and Poland. 66 A number of gas pipelines projects diversifying the transit routes of 
Russian gas to Europe are among the EU's Trans European Networks priority projects. 67 
These projects will further guarantee Russia's position as a key energy supplier to Europe 
and will give CE reassurance in their own contacts with Russia's energy suppliers. 
Like the EU, Russia is concerned with developing a diverse energy transportation network 
to avoid dependence on a single route. In this regard, the construction of the Yamal- Europe 
gas network via Belarus and Poland will not only increase the volume of gas flow from 
Russia to Europe, but will also relieve Moscow of dependence on Ukraine as the only 
transit route for this gas. Thus Russia and the EU are pursuing a parallel objective of 
establishing a secure and diverse gas network across and to Europe. Such mutual interest 
not only brings Russia and the EU closer together in practice, but also gives a new 
dimension to Russiarý-CE economic relations. The plan to construct an additional Yamal- 
Europe pipeline via Poland to Slovakia bypassing Ukraine elicited concerns in Poland. The 
and economic role of Ukra* main reason for concern in Warsaw was that the geopoll ine 
as a single export route of Russian gas to Western Europe so far and Warsaw's strategic 
65 Joint Statement on the EU-Russian Federation Energy Dialogue, Brussels 03-10-2001 - Press: 342 - Nr: 
12423/01, http: //europa. eu. int/comm/extemal - relations/russia/summit_ 
I 0_01 /dc-en. htm#nrg 
66 Ibid. See also the European Commission Directorate- General for Energy (DG XV11) document on "Trans- 




ally, would significantly diminish as a result. 68 Such examples highlight not only new 
economic configurations in CE and Russia, but also point to the greater complexity and 
interdependence of political and economic relations. For that reason, it is hard to 
underestimate the role that Central Europe will play in Russia's energy expansion in 
Europe. The natural gas sector, being one of Russia's most European oriented and export 
driven, in combination with the EU's growing demand and Central Europe's transit 
location can be looked at as one of most important and defining elements in Russian-CE 
relations. 
Russia's oil sector, despite being powerful in Russia's domestic context and one of the 
biggest employers and contributors to the federal and regional budgets, does not exercise 
the same foreign policy clout as Gazprom. The Russian oil industry is represented by a 
number of independent companies, which are in a constant state of flux, mergers, 
acquisitions and restructuring. 69 Moreover, their influence is further constrained by the 
existence of the state-owned transportation company Transneft as the sole proprietor and 
70 
operator of the entire system of Russian oil pipelines. 
In their foreign policy orientation, Russian oil companies are less Europe-focused than the 
gas industry, as their strategic priorities lie mainly in Asia. Russian oil firms increasingly 
look at China and Japan as the key strategic markets. Nevertheless, for the time being 
Russian oil companies still regard Europe as their main foreign market. 71 Since 1991 9 
Russian oil exporters have increasingly shifted their export drive from the countries of the 
68 Semen Bukchin, "Gazprom shagaet po Evrope, " Russkaya MYSP, No. 4342 
(http: //www. rusmysi. ru/20001V/4342/434211-200ONov23. htm]: 23 November 2000). 
69 "Business Elites and Russian Foreign Policy, " in Russia Beývond 2000 series, ed. by Medvedev, Sergei 
(Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affaitrs, 2000), pp. 14-17. 
70 As a natural monopoly, Transneft is required by federal law to guarantee equal access to the pipelines for 
all oil producers Ibid. p. 16. 
71 Ibid. p. 14. 
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former Soviet Union (FSU) and Central and Eastern Europe to Western Europe. The share 
of net exports to countries outside the former Soviet Union rose from 53 percent in 1992 to 
87 percent in 2000, and the share of net exports to former Eastern Bloc and Soviet Union 
72 countries decreased. At the same time, unlike gas exports, Russian oil exports are less 
dependent on Central Europe as key transit routes. The majority of Russian oil is exported 
via terminals in the Baltic Sea (until recently the majority of Russian crude oil was 
exported via Ventspils port in Latvia and Butinga in Lithuania) and the Black Sea (mainly 
Novorossiisk). Russian crude oil is also exported to Europe via the 1.2-million bbl/d 
capacity Druzhba pipeline through Ukraine and Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Hungary, and Germany. Russia's recent oil export record was broken in 2000 when the 
country exported a total of 4.37 million bbl/d of crude oil and petroleum products. 73 in 
other words, as much as 27 percent of Russian crude oil is being exported via this route. 
Unlike Russia's gas sector, is oil export structure lacks reverse dependency with Central 
Europe. The world oil sector overall differs fTom the gas one in its greater flexibility of 
supply routes and larger number of suppliers. 74 It is not surprising therefore, that Russia's 
oil producers, whose income largely depends on export levels, support Russia's pro- 
European orientation. The oil industry's main interest with regard to Russia's policy 
towards Europe lies in securing a positive international image for the country in order to 
attract investment and maintain a stable client base. In Western Europe, one of the main 
consumers of Russian oil is Germany, receiving up to 15 percent of all Russia's oil 
exports, Italy -7 to 10 percent, and the Netherlands - 2.5 -3 percent. 
Central Europe 
72 "Russia: oil and Gas Exports, " Energy h1formation 
(http: //www. eia. doe. gov/emeu/cabs/russexp. htm]#OIL: accessed 12 October 2001). 
73 Ibid. 
74 Yakov Pappe, "Neftyanaya i Gazovaya Diplomatiya Rossii, " Pro e, 
(http: //pubs - carnegi e. ru/p&c/Vol 
12 -1997/3 /04pappe. asp: accessed 11 April 1999: 
Center/Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Summer 1997). 
Administration 




remains one of Russia's key oil export destinations, with Poland consuming from 9 to 13 
percent of all Russian oil exports, Hungary and Slovakia - 4.5 to 5 percent each, and the 
Czech Republic gets 4-4.5 percent of Russian oil . 
75 
The main Russian oil conpanies coordinate their export quota and pricing of crude oil 
exports through a coordination scheme, introduced by the Russian Energy Ministry in early 
1997.76 Among the key Russian oil companies that operate in Central and Eastern Europe 
are LUKoil, which has been in charge of delivering and pricing crude oil shipped for, 
among others, the Czech Republic, Sidanco - for Poland, Yukos - for Hungary, and 
Slavneft - for Slovakia. 77 These companies are among the leading Russian oil companies, 
and make up the backbone of the Russian petroleum industry. However, one cannot talk of 
a single strategy of these companies towards advancing their interests in the various 
regions of Europe and influencing the Russian government. These companies in some 
cases compete with each other in Central European markets through building alliances with 
local refineries and distributors. 78 At the same time, their general strategy is to divide their 
spheres of interest in Central Europe, along the lines of the Russian domestic oil market. 79 
As far as the industry's influence on foreign policy deci sioný- making is concerned, the 
highly fragmented and diverse Russian oil companies rely mainly on direct contacts and 
lobbying in the government. 80 Some of Russia's largest and westernised oil companies 
75 Mikhail Zhuravlev, "Evropeiskie rynki mogut okazat'sya tesnymi dlya rossiiskoi nefti, " RusEnergy. Com 
(http: //www. rusenergy. com/politics/a]5022001. htm: acccessed 22 March 2001: RussEnergy. Com, 15 
February 2001). 
76 Eugene Khartukov, "Massive Shakeup for Russia's Oil Companies, " The Russian Journal Special Report. 
Oil, Gas and Ener,, u, June 22-28 2001, p. 21. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Konitnersant, 06 February 2002, p. 5. 
79 Komniersant, 12 February 2002, p. 8. 
80 Pappc, 'Neftyanaya i Gazovaya Diplomatiya Rossil'. 
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such as LUKoil, for example, apply significant influence on foreign policy decisions at the 
level of bilateral relations, where their interests are directly affected. 81 
Russia's electrical power industry is another potentially important actor in Russian-Central 
European/European economic relations. At the moment, however, Russia's electricity 
monopoly, the joint stock company Unified Energy Systems of Russia (or widely referred 
to in Russia as RAO EES) has limited relations with Europe. However, this sphere of RAO 
EES activities is set to grow and play a vital role in bringing Russia into the common 
European energy space. RAO EES is also interested in liberalisation of the EU energy 
market. 82 The EU Trans-European Energy Networks plan envisages connecting the 
Russian electricity grid to CENTREL and UCPTE systems in Central and Western 
Europe. 83 In its bid to establish its presence in Europe the RAO EES has joined forces 
with transit countries such as Belarus, Ukraine and Poland. In October 2000, for instance, 
the RAO EES connected a new electricity gid it had built in Belarus to export electricity 
to Germany via Poland. 84 
Although the RAO EES is just beginning its Europe-oriented export activities, it can 
become a potentially important player in the European energy sector. Its ability to 
influence Russia's foreign policy direction also has a potential to grow. The RAO EES as a 
monopoly providing electricity nationý-wide has big political clout. Some fon-ner 
government officials are in the company's management: its CEO, Anatoll Chubais - an 
architect of Russian privatisation, a well-know liberal reforrner with pro-Western attitude - 
81 'Business Elites and Russian Foreign Policy. p. 17. 
82 "Novaya Eksportnaya Politika i Strategicheskoe Napravlenie Razvltlya Eksporta, " RAO YES Rossii" 
(http: //www. rao-ees. ru/ru/intemational/pol it. htm: accessed on 09 December 2001). 
83 Ibid. See also European Commission Directorate- General for Energy (DG XV11) document on "Trans- 
European Energy Network. " Policy and Actions of the European Community, " 1997. 
84 Dniitrýya Donskogo, 1,5 May 2000, (Kaliningrad), p. 1. 
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was Russia's Deputy Prime-Minister and the Chief of Yeltsin's Presidential Staff at 
various points. 
The final important player in the Russian energy sector that has a significant economic 
interest in Central Europe is the nuclear industry. Military and civilian personnel who 
espouse opposing political views represent this sector: the former are nostalgic for state 
control and the planned economy, while the latter group is reconciled to the market and an 
open economy. 85 The Soviet/Russian nuclear industry used to have strong ties to the CE 
market, catering for the supply and storage of nuclear fuel to the region's nuclear power 
stations. However, it has seen its position eroded in the region in the last decade as the 
Central European states introduce EU regulations and nonns. Its position in Central Europe 
is facing further long-term difficulties as the CE states adopt EU energy market 
liberalisation norms. According to some experts, the nuclear sector in CE will experience 
the same problems that affected its Western counterpart: "there will be strong disincentives 
to choose nuclear technology over much cheaper and less risky technologies such as gas 
, -S6 technology. 
Russian-Polish Energy Relations. 
The energy dimension is one of the key areas of Russian-Polish economic relations. Of all 
the CE states under discussion, Poland is the most important country in Russia's European 
energy policy and its importance in this area has increased since the late 1990s. However, 
the very scale of Poland's dependence on Russia's energy materials has been at the centre 
85 'Business Elites and Russian Foreign Policy', p. 24. 
86 Tony Weslowsky, "EU: Energy Deregulation May Be Bad News For Nuclear Power, ' Radio Free 
EuropelRadio Liberýy, 01 November 2000, (http: //www. rferl. org/nca/features/2000/11/011120001 54626. asp: 
accessed 12 December 2000). 
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of numerous political discussions in Warsaw, making bilateral cooperation between Russia 
and Poland in this area highly politicised and complicated. 
In 1944 Poland became the first CMEA country to receive natural gas from the USSR. 
From then, the volume of gas imports grew consistently, reaching a peak in 1990 - 8.4bn 
cubic metres (CU M). 87 After a slump in the gas trade associated with the collapse of the 
CMEA and the USSR, and general economic decline in the CE states (in 1994 Poland 
imported only 6.4bn cu in of gas from Russia), the level of gas imports from Russia rose 
88 once more, reaching 7.5bn cu m in 1997, but shrank again to 6.9bn cu m in 2000. The 
share of Russian gas in Poland's overall gas consumption stands at approximately 65 
percent; the remaining 35 percent is produced domestically. 89 Compared to the other CE 
states, the share of natural gas in total energy consumption in Poland is relatively low, 
accounting for as little as 8.6 percent. 90 In Hungary, for instance, the share is 40 percent, 
34 percent in Slovakia, and 18 percent in the Czech Republic. 91 
Poland uses coal to cover more than 66 percent of its energy needs, making it one of the 
most coal dependent countries in the world. 92 However, in 1990 Poland adopted a policy 
aimed at increasing the use of gas in its energy economy. In 1996 the Sejm adopted 
General Guidelines on Energy Policy until 2010, which calculated that gas consumption in 
Poland would increase from 10.5bn cubic metres (cu m) in 1995 to 22-27bn cu m in 2010, 
87 Shkuta, Rossiiskii Gaz v Tsentralnoi i Vostochnoi Evrope, p. 105. 
88 Ibid; see also Yuri Vyakherev, "Rossiiskii Gaz v tsentral'noi Evrope, 11 Neftegazovaya Vertikal', 06 April 
2 00 1, pp. 46- 5 1. 
89 Finansovve izvestia, 10 February 1998. 
90 Jan Ptashek, "Strategiya Obespechenlya Pol'shl Gazom, " Probleniv Teorii i Prakfiki Upravleniva, No. 2 
(http: //www. ptp. ru. issues/2-99/14_2-99. htm: accessed on 17 August 2000,1999). 
91 The share of gas in total energy consumption In Great Britain Is 27.7 percent, In Italy - 26.1 percent, 
Germany - 18.2 percent, and 
France 13.2 percent. See ibid, also Shkuta, Rossiiskii Gaz v Tsentralnoi i 
Vostochnoi Evrope, p. 105. 
92 "An Energy Overview of the Republic of Poland, " Fossil Energy International, U. S. Department of Energy 
(http: //www. fe. doe. gov/intemational/pindover. htm1: accessed on 12 February 2002). 
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and its share in total energy consumption would reach 13-14 percent. 93 Even this projected 
figure fell far behind EU recommendations, which suggest that the energy sector relies on 
94 a varied range of fuels in which the share of one type should not exceed 30 percent . 
Nevertheless, it was in part due to such optimistic predictions and policy guidelines that 
Poland negotiated with Gazprom a Yamal Agreement in 1996 to supply the country with 
250bn cu m of natural gas for 25 years, reaching 14bn cu m per year by 2010 via a new 
pipeline, which was also to make Poland a major transit route for Russian gas to Western 
Europe. 95 
As noted before, almost all Poland's imported gas comes from Russia. In the 1990s, most 
of the Russian gas in Poland was delivered within the framework of the two key 
agreements reached between the then USSR and Poland. The first, the Orenburg 
Agreement, signed in 1974, provided for a delivery of 2.8bn cu m of gas a year from 1976 
until 1998. The Yamburg agreement, signed in 1987, stipulated the delivery of 2.5bn cu m 
of gas per year to Poland until 1998. Thus, Russia was supplying Poland with 5.3bn cu m 
of gas on a commercial basis. In addition, Russia would deliver an extra 1.5 to 3bn cu in of 
gas, depending on demand, in payment for Poland's participation in constructing the 
pipelines and developing the gas fields in Russia. Extra volumes of gas were also delivered 
in payment for Polish goods and equipment. 
96 
As the duration of these contracts was coming to an end, Russia and Poland signed a letter 
of intent in 1993 to build a Yamaý Europe gas pipeline mentioned above. After 
four years 
93 Ptashek, 'Strategiya Obespecheniya Pol'shi Gazom'. 
94 Andrzej Rataiczyk, "Russian Gas, " Th e Warsaw V'oice 
(http: //www. warsawvoice. pi/v498/BusIO7. htmi: 10 May, 1998). 
95 Finansoviv izvestia, 10 February 1998. 
96 Ibid. 
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of negotiations, the two governments signed a contract in Warsaw in September 1996, 
which contained provisions for supplying Poland with 250bn cu m of natural gas over a 
period of 25 years. At the time of the signing, the then Polish Industry Minister Klemens 
Scierski hailed the project as the largest of its kind in Europe and called it 'the deal of the 
century', arguing that the tenns of the contract were good for Poland. 97 The total cost of 
the 40OOkm 'Yamal-Europe' gas pipeline, originally projected to consist of two parallel 
pipelines, was estimated to be about USD35bn, while the cost of constructing the 670km 
Polisb sector was USD2.5bn. It would bave the capacity to carry 65.7bn cu m of gas from 
the Yarnal peninsula to Western Europe. 98 
Map I Gas transit pipelines from Russia to Central/Western Europe 
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It is interesting to note that Poland was the first among the CE states to conclude such a 
major long-term contract. It came at a time when Russian-Polish political relations were 
worsening and issues such as energy security and diversification of its sources were 
featuring high on the political agenda in Poland. It is difficult to point out what exactly 
persuaded the Polish authorities to enter into such a weighty economic and political 
agreement with Russia, given its highly sensitive security nature. However a number of 
arguments, economic in nature rather than political, seem to have swayed the decision in 
Russia's favour. First of all, despite the fears of falling into energy dependency on Russia, 
199 which the Polish opposition interpreted as 'new Russian expansion , Russian gas 
remained the most logistically accessible and cheapest source of natural gas. In the long- 
term, no other alternative source would be able to provide the volume of gas needed, as the 
Polish economy was predicted to expand and require more gas. Second, the above- 
mentioned Yamburg and Orenburg agreements, guaranteeing the delivery of gas to Poland 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, were coming to an end and necessitating a new 
framework for gas supplies from Russia. Third, unlike the previous agreements, Poland 
was not required to participate in financing the construction of the "Yamaý Europe" 
pipeline outside its borders. Poland only contributes 15 percent of the cost of constructing 
the pipeline on its territory -a share proportionate to the amount of gas Poland will take 
for its own consumption from the total carried by the pipeline. 
' 00 Previously, for instance, 
the construction of the Yamburg pipeline cost Poland USD 700 million. 
101 Fourth, once the 
pipeline is operational, Poland will become a major transit route, which will bring with it 
not only significant added revenue, but also the added security of stable gas supplies and a 
potential increase in Poland's bargaining power vis-a-vis Russia. 
However the latter 
99 Segodtýva, 2 February 1995, p. I- 
hi Gazom, " Problenzy Teorii i Praktiki Upravleni 100 Jan Ptashek, "Strateglya Obespechenlya Pol's 1 Ya. 
No. 2 
(http: //www. ptp. ru-issues/2-99/14-2-99. htm: accessed on 17 August 2000,1999). 
101 Ratajczyk, 'Russian Gas'. 
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argument of reverse dependence did not persuade some Polish politicians. The issue of 
excessive dependence on Russia for gas energy and controversy surrounding the 
implications of constructing the Yamal-Europe pipeline featured largely in Poland's 
domestic political battles, and dominated the two countries' bilateral relations in the late 
1990s and well into 2000-2001. 
Various politicians in Poland questioned the suitability of having such a pipeline running 
through the country and making Poland structurally dependent on Russian gas. According 
to some Polish analysts and politicians, such dependence would put into question 
Warsaw's commitment to European integration and become an obstacle on the path to 
Poland's integration into the EU and NATO. Some of them argued that in "Poland's 
relations with such a country as Russia, that only recently dominated the whole region, one 
cannot separate economy from politics. The lessons of history dictate a cautious 
approach. "' 02 Polish politicians exploited the issue in their domestic battles, invoking 
arguments about a possible threat to national security. Leader of the opposition movement 
Reconstruction of Poland Jan Olszewski, for instance, argued that if relations between 
Russia and the NATO states worsened, 'the complete dependence of Poland on natural gas 
supplies from a single source - Russia - may have incalculable consequences for our 
. )103 economy. 
Some politicians and observers in Poland also saw in Russia's plan to build the Yamaý 
Europe pipeline across Poland an attempt to limit the leverage that Ukraine enjoyed until 
then as the main transit route for Russian gas. Polish observers 'discovered' 
in Russia's 
plans a calculated policy of 'taming' Ukraine 
by constructing a 'bypass', which would take 
102 Avie Wai-szavvy, cited in Kobrinskaya, Rossýya i TsentraIna. va Vostochnaya Evropa Posle, p. 
134. 
103 Warsaw PAP, 26 March 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0330. 
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away from Kiev one of its key areas of leverage in its relations with Moscow. In the 1990s 
Ukraine handled about 95 percent of Russia's gas export to Europe (the remainder passing 
through a low-pressure pipeline between Kobrin, in Belarus, and Warsaw, in Poland). 1" 
Up to II 5bn cu m of Russian gas a year is carried via Ukraine, whereas the capacity of this 
Soviet-era built 'Bratstvo' (Brotherhood) pipeline is 180bn cu m. If the existing pipeline 
operated at full power it could easily accommodate the additional volume that Russia 
wants to divert via the new Yarnal- Europe pipeline. However, since Ukraine's 
independence, relations between Kiev and Gazprom have become increasingly tense and 
complicated. Kiev used the pipeline as the main bargaining chip in its dealings with 
Russia. According to Moscow, Kiev demanded excessive transit fees, despite having 
accumulated enormous debts for the consumed gas (in 1999 Gazprom demanded USD 
2.2bn, whereas Ukraine insisted that the figure was far lower - USD 1.5bn). But most 
importantly, Gazprom accused Ukraine of illegal withdrawal of gas from the system and 
threatening the security of gas supplies to Europe. 105 The Ukrainian government admitted 
the fact that as much as 8.2bn cu m of gas was withdrawn without authorisation in 2000 
alone. 106 Although the Yarnal project was conceived in the late 1980s and was later 
significantly altered, problems with the transit through Ukraine gave more urgency to 
constructing an alternative pipeline. Gazprom also took a decision that in the long-term no 
more than 40 percent of its gas export should be transported through any single country. 
107 
In 1999 construction of one pipe of the Yamaý Europe pipeline was completed. However, 
its capacity was only half of the projected level, as only two out of five envisaged 
104 Margarita Mercedes Balmaceda, "Gas, Oil and the Linkages Between Domestic and Foreign Policies: the 
Case of Ukraine, " Ew-ope-Asia Studies (March 
1998), see also Petra Opitz, Christian von Hirschhausen, 
Working Paper No. 3, "Ukraine as the Gas Bridge to Europe? Economic and Geopolitical Considerations, " 
(Kiev: Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, October 2000), p. 4. 
105 Ekho planet , v, 
2000, (http: /ixN, ww. explan. ru/archive/2000/45-46/sI. htm, accessed on 20 December 2000) 
106 Mezhdunarodnoe Energetichkoe Agentstvo, Energeticheskava politika Rossii. Obzor 
2002, (Pans: 
International Energy Agency, OECD, 2002), available online at http: 
//www. iea. org, p. 169. 
107 lbid, p. 169. 
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compressor stations were installed. In 2000 Poland started to receive some of its gas via the 
Yamal pipeline, while Germany took a delivery of 10- l4bn cu m of Russian gas. 108 
Installation of the remaining three gas compressing stations, which would allow the first 
stretch of the Yarnaý Europe pipeline to operate at full capacity (33bn cu m) was one of the 
key issues in Russiarý- Polish gas talks, a decision on which the Polish govemment made 
dependent on amending the 1996 Yamal agreement, changes in EuRoPol Gaz 
management, and an increase in Yamaý Europe transit fees. 109 
In 2000 Gazprom started looking for alternative ways of further reducing its dependence 
on transit through Ukraine by finding new routes for transporting gas to Europe, utilising 
the existing network of pipelines and routes in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. This 
could be achieved by constructing an additional pipeline connecting the newly built Yamal 
pipeline in Poland with the existing gas export network in Slovakia. The 'bypass' would 
deliver Russian gas to Europe by a traditional route while circumventing Ukraine. In late 
2000, Gazprom together with Gennan Ruhrgas and Wintershal, French Gaz de France, and 
Italian SNAM signed a framework agreement on constructing a southern branch of the 
Yamal pipeline to be laid across Poland from Belarus and into Slovakia, with an annual 
capacity of 60bn cu m. "0 It is important to note that the initial decision on the bypass was 
taken without consultation with Warsaw. 
Poland's reaction to the news was immediate and negative. The then Polish Prime Minister 
Jerzy Buzek stated: "Nothing about us without us". 
" Added to this indignation was a 
perception in Poland that Russia wanted to dnve Ukraine into a comer, 
leaving Ukraine 
108 Ibid, p. 169. 
109 Vreniva novostei, 15 April 2002. 
110 Sine, 09 December 2000, FBIS-WEU-2000-1215. 
111 PAP, 31 October 2000, F BIS- EEU-2000-103 1. 
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without the last remaining bargaining chip in is relations with Moscow. However the 
official justification for Poland's concern over depriving Ukraine of its near monopolistic 
position on Russian gas export to Europe was that the loss of revenue in Kiev would spell 
economic collapse for Ukraine. Officially, Warsaw stated that it was not against an 
alternative to the Ukrainian route, but that the project should not harm the interests of 
Ukraine. 1 12 Ukraine's losses are potentially substantial, estimated to be hundreds of 
millions of USD per year in pre-tax profits, and reaching as much as USD 3 to 5bn in 
discounted profits. 113 
Russia's response to Polish worries did not in any way help ease Warsaw's concerns. Press 
reports as well as commentaries by some Russian officials displayed a condescending 
attitude towards Polish anxieties, mocking Poland's traditional fear of its big neighbour 
and its attempts to see more than simply an economic rationale behind Gazprom's moves. 
The Russian magazine Ekho planeýv (an ITAR-TASS weekly magazine) quoted Zycie 
Warszawy as saying that building an additional Yamal-Europe pipeline bypass would spell 
the end of Ukraine's independence and would mark the return of imperial Russia to the 
Polish borders. 114 The Russian authors argued that Poland's position on Ukraine as its 
strategic ally makes the Yamal-Europe pipeline a direct threat to Ukraine's sovereignty, 
and Warsaw is prepared to turn a blind eye to Ukraine's unauthorised withdrawal of 
Russian gas, as long as its independence is not compromised. 
' 15 Poland's initially negative 
position was also explained by the early approach of the Russian government. Russia's 
Vice Premier Viktor Khristenko reportedly upset his Polish counterparts by arguing that 
112 "Miller, snova Miller i Rossi isko -Pol'skoe gazovoe sotrudnichestvo, 
" N, ýfti Kapital, 18 February 2002. 
'" Petra Opitz, Christian von Hirschhausen, Working Paper No. 3, "Ukraine as the Gas Bridge to Europe? 
Economic and Geopolitical Considerations, " (Kiev: Institute 
for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, 
October 2000), P. 15. 
114 Ekhoplaneýy, 2000, (http: //www. explan. ru/archive/30/diary. 




Russian gas is needed in Germany, France and Italy. By this Khristenko implied that the 
final decision on whether the pipeline is built or not would not be taken in Poland, Ukraine 
or Belarus, but rather in these EU countries. ' 16 As Russia's pro-govemment Izvestia put it, 
'Poland, like Ukraine and Belarus, is a mere pawn in the chess game of Russian gas export 
to Western Europe. And there's a very powerful queen in the game - Gen-nany and its 
Ruhrgaz, Gazprom's strategic partner. In political and economic tenns Poland is very 
dependent on Germany. There are firm grounds to believe, therefore, that on this occasion 
Germany is not going to be on Poland's side. ' 117 
It is likely that concerns over Ukraine being deprived of its near monopoly on Russian gas 
transit provides only a partial explanation for Poland's reluctance to allow the construction 
of the additional pipeline. Gazprom's bypass plan could potentially undennine Warsaw's 
strategy of gas import diversification. Despite already being tied up by a long-term contract 
with Gazprom (which in the light of the downward revised projection of gas demand made 
Poland's search for alternative large-scale gas imports meaningless) the Buzek government 
signed a provisional agreement with Denmark and Norway in 2000 on constructing a 
BalticPipe. 118 The project envisaged construction of an underwater pipeline from the 
Norwegian gas deposits to Niechorze in Poland. It was also planned that Norwegian gas 
would be delivered to Croatia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and possibly Ukraine. If Gazprom's 
bypass project is realised, then, according to Jerzy Nowakowsky, an international affairs 
116 Konimersant, 13 February 2000. 
117 Izvestia, 13 February 2000. 
118 "Miller, snova Miller i Rossi i sko -Pol'skoe gazovoe sotrudnichestvo., " Xýft' i kapital, 
18 February 2002, 
pp. 52-57; In the mid 1990s 
Poland projected that gas demand in the country would reach 22-27bn cu ma 
year by 2010. Domestic producers were anticipated 
to supply 4.6bn cu m of gas, Gazprom's share was to 
reach 43 percent of gas 
demand, that is up l4bn cu rn by 2010. However, due to lower than expected 
economic growth, the Polish government's near 
term gas consumption forecast are nearly one quarter lower - 
12.7 - 13.7bn cu rn of gas 
by 2005. See Paul Shockley, "Poland, Russia Closer on Gas Deal. " Warsaw 




advisor to the Polish Prime Minister, the BalticPipe project and, more importantly, 
Poland's diversification plans, might become redundant. ' 19 
Poland continued to procrastinate over completing the construction of its stretch of the 
original Yamal-Europe pipeline, putting off negotiations with Gazprom on installing 
additional compressing stations to take the pipeline up to its projected capacity. 120 As 
mentioned above, the Polish government tied the issue of completing the pipeline project 
to clarifying the status of the EuRoPol Gaz company, which was jointly created by Russia 
and Poland in 1993 to construct the pipeline. The legal constraints in Poland at the time did 
not allow the establishment of a joint stock company with fewer than three bgal parties. 
Gazprom and the Polish Oil and Gas Industry (Polskie G6rnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo 
- PGNiG) formed a partnership with Gaz Trading Company. Gazprom and PGNiG had 
control of 48 percent of EuRoPol shares each, while the remaining four percent was given 
to Gaz Trading. The problem, which surfaced later, was that Gaz Trading, also a joint 
stock company, was created by Gazprom's Gazexport company, which owned 35 percent 
of the shares, PGNiG controlled 30 percent of the company, and the Polish Coal company 
Weglokoks and Gennan Wintershall had 5 percent. The remaining 25 percent belonged to 
a Polish company Bartimpex. Bartimpex was set up and controlled by Aleksander 
Gudzowaty, one of Poland's richest people and a friend of Gazprom's CEO Rem 
VyakhireV. 12 1 The Buzek government was unhappy with the way EuRoPol was managed. 
By 2001 Bartimpex was reportedly in control of 36 percent of the shares of EuRoPol, 
which in view of the close ties between Bartimpex and Vyakhirev gave Gazprom a 
controlling stake over EuRoPol management making PGNiG a minority shareholder. 
In 
119 Den, 25 October 2000. 
120 "Miller, snova Miller i Rossi i sko -Po Vskoe gazovoe sotrudnichestvo., 





March 2001 the Polish government planned to redistribute the four percent of the shares of 
EuRoPol belonging to Gaz Trading between Gazprom and PGNiG. The shareholders 
meeting did not take place in the end, as Gazprom made its participation in the meeting 
conditional on a resolution of the question of further financing of the first stretch of the 
Yamaý Europe pipeline. 122 In their turn, the Polish goverment sent a "pro memona" to 
their Russian counterparts saying that it wanted a solution to all controversial issues 
pertaining to EuRoPol Gaz and removal of Gaz Trading, i. e. Gudzovaty, from its 
managemen . 
123 
The head of Bartimpex, an opponent of the Buzek government and a 'Russoph, le' with 
close links to Gazprom's head, also ran into disagreement with the government over its 
plans to diversify gas supplies. As we have seen, starting in 1998, the Polish government 
began talks on the possibility of starting gas deliveries from Denmark and Norway. In July 
2001, the Dutch company Dansk Olie og Naturgas (DONG) signed an agreement to deliver 
16bn cu metres of gas, 2 bn each year, in 2003-2010. The two sides had also agreed to 
create a BalticPipe consortium to built a pipeline across the Baltic seabed from anmark to 
Poland. However, from the very beginning this project had a number of weak points. The 
project would have gone into force only if PGNiG and DONG could secure an agreement 
with a joint company DUC, owned by Maersk Oil, Shell and Chevron Texaco, to provide 
the gas. Even with the DUC gas, the 'BalticPipe' would use only a quarter of its capacity, 
and the partners also needed to secure supplies from the Norwegian government. 
Gudzovaty, head of Bartimpex, was pushing for an alternative 'diversification' route. 
Bartimpex, supported by Ruhrgas, offered to build a pipeline from German Bernau to the 
122 Ibid. 
123 Rzeczposl)Olita, 4 june 2001, FBIS-EEU-2001-0604. 
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Polish Szczecin that would cost only USD 100 million to build and would be able to carry 
up to 2.5bn cu ma year of gas of any origin, including from Norway or Denmark. 
However, the government- led talks on alternative gas sources, as well as Poland's desire to 
diversify "at any cost" made it possible for the Danish and Norwegian negotiators to put 
forward some conditions that in the final analysis made the project economically unsound. 
Even in the last days of the Buzek government some analysts saw no sense into entering in 
such an agreement. Since winning the elections in September 2001, the new left-wing 
government of Leszek Miller, seemingly more inclined to cooperate with Russia, has been 
looking for ways to walk away from the Dani s4- Norwegian agreement. 124 With the arrival 
of the new government, Poland in general became more friendly towards Moscow. The 
Miller government changed PGNiG management: Andrzej Lipko, the head of PGNiG and 
a strong supporter of diversification, was replaced with Mikhail Kwiatkowski, former head 
of the coal company Weglokoks, a government sympathiser and an associate of 
Guclzovaty. 125 
While the government of Buzek was trying to delay tl-r resolution of the issues pertaining 
to completion of the first stretch of the Yamal pipeline and find alternative sources of gas, 
Russia launched an unprecedented high-level diplomatic 'offensive' to persuade the Polish 
to agree to build the 'bypass', southern branch of the Yamal pipeline. While arguing the 
economic reasons for and benefits of operating the Yamal pipeline at its 
full capacity by 
constructing an additional by-pass trunk route to Slovakia across 
Poland, Russia also tried 
to put pressure on Warsaw. Gazprom argued that it 
had completed a feasibility study of a 
variety of ways of taking Russian gas to 
Europe, bypassing both Ukraine and Poland. An 
124 Paul Shockley, "Poland, Russia Closer on 
Gas Deal, " 11'arsaw Business Journal (http: //www. wbj. pi: New 
World Publishing, Inc., 22 April 2002). 
125 Op. cit. 
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alternative pipeline could be built across the Baltic Sea, using what was knoNvii as the 
Nordic Gas Grid (NGG), in cooperation with Finland's Fortuma company. In November 
2000, the Russian Foreign Minister argued that he did not wish to, and indeed could not. 
exert pressure on Warsaw, but declared that "if some kind of political reasons make it 
impossible to make a decision, then Russian gas will be sent by a route bypassing 
Poland. " 126 
At the time of writing it is still unclear whether the bypass pipeline will eventually be built 
or not. The two sides seem to be willing to pursue a more constructive dialogue. A 
combination of factors could account for this state of Russian-Polish 'gas' relations. The 
new government of Leszek Miller, Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), is seen as more pro- 
Russian and is less inclined to use antýRussian rhetoric for political reasons. Secondly, the 
new government has strong links with Bartimpex, which in its turn has strong ties with 
Gazprom and Ruhrgas, two of the most powerful companies in the European energy sector, 
with strong links to their national governments. 127 Third, Russia and the EU have moved 
towards a comprehensive and substantive energy dialogue, which, despite the EU's policy 
of energy liberalisation and supply security, designates Russia as the key gas source for 
years to come. Fourth, in contrast to the Yeltsin administration, the new Russian 
leadership has become Gazprom's major lobbyist in Central Europe and beyond. These 
changes are associated in part with further 'economisation' of Russian foreign policy, as 
described in Chapter 2, changes in Russian foreign policy under the Putin leadership, and 
increased government control over Gazprom. All these factors, will continue to deten-nine 
for the foreseeable future the character of Russian-Polish relations, and not only in the gas 
sector. 
126 PAP, 30 November 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-1130. 
127 Rzeczpospolita, 6 July 2001, FBIS-EEU-2001-0706. 
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The years 2000-2002 witnessed an unprecedented rise in prominence of the gas issue and 
its internationalisation in Russian-Polish bilateral relations. The events of these years also 
showed that the Russian authorities had begun to pay far closer attention to the economic 
side of foreign policy, at least in relations with the CE countries. 
As was noted before, the Russian oil sector, despite being important in Central European 
markets, and in Poland in particular, maintains a markedly lower political profile, than its 
gas counterpail. As described above, the Russian oil sector is very fragmented and oil 
exports are being undertaken by half a dozen different leading companies, which 
coordinate their export activities with the Russian government. Sidanco, one of these 
companies, is responsible for the majority of oil exports to Poland, while Lukoil is also 
responsible for a substantial share of oil exports. Russian oil supplies as much as 90 
percent of Polish oil consumption, 15 million tonnes in 1999, and 17.5 and 18.6 million 
tonnes in 2000 and 2001, that is about 9-13 percent of all Russian oil exported to 
Europe. 128 The issue of heavy dependence on Russian oil is less controversial than that of 
gas, due to the fact that their structural dependence on Russian oil is not as rigid as that of 
gas. Poland is moving towards meeting the EU's requirements to maintain a 90-day reserve 
capacity, which would allow Poland, or any other country, to find alternative sources in 
case of an emergency, or if current supplies discontinued. At the momentý Poland has a 30- 
day oil reserve capacity, and is planning to invest USDI. 5bn to meet the EU regulations. 
129 
The supply of crude oil is not the only way in which the Russian oil sector is represented in 
128 Nikolai Bukharin, "Rossi isko -Pol'skie Otnosheniya, " in Rossýva i Tsentral'no-Vostochna - va 
Evropa: 
Vzaimootnosheni. va v Kontse XX Veka, ed. by Glinkina, Svetlana, Igor Orl1k, Boris Shmelev (Moscow: 
IMEPI, 1999), p. 76. See also Mikhail Zhuravlev, "Evropeiskie rynki mogut okazat'sya tesnymi dlya 
rossiiskoi Nefti, " RiisEtit, i-,,,,. l,. 
Coni(http: //ww\ý,. rusenergy-com/politics/a]5022001. htm: accessed 22 March 
2001: RussEnergy-Com, 15 February 2001). Dmitri Fedotov, "Vozvraschenie v Evropu, " in Neft'Rossii, 16 
August 200 1, pp. 77-79. 
129 Bukharin, 'Rossi isko-Pol'skic Otnosheniya, 'p. 76. 
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Poland. In 1998 Lukoil expressed an interest in constructing a chain of petrol stations in 
Poland. 130 Lukoll also plans to expand its presence in the Polish oil market by increasing 
the amount of oil exported to Poland. 131 
Another important aspect of cooperation between Russia and Poland in the energy sector is 
with regard to electricity networks. Russia started to take the first steps in the direction of 
exporting electricity to Europe in the late 1990s. Poland plays an important part in Russia's 
strategy to participate in the European electricity market, both as a consumer of Russian 
electricity and also as an important transit link. In 2000 The Russian electricity monopoly 
RAO EES started to export electric power to Poland and on to Germany. According to the 
head of RAO EES Anatoly Chubais, Poland is Russia's strategic partner in its drive to 
break into the European energy market. 132 Furthermore, Chubais and then Polish Vice- 
Premier Steinhoff announced that a joint working group consisting of representatives of 
Russia, Poland, Belarus and Lithuania would work on a joint electric energy development 
plan for their countnes. 
133 
As the above analysis demonstrated, natural gas issues dominated Russianý-Polish relations 
in the energy sector. It also showed that serious political obstacles hindered the expansion 
of Russian economic interests, despite their economic soundness. The evidence presented 
here points to the fact that the successful pursuit of Russia's economic interests in Central 
Europe remains subject to bilateral political relations. Substantial expansion of Russian 
energy (and even maintaining its current level in the Polish market) 
is still viewed in some 
quarters in Warsaw as a continuation of a 
Russian tradition of imperial expansion, this time 
13 0 NG-Politekononli ' 
w, (Neza"isinia ' va 
gazeta supplement), 18 May 1998. 
131 Vi-eniva novostei, 14 December 200 1, p. 
5. 
132 Dmitriya Donskogo, 1, (Kaliningrad), 5 May 2000. p. 1. 




by economic means. The discussion that follows shows that such a state of affairs is not 
unique to Russian economic activities in Poland, but symptomatic of Russia's economic 
relations elsewhere in CE, particularly in the energy sector. The degree of politicisation of 
these relations, however , is not as significant as in Poland. The study of Russiarý- Polish 
energy relations has also demonstrated that the level of cooperation between the two sides 
depends on the political make-up of the Polish goveni-ment. As the following section 
shows, Moscow's relations with Bratislava in the energy sector have also been highly 
controversia an subject to domestic political clashes. 
Russian-Slovak Energy Relations. 
The natural gas sector and the related gas industry is the most important branch of the 
Slovak economy. Slovakia has the second densest gas distribution network in Europe after 
the Netherlands, and the consumption of natural gas represents almost 32 percent of 
134 or its natural gas primary energy consumed. Slovakia is also almost wholly dependent f 
supplies on Russia, and it is the second largest natural gas transit country in the world 
(after Ukraine). In 1998, for instance, 80 percent of Russia's total gas exports to CE 
countries and 25 percent of the total gas transported to Western Europe from Russia 
transited Slovakia via the Soviet-built 'Brotherhood' gas pipeline. 135 Slovakia's strategic 
location, its existing gas transport infrastructure inherited by the country after the 
separation with the Czech Republic, detennined in many ways the nature of Russian- 
Slovak economic relations in the 1990s. Gazprom chairman Rem Vyakhirev's visit to 
Slovakia in January 1993 underlined Slovakia's importance as a major consumer of 
Russian gas, but more importantly as key transit country. 
Slovakia became the first CE 
134 Nathalie Francouer (ed. ), "The Role of Natural Gas in Europe. 
" EU Enlargement Watch 
(http: //www. energy-eu. corn: October 2000). 
13 5 Ibid. 
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country to be visited by such a high-level Gazprom delegation. The results of the visit were 
reported in an official memorandum signed by the visiting Russian Premier Chernomyrdin 
136 and the Head of the Slovak Government, Meciar, in March 1993 . The memorandum 
described a plan to establish a joint company to be set up by Gazprom and Slovak 
enterprises and referred to Gazprom's interest in participating in the forthcoming 
privatisation of Slovak industry. 137 
During the transition period following Slovakia's separation from the Czech Republic, 
Russian natural gas deliveries to Slovakia and transit agreements were based on short-term 
contracts. However, in April 1997 Gazprom and the Slovak Gas Industry (Slovensky 
plynarensky priemysel, SPP) signed a long-terrn contract for the delivery of 90bn cu m of 
Russian gas from May 1997 to December 2008. The agreement also specified the amount 
of natural gas to be transported through the Slovak gas network to Western Europe - 
700bn cu m of Russian gas was to transit Slovakia in the space of ten years. 138 
Yet, despite providing Slovakia with steady and long-term income from gas transit, the 
Slovak government came under opposition attack for apparently succumbing to Gazprom 
pressure in such a way as to make Meciar's earlier plan for gas supply diversification 
unworkable. 13 9 The signing of the agreement heralded an important achievement by 
Gazprom - the new long-term gas supply contract made Slovakia solely 
dependent on 
136 Olga Afanasyeva, W 'Pesochnitse' Gazovykh Baronov Evropy Svoi lgry, " Faktor, No. 2 
(http: //www. factor-online. com/plain/page5l3. htmi: GazOil Press, 1998). 
13 7 Ibid. 
138 Ibid. 
13 9 m. o. Kopytina, "Rossi i sko -Slovatski e Otnoshemya vo Vtoroi Polovine 90-kh Godov, " Vneshnvava 
Torgovl. vw, No. 05-06, (28 December 
2001), pp. 24-29; See also Michael Lelyveld, "Gazprom Finds Export 
Route through Slovakia, " RFEIRL, 22 March 2002. 
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Russian gas supplies for the foreseeable future. In 2000,97 percent of Slovakia's gas 
imports came from Russia. 140 
The policy that the Meciar government developed toward Russia in the 1990s gave 
Gazprorn a favourable basis for implementing two important parts of Its CE strategy, 
namely setting up joint ventures to sell and distribute Russian gas, and putting in place 
mechanisms to guarantee the safety and stability of the gas delivery system. As noted in 
the previous chapter, Meciar's pro-Russian tilt in foreign policy had considerable 
economic motives, and was supported and lobbied for by a large group of leaders of 
unreformed Slovak heavy industry with which the Meciar government was closely 
associated. Economic justification for the return 'to the previous level of bilateral 
economic re at ons' between Slovakia and Russia was officially provided by Meciar's 
strategic vision of Bratislava as one of Europe's main trade centres, linking East and 
West. 141 Slovak analyst Alexander Duleba, a critic of the Meciar leadership, concludes that 
this grand vision of Slovakia as a bridge between the East and the West was no more than a 
grand illusion. Other analysts suggested that Russia 'cunningly encouraged' the Meciar 
government's pro-Russian orientation so that it could maintain its position in the CE 
energy market. 142 Whichever way one looks at Russian-Slovak economic relations, both 
sides extracted significant benefits from cooperation in the energy sector. While, as was 
noted above, Russia's Gazprom used favourable conditions in Slovakia to maintain and 
strengthen its position as the only gas supplier to that country, rendering any attempts by 
14 0 Lelyveld, 'Gazprom Finds Export Route through Slovakia'. 
141 See Alexander Duleba, "The Slovak- Ukrainian- Russian Security Triangle, " in On the Edge. Ukrainian- 
Centl-al Ein-opean -Russian SecuritY 
Tilangle, ed. by Balmaceda, Margarita M. (Budapest: Central European 
University Press, 2000), pp. 86-87. 




Bratislava to diversify its gas import sources impractical, the Slovak economy also 
benefited from close relations with Russia. 
One result of Meciar's effort to re-build 'the previous level of bilateral economic relations' 
was that he secured for a time a low price for imported Russian energy resources. In 1993 
Slovakia became the only non-CIS country to participate in what is known as the 'Surgut 
Agreement' with observer status. The Surgut Agreement dealt with practical cooperation 
between the CIS countries (except Turkmenistan) to develop Russian gas and oil exports 
on a multilateral basis. The participants used a bilateral system of price formulation 
between Russia and each partner. Although the details of contracts signed within the 
Surgut Agreement framework were kept secret, it is believed that 'Surgut' prices for gas 
and oil were half of world levels. 143 Although the Surgut Agreement was no longer 
effective after the end of 1994, big companies close to both the Russian and Slovak 
governments continued to follow the pricing 'rules' agreed upon in 1993.144 
Low prices for Russian energy provided a considerable boost to the Slovak economy in the 
mid- 1990s. The difference between world energy prices and special CIS prices became an 
indirect form of Russian investment in the Slovak economy, allowing it to earn more 
foreign currency than would otherwise have been possible and making Slovak goods more 
competitive on foreign markets. About 20 to 30 percent of the largest Slovak oc)mpanies 
benefited from cheap Russian energy resources and their elites were among the strongest 
supporters of Meciar's 'special' relationship with Moscow. 145 





However, despite the generally rapid growth of Slovak exports in 1993-1995, Meciar's 
pro-Russian economic policy brought about negative results for the Slovak economy: 1996 
saw a major economic crisis associated with an astonishingly rapid rise in Slovakia's 
negative trade balance. According to some estimates, in the first ten months of 1996,77 
percert of this negative trade balance was due to the import of Russian natural gas and oil; 
this figure grew to 87 percent by the end of 1996.146 Moreover, having benefited from 
cheap Russian raw materials and energy, Slovak industry was reluctant to embark on the 
comprehensive restructuring process needed to make it more competitive, becoming 
heavily dependent on Russian resources and vulnerable to changes in Russian markets. 
When in 1996, on the recommendations of the IMF, the Russian government introduced 
changes to the level of export duties on crude oil and gas exports, the prices Slovaks had to 
pay for Russia's strategic raw materials reached almost world levels. This hike in the level 
of prices had a negative effect on the Slovak economy, where the previously profitable 
monopoly Slovnaft, which imported and processed Russian oil, reported big losses. 
Domestic energy prices rose as a result, leading to price rises in all other sectors. 147 
Despite this negative outcome for the Slovak economy, the Meciar government ruled out 
the possibility of diversifying energy imports, claiming that "... we could not find a more 
advantageous supplier of energy nowadays. This is due to the existing transport system; at 
A48 
the same time, we are not ready to accept other prices. To tackle the problem of the 
negative trade balance with Russia, brought about by the import of large volumes of 
Russian energy and raw materials, Slovakia responded to Russia's idea of establishing a 
146 Hospod6i-ske noviny, 30 December 1996, pp. 1,10; quoted in Duleba, 'The Slovak- Ukrainian- Russian 
Security Triangle', p. 90. 
147 Ibid., pp. 90-91. 
148 Hospodcirske novinY, 6 September 1996, p. 2; quoted in Duleba, 'The Slovak- Ukrainian- Russian Security 
Triangle', p. 91. 
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free trade zone and a number of institutions to facilitate 1he improvement of the trade 
balance. 149 It is worth noting that the idea of creating a free trade zone between Slovakia 
and Russia was first aired by Russian Prime Minster Chernomyrdin during his visit to 
Bratislava in February 1995. The establishment of the free trade zone was made 
conditional by the Russian side on the setting up a 'common free trade house' - an 
intergovernmental institution to provide a framework, support the functioning of various 
companies and facilitate mutual trade. According to Slovak sources, the basis for such a 
(. common trade house' would be the creation of a joint stock company controlling the 
transit of Russian natural gas via Slovakia to Western Europe. 150 At the time the Slovak 
government resisted Russia's pressure to create the joint company on conditions suggested 
by Gazprom - that both sides should have 50 percent ownership of a company that would 
purchase gas for Slovakia and regulate the Slovak domestic gas market. 151 
In 1995 the Slovak government resisted Russia's call to create a joint company on terms 
unfavourable to Bratislava. In 1997, when the consequences of the trade imbalance with 
Russia on the Slovak economy had become all too obvious, Meciar restarted talks with 
Moscow about creating a joint gas company. In the economic circumstances of the time, 
Russia's proposals for creating a free trade zone, liberalising trade and establishing a gas 
joint company as a mechanism for overcoming the negative trade balance looked very 
appealing to the Slovak government. It is difficult to know whether the Russian 
government genuinely believed it was possible to create a free trade zone with the Slovak 
Republic, which was already bound by its Association Agreement with the EU (which puts 
restrictions on free trade agreements with other parties), Customs Union with the Czech 
149 More on free trade zone and Russian-Slovak trade relations in the next section of this chapter. 
150 Ncirodnci obroda, 8 March 1995, p. 3, quoted in Duleba, 'The Slovak- Ukrainian- Russian Security 
Triangle', p. 91. 
151 Quoted ibid., p. 92. 
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Republic and by its membership in CEFTA and the WTO. What is clear is that Russia's 
Gazprom, heavily promoted by Russian Prime Minister Chemomyrdin took a big step 
forward by persuading the Slovak side to establish Sbvrusgaz -a joint Gazprom-SPP 
company. Although the exact details of the deal, and of the sphere and scope of Slovrusgaz 
activity, were not released, speculation surrounding the deal provoked sharp criticism from 
the Slovak opposition. The then opposition leader Mikulas Dzurinda argued that the joint 
company with Gazprom would mean a financial loss for Slovakia and was a signal "that 
we have succumbed to huge political and possible financial pressure". 152 Dzurinda further 
alleged that the joint venture with Gazprom would split the profits Slovakia currently earns 
from transit of Russian gas across Slovakia. 153 
As details subsequently made available revealed, by creating a new joint company, thanks 
to heavy lobbying by Russia's Prime Minister Chemomyrdin, Gazp rom managed to 
establish an even stronger hold in Slovakia and to put a stop to any attempts by Bratislava 
to diversify its sources of natural gas, at least for the foreseeable future, something that 
Gazprorn was not able to prevent the Czech Republic from doing. The newly created 
company Slovrusgaz, equally owned by the Slovak SPP and Gazprom, was empowered to 
trade with gas that was in excess of existing capacities, as well as to manage the expansion 
of existing and construction of new gas networks in Slovakia. Moreover, to help improve 
Slovakia's balance of trade with Russia, the two sides agreed that up to 40 percent of 
payments for Russian gas delivered as a part of Slovrusgaz's operations was to be paid for 
in Slovak goods. 154 Fending off attacks by the opposition, Jan Ducky, General Director of 
152 "Slovakia: New Gas Director Linked to Russian Deal, " RFEIRL (02 April 1997). 
153 Ibid. 
154 Jolyon Naegele, "Slovakia: Natural Gas Agreement with Russia Criticised, " RFEIRL (22 May 1997), see 
alsoOlga Afanasyeva, W 'Pesochnitse' Gazovykh Baronov Evropy Svoi Igry, " Faktor, No. 2 
(http: //www. factor-online. com/plain/page5l3. htm]: GazOil Press, 1998). 
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the SPP and an advisor to the Slovak Prime Minister, argued that setting up the Joint 
venture saved the country "tens of millions of dollars"), as the pnce of gas negotiated with 
Gazprom was significantly lower than that paid by Slovakia's neighbours - Poland and the 
Czech Republic. 155 
Whatever benefits Slovakia obtained from the deal with Russia, Gazprom seems to have 
been an obvious winner. Even after the changes in the political leadership of the country in 
1998, Slovakia did not move to diversify its sources of natural gas. The strong position it 
had in the country's gas market allowed Gazprom to further increase its weight in the 
region when SPP was put forward for privatisation in the end of 2001, and put any 
prospect of diversification even further on the backburner. When the Slovak government 
put 49 percent of the SPP up for privatisation, Russia's Gazprom formed a consortium with 
Gennan Ruhrgas and Gaz de France, offering Bratislava USD2.7 billion. In March 2002 
the Slovak government accepted the consortium offer, thus giving Gazprom, as 
monopolistic supplier of gas to the country, even greater control over transit gas pipelines 
and the gas distribution network in Slovakia. Gazprom's head Aleksei Miller stated that 
6participation in the project had a strategic significance for both states and would provide 
for stable and secure supplies of gas to Slovakia and other European countries". 156 
Gazprom and its strategic partners' acquisition of the stake in the Slovak SPP gave 
Gazprom even stronger leverage over Ukraine. If Gazprom is to go ahead with building an 
additional Yamal pipeline to Slovakia across Poland (this seems to be the long-term 
strategy of the French- German-- Russian consortium), Slovakia would remain a major 
155 Bratislava TASR, 9 June 1997, FBIS-EEU-97-160. 
1 so Izvestia, II March 2002, p. 5. 
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European gas transit country, while Ukraine's monopolistic position as a transit route of 
Russian gas to Europe would be further reduced. 157 
As far as Russia's oil supplies to Slovakia are concerned, Russia also managed to maintain 
its status as the only major supplier via the Soviet built Druzhba pipeline. Russian oil 
represents 97 percent of all oil consumed in Slovakia, which accounts for 4-4.5 percent of 
all Russian oil exports to Europe. 158 Despite a commitment made by the Slovak 
government to prepare a plan to diversify its oil supplies by the year 2005, Bratislava did 
not make any attempt to do so, even though it was in theory able to diversify these 
supplies. Without big capital investments, Slovakia could import oil from Germany, via the 
Czech Ingolstadt-Karlupy pipeline. An alternative way would be to connect an Austrian 
AWP pipeline to the Druzhba pipeline in Slovakia, which come within 50 kilometres of 
each other. 159 However, the existence of an emergency oil supply via the Adria pipeline, 
and stable supplies of Russian oil seem to have made the diversification plans a low 
priority. The reluctance to press ahead with diversification can also be explained by 
technological factors - all Slovak oil refineries are only able to process oil delivered from 
Russia. In the year 2000, Moscow and Bratislava signed a long-term contract for the 
delivery of 6 million tons of oil annually between 2000 and 2015.160 Moreover, Russian 
and Slovak oil companies agreed to cooperate in developing the capacity of Slovakia to 
transport Russian oil to other countries. 161 
157 Michael Lelyveld, "Gazprom Finds Export Route through Slovakia, " RFEIRL, 22 March 2002. 
158 U. S. Department of Energy, "An Energy Overview of the Slovak Republic, " Fossil Energy International, 
see also Mikhail Zhuravlev, "Evropeiskie Rynki Mogut Okazat'Sya Tesnymi Dlya Rossilskol Nefti. " 
RusEnergy. Coin (bttp: //www. rusenergy. com/politics/a 1502200 I. btm: acccessed 22 M arch 2001: 
RussEnergy. Com, 15 February 2001). (http: //www. fe. doe. gov/intemational/sIvkover. htm1: October 2001). 
159 U. S. Department of Energy, 'An Energy Overview of the Slovak Republic'. 




In December 2001 the Russian oil company Yukos acquired 49 percent of the shares in 
Slovakia's oil pipeline operator Transpetrol for USD74 million. This marked a 
strengthening of the Russian oil company's position in the region. Although Russia's other 
major company, Slavneft, is the coordinator of Russian oil supplies to Slovakia and 
delivers the majority of oil to that country, through the acquisition of Slovakia's oil 
pipeline network Yukos strengthened its control of the oil flow to Hungary and Southern 
Europe. Yukos is the coordinator of Russia's oil supplies to Hungary and delivers up 70 
percent of oil consumed in that country. Moreover, Yukos is a strategic partner of MOL, 
the Hungarian petrochemical company, which in turn controls 36 percent of Slovakia's 
major oil refinery Slovnaft. 162 
The expansion of Russian oil interests in the Slovak Republic was not accompanied by the 
kind of controversy which surrounded the expansion of Gazprom's presence. As noted 
earlier in the chapter, Russian oil companies represent a diverse group of companies, 
lacking the clout and close association with the Russian govemment that characterise 
Gazprom. Quite often, as shown above, Russian oil companies come into competition with 
each other, although their respective export destinations are clearly coordinated by the 
government. And finally, unlike gas, oil is a commodity that can be relatively easily 
obtained through alternative routes, thus depriving Russian oil companies of the negative, 
monopolistic colouring that Gazprom has acquired. This fact, and the relative success 
Russian oil companies have had in expanding in the region is proving to have a positive 
effect on the perception of Russian business in the area, though it ý still widely perceived 
as gpolitically unwelcome'. 
162 Ekspert, 17 December 2001, p. 7: Kommersant, 06 February 2002, p. 5. 
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Russian-Czech Energy Relations. 
The Czech Republic, like Slovakia, is one of the biggest consumers of Russian natural gas 
in the region and is also a major transit route for Russian gas to the rest of Europe via the 
Soviet built Bratstvo gas pipeline. The pipeline enters the Czech Republic from Slovakia 
and carries on to Gen-nany. Until 1997, Gazprom supplied 99 percent of all Czech natural 
gas needs, while the remainder came from domestic sources. In physical terms, the volume 
of gas supplied to the Czech Republic in 1997, for example, was 8.6bn cu M. 163 Over58bn 
cu m of Russian gas a year is currently piped through the Czech Republic en route to 
Westem Europe. 164 
Changes in the political and economic character of relations between Moscow and CE, and 
CE's reorientation towards integration with the West meant that Russia's virtually 
monopolistic control of gas supplies to the region was increasingly challenged. As was 
noted in the discussion of Russia's energy ties with Poland and Slovakia, Gazprom's 
efforts to maintain its position in the region and to increase its control of the gas 
infrastructure were increasingly challenged. Decisions on the future of Gazprom's activity 
in the region were often taken not on grounds of economic expediency, but rather based on 
the political predisposition of the government in charge and its long-term external policy 
objectives. As we have seen, quite often the results were not favourable to Gazprom. 
Gazprom suffered a similar fate in the Czech Republic. In April 1997 the Czech 
government signed a supply contract with the Norwegian consortium of gas producers 
GFU (made up of Statoil, Norsk Hydro and Saga Petroleum), which obliged Transgas, 
until then the state-owned gas company, to buy gas from Norway. The 20-year contract 
163 Shkuta, Rossiiskii Gaz v Tsentralnoi i Vostochnoi Evrope, p. 108. 
164 Francouer, 'The Role of Natural Gas in Europe', p. 13. 
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obliges Transgas to get delivery of 3 bn cm of Norwegian gas. The first gas from this 
source was delivered in May 1997.165 
The Czech decision to diversify its gas import sources provoked an unprecedented ve rbal 
exchange between Moscow and Prague and led to brief period of coolness in bilateral 
relations. The Czech side claimed that the possibility of importing Norwegian gas was 
being considered even in the days of the CMEA, and that technical aspects of supply routes 
had been in the works for at least a year, but the final fillip to what Gazprom described as a 
politically motivated decision was given by none other that the Russian ambassador to the 
Czech Republic Nikolai Ryabov. In an interview with a Russian TV station, Ryabov made 
the heavy-handed suggestion that if the Czech Republic joined NATO, this could have a 
negative impact on Russian deliveries of gas and nuclear power technology. 166 
Ryabov's comments resulted in his being summoned to the Czech Foreign Ministry and 
brought harsh comments from Czech officials. By far the strongest commentary came from 
Czech Interior Minister Jan Ruml, who stated that Ryabov's comments reflected "attributes 
of big-power state terrorism" and showed the "existential impoitance for the Czech 
Republic of the Czech governrnent's decision to diversify the country's sources of oil and 
gas. " He further stated that the "Czech government will have to consider carefully, for 
security reasons, which entrepreneurial subjects will be dlowed to participate in the 
strategic branches of Czech industry. , 167 
165 Ibid, p. 13. 
166 Jolyon Naegele, "Czech Republic: Norwegian Gas Deal Final Step in Energy Independence, " RFE,, RL 
(Prague, 20 March 1997). 
167 Jolyon Naegele, "Czech Republic/Russia: Ambassador Draws Ire in Prague and Abroad, " RFEIRL 
(Prague, 19 March 1997). 
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Gazprom was aware of the Czech plans to diversify gas supplies and tried to head off 
Prague's move. To alleviate trade balance problems Moscow offered to accept Czec4- 
made goods as part payment of any additional gas supplies needed by the Czech Republic. 
Gazprom also suggested an alternative route for Russian gas to the Czech Republic, via 
Gen-nany, which would have eased Czech concern about security of deliveries, if relations 
with Slovakia deteriorated. 16 8 No matter how attractive Russia's proposals were, the Czech 
side chose to go along with the Norwegian deal. As one unnamed senior official was 
quoted as saying, "paradoxically, it was the Russian Ambassador, Mr. Ryabov, who 
convinced those who were still wavering whether we should take gas from the Norwegians 
and not just fTom the Russians. , 
169 
Gazprom's attempts to rescue its reputation suffered another setback when Czech Industry 
and Trade Minister Vladimir Dlouhy stated that the higher cost of Norwegian gas would be 
compensated by its more reliable supply. 17 0 Gazprom retaliated by suggesting that politics 
and not economics was behind the deal. As Gazprom's press release put it, "We view this 
statement [about unreliability of Russian gas supplies] as hostile and not corresponding to 
reality". Gazprom pointed out that the reliability of Gazprom as a gas supplier had been 
proved by a trade relationship of some 30 years. 
171 
The above episode illustrates a range of problems Russia faced in advancing 
its interests in 
the region. First, an ingrained, and in many cases justified suspicion of 
Russia on the part 
of CE states extended to Russias businesses in the reglon. Gazprom particularly suffered 
168 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 25 March 1997, p. I 
169 Jolyon Naegele, "Czech Republic: Norwegian Gas Deal Final Step in Energy Independence, 
' RFEIRL 
(Prague, 20 March 1997). 
170 Stephanie Baker, "Russia: Gazprom Lashes Out At Czechs Over Norwegian Gas Deal, " 
RFEIRL (Prague, 
21 March 1997). 
171 lnteýfax, 21 March 1997, FBIS-SOV-97-080. 
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from such a hangover because of its close association with the Russian leadership and its 
near monopolistic position as a gas supplier. Secondly, incompetent and ill- informed 
diplomats did not help Gazprom's plans to strengthen and extend its position in the region. 
The Czech authorities' decision to consider 'carefully, for security reasons, ' which 
entrepreneurial subjects would be allowed to participate in the strategic branches of Czech 
industry meant that Gazprom and Russian oil companies were discriminated against during 
privatisation of Czech Transgaz and the Paramo AS oil refinery. 172 
Despite all the changes that the Czech government pursued to reduce its exclusive 
dependence on Russian energy resources, the long-tenn position of Russia as a major 
supp ier of these products to the Czech Republic remains stable. In 1999, Russian gas 
contributed 78.7 percent of Czech gas imports. 173 Moreover, in 1998 Moscow and Prague 
extended a three-year contract for the delivery of 8 to 9bn cu m of natural gas annually 
until 2008, which would satisfy at least 75 percent of the Czech natural gas needs. In the 
same year, the two sides agreed on the conditions of Russian gas transit through the 
territory of the Czech Republic until 2020.174 At least 50 percent, or about 30bn cu m of 
Russian natural gas, passes through the Czech Republic en route to Western Europe. 175 
The Czech Republic also remains one of Russia's main oil impoiters. Deliveries to the 
Czech Republic account for 4-5 percent of all Russian oil exported to Europe. 176 Russia's 
overall share in Czech crude oil imports is about 70 percent, and most of the deliveries are 
172 Irina Myatleva, "Russkii Gaz Strashnee Russkikh Tankov, " Mirovqva Energeticheskaya Politika 
(http: //www. wep. ru/arhiv/2002/i/165. shtm]: 19 March 2002), Vedomosti, 18 December 2001, p. 2; Ilya 
Galadzhii, "Bliznetsy-Brat'ya, " Nqft'Rossii, no. 6, pp. H 2-115 (30 June 200 1). 
17 1 Francouer, 'The Role of Natural Gas in Europe', p. 13. 
174 Marina 0. Kopytina, "Rossi ya-Chekhi ya: Torgovo-Ekonomicheskie Otnosheniya vo Vtorol Polovine 90- 
kh Godov, " Vneshn. va - va 
Torgovýva, 29 June 2001, pp. 27-33. 
175 Izvestia, 15 October 1998, P. 5. 
176 Zhuravlev, 'Evropeiskie Rynki Mogut Okazat'sya Tesnymi Dlya Rossiskol Neff. 
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provided by the Russian LUKoil company. 177 About 20 percent of Czech crude oil supply 
needs come from Germany through a pipeline built in 1996 from Ingolstadt in Bavaria to 
an oil refinery in Karlupy, north of Prague. 178 
Russian-Hungarian Energy Relations. 
Russia also remains Hungary's main energy supplier. Russia provides more than 85 
percent of all Hungary's natural gas needs and 98 percent of its crude oil requirements. 179 
Although Hungary steadfastly pursued its policy of energy diversification, and although its 
energy policy is largely in line with EU energy security guidelines, Russia has maintained 
its position as a main energy supplier to this country. 
Bilateral relations in this area are less controversial and subject to political interference 
than with the other three CE states. One of the reasons for this is that the Hungarian energy 
sector is one of the most advanced in the region in terms of ownership structure and energy 
market liberalisation. Hungary's MOL oil and gas company is one of the largest companies 
of its kind in the region and is the only vertically integrated structure. It is also amongst 
Europe's 15 largest petrochemical companies. The government now controls only 25 
percent of MOL's shares. MOL remains the sole importer of natural gas. In September 
1994 Gazprom and MOL established a joint company Panrusgaz, equally owned by the 
two companies. The remit of Panrusgaz involves the purchase of Russian natural gas, its 
distribution in Hungary, and its further export, as well as the construction and management 
of new transport pipelines and storage capacities in Hungary. 
180 
177 Finniarket, 20 April 1999, (http: //www. infoart. ru/money/news/99/04/20-356. htm). 
178 Naegele, 'Czech Republic'. 
179 Dmitri Fefotov, "Strana Dunaya i Chardasha, " Nqft' Rossii, No. 6 (30 June 2001), pp. 116-119; 
Balmaceda, 'Economic Relations and the Ukraini an- Central', p. 169. 
180 Biznes AM, II September 1995. 
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In November 1996 MOL signed a 20-year contract with Gazprom and Panrusgaz for the 
delivery of 225bn cu m of natural gas vorth USD24bn. 181 In addition to the traditional 
supply route across Ukraine, Russian gas is now also delivered through a specially built 
63km pipeline from Austria. By connecting to the Austrian gas network, Hungary became 
capable of receiving gas from other, Western suppliers, such Gaz de France and Ruhrgas. 
However, no matter which of these companies supplies the gas, most of it still originates in 
Russia. The new 20-year contract gives Hungary increased gas supply security in case the 
route across Ukraine becomes inoperative for political, economic or any other reasons. 182 it 
is difficult to overestimate the importance of this contract for Gazprom's future in the 
region. Hungary, four times smaller than Poland in terms of population, signed up for 
almost the same quantity of gas supplies. Gazprom managed to secure its position as the 
main strategic supplier of natural gas in the country, despite Hungary's security- related 
commitment to diversify its energy supplies. 
Yet Gazprom's activities in Hungary were rDt entirely problem free. Gazprom's attempts 
to expand in the region and move from pure supply and distribution of natural gas towards 
setting up an East European petrochemical system met with resistance and hostility. 
Gazprom's acquisition of more that 25 percent of shares in Hungary's, and indeed CE's, 
largest PVC producers Borsodchem provoked an outcry and accusations of an attempted 
hostile takeover. Gazprorn acquired the shares through an Ireland -registered company 
Milford Holdings Ltd., set up by Gazprom. Gazprom's control over Borsodchem could 
have also given it control over 29.9 percent of the shares of another large Hungarian 
company belonging to Borsodchem, TVK. To minimise the damage, Borsodchem decided 
18 1 Finansoy 
, 




to hand over control of its TVK shares to MOI, thus stalling Gazprom's plans to expand 
its business in the region. 
183 
However, where Gazprom failed, Russia's LUKoil succeeded in entering in alliance ýN, ith 
the Hungarian Borsodchem. In November 2000, LUKoil managed to create a joint 
company with a Ukrainian petrochemical company Oriana. In Soviet days Oriana used to 
be one of Borsodchem's main suppliers of ethylene, but since then Oriana had run into 
debt and scaled down production. After taking over Oriana LUKoil held negotiations with 
Borsodchem to re-establish cooperation. 184 
Russian participation in Hungary's oil market, as noted above, is substantial. Hungary is 
one of Russia's main oil consumers in the region, accounting for 4.5-5 percent of all 
Russian oil exported to Europe. 185 Moreover Russia's Yukos oil company successfully 
cooperates with Hungary's MOL in developing the Zapadno-Malobykskoye oil fields in 
the Khanty-Mansi autonomous region of Russia, fields which are reported to have 24 
million tonnes of proven oil reserves. ' 86 
Conclusion 
The energy dimension of Russianý-CE economic relations is significant not only on its 
obvious merits of pure economic importance for the Russian Federation as the largest 
profit-making sector of the economy. From a wider perspective, the Russian oil and gas 
183 The St. Petei-sburg Times, 4 may 2001; Kommei-sant, 23 September 2000, p. 4-, Interfax, 26 September 
2000, FBIS-SOV-2000-0926; lnteýfax, 6 October 2000, FBIS-SOV-2000-1006; 
184 TEK, 15 November 2000, (Kiev). 
185 Zhuravlev, 'Evropeiskie Rynki Mogut Okazat'Sya Tesnymi Dlya Rossilskoi Neff. 
186 '011 and Gas Report', Interfax, 21-27 January 2000, FBIS-SOV-01 19. 
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sector ha s an important role to play in integrating Russia into the global economy. 187 The 
success of this endeavour will qualitatively affect the process of Russia's intemal 
transformation, and consequently the character of Moscow's foreign and secunty policY. 
With so much at stake, Moscow's energy policy plays a large role in shaping Russia's 
security perceptions. It is therefore, important not to underestimate the role that CE plays 
in the above process. So far, as was demonstrated in the discussion of Russian-CE energy 
ties, the developments in CE in relation to the integration and enlargement processes in 
Europe had an ambiguous effect on Russian foreign and security process. From the 
perspective of Russian foreign and security policy makers, the vulnerabilities of Russia's 
energy export routes and preservation of its CE gas and oil market share is a formidable 
concern. These concerns are further complicated by the negative perception that Russia has 
in the region. The burden of history weighs heavily not only on the military-political side 
of Russian-CE relations, economic ties were also a hostage to past experiences. The energy 
issue is no exception, and by far the most politically sensitive area in bilateral relations. 
However, despite the complications, Gazprom, with the help of the Russian government, 
made significant progress implementing its CE strategy. Gazprom's overarching objective 
in CE Europe was to secure a stable flow of gas to the region and beyond and secure a 
long-ten-n presence. Gazprom's particular objectives in CE have included creation of joint 
ventures/trading houses and extending its ability to control the volumes of gas and its 
routes. By and large, Gazprom has been relatively successful in implementing the main 
tenets of its policy in region. As shown in the previous discussion, Gazprom's plans came 
up against a number of obstacles, one of the most significant of which was the persistent 
negative perception of Russia amongst Central Europe's elites. As one commentary in 
187 Amy Myers and Robert A. Manning Jaffe, "Russia, Energy and the West, " 
Survival, Vol. 43. No. 2 
(Summer 2001), p. 133. 
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Poland's Gazeta Wyborcza put it "Gazprom means the Russian republic, Russian 
institutions, Russian military and oligarchy". 188 In light of the previous historic 
experiences, CE's nervousness about Russia's intentions is understandable. Russia's 
approach, particularly evident during President Putin's tenure, was to involve Western 
European companies in Russia"s projects in CE. While in most cases, as for instance in 
Gazprom's acquisition of the Slovak SPP in consortium with French and German partners, 
Gazprom's joint efforts were due to the Russian giant's financial inability to buy into CE 
capacities on its own, such a formula proved to be a positive development in alleviating CE 
concerns. Russia's cooperation with the EU and development of the EU-Russia Energy 
Dialogue might even further help Russian companies improve their image in CE and by 
doing so serve the deeper integration of the Russian economy with the CE, and as a result 
with the rest of Europe. 
However, one should not overestimate the role of energy in Russia-CE relations. As 
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov aptly noted 'Oil and gas pipelines are blood vessels 
to the economic body of Europe. But by no means the whole organism. "' 89 We will now 
look at other aspects of Russiari-CE relations. 
Trade and Investment in Russia-CE Relations 
Since the demise of the CMEA trading system bilateral trade between Russia and the CE 
states has undergone a dramatic decline, with both sides' external trade links shifting 
mainly toward the West. CE states' interest in the Russian market is now in many respects 
mainly a derivative of their trade policy toward the EU. Yet the role of trade with Russia in 
188 Quoted in The St Petersburg Times, 4 May 2001, 
(http: //www. sptimesrussia. com/secur/666/newsib-3217. htm, accessed 14 February 2002). 
189 Financial Times, 27 November 2000, p. 7. 
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CE's economic development should not be underestimated. One of the main reasons why 
the CE states have a vested interest in maintaining their presence in the Russian market is 
that CE producers find it difficult to break into saturated Western markets with their 
products, while they are still adapting their capacities to improve quality and compatibilitiv. 
Second, in many cases western investors come to the CE region partly with a \'iew to 
expanding exports to the Russian/CIS markets. Third, as Russia's exports to the CE states 
are considerably larger than CE exports to Russia, due to the large proportion of energy 
materials in Russia's export structure, the CE region and Russia have a large trade 
imbalance in Russia's favour. The trade imbalance has created a worrying level of current 
accounts deficit in the CE states and has made it a priority for CE governments to expand 
exports to Russia. 
Economic cooperation with the CE states during the Soviet Union days was so deep and 
extensive that it still affects and informs Russia's perception of and policies toward CE 
today, raising unjustifiable expectations of a possible restoration of bilateral links on the 
previous scale. Often, statements by Russian officials to that effect lead to the reanimation 
of old fears on the part of the CE states and political speculation about Russia's plans in 
CE. 190 Yet, as some of Russia's influential observers have pointed out, neither CE nor 
Russia will ever become major economic partners for each other again. 
191 As became 
evident by the mid- 1990s, the structure of Russian trade with CE underwent a 
dramatic 
decrease of manufactured goods such as machinery and equipmert, leading to the rapid 
rise of the share of energy materials exported to the region. 
The end of the centralised ties 
190 Aleksandr Yershov, "Rossiiskie ekonomicheskie interesy I Pol'sha- Pro et 
Contra, Vol. 2, No. 3,1997 
(internet version http: //pubs. carnegle. ru/P&C/Vo]2-1997/3/07ershov. 
htmi accessed 13 April 1999). 
191 Oleg T. Bogomolov, "Rossiya i Tsentral'naya i Vostochnaya Evropa, " Rossiya 
I Tsentral'na. va Evropa v 
noKvkh geopoliticheskikh real'nostiakh, 
Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference, Russian 
Academy of Sciences, Institute of International Economic 
Studies, Moscow27-30 January, 1995, see also 
Pavel Kandel, report, "Tsentralnaya i Vostochnaya Evropa 1 
Interesy Rossil. Tezisy Doklada. " 
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revealed their negative qualities - poor efficiency and volatility, absence of any objective 
grounds for maintaining the previous volumes and forms of trade. 192 
From Moscow's perspective therefore, as a large and potentially growing market for its 
energy resources and as a major transit route for these resources to the likewise expanding 
gas and oil markets of the EU the CE region remains an important economic area. The dual 
processes of NATO and EU enlargement only accentuate Russia's economic interests in 
the region, making preservation of energy transportation transit routes and safeguarding its 
positions in the CE region's energy sector a high priority. NATO and EU enlargement, 
although different in nature, could not but affect Russia's economic policy toward the 
region. While Russia made a point of distinguishing between the NATO and EU 
enlargement processes, maintaining a strongly negative view of the former and being 
cautiously positive toward the latter, the negative stance towards NATO cast a long 
shadow over bilateral political relations, making progress on the economic front more 
difficult. 
This was at the time when the authors of the 1997 SVOP report on CE pointed out that 
overall economic ties between the CE states and Russia were scarcely so strong as to make 
it worthwhile politicising them. 193 The degree to which Russia and the CE states scaled 
down their bilateral trade can be seen from the following figures: by 1995 Russia 
accounted for 9.4 percent in Hungary's external trade (as opposed to 25 percent in 1989), 
11.8 percent of Slovakia's and 6.4 percent of the Czech Republic's (40 percent of the 
Czechoslovak trade in 1989), and 6 percent of Poland's (in contrast with 25 percent in 
192 Nadezhda Feit, "Zhizn' posle SEV, " Bi7nes i politika, No. 8, August 1997, (retrieved from 
www. public. ru, 19 December 200 1). 
193 Kandel, 'Tsentrainaya i Vostochnaya Evropa i Interesy, ' section 4.5. 
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1989)., 94 Yet for most of the CE states Russia remained one of their major trading partners. 
occupying from first to third place among sources of imports, mainly due to the large 
volume of Russian raw materials imported. 195 Likewise, from Russia's perspective, while 
the states of the region lost their previous position as key trading partners, links have 
persisted, some of them, as in the case of energy, due to the inherited structure of transport 
routes. The figures for 1995 show that Poland occupied the tenth place amongst Russia's 
trading partners, while Hungary was eleventh, the Czech Republic 15 th and Slovakia 
17 th . 
196 As was noted above, these figures demonstrate primarily the CE region's 
importance as a n-nrket for Russian natural gas and oil, and as a vital transit route of these 
energy resources on their way to Western Europe. Russia sells more than 30 percent of all 
its gas exports in the region and as much as 26 percent of its oil. 
197 Moreover, up to 90 
percent of natural gas exports to Western Europe go through CE. 198 
A second important factor in Russian-CE bilateral economic and trade relations over the 
last decade, concerns the problems caused by Russian debts to the CE states inherited by 
Moscow from the Soviet Union, and the means used to settle them. In many cases the debt 
settlement issue became quite controversial and led to accusations that Moscow employed 
the issue as another political lever. The following analysis looks at the state of bilateral 
trade relations, mutual investments and the role of debt settlement in Russia-CE economic 
cooperation in more detail. 
194 Ibid., section 3.2. 
195 " Eastern Europe Consensus Forecast, " in Digest of Economic Forecasts, (Consensus Economics Inc.. 
1999). 
196 Ibid., section 3.3. 
197 Kandel, 'Tsentrainaya i Vostochnaya Evropa i Interesy, ' section 3.3. 
198 Oleg Davydov, Inside Out: Radical TransfOrnzation of Russian Foreign Trade, 1992-1997. (GSC %Iarco 
Media, 1998), p. 94. 
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Russian Debts, Bilateral Trade and Capital Investment 
Analysis of Russian and individual CE states' approach towards the resolution of the 
Russian debt issue provides further support to the view that Russia did not have a 
consistent and comprehensive economic policy toward the region. Moscow's economic 
relations with the CE states developed on a case-by-case basis, in a reactive rather than a 
pro-active way. Such a state of affairs is not surprising as Russia's dealings with the 
Central European states were largely limited by Moscow's larger agenda of its relations 
with the West and its internal economic development. Furthermore, inconsistency and lack 
of long-term policy towards CE was a direct consequence of a fragmented and chaotic 
Russian foreign policy process during the Yeltsin presidency, which in the case of foreign 
economic policy became even more fragmented with the proliferation of independent 
economic actors witb divergent external policies. In sucb circumstance it is not possible to 
talk of a single Russian economic policy towards the CE states or long tern-ý-vision of 
Russian interests in the region. Apart from energy exporting companies that see CE as a 
major export market and transit route for their products, Russia demonstrated little interest 
or effort in expanding exports to CE. However, one also has to take into account the sea 
change in export potential and orientation of both Russian and CE producers and the 
constraints that weak financial and legal circumstances both in Russia and CE imposed on 
them. 
Analysis of Russia's Soviet-era debts settlement with CE also points to the uneasy state of 
relationship between Russia and the CE states in the economic sphere. The degree of 
progress in achieving agreements on debt settlement on Russia's tenns more often than not 
depended on the political predisposition and economic needs of the countries concerned. 
Each of the four countries urider consideration chose different ways of recovering what 
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Russia' owed them. The choices they made depended on the conditions Russia attached to 
debt repayments, their own needs and whether Russia's offers, which in most cases 
envisaged a choice of arms and military equipments in payment, were consistent with the 
CE states' long-term objectives and strategic choices. 
The origins of the Russian debt to Central Europe go back to the last days of the CMEA, 
when in the early 1990s the USSR and the CE states started to discuss putting their trade 
accounting on a hard currency basis. With the dissolution of the CMEA and the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, Russia inherited all Soviet foreign debts, including those owed to the 
former CMEA member states for unfulfilled trade obligations. Having taken on the 
responsibility for the debts, Russia pursued a diverse approach with individual CE states on 
the timetable for and manner of its debts repayments. 
Some analysts have suggested that Russian debts to CE have provided an additional means 
of political leverage. ' 99 The following analysis however offers a different view, arguing 
that Russian external economic relations, of which debt settlement was a part, did not flow 
from an elaborate state policy aimed at a particular objective. Rather, economic relations 
with CE provide evidence of the absence of a coherent economic CE policy on a state 
level, which in part derives from the absence of a coherent policy toward the region. In its 
turn, such a state of affairs demonstrates that except in the case of a small number of 
sectors (although representing a substantial proportion of the Russia economy, that is 
Gazprom and the oil companies) the Russian government did not make the region a 
priority in any aspect of its foreign econDmic policy. Secondly, as the evolution of the debt 
settlement process demonstrated, particularly in the often-cited example of the 
debt 
199 Balmaceda, 'Economic Relations and the Ukrainian- Central European-Russian Triangle, " p. 178. 
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settlement with Slovakia, a number of competing economic, rather than governmental 
actors from both sides managed to influence the final decisions and determine the ways in 
which the debts were to be settled. As will be demonstrated below. Russia's sale of 
weapons to Hungary and Slovakia in part payment of debts resulted in accusations of 
enduring Russian influence in Slovakia, yet Hungary's decision hardly evoked any 
criticism. This difference is explained by the internal political situation in Hungary and 
Slovakia at the time. 
The following analysis of Russian-CE debt settlement, trade and capital investment aspects 
of relations starts with Russian-Polish ties. Russia's relations with Poland stand out 
compared to those with the other three CE states, and not only because of Poland's larger 
economy. Poland was the only CE state under discussion that the Russian Federation 
regarded as a significant debtor, while Poland had similar debt claims on Russia. The 
question of mutual indebtedness and determination of the exact sums marred bilateral 
economic relations for a number of years. However, in November 1996, after lengthy 
negotiations spread over several years, the two sides agreed on a "zero plus" framework, 
whereby the two governments cancelled out mutual debts. 200 Despite this agreement, the 
final settlement still meant USD150 million had to be paid by Poland to Russia, and 
USD 175 millions by Moscow to Warsaw. While Moscow agreed to pay the bulk of the 
Russian debt in cash by instalments, it was also agreed that the difference of USD25 
million would be paid by supplying Poland with military equipment. 201 
Both governments hailed the debt settlement as a vital step towards removing "the last 
barrier on the road to further development of economic relations between the two 
2 00 Koin ni ersant- Dail v, 12 November 1996. 
201 PAP, 30 January 1995, FBIS-EEU-95-021-A; alsoPAP, 12 December 1997, FBIS-FEU-97-346. 
228 
Chapter 4 
states". 202 The debt settlement also included the abandonment of mutual compensation 
claims for the stationing of Soviet troops on Polish territory. While resolution of the debt 
issue opened the way to further cooperation, it also reduced Russia's room for manoeuvre, 
closing the door on arms- for-debt swaps, as were used in the case of Hungary and 
Slovakia. According to the Polish Defence Minister Janusz Onyszkiewiz, only a small part 
(about USD20 million) of the remaining Russian negative balance after debt settlement 
was to be paid for through supplying Poland with parts and servicing for MiG-29 and Yak 
aircraft, mainly engines. 
Russiarý-Polish bilateral trade relations, although they showed a noticeable recovery by 
1996, persisted as one of the key issues on the bilateral intergovernmental agenda (see 
Figure I and Table 7). 203 Despite the fact that the character of Poland's trade relations with 
Russia in many ways is a derivative of its trade relations with the EU, and despite the fact 
that for Russia the size of its trade with Poland does not make the country a top trade 
partner, a number of important aspects command both the Russian and Polish authorities' 
attention. 
Table 7 Russia's Foreign Trade with Poland (in million USD) 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998' 19992 2000' 2001 T- 
Export 1311.1 1133.0 1996.4 2478.0 2511.1 2259.1 2600 4619.5 4660.0 
Import 528.8 945.8 1321.4 928.0 1348.1 1305.7 710 862.1 958.0 
' Years 1991-1998: Vneshnyaya torgvolya, No. 4,1999, p. 55. 
'PAP, 09 July 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0709 
3 http: //www. polska. ru/biznes/ekonomika/ekonomika2OOO. htmi 
4 http: //english. pravda. ru/economics/2002/01/15/25590. htmi 
202 PAP, 30 January 1995, FBIS-EEU-95-021 -A. 203 By 1994-1995, Russia and Poland overcame the decline in bilateral trade. In 1995, Russian-Polish trade 
grew 80 percent compared to 1993, reaching USD3.3 million. See Aleksandr Yershov, "Rossliskle 
ekonomicheskic interesy I Pol'sha" Pro et Contra, Vol. 2, No. 3,1997 (Internet version 
http: //pubs. camegle. ru/P&C/Vo]2-1997/3/07ershov. htm] accessed 13 April 1999). See also Yuri Vo inov. 
"Rossiya i Pol'sha: vzaimodeistvie na novoi osnove, " Vneshniaya torgovIva, No. 7-9,1997. internet version 
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From Russia's perspective, its interests in Poland (and this is true of Russia's interests in 
the CE region as whole) are closely linked with the CE states' integration into the EU. 
However Poland, as the most populous country in the region with the biggest economic 
potential, is of particular importance for Russi 'a. Poland's significance is increased by the 
fact that Poland is the only state of the CE region to border Russia. Although the border is 
not with "mainland" Russia, but its exclave Kaliningrad, this does not diminish but 
increases Poland's importance, since without its cooperation Kaliningrad's existence could 
be threatened. As has already been highlighted, Poland occupies an important intennediate 
location between Russia and the rest of Europe, and this appears to be important in 
determining Russia's economic policy toward Poland. Aware of Poland's concern over the 
mounting trade imbalance and keen to expand its own presence in the Polish market 
beyond energy products, in 1996 Russia offered Poland a liberalisation of bilateral trade 
and a move towards a free trade zone between the two states. 
204 The idea came from 
Russian Deputy Prime-Minister Oleg Davydov, who argued that Poland's participation in 
the Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA) put Russia's exporters in a 
204 SegodnIva, 14 November 1996. 
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disadvantageous position. 205 The Polish authorities, hitherto unreceptive to Russia's 
proposals, agreed to set up an intergovenunental working group to look into the possibility 
of liberalising bilateral trade. However, this remained nothing more than an intention. The 
main argument against such an arrangement was that Russia would have to gain WTO 
membership before signing such a special trade agreement with Poland. Such an agreement 
would also put Poland in a difficult position vis-a-vis its CEFTA membership obligations 
as well as its status as an associate EU member. On the other hand, Russia's membership 
of the WTO would remove the necessity for a special trade agreement with Poland. 
Russia's proposal seemed to have been badly thought through, giving some observers a 
reason to argue that Russia was aiming above all to expand its energy exports to Central 
Europe and took less account of the Polish side's economic interests. 206 
A marked de-industrialisation of the structure of bilateral trade resulting from the general 
technological lag of the fori-ner socialist bloc and the inability of fon-ner-CMEA producers 
to compete with Western and other exporters was another major obstacle to increasing 
bilateral trade. Russia's priority was to maintain and expand its energy presence in the 
region in order to secure a stable return in hard currency and to use this economic presence 
in the region as a springboard for diversifying its exports. 
The anns trade and mi I itary- technological cooperation is another area of Russian-Polish 
economic relations that has undergone drastic changes since the dissolution of the CMEA 
and the WTO. In Russia, the military industrial complex is one of the largest economic 
sectors, and has a vital interest in sustaining and expanding its export markets. 
The arms 
industry is also considered by some to be an engine of technological and scientific 
205 Ibid. 
206 Balmaceda, 'Economic Relations and the Ukrainian- CentraL, ' p. 196. 
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transfon-nation, which could eventually lead Russia out of its current cnsis and 
technolo gical backwardness. 207 However, relations in the militarýL technical area between 
Russia and the CE states have been negatively affected by a number of factors, resulting in 
a severe decline in anns and military equipment. Initially, in accordance with Russia's 
early foreign and security policy priorities, little attention was paid to Central Europe. This 
could not but affect the area of military-technical cooperation. Three reasons have been 
identified by some Russian analysts for Moscow's lack of interest in developing 
cooperation in arms trading and military- technical cooperation with the CE states. First, in 
the Russian military there was a feeling of distrust toward the CE states in the aftermath of 
the demise of the Warsaw Pact; this was more of a psychological factor than an objective 
reason. Secondly, Russia was discovering the short-term profits it could make from arms 
sales: the long-term benefits that could come from continuing cooperation with traditional 
partners were not taken into account. Compared to the markets of Asia or the Middle East, 
Central Europe seemed far less attractive and received less attention. A perhaps more 
cogent justification was reflected in the fact that Russian arm producers were wary about 
agreements that gave production licenses to the former 'allies', which could result in the 
creation of potential competition in third-country markets. 
208 
In the CE states, there was also a sense of frustration and anger at the level of managers 
and government departments responsible for defence cooperation for the 'sudden 
207 Kokoshin, Andrei, "Defence industry conversion in the Russian Federation, " eds T. P. 
Johnson and S. E. 
Miller, Russian Securiti, a er the Cold War, CSIA Studies in International Security 
No. 3 (Brassey's: ft II 
Washington, DC, 1993), quoted in Irina Kobrinskaya and Peter Litavrin, "Military -Technical 
Cooperation 
Between Russia and Countries of East-Central Europe, " in Russia and the 
Arnis Trade, ed. by Ian Anthony 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1998). 
208 Irina Kobrinskaya, Peter Litavrin, "Military -Technical Cooperation 
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abandonment' of links with Russia by the responsible authorities . 
209 By 1996 having come 
up against shortages of equipment and spare parts in their anned forces, most of the CE 
states had come to the conclusion that their reorientation toward the West and NATO in 
particular would be easier if they did not completely rule out all forms of cooperation xvith 
Russia. Almost all of them had re-established some forms of military technical cooperation 
with Moscow, although the nature of these relations has been different in different 
countries, depending on the nature of their overall political relations with Russia. 
From the Russian side, one could also see a gradual change in views on military- industrial 
cooperation and the anns trade with fonner allies. Such a change was largely a 
consequence of shifts in Russian foreign and security policy, which by the mid- 1990s had 
become more multý dimensional and pragmatic. In July 1993 Russia and Poland signed 
five documents which laid down the basis for bilateral military- technical cooperation. 
However, by then a lot of damage had already been done to military- industrial relations. 
Coupled with that, the warming of the debate on NATO enlargement, and Russia's 
negative stance, made cooperation in arms and military cooperation with NATO aspirants 
all the more politically sensitive. 
In Poland, military- technical cooperation with Russia was a particularly controversial 
political issue. For instance, the then Polish Defence Chief Dobrzansky's talks with 
Russian Defence Minister Grachev were severely criticized in Poland, especially because 
of his proposal to strengthen military- technical cooperation with Russia. 
Dobrzansky 
expressed interest in spare parts for MiG-29 and MiG-21 fighter aircraft; 
he also offered to 
209 Kiss, Y., SIPRI, The Defence Industry in East-Central Europe: Restructuring and 
Conversion (Oxford 
Oxford University Press, 1997), quoted ibid. 
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establish Polish-Russian joint ventures to manage repairs and production. ý"() The 
disapproval that ensued in the Polish media and official circles demonstrated that the 
negative perception of Russia common in the Polish establishment was a major obstacle to 
developing bilateral military- technical cooperation. In light of the fact that almost 80 
percent of the equipment in the Polish armed forces is of Russian design and origin, 
cooperation with Russia in the area would be natural, at least for as long as such equipment 
is in use. However, in the mid- 1990s there was a view in Warsaw that Poland should try to 
replace military- industrial cooperation with Russia by imports from other post-Soviet 
states such as Slovakia or Ukraine. In March 1994 Polish Defence Minister Piotr 
Kolodzejczik signed an agreement in Kiev for the repair of T-72 tanks as well as MiG and 
Sukhoi combat aircraft in Ukraine. 
211 
In 1994 Russia made proposals to Poland to establish joint companies to manufacture 
MiG-29 aircraft in Poland in return for the repair of Russian Baltic fleet vessels in Polish 
yards. Two years later, in 1996, Russia made another proposal, which like the first one, did 
not materialise. Overall bilateral cooperation in the mi I itary- technology sector remains 
small-scale and is sustained only by the need for an ongoing supply of old types of Soviet 
military equipment and spare parts. A contract was signed in 1999, for example, with the 
Russian Sukhoi Designing Bureau to modemise 15 Stý-22 planes for the Polish air force. 212 
Arguments to the effect that intensification of mil itary- technological cooperation with 
Russia might have endangered Poland's efforts to be integrated with NATO, as suggested 
by some analysts, are not entirely convincing, especially if one looks at the experience of 
2 10 Gazeta Rývborcza, 18 June 1996, quoted in Kobrinskaya, 
Russia and, " p. 188. 
211 Kommersant Dail 
- v, 
12 April 1994. 
212 ITAR-TASS, 17 February 1999, FBIS-SOV-1999-0218. 
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Hungary, which did engage in military- technical cooperation with Russia and did become 
one of the new NATO members along with the Czech Republic and Poland. The reason for 
the reluctant approach to cooperation seems to be more political in nature rather than 
technical military or economic. Attempts to put forward Slovakia as an example of a 
country that did not become a NATO member, reportedly because of Bratislava's intensive 
cooperation with Russia in the areas of an-ns and military equipment, ignore more 
fundamental reasons why Slovakia failed to qualify for NATO membership. The existing 
evidence does not seem to suggest that Russia tried to use the continuing dependence of 
CE armed forces on its spare parts and equipment to thwart their NATO membership 
plans. On the contrary, Russian arms manufacturers even appeared to be ready to supply 
NATO-compatible equipment to the CE states to help them transform their armies to 
NATO technical standards. 213 The main reason for the reluctance to cooperate, it seems, 
lies in the political sphere and in the persistent negative perception of Russia by the CE 
political establishments. 
Overall bilateral trade between Russia and Poland remained in a state of flux, very 
sensitive to the political climate of relations between the two states. Economic relations 
were also seriously affected by the general weakness of the Russian economy. The August 
1998 economic crisis in Russia seriously affected Polish exports to Russia, which in 1999 
fell by 72,9 percent. 214 As a result of the decrease in Polish exports to Russia, according to 
the Polish Infrastructure Minister Marek Pol, almost 150 000 people lost their jobs in 
Poland. 215 Russia's exports to Poland, however, were not that significantly affected, and 
21 1 FinansoKye Izvestia, 13 February 1996. 
214 [echei-niaya Moskva, 29 December 1999. 
21 S Kaliningi-adskaýya vecherka, 16 January 2002, p. 2. 
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had fallen only by about 15 percent a year after the crisis. 216 In 2001, however. bilateral 
trade showed some positive signs for Polish producers, as exports to Russia grew by an 
estimated 30 percent. 
217 
Relations in another important aspect of external economic relations, namely capital 
investment, also deserve attention. The level of mutual investment remains extremely low. 
Statistically, however, Russia is the tenth largest investor in the Polish economy. The 
single largest Russian investor is Gazprom, and it was construction of the Yamal pipeline, 
(USD 1.2 billion) which gave Russia its place amongst Poland's top ten investors. 21 8 At the 
same time, Poland's capital investments in Russia stand at a mere USD 100 million. 219 -Me 
Polish side criticizes the Russian government for its failure to implement a 1992 
intergovernmental agreement on mutual support and protection of investment. 220 -me 
Russian Duma postponed ratification of the agreement on the advice of the Russian 
government, as Russia's forthcoming admission to the World Trade Organisation would 
make such an accord redundant. 22 1 However, the reluctance of the Russian government to 
ratify the agreement, perhaps very short sighted in policy terms, can be seen as further 
evidence of the fact that Poland, as well as other CE states, are not comprehensively 
understood by the Russian elite. Similarly, the CE states' significant economic and 
geographic potential for Russia's economic recovery is not seriously conceived of The 
exception is individual economic groups, mainly the energy sector in the Russian 
economy. However, even where Russian economic actors seem to pursue purely economic 
216 Nikolai Bukharin, "Rossiisko-Pol'skie Otnoshemya, " in Rossýya i Tsentral'no-Vostochnaya Evropa. - 
Vzainiootnosheniya v Kontse XX Veka (Moscow: IMEPI, 1999). 
217 Transpoi-t Rossii, 17 June 2002, No. 25, p. I- 
218 IA ROSBALT, 10 November 2001. (http: //www. rosbalt. ru/index. php? sect=news&ct=O&cn=2409, accessed 
on 07 December 2001). 
219 Yuri Vomov, "Rossiya-Pol'Sha: Neobkhodimy Novye Initsitativy., " Vneshniqva Torgovlia, 
No. 1 (1999). 
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interests, their actions are quite often construed by some in CE as an extension of Russia's 
policy to re-vitalise its lost influence in the region. 
The case of Russian relations with Slovakia in the field of trade and debt settlements is no 
exception to the generally highly politicised nature of Russia-CE bilateral relations. In this 
particular case, because of the 'above the norm' character of Russian--Slovak relations 
during Meciar's leadership, Moscow's dealings with Bratislava in trade and debt 
settlement cases represents a model of relations that contrasts strongly with relations with 
Poland. That does not mean to say that as a result of its 'special' relationship with 
Moscow, Bratislava managed to settle the debt problem in exactly the way it preferred, or 
that the trade imbalance problem was resolved. On the contrary, when compared to other 
CE states, Slovak- Russia trade fares quite badly (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2 
Source: Aggregated data. '2' 
222 M Kopytina, 'Ekonomicheskie Svyazi Rossil ]i Slovakn', in Rossi - va 
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va v Kontse XX Veka, ed. by Boris Shmelev, Igor Orlik, Svetlana 
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The problem of debt settlement and the question of military- industrial cooperation are 
intertwined in Russiarý-Slovak relations. Mi I itary- industrial ties between Slovakia and 
Russia were a matter of high political sensitivity in any case, but were perceived as doubly 
important in the light of Slovakia's declared intention to join NATO. While the rest of the 
CE states made a point of scaling down cooperation with Russia as a major supplier of 
weapons and equipment to increase their 'interoperability' with NATO forces and their 
chances of joining the alliance, Bratislava took a different approach. The explanation must 
be sought first of all in Slovakia's internal politics. As pointed out elsewhere in the thesis, 
after separation from the Czech Republic, Slovakia was faced with the dual task of 
building its armed forces from scratch and sustaining the bulk of the Czechoslovak 
mi I itary- industrial complex that Slovakia inherited. Both of these challenges, dependent on 
one another, required continued cooperation with Russia. The majority of Slovak arms and 
military equipment that are used in the armed forces and are produced locally are of Soviet 
design. In addition, Vladimir Meciar owed his political success in large part to the support 
given him by the old elite of the unreformed part of Slovak industry. In the absence of 
substantial investment, continuation of cooperation with Russia was an obvious way to 
sustain their business. In addition, modernising Slovak Army weaponry also demanded 
substantial capital. According to Slovak experts' calculations the cost of modernising the 
Slovak Anny in cooperation with Russia would be 7- 10 percent of the cost of a transition 
to Western models. 223 These were some of the key conditions that paved the way for 
Slovak-Russian cooperation to develop to levels unparalleled elsewhere in Central Europe. 
The Russian side seized the opportunity, at a time when its exports to CE as a whole were 
reducing to raw materials, as the export of manufactured products and machinery shrunk. 
223 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 4 June 1996. 
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In 1993 and 1994 Moscow and Bratislava negotiated agreements to use military equipment 
transfers to settle bilateral debts. According to the then Security CDuncil Secretary Oleg 
Lobov, items transferred by early 1996 included one IL-76 transport aircraft and 13 MiG- 
29 fighter aircraft. 224 This transaction reduced Russian debt to Slovakia from USDI. 6 
billion to USD 1.2 billion. According to the then Slovak Deputy Prime Minster Kozlik, the 
deal saved Slovakia USD3.35million per MiG-29 fighter compared to the price paid for 
MiG fighters acquired by Hungary in 1993.225 
Yet the controversy that surrounded Russian debt settlement through the delivery of 
fighters, spare parts and equipment meant that the whole process generated negative 
publicity and speculation about undue Russian influence. The fact that obscure interest 
groups mediated agreements on "deblocking" Russian debt tainted bilateral relations. The 
details of these deals and the schemes employed are too complicated to be discussed here 
in detail. A frequently mentioned participant in these schemes was Devin Banka, reported 
to have benefited significantly from 'debt- for- military hardware' deals. Originally founded 
in 1992 by trade union and 'production cooperative' organisations, the bank came up 
against serious economic difficulties in 1993. Two Russian firms - VTF Energia and MFK 
(Mezhdunarodnaya Finansovaya Kompaniya) - came to its rescue and joined the bank in 
1993-1994. S. Gorodkov, VTF Energiya representative, became Devin Banka governing 
board chairman, with Russian capital accounting for 52.7 percent of the bank's shares. 
With Meciar's electoral success in 1994, Devin Banka's managed to become the key 
player in the process of Russian debt unblocking, participating in official and unofficial 
dealings, managing financial aspects, and pocketing significant commissions in the 
224 Irina Kobrinskaya, Peter Litavrin, 'Military -Technical Cooperation Between 
Russia and Countries of East- 
Central Europe', in Russia and the Arms Trade, ed. by Ian Anthony (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press for 
SIPRI, 1998), p. 189. 
225 Quoted in Balmaceda, 'Economic Relations and the Ukrainian- Central, ' p. 181. 
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process. Another obscure small company, Katrim Stella Ltd... whose assets did not exceed 
USD3.500, became one of the main suppliers of the Slovak army, with help from Slovak 
Defence Ministry officials, implementing the deals which Devin Banka was managing the 
finances of . 
226 
At the time the opposition criticised the Meciar government for deals arranged through 
Devin Banka, which they referred to as "a nest of the Russian secret services". As the 
opposition claimed, the conflict of interests created by the Slovak government's 
relationship with Devin Banka was blatant. In 1994, Karol Martinka, the husband of one of 
Meciar's advisors, became Devin's director, while Devin's deputy director was appointed 
a state secretary at the Finance Ministry. Even when the opposition came to power Devin 
Banka yet again became the main agent servicing Russian debt repayments, this time 
winning an open tender. 227 Not surprisingly, such an outcome brought speculation of 
continued Russian influence, reflecting Moscow's grip on the Slovak political 
establishment. As a prominent Slovak foreign policy analyst commented, "The problem 
with the Russians is that their initially standard commercial interests [in post-communist 
countries] develop into influencing domestic POIICY.,, 
228 
While the story of debt settlements is far from over in Russian-Slovak relations, political 
speculation about Russian influence still abounds. Suggestions that it was due to Russian 
influence that Slovakia's foreign policy managers compromised its chance to join NATO 
and alienated the West in general are staples of Slovak domestic political in- fighting. Some 
observers find a "great paradox in the handling of the Russian debt to Slovakia" in that it 




has been used "by the Russian govemment in favour of Russian business" in the Slovak 
Republic. 229 This provides another example of the negative perception that Russia has to 
take into account in advancing its interests in Central Europe, where its every move is I 
scrutinised from a critical standpoint. 
The process of debt settlement was also used by Russia and various interested economic 
groups within it to advance their interests. In a similar way Russia played a key role in 
setting up the Slovak national airline, Slovak Airlines (SA). Russian debts were used in 
part payment for the delivery of six passenger airliners (Tu-154 and 11-86) that were to 
constitute the backbone of the SA. 
230 
With the change of government in Slovakia, Russia found it more difficult to continue to 
insist on paying its debts with arms and military equipment. Moreover, in February 1999 
the Dzurinda government decided to cancel a 1995 agreement between Russia and 
Slovakia for the delivery of the S-300 air defence system worth USD 158 million as part of 
the debt settlement process. 23 1 The new Slovak government wanted to decrease the share of 
military equipment and increase payments through energy and raw materials. Slovakia's 
decision stalled all further talk on Russia's debt repayments for some time. First of all, 
Moscow did not accept Bratislava's explanation for the cancellation that its acquisition 
would harm Slovakia's chances to join NATO. Russian ambassador to Slovakia 
Aksenyonok claimed that the Russian system was modem and could easily be adapted to 
NATO standards. 232 Russian newspaper Kommersant-daily suggested that Slovakia's 
229 Balmaceda, 'Economic Relations and the Ukraim an- Central... ' p. 181. 
23 0 Hospodtirske novin. v, 15 January 1997; 24 January 1997, quoted ibid; also TASR, 9 January 1997, 
FBIS- 
EEU-97-008-A. 
231 Izvestia, 18 March 1999. 
232 TASR, 12 March 1999, FBIS-SOV-1999-0217. 
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decision to forego purchase of the S-300 was similar to the Cypriot governinent's decision 
to abandon plans to purchase the Russian system, which resulted from US and NATO 
pressure. 
233 
Russia insisted on payments of compensation for the resources spent on manufacturing the 
Slovak- commissioned S-300 system. As a result, the process of debt deblocking froze for 
nearly two years, as Moscow made further debt talks conditional on settling the cost 
incurred for manufacturing the S-300. Russia also insisted on payment of its debts with 
finished products and specialised equipment, and resisted Slovakia's demands to pay a 
share of debts in cash. To put pressure on Bratislava, Moscow announced that if talks on 
debt deblocking did not start soon, it would transfer its debts to the Paris Club in early 
2000, which would in effect prevent Slovakia from recovering its debts for a long time. 234 
As a result, Slovakia agreed to write off USD54 million for cancelling its S-300 order. 
Russia agreed to unfreeze USD 100 million of its debts to Slovakia that were paid with the 
delivery of USD20 million worth of fuel for Slovak nuclear power stations, USD19.5 
million worth of equipment for the Cyclotron centre, USD5.7 million for a laser centre, 
and repairs to Russian made aircraft and helicopters. 235 Russia also trained and put into 
space a Slovak citizen, Ivan Bella, which cost Bratislava USD20 million. 
236 
At the end of 2001, Russia and Slovakia negotiated the unblocking of another USD137 
million, paid by supply of goods, with the remaining USD790 million of outstanding 
Russian debt to be rescheduled for a period of about 20 years. 
237 Later, however, 
233 Cited in Monitor: A Daily Briefing on the Post-Soviet States, Vol. 5, Issue 
27, Jamestown Foundation. 9 
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encouraged by the Czech example, Slovakia agreed to a deal by which USD460 million of 
the total sum was cancelled, while it would receive 30 percent of the total in cash, the 
remaining USD310 million being partly settled through goods supplied in 2006-2007 and 
238 the rest by 2021 . 
Russiarý- Slovak trade is dominated by the export of Russian energy materials, which make 
up 80-85 percent of all Russian goods delivered to Slovakia . 
23 9 As can be seen from Figure 
2, Russia maintained a significant trade surplus. Slovakia's negative current account 
problems made it a priority in its relations with Russia to resolve the debt issue as quickly 
as possible. Russia, on the other hand, wanted to use its debt to increase the share of 
finished and manufactured goods in its exports. 
The low level of Slovak imports to Russia was a regular matter for discussion at high-level 
Russia-Slovak meetings. The Slovak explanation for their exporters' problems in breaking 
into the Russian market was that they faced increasing competition from western producers 
who enjoyed credits from their governments, giving them significant advantage over 
Slovakia's products, according to one account. 240 The Russians took a different view. In 
most cases, a Russian official argued, Slovak exporters seemed to have the impression that 
they could offload on Russia products rejected by Western markets. 
241 It was suggested 
that during Meciar's leadership Bratislava expected Russia to accept sub-standard Slovak 
imports in return for Slovakia's loyalty. 242 
238 SITA, 21 August 2001, FBI S-EEU-2002-0821, TASR, 28 August 2002, FBI S-EEU-0828- 
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The above account of Russiarý- Slovak economic relations demonstrates the interplay of a 
variety of forces, both internal (to Slovakia and Russia) and external. The Meciar era of 
what one might describe as 'pseudo-pro- Russian orientation' represented a good 
opportunity for Russia to advance its interests in the region. The Russian military- 
industrial complex managed to maintain its presence in the country, which provided it with 
a stable order list of spare parts and maintenance orders. On the other hand, and perhaps 
not always with the Russian government's blessing or full awareness, various Russian 
actors, who perhaps had good connections in the govenunent, took advantage of the 
permissive environment in Slovakia under Meciar. Their activities, coupled with the 
polarised political environment in Slovakia and Russia's bad reputation in the region made 
Moscow's ability to defend its policies in CE even more difficult. 
After reviewing the treaties and agreements reached with Russia by the previous 
government, the opposition parties that succeeded the Meciar government in 1998 
concluded that none of them were going to be cancelled or amended. Despite earlier 
accusations, they found that Russia did not make any attempts at abusing any treaty to the 
detriment of Slovakia. 243 As Slovakia's Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan tried to explain, 
most of the fears about secret Meciar era Russiarý- Slovak agreements were blown out of 
proportion by the media. No such agreements, save for 'a couple of paragraphs', were 
discovered by the governmental commission reviewing agreements reached by the Meciar 
goveniment and Russia. 244 Slovakia's intention, according to Kukan, was to have 
'standard' not 'privileged' relations with Russia which, he argued, Bratislava did manage 
to establish within two years of the change of government. 
245 
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The record of the evolution of Russia-Czech economic relations is also a demonstration of 
the primacy of political considerations and circumstances. External influence and lasting 
suspicion of Russia on the Czech side were matched by Russia's perception of the Czech 
Republic as a mildly antýRussian and economically fairly insignificant small nation. 
Bilateral economic relations, as with the other CE states, were and remain dominated by 
the large volume of Russian energy and raw materials exports to the Czech Republic, 
which afforded Russia a positive balance of trade of around USDI billion a year. For the 
CE states negative trade balances with Russia were and remain a rmjor problem. The 
difficulties they had in selling their traditional Products on the volatile and unpredictable 
Russian market made it all the more pressing to get Moscow to pay its Soviet-era debts. 246 
When it came to paying debts, Moscow gave preference to settling its debts with 
international organisations (IMF, World Bank) and leading developed states (such as 
Germany). The CE's demands for debt repayment were met with Russian proposals either 
to supply equipment (arrns, helicopters and fighter jets) as part payment or else to transfer 
the debts to the Paris Club of creditors. 247 Prague's suggestion that over USD3 billion of 
Soviet debts owed by Russia be repaid in gas, oil and raw materials was rejected by 
Moscow. For Russia these raw materials are a strategically important source of foreign 
currency which it is reluctant to use for debt repayment. 248 
246 In most cases products, traditionally exported to Russia/Soviet Union, were in the aftermath of the break 
up of CMEA ties replaced by Western equivalents. Often the CE producers have to compete with Western 
products that are of superior quality and enjoy state subsidies and guarantees. 
247 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 16 April 2002, p. 3. 
248 Lidove noviny, 22 August 1998, FBIS-EEU-98-234; However, both Russian and Czech press carried 
contradictory reports on the issue of paying Russian debts with gas and oil: while the above 
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The Russian governmental newspaper Rossi , vskaya gazeta 
reported that the Czech government did not accept 
Russia's proposal on additional deliveries of gas to pay off debt. (See Rossiyskaya gazeta, 




In April 1994, Moscow and Prague agreed on a schedule of Russian debt repayments. 
However, Russia failed to deliver on the agreements, and In April 1997 Prague agreed that 
Russia would settle the debts on Paris Club tenns. Russia was to defer payments for fivc 
years, until 2002. Until then Moscow agreed to pay annual interest on the debts. 249 
However, the faltering Russian economy led to failure to meet its obligations even on 
interest payments. Before the 1998 financial crisis, the Czech government reported that 
Moscow had failed to carry out payment of interest for the year 1996, and that only a fifth 
of what was due for the year 1997 had been transferred as of August 1998 . 
25 0 Following 
the August financial crisis, Moscow announced a moratorium on sovereign debt payments. 
This did not include interests repayments. However, in the light of the existing situation, 
Czech specialists saw little hope that Russia would honour its obligations. Perhaps it is not 
surprising, then, that the Czech leadership in the end responded positively to Russia's 
proposals to accept a Tu- 154 transport aircraft and spare parts for helicopters and combat 
aircraft that are to remain in service until 2005 in exchange for debt. 251 
In October 2001 , during the first visit in four years by a Russian Prime Minister to Prague, 
another major agreement was reached on settlement of the Russian debt - effectively a 
write off of USD2.5 billion. 252 Apart from a significant breakthrough in the debt settlement 
249 Rossiyskaya gazeta, 23 April 1997, FBI S -SOV-97-113. 
250 Lidove noviny, 22 August 1998, FBIS-EEU-98-234 
25 1 Hospodtirske novin - v, 
10 September 1998, FBIS-EEU-98-254, Previously Russia had insisted on supplying 
new arms systems. Half a year later the Czech media revealed that the deal reached with Russia was to the 
Czech side's disadvantage, as the Czech CTK reported it was twice overpriced and contained components 
that the Czechs did not need to purchase. Moreover, CTK found out that some of these components did not 
function and were even radioactive. The Czech Defence Ministry iefuted the allegations, claiming that the 
prices were in line with current prices on the Russian market and that it had only complained about two sets 
that were incomplete and one engine that had an error in documentation. See CTK, 
23 March 1999, FBIS- 
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252 The deal involved a complicated scheme, allegedly masterminded by UES (Unified Electricity 
Systems) 
chairman Anatoly Chubais. The USD2.5 billion of Russian debt was sold to Falkon, a 
Czech company that 
buys and sells Russian electricity in the Czech Republic. Falkon acquired that share of 
Russian debt for a 
fifth of its value, around USD550 million. The UES, in its turned received USDI. 35 
billion from the Russian 
government to settle its debts with the Tax Ministry, Gazprom, Rosenergoatom, coal companies and some 
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issue Russian Prime Minister Kasyanov's visit marked an important step towards 
normalising bilateral political and economic relations. According to Kasyanov, over the 
past few years, cooperation between the two countries 'could have been much better'. 253 
The step-by-step expansion of Russian-Czech bilateral trade and cooperation that 
proceeded in the mid- 1990s was upset by the August 1998 financial crisis in Russia, which 
resulted in an almost 50 percent decline in the volume of Czech exports to Russia. 254 
Compared to Soviet times, Russia's share in Czech trade fell from 45 percent to a mere six 
percent. 255 However, despite such a sharp fall, both countries remain among each other's 
main trading partners - the Czech Republic is among Russia's fifteen largest importers, 
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UES daughter companies. Effectively, according to UES spokesperson Yegorov, none of the cash left the 
Russian treasury. Falkon, in its turn is supposed to be paid with the supplies of electricity within the next 10 
years, worth USDI. 35 billion. Responding to the question why the Russian and 
Czech governments did not 
settle the deal directly, the Russian goverriment responded that a direct 
deal would have breached the Paris 
Club rules. A similar arrangement was used to write off part of Russia's 
debt to Slovakia. For more details 
see Moscow Tinies, 25 January 2002, Financial Tinies 24 January 2002. 
253 ITAR-TASS, 9 October 2001, FBIS-SOV-2001-1009. 
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The poor state of Russian-Czech economic relations, according to Czech Ambassador 
Dobrowsky, was the direct result of Moscow's policy of neglect towards Prague. Writing 
in a Russian newspaper in 2001, the Czech official argued that since the end of the 
'USSR's politicalý ideological imprisonment', and following the Czech decision to join 
NATO and the EU, the Czech republic ceased to be an object of political, military and 
economic interest for Russia. Relations between the two states had become even colder 
since the Czech Republic joined NATO. Dobrowsky reminded his readers that even during 
Russian Prime Minister Chemomyrdin's visit to Prague, where the main focus was 
supposed to be on economic issues, Chemomyrdin appeared to have warned the Czech side 
that joining NATO would endanger bilateral relations. 257 The Russian side was also 
accused of failing to honour bilateral economic agreements and undertakings, be it 
honouring debt repayments or putting into operation joint production projects in Russia. 
The scathing account of the state of bilateral relations given by the Czech ambassador 
reflects a widespread attitude toward Russia among the Czech elite. It is also illustrative of 
the general feeling of frustration on the part of the CE states with the difficulties they are 
facing as they try to build economic relations with Russia on a new basis. Russia's 
economic weakness, coupled with legal and political uncertainties, mutual negative 
perceptions, and the history of Russian-CE relations all played a part in the evolution of 
bilateral economic relations in the decade following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
Only in 2000-2001 did Russian-Czech economic relations begin to show some positive 
signs. In 2001 bilateral trade posted a noticeable rise. Czech exports to Russia rose by 30 
percent, while Russian exports to the Czech Republic rose by 12 percent. 
258 
257 Nezavisimaya gazeta-Dipkur'er, 15 February 2001. 
258 ITAR-TASS, 10 October 200 1, FBIS-SOV-2001 -1010. 
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Direct investment in each other's economies remains very low, and big Russian 
companies, mainly gas and oil producers and retailers, continue to encounter obstacles in 
their efforts to expand their presence in the Czech Republic (see previous section). The 
only breakthrough was achieved by Russian 'LUKoil', which established three petrol 
stations along major Czech motorways. The Czech Republic on the other hand, made good 
progress in setting up joint ventures with Russian counterparts. Czech engineering giant 
Skoda-VMZ, with financial support from the World Bank, set up a joint venture in 
Vologda to produce trolleybuses. 259 Despite various problems, Czech carmaker "Skoda 
Mlada Boleslav" persisted in its efforts to establish car production in lzhevsk. 260 
The affirmed economisation of Russian foreign policy appears belatedly to be making a 
significant impact on bilateral relations with the CE states. Russian Prime Minster 
Kasyanov stated during his visit to Prague that Russia and the Czech Republic were 
entering a new stage in economic cooperation: "misunderstandings and bias are a thing of 
-) 261 the past' . 
Russia's relations with Hungary have followed a similar course to those with the Czech 
Republic. However, the question of Russian debts to Hungary was relatively easily 
resolved: the bulk of the estimated USDI. 7 billion owing to Hungary was repaid through 
deliveries of Russian fighter planes and spare parts, following an agreement reached 
during 
Yeltsin's visit to Budapest in November 1992.262 Between 1993 and 1996 the 
Russian 
weapons export agency Rosvooruzhenie exported 28 MIG-29 aircraft worth 
USD800 
259 lnteýfax, 28 September 1998, FBIS-SOV-98-271- 
260 Kopyti na, 'Rossi ya-Chekhiya'. 
261 ITAR-TASS, 10 October 2001, FBIS-SOV-2001 -1010. 
262 Alfred. A. Reisch, 'Hungary Acquires MIG-29s from Russia. ', RFEIRL Research 
Report, Vol. 2. No. 33 
(20 August 1993), pp. 49-56. 
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million. 263 In the following years, Rosvooruzhenie delivered a further USD300 million 
worth of equipment to Hungary, including NTR-80 armoured personnel vehicles, anti-tank 
missile systems, ammunition and other equipment. 264 Commenting on the 1992 agreement 
on arms imports and related services, the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Bulgak 
praised Hungary for its flexible approach towards debt settlement and the acquisition of 
Russian military equipment. Bulgak commented that "the very idea of such an agreement 
between Moscow and Budapest is a big step forward in the light of Hungary's intention to 
join NATO") 
. 
265 Bulgak explained Budapest's acceptance of Russian an-ns as a 
consequence, firstly, of the pressing need to upgrade its military capacity, and secondly of 
the fiscal constraints that made it difficult for the Hungarian government to purchase 
Western equipment. 266 Furthen-nore, in 2000 Moscow proposed to Budapest to upgrade 
Hungary's MiG-29 fighters to NATO standards, in cooperation with a specialist Gen-nan 
firm. Russia's proposal found support in the Hungarian legislature, although they elicited 
sharp criticism from the US, which offered its own warplanes. 267 
As far as Russiai-ý- Hungarian trade is concerned, one can see a pattern similar to that of 
Russian ties with the CE states previously analysed: a substantial trade surplus in Russia's 
favour (due to the big share of energy in Russia's export structure), and difficulties 
encountered as Hungary attempted to expand its share in Russian imports. The 1998 
financial crisis also significantly affected the level of Hungary's exports to Russia, which 
underwent a 30 percent decline in 1999 compared to the previous year. 
268 In the following 
years bilateral trade figures improved significantly, although there was a 
further increase of 
263 Interfax, 3 February 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0203. 
264 Ibid. 
265 lnteýfax, II November 1997, FBIS-UMA-97-315. 
266 Ibid. 
267 Inteýfax, 14 August 2000, FBIS-SOV-2000-0814; Intelfax, 
268 Rossi-vska. va gazeta, 30 November 1999. 
18 October 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-1018. 
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the share of energy products in Russian exports. In 2001 , exports to Hungary reached 
USD2.5 billion, whereas Hungary exported USD500 mil-lion worth of products to Russia. 
This made Hungary, along with the Czech Republic, Russia's second largest economic 
partner in CE . 
269 However, when it comes to the structure of products exported to 
Hungary, as well as other CE states, the indicators are not so positive for Russia. Energy 
resources in Russia's exports to Hungary grew from 75.8 percent in 2000 to 83.6 percent in 
2001, the share of processed products shrunk from 14.9 percent to 10.9 percent, and 
machinery and equipment declined from 5.1 percent to only two percent. 270 
Figure 4 
As far as Russian investments in Hungary are concerned, perhaps surprisingly, Hungary 
proved to be a more attractive place for Russian investors than the more pro-Russian 
27 Slovakia. 1 However , if one takes into consideration 
how much more predictable, stable 
and fin-nly anchored in the West the Hungarian economy was, the choice of Russian 
269 Rossýyskava gazeta, 06 April 2002, p. 7. 
27 0 Koninzersant-Vlast', 02 July 2002. The change in the structure of Russian exports to Hungary is due to the 
fact that Russia exported less military equipment to Hungary than in the previous period, at the same time 
Budapest introduced import quotas on Russian metal and a 45 percent import 
duty on Russian nitrogen 
fertilisers, thus changing the balance towards a larger share of energy products in its exports. 
See Itar-Tass, 
18 January 1999, FBI S- FBI S-SOV-99-018, Inteifiax, 4 February 2000, FBIS-SOV-2000-0204. 
271 Balmaceda, 'Economic Relations and the Ukramian- Central European-Russian Triangle', p. 193. 
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investors is less puzzling. The very 'closeness' of the Slovak economy and its leanino 
towards Russia during the Meciar governments made it a less attractive partner not just in 
the eyes of Western investors, but also Russia's. Although data on Russian capital 
investments in Hungary, and indeed other CE states is scarce, some conclusions can be 
drawn from the information that is openly available. As mentioned in the energy section of 
this chapter, Russian gas and oil producers remain one of the major Russian economic 
players in the country. Although not without controversy, in large part motivated by 
traditional suspicion of Russian intentions in the region and aggravated by the lack of 
transparency within Russia's major enterprises, Gazprom became one of the largest 
Russian capital investors in the Hungarian petrochemical industry. While Gazprom failed 
to take control of Borsodchem, one of Hungary's biggest integrated chemical plants, it 
established a joint company "Panrusgaz". The remit of Panrusgaz is to the purchase 
Russian natural gas and distribute it in Hungary, to export it on, as well as to construct and 
administer new transport pipelines and storage capacities in Hungary. 272 Gazprom also 
controls 10 percent of the shareholdings in two Hungarian gas companies, tGAZ and 
DEGAZ. And the important outpost of Russian capital in CE is the AEB bank mentioned 
above, used by Gazprom to finance Russian gas deliveries to Hungary. 
273 Among other 
large-scale Russian investments are the Ikarus bus factory (a 32 percent of the 
shareholdings) and Dunantuli Koolajipari Gepgyar (Dunantul Oil Machinery Factory, 68 
percent . 
274 
272 See footnote 182. 
273 0P Cit., P. 193. It was reported, however, that at the beginning of 
2001 Gazprom reduced its share in AEB 
ftom 51 percent to 25 percent. The move came against the background of nexý, 
Gazprom the leadership's 
policy to rid company of some of its assets that are not directly related to its profile. 
See Komniersant-DailY, 
27 April 2001, p. 4. 
274 Balmaceda, 'Economic Relations and the Ukraim an- Central, ' p. 193. 
252 
Chapter 4 
From this account of Russian-CE trade- investment relations we can draw a number of 
conclusions. As was mentioned in passing, in contrast to Hungary, Slovakia did not prove 
to be such an attractive market for Russian investors for most of Meciar's tenure. Wlifle 
Slovakia under Meciar offered Russian capital immediate advantages, the long-term 
prospects for the security of investment and the outlook for cross-border expansion did not 
seem too encouraging. The disparity between the official expression of support for closer 
ties with a 'fraternal' state and the real interest expressed by Russian economic actors 
points to the lack of coherence in interpretation of Russian interests on the part of its 
leadership. They seem to have been largely formulated in a reactive, day-to-day way, 
lacking long-term vision and not based on calculations of Russian economic interests in the 
region, as reflected in the behaviour of Russia's main economic actors. Indeed, as was 
suggested earlier in the chapter, perhaps it was only the Russian giant Gazprom and other 
energy companies which really had a long-term policy of operation in Central Europe. The 
latest developments in this area back this suggestion: having invested in a joint Russian- 
Slovak gas trading venture "Slovrusgaz" in April 1997, in March 2002 GazProm acquired 
49 percent of SPP in a consortium with Ruhrgas and Gaz de France for USD 2.7 billion. In 
December 2001 the Russian oil company Yukos acquired 49 percent of Slovakia's oil 
pipeline operator Transpetrol for USD74 million. 
The above record shows similarities and differences in the conduct of Russian economic 
relations with the CE states. Similarities lay in the commonality of obstacles the CE states 
encountered in their trade relations with Russia: lack of government support and 
protection, an uncertain political and poor legal environment in Russia, and stiff 
competition from Western producers. This translated into CE's negative trade balance with 
Russia. For their part, Russian producers, mainly from the energy sector, also experienced 
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significant opposition to conducting their activities in Central Europe as a consequence: 
CE governments' desire to diversify energy supplies from Russia and diminish dependence 
on Russia as the only source of natural gas. The issue of gas dependence on Russia was a 
highly politicised one, especially in Poland and the Czech Republic. At the same time one 
could see varying degrees of official unfriendliness towards Russia, depending on the 
political make up of leaderships in the CE states. As was demonstrated above, as a rule, 
leftist governments in CE followed a more pragmatic, balanced foreign policy, which 
influenced economic relations with Russia. While maintaining their strategic orientation 
towards integration with the West, they were keen to sustain and develop relations with 
Russia. As the case of Russian-Polish relations, for example, demonstrated, Warsaw's 
achievement of NATO membership and Moscow's wan-ner relations with the West under 
Putin, removed some of the old fears and irritants and led to more balanced, less politicised 
bilateral relations. 
On the other hand, frequent changes of government in Russia, coupled with severe 
economic upheaval, also hindered the development of bilateral relations during the Yeltsin 
years. The institutional weakness of Russian foreign policy and the lack of coordination of 
external economic policy were also important factors. With the arrival of a new president 
in Russia, and more of a 'one-voice' foreign policy, and with an even greater emphasis 
than before on the economisation of Russian foreign affairs, relations with the 
CE states 
underwent a qualitative change. Under Putin's presidency, 
Moscow put greater emphasis 
on economic relations with Europe, as its largest trading partner. 
Russia demonstrated 
greater interest in improving dialogue with the 
EU, pron-pted by its imminent enlargement 
and the changes that it was introducing in 
its energy sector. The following section analyses 
the evolution of Russian- EU relations 
in the context of EU enlargement plans that 
254 
Chapter 4 
envisaged all four CE states in question becoming EU members within between two to five 
years. 
Russia, CE and EU Enlargement 
The dual process of European enlargement, of NATO and of the EU, will have a lasting 
influence on, and change the character of, Russian European security policy, in both its 
military-political and 'soft' security aspects. Whereas NATO enlargement caused a great 
deal of political controversy and significantly impacted on Russia-CE relations and more 
broadly on Russia's relations with the West, EU enlargement, according to A. Hyde-Price, 
will be an incomparably more significant process in reshaping the post-Cold War European 
or er. 275 Although Russia does not in the foreseeable future, and will not, aspire to full 
membership in the EU, the EU enlargement process is already having tangible effects on 
Russia's relations, with the current EU and its prospective members in the political, 
economic and societal spheres. The process of EU enlargement to include as many as ten 
new countries, mainly from Central and South Eastern Europe, and the Baltic states, brings 
out a plethora of issues of mutual concern. 276 This section looks at the impact the four CE 
states' accession to the EU has had and is likely to have on Russia's relations with these 
states and how their membership of the EU might affect Russia- EU relations. 
Russia's cooperation with the EU spans and affects a range of security concerns that came 
to the forefront in the post-Cold War environment. As pointed out above, the process of 
EU enlargement is not only a matter for concern for the current EU member-states and 
275 Adrian Hyde-Price, 'The Antinomies of European Security: Dual Enlargement and the Reshaping of 
European Order', Contemporaiýv Securit -v 
Polic 
, v. 
Vol. 2 1. No. 3 (December 2000), p. 154. 
276 Details of Russian conceptual i sati on and political 
debates on the effect of EU enlargement for Russia's- 




aspiring candidates. Apart from the big challenges that EU enlargement presents for the 
functioning of EU institutions, the rules that govern it and how they should best be adapted 
to accommodate a larger number of states, the EU enlargement is naturally forcing changes 
on the pattern of relations with the states left outside the EU. Although the full 
implications of these changes will not become apparent until after enlargement, the 
changes being adopted by candidate states and compliance with all the EU acquis 
communautaire are already affecting Russia's relations with the CE states under 
discussion. CE integration with the EU, unlike their joining NATO, is having immediate 
and tangible effects on Russian interests in the region. 
Being left outside the process of European integration, Russia found itself facing the 
question of how best to approach the changes taking place on its eastern borders so that its 
European foreign policy truly reflected its national interests. It was not a question of mere 
'damage limitation' but of a strategic choice Russia had to make. In broader terms, 
European enlargement affects one of Russia's most sensitive areas - the question of 
Russia's identity and strategic orientation in the post-Cold War environment. Russia's 
response to these challenges will have a lasting effect on the nature of its foreign and 
national security policy. The European Union and its enlargement process has become one 
of the key external factors affecting the Russia-CE security complex and the nature of 
security within it. Russia's response to CE joining the EU is determined by the views that 
Russia's political and economic elite hold of the EU, as well as their threat and opportunity 
assessment of the implications of its enlargement. 
EU enlargement, despite the largely positive assessment given to it by Russian elites, 
has 
nevertheless brought out traditional fears of Russian isolation and curtailment of influence 
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277 MOSCOW-)S I in the region. initial enthusiasm for EU enlargement was in Part motivated by 
the view that it was a preferable alternative to the enlargement of NATO. 278 It also, 
however, reflected more pragmatic considerations. The EU, Russia's largest trade partner, 
accounting for 35-40 percent of all Russian foreign trade, is seen as a principal source of 
investment and expertise to support Russian reforms. It is also seen as a possible model for 
Russia's own integration projects within the CIS framework, and other integration projects 
(the Russia-Belarus Union, fie Eurasian Economic Community). 279 At the same time, 
Russian elites harbour a degree of irritation with the EU for its criticisms of Russia's 
human rights record, its activity in the Chechen conflict, and its poor respect of democratic 
values. 28 0 Finally, some recent studies have drawn attention to the surprising amount of 
ignorance in Russia about the EU and its significance. 281 
Until recently, that is not until the late 1990s when official attention became more drawn to 
the possible negative effects of EU enlargement on Russian trade and cross-border 
relations, the Russian mass media paid scant attention to the EU. Russia's relations with 
the EU were considered to be primarily economic and technical, and of little relevance to 
277 Dmitri Danilov points to a consensus that appeared in Russia with regard to EU enlargement, and quotes 
Russian Communist Party leader Genadi Zyuganov saying that EU enlargement is a positive and very 
important element. Zyuganov's conclusion comes from the assumption that by enlarging the EU will be able 
to exert more influence in Europe and internationally. Such a statement points to the importance the Russian 
elite tends to put on the EU as a counterbalance to NATO/US influence in Europe. Dmitri Danilov, 
'Otnosheniya Rossii 1 ES v Kontekste Rashireniya NATO', NATO: Fakty i Kommentarii 
(http: //www. inion. ru/product/nato/nato6 - 
3. htm: INION, 8 November 2000). 
278 Vladimir Baranovsky, 'Russia: a Part of Europe or Apart from EuropeT International Affairs, Vol. 76. No. 
3 (July 2000), p. 453. 
279 Igor Leshukov, 'Rossiya i Evropeiskii Soyuz: Stretegiya Vzaimootnoshenil', in Rossiya i Osnovnve 
Instituty Bezopasnosti v Evrope: Vstupaya v XXI Vek, ed. by Dmitri Trenin (Moscow: Moscow 
Carnegie 
Center, 2000)., p. 25. 
2 80 Ibid., p. 25. 
281 Many Russians, and even those in the professional elite, have no clear understanding of the powers and 
decision-making process of the EU, which they often confuse with the Council of Europe. 
See David Gowan, 
How the EU Can Help Russia (London: Centre for European Reforrn, 2000), p. 
5; Margot Light, Stephen 
White, and John L6wenhardt, 'A Wider Europe: the View from Moscow and 
Kylv', International Affairs, 
Vol. 76. No. 1 (2000), p. 82. 
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the daily lives of Russians. 282 More interestingly, despite significant changes that have 
taken place in the EU decision- making process and the evolution of EU common policies, 
controlled by the European Commission and governed by an intricate body of EU law, 
Moscow persisted with an overwhelmingly bilateral style of relations with the EU states 
characteristic of Soviet days. 283 The foreign policy style of President Yeltsing who 
preferred personal contacts and informal meetings with key figures in leading EU 
countries, Russia's obsession with geopolitical models and nurturing poles of a new 'multý 
polar world order', the structure of the Russian MFA, which even today lacks a unit 
responsible for the EU, and operates on a country- b y- country basis, are all important 
reasons for the lack of understanding in Moscow about what the EU really is and how it 
works. 284 Recently, in his new book The New Russian Diplomacy Russian Foreign 
Minister Igor Ivanov, referring to Russia's ties with Europe, insisted that 'one of the 
fundamental tenets of Russia's European policy is the expansion of bilateral relations with 
individual countries'. 285 When referring to the place of the EU in Russian foreign policy, 
Ivanov emphasised somewhat optimistically the evolution of the EU's unified defence and 
security policy, and praised the EU's desire to rely on its own forces to ensure security and 
deal with crisis situations as 'logica '. 286 
Thus Russia's shift towards a more geopolitical world view, which emphasised 'balancing 
acts' with other 'poles of power' rather than integration, its economic weakness and simple 
lack of knowledge about the EU, were key reasons for the lack of interest in developing 
282 Ibid. 
283 Timofei Bordacbev, Terra Incognita, ill Evropeiskaya Politika Rossli', Pro et Contra, Vol. 6. No. 4 
(2001), p. 25. 284 Ibid. 
285 Igor S. Ivanov, The New Russian Diploniwýv (Washington, D. C: The Nixon Center and Brookings 
Institution Press, 2002), p. 95. It is also telling that Igor Ivanov referred to Jean Monnet as one of the 
Council 
of Europe's leading ideologists, not as the ideologue of the European 
Coal and Steel Community, see. p 102. 
286 Ibid. p. 103. 
258 
Chapter 4 
relations between the EU and Russia during the Yeltsin presidency. As was noted before, 
the situation was worsened by NATO enlargement which consumed most of Russia's 
foreign policy energy, while the EU's stance on the Chechen conflict put its ties with 
Moscow on ice. Russia's first war in Chechnya delayed until late 1997 ratification of the 
1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) that lays down the legal groundwork 
for Russia-EU relations, and the second Chechen campaign in 1999 again led to a cooling 
of relations. 
However, despite the EU's uneasiness as to how to approach Russia in the light of its 
internal political and economic upheavals, and Russia's negative reaction to the Kosovo 
crisis, 1999 was a year that saw significant developments in EU-Russian relations. Russia 
finally officially presented the EU with a "List of Russia's Concerns with regard to EU 
Enlargement". Moscow became more concerned with the effect EU enlargement would 
have on the Russian exclave Kaliningrad region, something that until then it had refused to 
discuss officially. 287 In the same year the EU, acting within the framework of the new 
Common Foreign and Security Policy enacted by the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), adopted 
its Common Strategy on Russia (CSR). In response, Russia promulgated its own Medium- 
term Strategy for Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the 
European Union (2000-2010), which was handed to the EU delegation at the EU-Russia 
Summit in Helsinki in October 1999.288 
287 Leshukov, 'Rossiya i Evropeiskii Soyuz', p. 41 
288 Russian EU scholar Yuri Borko provides evidence that even when the Russian government was aware that 
the EU was preparing The Conimon Strategy on Russia Russian officials 
did not appear to see the need to 
provide the EU with Russia's own strategy on relations with the EU. 
It was only with the Institute of Europe 
of Russian Academy of Sciences' suggestion that Russia should prepare a response 
to the EU, that the 
Russian government started to draw up the Medium-terni strategl,. See Yuri 
Borko, 'The European Union's 
Common Strategy on Russia: A Russian View', in The EU Coinnion Strategy on Russia. 
Learning the 
Granunar of CFSP, ed. by Haukkala, Hiski, Sergei Medvedev (Helsinki, Berlin: 
Ulkopoluttmen instituutti, 
Institut ffir Europdische Politik, 2001), p. 118 
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The above gives us an idea of the context in which Russia's assessment of CE accession to 
the EU was formed. From the dynamics of Russia-EU relations we can derive indications 
of how Russia sees the EU, of where Russia's overall European foreign policy is heading, 
of what approach Moscow is likely to take in dealing with the current or anticipated 
negative consequences of EU enlargement, and of what opportunities it sees. The 
consequences of CE states' accession to the EU will have for Russia's relations with these 
states will not be fully known or understood until after the CE states ascend to full 
membership of the EU. To the Russian leadership's credit, particularly since the late 
1990s, it has evidently become more aware of the possible negative side effects of EU 
enlargement and adopted a more focused and pro-active approach to fostering relations 
with Brussels and the candidate states. The increase in the intensity of Russia-EU activities 
seems to be connected with a deliberate move by President Putin to give priority to 
relations with the EU and at the same time to overcome the impasse of the 1990s in 
Russia-CE relations. The Russian establishment, because of this change of priorities and 
the even greater emphasis of Russian foreign policy on the economic dimension, began to 
overcome its short-sighted and passive approach to the EU enlargement process. 
At the time of writing Russia's negotiation of its place in the new enlarged Europe is very 
much a "work in progress". Any conclusive statements on where Russia will arrive as a 
result are difficult to make. As set out in Chapter 1, this thesis has a much less ambitious 
aim - to determine and assess the driving forces behind Russia-CE security relations. 
EU 
enlargement is one variable that significantly affects Russia and CE in all areas of inter- 
state and international relations. In broader terms, is the enlarging EU a bearer of security 
and prosperity or does it bring challenges and possible isolation for the 
Russian 
Federation? Will the CE states' membership of the EU bring Russia closer to Europe or 
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drive it even further away? These hypothetical questions have a very practical meaning for 
the many thDusands of Russians living in the Kaliningrad enclave wedged between Poland 
and Lithuania without land surface access to 'big Russia'. The survival of the enclave 
depends on trade with its neighbours, who are soon to become EU members. Kaliningrad is 
perhaps a testing ground and an extreme example of what the EU on Russia's doorstep will 
come to mean. The Russian leadership seems to recognise that developing cooperative 
relations with prospective members of the EU, and in particular with those sharing a border 
with Russia, is in its long-term interests. 
EU enlargement and Russia's economic interests and security 
Writing about EU enlargement and its effects on the Russia economy, it has become a 
commonplace to calculate that the EU's share in Russia's foreign trade will rise from 
present 35 percent to nearly 50 percent. That is, as much as half of all Russian foreign 
trade will be with the EU .2 
89 The EU, in its current forin, is also Russia's biggest capital 
investor: 1998 figures show that as much as 79 percent of all foreign investment originated 
in the EU. 290 Thus for Russia the EU is and will remain the most significant economic 
partner, and crucial for its economic security. Yet these impressive figures do not reflect 
the asymmetry that characterises Russiarý-EU relations. In terms of trade and investments 
Russia does not matter to the EU to the same extent that the EU matters to Russia. In 1998 
Russia accounted for only three percent of the EU's external trade. However, 21 percent of 
the EU's natural gas and 12-15 percent of its oil and oil products come from Russia. With 
CE's much bigger dependence on Russian energy supplies, the immediate effect will be 
that Russia's share in the enlarged EU energy market will also grow. 
28 9 Tkacbenko, 'Rasbirenie ES i Voprosy Bezopasnosti Rossil', p. 55, Christopher Patten, 'The EU and 
Russia', International Affairs, Vol. 47. No. 2 (2001), pp. 59-65. 
2 90 Tkacbenko, 'Rasbirenie ES i Voprosy Bezopasnosti Rossil'. 
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The CE states' accession to the EU will not drastically alter the pattern of Russia's trade 
with them. As was noted in the previous section, ever since the end of the CMEA system 
both Russia and CE have drastically redirected their mutual trade in the direction of the 
current EU. The CE states joining the EU will finally remove remaining barriers and seal 
their status as full members of the European common market. CE's membership of the 
European Union will also spell a loss of control over external economic policy. At the 
same time, the CE states will be taking part in decision making on EU common policies. 
These are some of the key changes that Russian policy- makers will have to adjust to once 
the CE states join the EU. CE's new status will bring about, and is already bringing about, 
yet another adjustment in the way the Russian authorities have to approach the region. 
Russian and EU experts seem to disagree, however, as to whether EU enlargement will 
have overall positive or negative effects on Russian trade. Brussels insists that the CE 
states' accession to the EU will automatically make them party to the PCA that grants 
Russia Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status. As a result of the implementation of a single 
tariff by new member-states, the current CE average levy on Russian goods of 8 percent 
will reduce to one percent EU average. The EU also argues that in reality, because Russia's 
exports to the EU and CE states are predominantly non- manufactured, low added value 
products, the average trade barrier, as estimated by the Commission, is 0.3 percent. 
291 As 
was noted before, at the moment Russia complains about high tariffs being imposed by 
Hungary and Poland on Russian metals and chemical products. 
However, Russia voiced concern over the non-tariff restrictions (quantitative restrictions), 
competition and antimdumping policies that it encounters in trade with the 
EU. Russia's 
291 lbid, p. 59; also David Gowan, How the EU Can Help Russia (London: 
Centre for European Refonn, 
2000), p. 19. 
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manufactured products of high added value are subject to such restrictions, as the EU has 
not recognised Russia as a market economy and claims that some of Russia's goods are 
being sold at dumping prices. Twelve Russian products face antimdumping procedures 
292 launched by the EU . Russia's fear is that these procedures will be applied to the goods 
Russia exports to CE. 293 For Russia, which is keen to expand the share of manufactured 
products in its exports to Europe, the prospect of widening antýdumping procedures is a 
serious source of concern. Among other norkariff obstacles that could affect Russian 
exports to the current CE states is their adoption of EU quality procedures and other 
standards. As a result, the already small proportion of Russian manufactured goods that 
constitute CE imports will decline even further. According to calculations Produced by the 
Russian Ministry for Economic Development and Trade, Russia will suffer an estimated 
USD250-300 million in direct losses annually as a result of CE joining the EU. 294 These 
losses however, could be averted if Russia were to join the WTO and were to be 
recognised as a market economy. 
One other important factor that could possibly affect Russia's interests in the CE states is 
the direction of EU energy policy. The issue has already been dealt with in the energy 
section of this chapter. Suffice it to say at this point that Russia's fears that CE might 
significantly reduce its energy dependency should be allayed by the fact that at this stage 
and for the foreseeable future CE would in practice not be able to do so. There are no 
alternative sources of supply that are as competitive and as readily deliverable as the 
Russian ones. In addition, the EU sees Russia as a long term and dependable energy 
supplier. Brussels also recognises that to secure stable supplies Russia needs technology 
292 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 26 October 1999 
29 3Nikolay Zakbmatov, Viktor Fornicbev, 'Integratsiya Pol'sbi v ES I nteresy Rossii' 
(bttp: //isn. rsub. ru/iu/joumal/J*ouma]4.20001/7. btm: ). 
294 Interfax, 22 February 2001. 
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and the capital to increase production. Moreover, all the existing and planned energy routes 
run across Central Europe, where Russia and EU countries cooperate in developing 
capacities and infrastructure. All these questions became part of a broader Russia-EU 
energy dialogue that the two sides initiated at the high- level Russia- EU October 2000 
summit in Paris. 
295 
EU enlargement, CE and the Kaliningrad region 
Whereas both Russian and EU officials tend to put a largely positive spin on the effects of 
EU enlargement for Russia (an energised and more substantive Russia-EU dialogue under 
Putin gave more reason 6r many to believe that this was justified), the future of the 
Kaliningrad oblast is proving to be a stumbling block on the road to Russia-EU 
rapprochement. The anomalous situation that Kaliningrad will find itself in once Poland 
and Lithuania join the EU means that it will be even more isolated from 'big Russia'. The 
EU's strict external border rules, laid down in the Schengen agreement, will make land 
communication between the two parts of Russia problematic. Any Russians wishing to 
travel between Kaliningrad and mainland Russia by land are likely to have to possess an 
international Russian passport and a valid Schengen visa. 296 
These changes affect the nature not only of Russia-EU relations, but also Russian-Polish 
relations. The extent to which the EU, Tbland and Russia agree to cooperate and find 
solutions to the Kaliningrad problem will either impose new dividing lines at the EU's new 
eastern borderlands, and thus increase the sense of isolation and 'otherness' amongst 
Russians, or, alternatively, create an even longer 'interface' of cooperation and enhanced 
295 Patten, 'The EU and Russia', pp. 61-62. 
296 Poland plans to stop visa-free travel for Russian in July 2003., Rzeczpospolita, 




security between Russia and the EU. Which alternative is to be preferred seems obvious. 
Yet the achievement of a positive outcome is not without obstacles. These are not always 
of a material nature, but rather political, arising from the key problem of perceptions and 
misperceptions. The fact that Kaliningrad oblast' will be a Russian enclave within EU 
territory in the not so distant future is not open to question. How the region is going to 
function in the new environment and what effect EU enlargement will have on its 
existence, on the other hand , is a question without a clear answer. Lithuania and Poland 
will have to adopt all the EU acquis as required by the Amsterdam Treaty before their 
accession to the EU, and will therefore have to remove all the internal barriers separating 
them from the other EU member-states, and strengthen their "external" borders, 
Kaliningraders will have to adapt to these new realities. Taking into account the relative 
weakness of Russia's regions in determining their external policies, Moscow's position in 
relations with current and aspiring EU member-states will be of central importance. 
Russian-- Polish relations , in this respect, are one of the vectors on which solutions 
tD the 
















Evolution of Russian federal policy (or rather its haphazard nature) towards Kaliningrad 
throughout the 1990s and developments within the exclave in the last decade inform to a 
great extent the perception of the region in the EU and its neighbours. 297 
Kaliningrad's past as a Soviet military outpost in the Baltic continues to have a bearing on 
Moscow's perceptions. After the Cold War, the region found itself isolated from 'big 
Russia', which led to problems over basic supplies, energy, raw materials transport, 
communication and travel. As a result of extended militarisation and the closed character 
of the region during Soviet times, as well as its 'exclave' location, Kaliningrad's economy 
became almost exclusively dependent on external trade, and it now imports almost 90 
percent of what it consumes. 
298 
The initially optimistic views that saw the Kaliningrad region as a bridgehead of Russia's 
Europeanization, accompanied by an integration- centred agenda, favouring greater 
openness and increased cross-border cooperation, ran into difficulties throughout the 
1990s. As Pertti Joenniemi observed, new and previously unexplored ideas pertaining to 
the European agenda sow seeds of an unwelcome ambiguity amongst Russian policy- 
makers, challenging the traditional realist logic of 'security'. 299 In wider terms, Russia's 
inability to deal with the Kaliningrad region is a product of Russia's ongoing search for its 
297 A considerable literature exists on the Kaliningrad question. Among the most recent and widely cited 
works are Pertti Joennierm, Jan Prawitz Kaliningrad: The European Amber Region (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
1998), James Baxendale, Stephen Dewar, David Gowan, The EU and Kaliningrad. Kaliningrad and the 
Impact of EU Enlargement (London: Federal Trust for Education and Research, 2000); Lyndelle D. Fairlie, 
Alexander Sergounin, Are Borders Barriers? EU Enlargement and the Russian Region of Kaliningrad, 
Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, No. 13 (Helsinki, Berlin: Ulkopohittinen instituutti, 
Institut ffir Europ5ische Politik, 2001), Pertti Joenniem], Stephen Dewar and Lyndelle D. Fairlie. The 
Kaliningrad Puzzle -A Russian Region it, ithin the European Union (Karlskrona, 
Sweden: The Baltic Institute 
and The Aland Islands Peace Institute, 2000). 
298 Sander Huisman, A New European Union Policýv fior Kaliningrad, Occasional Papers, European Union 
Institute for Security Studies (Paris: March 2002), p. 10. 
299 Perttl Joennierm, Kaliningrad as a Discursive Battle-Field, COPRI Working Paper No. 15 (Copenhagen: 
Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 1999), pp. 9-10. 
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place in the world and an ongoing-process of nation building. Any hints at decentralisation 
and autonomy resonate with fears of centrifugal forces taking hold of the Russian 
Federation. 300 And although in recent years Moscow became more open towards regional 
cooperation, ideas commonly associated with globalisation - "vanishing borders", 
"borderless world", "fragmented sovereignty") and others - are not very welcome among 
many at the core of the Russian political establishment. 301 Moreover, Russia's limited 
historical claim on Kaliningrad made Moscow especially sensitive about the claims of 
nationalists in Gennany, Lithuania and Poland who in the early 1990s made claims on the 
zone. 302 Despite the fact that the governments of these states denied any interest in the 
territory of Kaliningrad, in the early 1990s the Russian government was suspicious that 
foreign investments in Kaliningrad and land acquisitions would be used as a concealed 
means to return the land to foreign control and to push Russia out of Europe. As a result, 
land reforms were held back and Kaliningrad arguably missed out on significant foreign 
investment. 303 
In this light, it is not surprising that, as Stephen Dewar noted, some Moscow-based 
analysts and politicians seriously debated whether a poor but traditional Kaliningrad might 
3 00 Andrei Makarychev, working Paper No. 2, Islands of Globalization: Regional Russia an 
id 
the Outside 
World, Project on "Regionalisation of Russian Foreign and Security Policy, " Center for Secur ty Studies and 
Conflict Research (Zilrich: Eidgen6ssische Technische Hochschule, August 2000), p. 25. 
301 Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
302 For example, in 1993 the Lithuanian Ambassador to the United States claimed Kaliningrad as 
Lithuanian 
territory. However, the Lithuanian government has subsequently retracted all such statements. Similarly 
neither the German or Polish governments have made a claim on Kaliningrad and are unlikely to 
do so. 
Richard J. Krickus (1998) US Foreign Policy and the Kaliningrad Question (Copenhagen: DUPI Working 
Papers 1998/18) pp. 5-6. Also see, Christian Wellmann (1996) 'Russia's Kaliningrad 
Exclave at the 
Crossroads: The Interrelation between Economic Development and Security Politics', Cooperation and 
Cotýflict (Vol. 31, No. 2) pp. 171-174; Ingmar Oldberg, 'Kaliningrad', pp. 16-24; Ramunas Janu§auskas (2001) 
'The 'Kaliningrad puzzle' in Lithuanian and Russian political discourses', in Pertti Joenmemi and 
Jevgenia 
Vlktorova (eds., ) Regional Diniensions of Securiti, in Border Areas of Northern and Eastern Europe (Tartu: 
Tartu Universiy Press) pp. 224-229. 
303 Pertti Joenniemi, Stephen Dewar and Lyndelle D. Fairlie, The Kaliningrad Puzzle, p. 6. 
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not be better than a prosperous and internationally integrated one. 304 The ambiguity 
surrounding the future direction of the region was also reflected in the cautious approach 
that its neighbours adopted in developing ties with the region. Moscow's lack of a clear 
vision of the future, coupled with isolationist and 'strong centre' attitudes have also held 
back the development of Kaliningrad's cross-border ties. At a conference, on Kaliningrad 
A. Zmeyevsky, an ambassador at the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, suggested that 
cross-border cooperation needed to be dealt with circumspectly and that the process should 
not be forced: 
Otherwise, it will be difficult to draw a boundary between cross-border co- 
operation and the economic, demographic and cultural or religious expansion of 
contiguous countries. It would be a great nuisance, if the established climate of 
trust and equal co-operation should be destroyed as a result of 
5 
thoughtless, 
premature and controversial initiatives on cross-border co-operation. " 
Some observers have also seen President Putin's federal reforms, which are widely 
believed to be aimed at strengthening "vertical power", as an attack on the regions and as 
aimed at consolidating Moscow's control over Russia's territory. 306 
At the same time, while Moscow struggled with how best to deal with the Kaliningrad 
region, the oblast leadership used the 'secession argument' to pressure the central 
government to pay more attention to the exclave. In 1994 Yuri Matochkin, the governor, 
warned Moscow that unless it began to seriously tackle Kaliningrad's problems, 
compounded as they were by its geographical location and military- industrial heritage, he 
would call a referendum on secession. Whether it was posturing or not on the governor's 
304 Stephen Dewar, Why Kaliningrad is "Unique" in the Russian Federation. Presentation to an IESW 
conference in Kaliningrad, 8-9 September 1998, cited ibid., p. 9. 
305 A. V. Zmeyevsky, Ambassador, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, speech in Conference on the 
Northern Dimension and Kaliningrad: European and Regional lntegration, 17-18 Ma ,v 
2000 (Copenhagen: 
Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000), p. 19, quoted in Christopher S. Browning, The 
Internal/External Security Paradox and the Reconstruction of Boundaries in the Baltic: The Case qf 
Kaliningrad (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 2002), p. 30-31. 
306 Michael Emerson The Elephant and the Bear: The European Union, Russia and their Near Abroads 
(Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2001) p. 20; Sergei Jakobson-Obolenski 'Kaliningrad - the 




part, it did have an effect on the federal govem-ment. 307 Responding to Kaliningrad's 
obvious 'special character', the Kremlin gave the oblast' a privileged status as a Free 
Economic Zone (FEZ) with significant tax exemptions to compensate for its isolated 
location. Thus, the FEZ could be seen as a 'pilot region' that could become a West-East 
trade bridge, Russia's Hong-Kong, and speed up economic recovery through foreign trade, 
technological cooperation with foreign countries and attraction of investment and 
technology. 308 To an extent, Kaliningrad region's Governor Yuri Matochkin, a liberal and 
Yeltsin appointee, was successful in establishing special relations with neighbouring 
Lithuania and Poland. In 1995, a Russian-Polish Council on Co-operation of Regions of 
North-Western Poland with the Kaliningrad oblast was set up. The region's international 
border crossings were opened and progress was made on improving the transport 
infrastructure. A European gauge railway from the Polish border to the city was restored 
and the Russian part of the Kaliningrad- Elblag motorway was reconstructed. 309 
Map 3 
307 Browning, The InternallEx ternal Securiýv Paradox, p. 31. 
308 Alexander Sergounin, 'EU Enlargement and Kaliningrad: The Russian Perspective', in Are 
Borders 
Barriers? ed. by Fairlie, Lyndelle D., Alexander Sergounin (Helsinki: 
Ulkopollittinen instituuttiand Institut 
f6r Europ5ische Politik, 2001), p. 163. 
309 Alexander Songal, 'Kaliningrad Oblast: Towards a European Dimension', in 
The EU and Kaliningrad. 
Kaliningi-ad and the Iinpact Qf EU Enlargenient, ed. by Baxendale, 
James, Stephen Dewar, David Gowan 
(London: Federal Trust for Education and Research, 2000). p. 102. 
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By 1994 however a shift in Russian foreign policy became apparent, reflected in the way 
the federal authorities perceived the region in the geopolitical enviromrnent. Some Russian 
officials saw little positive effect ftom the special economic status that the region enjoyed. 
As Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Shakhrai complained at the time, the region 
was being turned into a channel for the export of raw rraterials and for the creeping 
expansion of foreign influence in the economic and ethnic sphere, with the prospect of the 
310 
creation of a 'fourth independent Baltic state'. Shakhrai proposed creating targeted 
zones of free trade activity instead of setting ýp a whole region of free trade, emphasizing 
that 'we have again to declare clearly the priority of Russia's military- strategic interests in 
, 311 the Kaliningrad oblast . 
Ambiguity surrounding Kaliningrad's status as a FEZ continued and was reflective of the 
shifts in Russian foreign policy and countrywide process of power-struggle between the 
regions and the centre. Kaliningrad's Governor Matochkin was successful in lobbying 
Moscow for special status for the region. And despite strong opposition, the oblast 
governor was granted the right to deal directly with the Polish and Lithuanian governments 
on the issue of subregional cooperation, including participation 
in the Euroregions. 
Moscow also appointed a special representative of the MFA in the region, while 
Polish and 
Lithuanian consulates, along with honorary Swedish, Danish and Icelandic consulates were 
opened in Kaliningrad. The Kaliningrad oblast also established 
trade missions in Gdansk 
and Vilnius. 
312 
I 110 Quoted in op. cit. pp. 164-165. 
31 1 Quoted Ibid., p. 164. 
312 Ibid., p. 166. 
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Yet in 1995, under pressure from the 'centralists ", the Russian government abolished the 
customs exemptions for the oblast, which led to the annulment of a large number of 
international contracts, in effect scrapping the FEZ pn -1 
Later. the re-gional 
leadership again succeeded in swaying Yeltsin in favour of creating a Special Economic 
Zone (SEZ). But the following years saw a number of attempts from the federal centre to 
introduce changes and tighten controls over the SEZ, as it grew increasingly disappointed 
with the nm-efficiency of the Zone. 313 Governor Gorbenko, who succeeded Matochkin in 
1996, pursued an isolationist policy. He was notorious for his close ties with many 
enterprises in the region, and for the stories of corruption attached to him. Moscow's 
numerous attempts to implement targeted programmes to develop Kaliningrad did not bear 
much fruit as the regional government that was entrusted with implementing the 
programmes was lacking in expertise and professionalism. 314 Even as late as March 2001, 
Moscow still continued to take pains to prevent the Kaliningrad region from taking 
advantage of its location and engaging with neighbouring states behind its back. Foreign 
Minister Igor Ivanov said: 
... it 
is necessary by common efforts to cut short bad faith attempts - and they, 
unfortunately, persist - to conduct affairs with the Kaliningrad region in 
circumvention of the federal centre. It cannot be allowed that in questions of 
development of the external ties of the region somebody should be able to disturb 
the Russian power vertical [sic], to disunite and oppose us to each other. "' 
Moscow's protective view of the region, focused on traditional security concerns coupled 
with the shift towards isolationism, had its effects -a deteriorating socio-economic 
situation in Kaliningrad, and worsening relations with neighbouring countries. According 
to Kaliningrad Regional Duma official Alexander Songal, cooperation with the Baltic Sea 
313 Ibid., p. 168 
314 Sander Huisman, A New European Union Polici, fior Kaliningrad, Occasional Papers ýb 33, European 
Union Institute for Security Studies (Paris: March 2002), p. 10., see also ibid., p. 165-168 
315 Igor Ivanov (2001) Speech at a Meeting with the Leaders of the Kaliningrad Region on March 8,2001. 
Speech available at http: //www. 1n. mid. ru/ 
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316 area in general, and with neighbouring territories in particular, was drastically reduced. 
For more than two years, from the autumn of 1996, the issue of the impact of EU 
enlargement on the Kaliningrad oblast disappeared from the agenda of the region's 
executive authorities. A plan of activities proposed by the MFA representatives to the 
Gorbenko administration, including a number of specific steps aimed at establishing a 
dialogue between all the interested parties in the region and actions to be taken in the 
framework of the PCA, was simply not taken seriously. The only issue that attracted all 
parties 1) attention was the possibility of establishing public representation for Kaliningrad 
in Brussels. This project, however, fell apart due to disagreement over the selection of 
represen atives. 
317 
Putin's accession to power saw the beginning of regional administrative reform, and the 
introduction of large administrative regions, supervised by presidential envoys, aimed at 
strengthening federal authority over the regions. The Kaliningrad oblast'became a part of 
the so-called North-Western Federal District (NWFD) with its centre in St Petersburg. The 
centralisation of power was intended, it was argued, to harmonize local and federal laws, 
make the Federation more coherent, manageable, and fight corruption and organised 
crime. 318 What the effect of this administrative reform will be with regard to the regional 
authorities' freedom for cross-border cooperation and contacts with foreign partners is still 
a matter for debate. 
316 Alexander Songal, 'Kaliningrad Oblast: Towards a European Dimension', in The EUand Kaliningrad. 
Kaliningrad and the ImPact of EU Enlargement, ed. by Baxendale, James, 
Stephen Dewar, Da,, id Gowan 
(London: Federal Trust for Education and Research, 2000). 
117 ]bid. pp. 109-110. 
318 Sergounin, 'EU Enlargement and Kaliningrad'. p. 174. 
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The election of Putin's favourite, former Admiral of the Baltic Sea Fleet Vladimir 
Yegorov, in November 2000, as Kaliningrad's new governor was widely seen as a 
promising development for the region. Yegorov was perceived as a welcome alternative to 
the corrupt and antiýreformist leadership of Gorbenko. The Admiral enjoys support in 
Moscow and from members of the Matochkin administration. The new governor supports 
developing various subregional schemes of cooperation. He has called the oblast' a 
"laboratory for working out new fonns of cooperation between Russia and the European 
Union"). 319 At the same time, Yegorov is viewed as a pragmatist and a defender of Russiaii 
national interests, opposing further NATO enlargement and fighting against potentially 
harmful effects of EU enlargement. His administration played a key role in establishing 
Kaliningrad's position on Schengen, EU enlargement and the Northern Dimension. 320 In 
general, since Putin's accession to power, Russia and the EU have moved towards more 
substantial and institutional i sed cooperation. Kaliningrad has also become a more frequent 
feature of bilateral dialogue, especially in light of EU enlargement. In its 1999 Medium 
Term Strategy towards the EU, Moscow called for, amongst other things, a special 
arrangement for Kaliningrad and suggested the oblast should be seen as a 'pilot region' in 
the development of EU-Russian relations. 321 
In light of some of the constraints outlined above, it would be over-optimistic to expect 
Russia's Kaliningrad oblast to have developed sophisticated and wide-ranging relations 
with its neighbours. The wider context of 'cool' Russian-Polish political relations during 
the larger part of the 1990s, coupled with economic weakness in both Kaliningrad and the 
Polish voevodships bordering it has inevitably restricted regional and cross-border 
319 Rossiiskqýva gazeta, 16 March 200 1, p. 6 
320 Sergounin, 'EU Enlargement and Kaliningrad', p. 175. 
321 'Strateglya Razvitlya Otnoshenii Rossiiskoi Federatsii s Evropeiskim Soyuzom na Srednesrochnuyu 
Perspektivu (2000-2010 gg. )', Diploma ticheskii vestnik, No. II (1999), pp. 20-28, see especially section 8.4. 
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cooperation. It is not surprising, therefore, that, despite the signing of a number of 
intergovernmental agreements, treaties and 'understandings' on the subject throughout the 
1990s, little has been achieved in practice. As one Polish researcher somewhat 
emphatically summed things up - "there is no co-operation! It is all empty words! , 322 
There is little evidence in open sources of successful outcomes of official agreements and 
plans for cooperation. This is especially true with respect to the pre-2000 period, when 
overall Russian-Polish relations were at their lowest point in post-Cold War history. For 
both Russia and Poland, the two regions (Kaliningrad and Northern voevodships) where 
the only interface between the two countries exists, unfortunately remained not only 
geographically, but also politically and economically peripheral. As noted above, 
Moscow's entrenched statist perspective on the region has prevented it from taking 
advantage of regional and cross-border opportunities. Similarly, the Polish government's 
'Eastern policy' has also suffered from the country's overall bias towards the West, where 
it sought 'hard' security guarantees and economic benefits. For their part, the voevodships 
bordering Kaliningrad lacked financial clout and political support from Warsaw to pursue 
relations with the Russian oblast. 
This, however, does not mean to say that cross-border and regional cooperation in the area 
did not progress beyond official exchanges and documents that signed during these 
meetings. A number of findings produced by researchers with a close focus on Russian and 
322 Cited in Henry Andreasen, 'Poland, Local Co-Operation and Kaliningrad', Russian Participation in Baltic 
Sea Region -Building: A Case Sudy of Kaliningrad, Paul Holtom, 
Fabrizjo Tassinari (Gdansk, Berlin: 
BaltSeaNet, 2002), p. 92. 
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Polish regional policies point towards a positive trend of growing ties and exchanges 
between Kaliningrad and Warminsko-Mazurskie voevodship and beyond. 323 
In the short history that Kaliningrad had as a part of the Soviet Union, contacts between the 
region and Poland were very limited and very formal. The first direct contacts between 
Kaliningrad oblast and the People's Republic of Poland began in 1956. Reciprocal visits 
between the oblast and Olsztyn voevodship were kept up for 35 years. 324 With 
administrative reforms in Poland, increasing the number of voevodships in 1975, 
Kaliningrad had three partner voevodships in Poland. However, Kaliningrad lost the right 
to cooperate with the directly bordering Suwalki voevodship, because Kaliningrad was not 
allowed to cooperate with regions of the Lithuanian SSR in the area. 325 With the changes 
of the late 1980s, in June of 1990 an agreement was reached between Kaliningrad, the 
Polish north-eastern voevodships and the Swedish region of Blekinge that focused on 
cooperation in the field of transportation, and contained plans to reconstruct the 
Kaliningrad- Elblag motorway and establish a regular Karlskrona- Gdyna -Kaliningrad ferry 
connection. 326 Former Russian Foreign Ministry representative in Kaliningrad, Yurii 
Rozhkov-Yurievskii, described the legacy of Soviet-era cooperation with Polish provinces 
as 'important for the oblast'. 327 
323 The following works provide good insights and factual evidence of Polish-Russian cooperation in the 
Kaliningrad region: Agnieszka Hreczuk, 'Polish-Russian Relations and Kaliningrad', Russian Participation in 
Baltic Sea Region -Building: A Case Study of Kaliningrad and Henry 
Andreasen, 'Poland, Local Co-operation 
and Kaliningrad', in Russian Participation in Baltic Sea Region -Building: A Case Study of Kaliningrad. 
edited by Paul Holtom, Fabrizio Tassinari (Gdansk, Berlin: BaltSeaNet, 2002). The following work is very 
useful in providing Russian perspective and analysis: Alexander A. Sergounin, Working 
Paper No. 3. 
External Determinants of Russia's Regionalization, Project on "Regional isation of Russian Foreign and 
Security Policy, " Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research (Z&ich: Eidgen6ssische Technische 
Hochschule, February 2001). The dedicated Russian Internet website Rosbalt is also useful in providing 
details on the matter. The Rosbalt information agency website address is http: //www. rosbalt. ru 
324 Hreczuk, 'Polish-Russian Relations and Kaliningrad', p. 74. 
325 Ibid., p. 74 
326 Ibid. 
327 Cited ibid., p. 75. 
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The subsequent, post-Soviet period witnessed the signing of a number of bilateral treaties. 
accords and agreements specific to Russianý-Polish regional relations, cross-border links. 
and ties between Kaliningrad and Poland's north-eastern voevoclships. One was the 
Agreement between the Government of Poland and Russia on Trans-Border Cooperation. 
In its preamble the document stated that cooperation between the regions of the two 
countries would "contribute to the further economic and social development of both states, 
in particular in the north-eastern and coastal areas of the Republic of Poland, the region of 
St. Petersburg, and the Kaliningrad oblast. , 328 A separate agreement on cooperation 
between the nort4-eastem provinces of Poland and the Kaliningrad oblast was reached in 
May 1992.329 This document provided for the establishment of a Joint Commission, which 
itself later established a Polish-Russian Council on Cooperation of Regions of the Republic 
of Poland with Kaliningrad oblast . 
33 0 This evolution of the institutional framework for 
dealing with regional cooperation was a remarkable development at a time when Polisl-ý- 
328 The Treaty on Friendship and Good Neighbourly Relations between the Russian Federation and the 
Republic of Poland signed on 22 May 1992 makes a provision in article 10 of the treaty for direct contacts 
and cooperation between regions, administrative-territorial units and towns of the two countries, and also for 
the establishment of a Joint Polish-Russian Commission on Inter-regional Cooperation. An Agreement on 
Trans-Border Cooperation signed on 2 October 1992 between the two countries stipulated conditions under 
which the establishment of the above mentioned commission was to take place, it also spelled out its tasks 
and fori-ris of functioning. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw, 'Co-Operation Between Poland and 
Kaliningrad Obas't of the Russian Federation', Baltinfo 
(http: //www. baltlinfo. org/Docs/ministerial/18/CS01718feb1999-19. htm: CBSS Secretariat, 25 May 1999). 
See Hreczuk, 'Polish-Russian Relations and Kaliningrad', p. 76 
329 To implement the agreement, Russia and Poland appointed Plempotentiaries of Governments. On January 
28,1993, the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation appointed the Plenipotentiary of the Russian 
Government for Co-operation of Kaliningrad oblast'of the Russian Federation with North-eastern Provinces 
of the Republic of Poland (Leonid Gorbienko, Governor of the Oblast of Kaliningrad). A 
decree of the Polish 
Council of Ministers, dated March 11,1997, instituted the office of Government Plenipotentiary 
for Co- 
operation of North-eastern Provinces of the Republic of Poland with the Kaliningrad 
Oblast of the Russian 
Federation and of Regions of the Republic of Poland with the Region of St. Petersburg. 
On November 12, 
1998, Piotr Stachanczyk - Under-secretary of State at the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration - 
was appointed Government Plenipotentiary for Co-operation of North-eastern 
Provinces of the Republic of 
Poland with the Oblast of Kaliningrad of the Russian Federation. Details in 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Warsaw, 'Co-Operation Between Poland and Kaliningrad Oblast' of the Russian Federation', Baltinfo 
(http: //www. baltinfo. org/Docs/ministerial/18/CS01718febl999-19. htm: CBSS 
Secretariat, 25 May 1999). 
33 0 The Council adopted its statute, stipulating that it is a working organ of the plempotentiaries. 
The tasks of 
the Council include: defining programme of action, submitting to the relevant organs of the two states 
proposals concerning development of co-operation, and creation of 
legal, economic and financial conditions 
essential for mutually advantageous economic collaboration and invigoration of 
business activity in both 
states. The Council works out specific proposals in the form of 




Russian 'high-politics' relations were going through an 'ice age'. The Council was first 
chaired by Polish deputy prime minister. Goryszewski and Russian deputy prime minister 
Shokhin. Between 1994 and 2001 the Council held five meetings, taking a decision to hold 
biannual meetings starting in 2001, a decision brought about both by improvements in 
high-level Russiarý-Polish bilateral political relations, and by the elevation of the 
Kaliningrad problem to the forefront of the Russian-EU cooperation agenda as a result of 
EU enlargement. 331 
Among the issues the Council had the authority to deal with were common problems of a 
social, economic and ecological nature and joint applications for EU funding. The Council 
delegated authority to its eleven working groups, covering areas such as transportation, 
protection of the environment, the bay of the Baltiisk straits, economic cooperation, culture 
and the ability to view Polish TV in Kaliningrad oblast,. 332 In addition, Kaliningrad is a 
regular item on the agenda of the Russian-Polish Intergovernmental Commission on trade 
and economic cooperation, which held its fifth meeting in Warsaw in 2001.333 Following 
Putin's visit to Warsaw in January 2002 a new forum was instituted The Russian-Polish 
Cooperation Strategy Committee. The first meeting was held in Warsaw in June 2002, 
chaired by the Russian and Polish Foreign ministers Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz and Igor 
Ivanov. 334 The forum is reported to have been established with a view to 'coordinating 
cooperation between the two sides' and includes representatives of both governments and 
presidential structures. 
335 
331 The meetings took place in Svetlogorsk (1994), Goldap (1995), Kaliningrad (1996), 
Gdansk (1999) and 
Kaliningrad (2001). 
332 Andreasen, 'Poland'. p. 98. 
333 Ibid. 




However, for reasons mentioned above, for most of the past ten years a large number of 
proposals and statements of intent have remained unfulfilled. No meetings of the Russian- 
Polish Council for Cooperation took place in the year 2000. No Russian-Polish 
Commission for Interregional Collaboration, provided for under the provisions of Russiar-i- 
Polish Intergovernmental Agreement on Trans-border Cooperation of 2 October 1992, has 
been set up. 336 That said, Poland was one of the first countries to establish a Consulate 
General in Kaliningrad in 1992, and, there are a number of areas where cooperation has 
been taking place that have brought about positive results. Moreover, although the 
Kaliningrad oblast and the north-eastern voevodships of Poland do not play a highly 
significant role in overall Russian, -Polish economic relations, Poland is a significant 
economic partner for Kaliningrad as both a vital supplier of products and a major export 
destination. As of July 2001 there were more than 400 Polish companies registered in 
Kaliningrad, accounting for about 16.7 percent of all companies with foreign capital in 
Kaliningrad oblast. At the same time, almost all Polish companies in Kaliningrad are of 
small and medium size, and the level of investment only comes up to about USD 5 million, 
making Poland oblast'S fourth biggest investor with a share of 7.8 percent. Nine percent of 
all Polish-Russian joint ventures are located in Kaliningrad, with an estimated value of 
USD 48 million. 337 In terms of bilateral trade with Kaliningrad, Poland comes at the top of 
the league, with a total turnover with region reaching USD 294 million (up five- fold since 
1994), accounting for 22 percent of Kaliningrad's overall trade turnover: in 2000 Poland's 
share of Kaliningrad imports reached 14.7 percent, while 30 percent of Kaliningrad's 
exports went to Poland. 
338 
336 Zbigniew Kruzinsky, 'Interregional and Transfrontier Co-operation', Yearbook of Polish Foreign PolicY 
2001 (http: //www. qdnet. pVwarecka/yearbook/2001: 2001). 
337 Hreczuk, 'Polish-Russian Relations and Kaliningrad', p. 82. 
338 Data from ibid., pp. 81-82 and "Russian, Polish Investors Boost Cooperation, " 
Rosbalt. 7 September 
2000, http: //www. therussianissues. com/print/994421789. htmi 
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As one researcher into Poland - Kaliningrad cross border cooperation has noted, examples 
of such cooperation are limited, which does not mean that they do not exist, and a lot of it 
does not get registered on paper . 
33 9 However, documented examples of successful 
cooperation projects do exist, such as those between Kaliningrad and the Polish 
Wan-ninsko-Mazurskie voevodship capital Olsztyn. The two cities have been twinned and 
are involved in more than 30 registered projects, events and contact plans in such areas as 
local govenunent, business and tourism, culture, science, civil society, police and border 
police, assistance in tracing relatives lost during and after the Second World War, and the 
local media. The two cities view the development of relations between their business 
communities and increasing the number of contacts between small and medium sized 
companies as their priority. 340 
Other stories of successful cooperation include Kaliningrad's ties with the cities of Gdynia 
and Gdansk in Pomorskie province. Gdansk and Kaliningrad municipalities signed an 
agreement on cultural and economic cooperation in 1993. However, little cooperation has 
been in evidence since. The exception was USD3000 financial assistance given by 
Kaliningrad city to Gdansk in the summer of 2001 after serious flooding. A far more 
successful cooperation record was achieved by Gdynia and Kaliningrad in areas such as 
economic development, administrative support, environment, energy, health care, social 
services, education and NGO relations. 34 1 The two cities formally began cooperation in 
1994, which developed into a twinning agreement in 1997. Cooperation takes place within 
two spheres: 'formalised cooperation', for instance within the 'Baltic' Euro-region, and 
institutional cooperation, between local governments regarding targeted areas (such as 
339 Andreasen, 'Poland', p. 102. 
340 Ibid., pp. 102-103. 
341 Information provided by the Pomorskie Department of International Affairs (Departament Wsp6lpracy 
Miedzunarodowej) quoted ibid., p. 104. 
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fishing for example). Gdynia- Kaliningrad municipal cooperation prioritized direct contacts 
between agencies of public administration, organisations and businesses in the areas of 
production, trade, culture, education and protection of environment. 342 In the aftennath of 
the August 1998 financial crisis in Russia, Gdynia city donated almost C26 thousand wortli 
of humanitarian aid to Kaliningrad city. Antkuberculosis medicines were donated to a 
Kaliningrad kindergarten in December 1997.343 
As noted above, the Polish nort4-eastem territories and Kaliningrad are members of the 
'Baltic' Euroregion, which also cover selected regions of Latvia, Lithuania and Sweden. 
Within this framework, the Polish and Russian cities successfully carried out a practical 
seminar on the theme 'United against Drugs', in which civil servants, police officers, social 
workers and NGOs from the Euroregion took part. The project was highly valued by the 
Baltic Sea States Sub-regional Cooperation (BSSSC) organisation and was nominated the 
best example of cross-border cooperation at the BSSSC Conference in Riga held in 
October 200 1.344 The Polish Ministry of the Economy expressed its interest in joining a 
Russiar-ý- Lithuanian pilot project on training business executives. The programme also 
envisaged training border guards and customs and regional administrative personnel. 
345 
Poland and Russia also started to make use of various multilateral fora in the Baltic area as 
an additional venue for bilateral contacts. During the I Oth anniversary gathering of the 
Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), held under the Russian chainnanship in Svetlogorsk, 
Kaliningrad region, in March 2002, the Polish, Lithuanian and Russian delegations met to 
discuss the future of the Kaliningrad region. Polish Prime Minister Leszek Miller presented 
342 Andreasen, 'Poland', p. 105. 
343 Ibid., p 105. 
344 Ibid. 
345 Goj ska- Gdula, 'Co -Operation in the Baltic Sea Region'. 
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a 29-point "Kaliningrad Package". The Polish proposals related to economic projects in the 
energy sector, participation in the construction of a then-nal power plant in Kaliningrad, 
modernisation and construction of roads, bridges and viaducts, cooperation in shipbuilding, 
processing in ustries, trade and services and telecommunications, and establishing 
Warsaw- Kaliningrad flights by LOT Polish airlines. 346 
2001 saw an increase in Russian-Polish contacts in the Kal iningrad- Warm i nsko- M azurski 
border region and also in wider Polish interest in the Russian exclave. The Polish 
government sees development of cooperation with the Kaliningrad region as justified by 
raison d'etat. 347 Due to its large trade deficit with Russia, the Polish govemment supports 
enterprises interested in developing mutual trade and investment in the Kaliningrad region. 
In January 2001, Kaliningrad hosted a Business Forum for Russian and Polish 
entrepreneurs, at which the Polish Deputy Prime Minister stated that his government 
intended to do its best to promote economic contacts between Russia and Poland in 
general, and principally through the Kaliningrad region. In a similar vein, President Putin 
suggested that further economic cooperation would be a good base for Russiai-&Polish 
economic re ations. 
348 
Intensification of Russian-Polish contacts and their focus on the Kaliningrad oblast, 
commendable as it may be from the point of view of enhancing regional security and 
overcoming the almost decade long alienation of Moscow and Warsaw, has increasingly 
been overshadowed by concern over Kaliningrad's future within the EU's borders. 
346 The Warsaw Voice, 17 March 2002, No. 11 (699). (http: //www. warsawvoice. pl/v699/NewsO8. htmi), as of 
06 October 2002, only one of the 29 Polish proposals - LOT flights Warsaw-Kaliningrad 
has been 
implemented. This has become the only foreign airline operating in Kaliningrad. Poland still waits for 
Russia's response to the other proposals. See The Warsaw Voice, 6 October 
2002, No. 40 (728). 
(http: //www. warsawvoice. pl/v728[NewsO2. htm]). 
347 Kruzinsky, 'Interregional and Transfrontier Co-operation'. 
348 Hreczuk, 'Polish-Russian Relations and Kaliningrad', p. 82. 
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Russia's view, that is the dominant view from Moscow, has also been distorted by an 
apparent misperception that the effects of Poland's joining the EU will be repeated in the 
case of Lithuania. Although the two countries will eventually close the EU ring around the 
Russian exclave, the two countries play different geoeconomic roles in the life of 
Kaliningrad. One of them, and the most divisive, is that of permitting or hampering 
continued free passage of people and goods between Kaliningrad oblast' and the rest of 
Russia. 
On the question of Poland and Lithuania's accession to the Schengen regime, that creates 
free internal borders and therefore common external borders, Russia's position has been 
persistently negative. Russia is opposed to having its citizens' right to travel between 
Kaliningrad and great Russia dependent on a foreign country. 349 Without considering the 
difference between the purposes the two neighbouring countries serve for Kaliningrad, 
Moscow makes similar demands for maintaining visa-free travel and right of passage for 
Russian citizens through the territories of both Poland and Lithuania. 
As analysts from Poland's Centre for East European Research have correctly argued in 
their aptly titled report "Seven Myths about the Kaliningrad Topic", and as Polish officials 
repeated, Poland does not serve as a main transit route between Kaliningrad and the rest of 
Russia while Lithuania does. 350 From Warsaw's point of view, for Russian citizens 
entering the Polish territory is nothing more than travel to a foreign country and a transit to 
other EU countries. Based on this logic, Poland is going ahead with the introduction of 
349 Arthur Kuznetsov, 'Rasshirenie ES i Kalningradskaya Oblast', MEWO, No. 2 (February 2001), pp. 104- 
109. 
35 0 RosBalt, 19 July 2002, (http: //rosbalt. ru/news/58355. htm]). 
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visas on July 1,2003.351 Nevertheless, the Polish authorities are promising to make sure 
that the visas do not become barriers on Poland's borders: 'we want visas to be cheap, with 
multiple entries and long-term . 
352 Warsaw also offered Moscow the possibility of visa 
privileges for students and the elderly. 353 Seeing visa flexibility as the only way of 
addressing the changes on the Polish- Kaliningrad border and stoPping the descending 
'Brussels curtain' or 'Paper Curtain' that is being put in place from creating new dividing 
lines in Europe, both the Polish leadership and various more forward looking 
representatives of Kaliningrad called for Moscow to reciprocate by making changes to its 
visa regime. As Poland's Foreign Minister complained, Warsaw wants Moscow's 
reciprocity in this question - currently a visa for Russian citizens to travel to Poland costs 
USD5, whereas Russia charges Polish citizens USD60 for a Russian visa. 354 Deputy Chair 
of Kaliningrad oblast Duma Sergey Kozlov accused the Federal government of double 
standards. According to Kozlov the Russian MFA in theory supports the region, but in 
practice makes it lurd for foreigners to get a visa to travel to Kaliningrad. Such a practice 
brings income to the MFA, but hinders regional development. 355 This episode points to the 
difficulties that lie ahead in changing Russia's position on opening up borders and 
benefiting from regional and cross border cooperation. Moscow seems inclined to slip into 
an entrenched position based on an unfinished process of nation- building and excessive 
reliance on state control as a means to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
While emphasizing the importance of taking Russia-EU relations to the level of strategic 
partnership, Moscow tried to encourage a more flexible EU approach to the 
Kaliningrad 






September 2002, p. 4. 
355 Kaskad, 12 October 2002, p. 4. 
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problem and Schengen rules. In his reference to Kaliningrad, while emphasising Moscow's 
concems, Putin stated that: 
Russia intends to continue with its step-by-step approach towards deepening 
relations with the European Union, which gradually take the form of strategic 
partnership. The main aim of such a partnership is moving towards a Europe 
without dividing lines, and this presumes Russia's integration into a common European economic, legal and humanitarian space. It is obvious that to achieve 
this aim both Russian and EU citizens should have the right to free movement 
within this territory. "' 
As a long-tenn objective President Putin put forward the goal of establishing visa- free 
travel between Russia and the EU. 357 It remains to be seen whether the Russian proposal is 
a real vision of relations with the EU in the long-tenn or part of a bargaining strategy - to 
ask for the impossible in order to win concessions that would be acceptable to both sides 
seeking a short-term objective, namely settling the Kaliningrad problem. Russia certainly 
raised the stakes substantially in its dealings with the EU. While emphasising the 
importance of the EU for Russia and its desire to see a resolution to the Kaliningrad 
problem acceptable to both sides, Putin declared, "This is a most important political 
question. On its resolution depends not only the future of Kaliningrad region as an integral 
part of the Russian Federation, but also to a significant degree the future vector of our 
relations with the enlarging EU. 1358 By announcing that the nature of Russia-EU relations 
will depend on how the Kaliningrad problem is resolved, Moscow seemed to be using the 
same tactic that it employed during the talks on NATO enlargement, which resulted in 
signing of relatively declaratory Russia-NATO Founding Act. However, in the case of 
Kaliningrad Moscow risked taking itself into a political dead-end, with consequences much 
more serious than hurt national pride. The Russian authorities either refused to accept or 
did not realise the position of Brussels on the acquis communautaire. Some Russian 





analysts suggested, however, that Putin's visa proposal was not made in the expectation 
that it would be accepted by the EU. Timofei Bordachev, from Carnegie Moscow Centre. 
and Andrei Piontkovskii, head of the Moscow-based Strategic Research Centre, saw in 
Moscow's 'EU-Russia free visa travel' proposal a way to retreat from the Kaliningrad 
issue, in which Russia is seen to be playing a losing game, without losing face. Bordachev 
explained that Moscow was attempting "to move relations with the EU from the state of 
scandal surrounding the problem of Kaliningrad to a long-term, slow process of 
negotiations on the problem of norý-visa status [for all Russian citizens], which can drag on 
, -)359 for years. Piontkovskii agreed, and added further that Putin's proposal was largely 
meant for domestic consumption, as the Russian public sees itself "on the losing end" of 
visa negotiations with the EU. The Russian public does not want Kaliningraders to receive 
special visa status, which might encourage separatism in the exclave. Therefore, Putin's 
proposal is seen in his view as a way of placating the Russian public both in Kaliningrad 
and in 'great Russia', by giving an impression that some progress is being made in visa 
negotiations. 
360 
In public Russia continued to press for special arrangements and visa exemption for 
Russian citizens wishing to travel between the two parts of Russia. In July 2001 Moscow 
called for quadrilateral dialogue between Russia, the EU, Poland and Lithuania on the 
Kaliningrad issue. 36 1 However, talking about the idea a year later, Russian Foreign 
Minister Ivanov complained that no progress was being made. 
362 Some analysts, however, 
saw a degree of insincerity in Russia's position on the Schengen regime. Their explanation 
359 Valentinas Mite, "EU: Analysts Say Russia Needs Reforins Before It Can Win Visa Concessions, 
RFEIRL, 3 September 2002. 
360 Ibid. 
36 1 Diplomaticheskii vestink, No. 7, July 2001 (online edition). 
362 Izvestia, 10 July 2002, p. 1. 
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for Russia's entrenched position on special transit arrangements for its citizens either in the 
form of visa exemptions or 'sealed high speed trains' was that a large number of 
Kaliningraders are military personnel, who according to Russian laws are not allowed to 
possess international travel documents and would therefore be excluded from easy and 
accessible means of land travel between the two parts of Russia. 363 While Kaliningrad's 
neighbours and the EU are concerned about crime, illegal migration, environmental 
problems and the spread of AIDS in the oblast, Russia is more worried about preventing 
Kaliningrad from creating a precedent for Russia's disintegration. 364 Russia's stance, once 
again, demonstrates the tendency on its part to put 'hard' security considerations before 
more pressing issues of a soft security nature facing, in this instance, Kaliningrad. Even in 
the field of regional cooperation, the purpose of Russia's regions (including Kaliningrad) 
having external relations was not "a conscious attempt at gaining access to global 
networks, but was seen as an 'anti-crisis strategy". 365 External economic relations of the 
regions, therefore, are being monitored by the Kremlin mainly with unease, overshadowed 
by worries about the fragmentation of Russia. 
Both Russia and the EU find themselves in a seemingly irreconcilable situation over the 
future travel and transit rights of Russian citizens in Kaliningrad. Poland wants its citizens 
to benefit from EU internal freedom of travel under the Schengen regime and does not 
366 
want to compromise its chances of EU membership by conceding to Russian demands. 
The future of Kaliningrad hinges on what look like irreconcilable positions and different 
visions on the part of the EU and Russia as to how to deal with the oblast. The position of 
363 Vladimir Baranovsky, Russia's Attitudes Towards the EU 
instituutti, Institut fdr Europdische Politik, 2002), p. 151. 
364 Expert, No. 23,17 June 2002, pp. 14-20. 
365 Makarychev, Islands of Globalization, p. 12. 
366 Trud, 09 August 2002, p. 4. 
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Poland and Lithuania is that while they do not want to spoil their relations with Russia. for 
obvious reasons they side with the EU. 
Implementation of the Schengen regime by Poland and Lithuania could further aggravate 
Kaliningrad's economic and societal situation as the costs of cross border cooperation 
become prohibitive. These informal business networks connecting Kaliningrad's economy 
with its European neighbours that worked as 'built-in stabillsers' are threatened by the 
introduction of strict controls over the movement of people and goods. As soon as these 
changes take place, the oblast, some Russian analysts warri, could plunge into severe 
crisis. 
367 Kaliningrad fears that its neighbours would not be able or might not be willing to 
devote much attention to cooperation with the oblast once they have joined the EU, in part 
due to the fact that both Kaliningrad and its neighbours have inadequate administrative and 
technical capacities to operate in the new environment. 368 One might expect an 
exacerbation of Kaliningrad's feeling of isolation and even increasing feelings of hostility 
towards Lithuania and Poland, as even land travel, the most affordable means of travel for 
an average Russian, will depend on the Polish or Lithuanian authorities. The sense of 
geoeconomic isolation in Kaliningrad did not come about simply as a result of EU 
enlargement plans. Yet the feeling of isolation will only grow if Kaliningrad's position is 
not taken into account; this applies both to the EU and the Russian leadership. As we 
have 
seen, the two do not view Kaliningrad from the same vantage point, and this 
in turn affects 
the character of Russia-EU, Russia-Poland dialogue on the su 
. ect. 
, 67 Natalia Smorodinskaya, Kaliningrad Exclave: ProsPects 
for Transforniation Into a Pilot Region 3 
(Moscow: Institute of Economics, Russian Academy of 
Sciences, 2001), p. 12. 
168 Sander Huisman, A Neii, European Union Polic. v, for Kaliningrad, 
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The EU tends to see the Kaliningrad region, as Chris Patten, the EU commissioner for 
external relations, put it, as Russia's 'hell- hole' in the middle of Europe . 
369 The EU wants 
to help the Russian oblast, and not just from altruistic motives: "Kaliningrad suffers from 
organise crime, pollution, illegal drugs circulation and a poor health system, " and i is not t 
in the European Union's interest to have such a 'menace' on its doorstep. 370 Brussels' 
readiness to help, however, is only focused on the consequences of the problems 
Kaliningrad is facing, not on their roots. Russian observers see the order of EU priorities 
with respect to Kaliningrad as, 1) nuclear waste, utilisation of submarines; 2) environment 
and health - AIDS and tuberculosis; 3) criminal activities - drug trafficking, illegal 
migration; and in the last place; 4) economic development. 37 1 This approach partly reflects 
of course, the EU's concern not to upset Russian sensitivities about territorial integrity. For 
the same reason EU spokesmen time and again emphasise that Moscow is solely 
responsible for the oblast'S future. 
372 
Moscow, for its part, does admit that Kaliningrad oblast needs special attention in the 
economic sphere. However the recently adopted Federal Economic Policy Concept for 
Kaliningrad region, although seen as relatively liberal in that it provides for reducing the 
scope for bureaucratic discretion in Kaliningrad - simplified registration procedures for 
enterprises, simpler screening of investment projects - is counterproductive in the opinion 
of some Russian observers. The Concept is seen as a concession to traditional 
local 
interests groups that call for both 'freedom and money ,- 
373 
36 9 The Guardian, 7 April 2001. 
370 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 January 2001. 
371 Smorodinskaya, Kaliningrad Exclave, p. 12. 
372 Hiski Haukkala, Two Reluctant RegIonalizers? The European Union and 
Russia in Europe's North, 
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CFSP, Working Papers, No. 32 (Helsinki, Berlin: 
Ulkopollittinen instituutti, Institut ffir Europdische Politik, 
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Russia's politically and economically determined inability to address the problems faciiig 
Kaliningrad, coupled with EU enlargement is threatening to further widen the gap in 
economic development and living standards between Kaliningrad and its neighbours. 
Lithuania and Poland receive huge financial support from Brussels to bring their 
economies up to the EU average standard - E8 billion a year for Poland and CI billion for 
Lithuania. The Kaliningrad oblast on the other hand is promised only 0-3.5 million a year 
through the TACIS programme. 374 The unequal starting position of the two regions in the 
early 1990s and disproportionate financial assistance and investments has already produced 
a significant lag in economic development. With Poland and Lithuania in the EU, and 
Kaliningrad's 'hell hole' image not improved, the oblast' could still cause serious 
problems for all concerned - Russia, the EU, and neighbouring countries. 
The new leadership in both Moscow and Kaliningrad has recently become more pro-active 
in addressing Kaliningrad issues at the Russia-EU high level forum. As already noted, in 
response to the EU Common Strategy on Russia, Moscow prepared its own Medium Term 
Strategy for development of relations with the EU, in which it called for making 
Kaliningrad oblast a 'pilot region of the RF in terrns of Russia-EU cooperation in the 21 " 
century'. 375 Omitting any specific details as to how this could be achieved, Russia called 
for more funding and support from the EU to address socio-economic disparities between 
the Russian exclave and bordering EU candidate member-states. 
376 Both Russia and the 
374 lbid., p. 9. 
375 Sylvia Gurova, "'EU/Kaliningrad: Future Aspirations"', in The EU and Kaliningrad. Kaliningrad and the 
1nipact qf EU Enlargement, ed. by Baxendale, James, Stephen Dewar, Da\ id 
Gowan (London: Federal Trust 
for Education and Research, 2000). p. 120 
376 Sergounin, 'Russia and the European Union'., p. 152 
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EU agreed during the May 2001 Russia-EU summit that Kaliningrad's problems should be 
dealt with within the Northern Dimension initiative. 377 
Russia's cooperation with Poland in solving Kaliningrad's problems has been rather 
haphazard and reflected economic weaknesses, both of the Russian exclave and the Polish 
voevodships, in addressing some of the problems. Lack of progress was also due to the 
poor legal basis on which such relations could be built. Moreover, all Kaliningrad's 
external activities are conducted with Moscow's approval, whereas its Polish counterpart, 
Warminsko-Mazurskie voevodship, has more autonomy in pursuing cross-border 
cooperation. 37 8 Russiarý- Polish cooperation and hvolvement in Baltic Seas State regional 
initiatives, as demonstrated above, remains at a very low level. As one analyst noted, 
Warsaw's efforts within the Northern Dimension are very meagre compared with the 
zealous approach taken by Vilnius. 
379 
Although Warsaw's position on Kaliningrad and the adoption of the Schengen rules 
remains intractable, the Polish authorities have promised to make sure that the visas do not 
become barriers on Poland's borders. 38 0 Tadeusz lwinski, international policy advisor to 
the Polish Prime Minister, revealed that Warsaw discussed with Moscow the possibility of 
381 introducing visa privileges for students and the elderly. In this respect, the revival of 
Kaliningrad- Polish relations is notable and perhaps reflective of the wider trends towards 
377 Olga Potemkina, 'Rashireme J novye granitsy Evropeiskogo Soyuza: Problemy 1 vyzovy dlya Rossil', 
Materialy Konventa "10 Let Vneshnei Politiki Rossii " (Moscow: June 2002). 
378 Huisman, A New European Union Policyfor Kaliningrad. p. 33. 
379 Ibid., p. 33. Lithuania and Russia drew up a list of projects specific to Kaliningrad: modernisation of a 
transport route from Kaliningrad to Kaunas, construction of a second gas pipe between Kaliningrad and 
Lithuania, various environmental projects, cooperation in dealing with natural disasters; establishment of a 
Eurofaculty in Kaliningrad State University and a student exchange programme; cooperation in the fight 
against AIDS; establishment of a business information centre; and modernization of 
border crossin-s. For 
more information see Lyndelle D. Fairlie, The EUs Northern Diniension and 
Kaliningrad (Royal Military 





improving Russian. -Polish relations with the accession to power of Putin. In September 
2001, the Kaliningrad authorities and the leaders of the Wan-ninsko-Mazurskie voevodship 
pledged to jointly develop border crossings and access to roads on both sides, and seek 
assistance from the EU. According to Wan-ninsko-Mazurskie Governor Zbignew Babalski 
the border crossing would stimulate cross-border economic development across the 230 
km long Kaliningrad- Polish border. 382 For the moment, however, Poland's rmin interest in 
the Kaliningrad region is developing economic and trade relations in order to improve its 
trade balance with the Russian Federation. 
To sum up this section of the chapter, the Kaliningrad oblast presents a very serious 
problem for both Russia and Poland. EU enlargement and Poland's prospective 
membership of the Union are already bringing a whole new dimension to Russian-Polish 
relations. The problems facing Kaliningrad are the product not just of its Soviet legacy but 
also of the ongoing Trocess of foreign policy adjustment in Moscow that is shaped by 
internal developments and the evolution of its perception of the world beyond. As was seen 
above, EU enlargement, although complicating Kaliningrad's problems further, brought an 
international spotlight on the oblast, highlighting ongoing tensions in Russia's perspectives 
on its place and role in Europe. Importantly for this study, the EU has become a catalyst of 
sorts in forcing the Russian and Polish leadership to seek jointly answers to problems that 
already exist and might potentially worsen if left unaddressed. However, this 
rapprochement has been hampered by lingering suspicion, misperception and plain lack of 
clear views on Russia's part as to what role Poland plays in the life of the region. Russia 
has once again demonstrated a tendency to talk down to CE states and to alienate them in 
the process. Russia's lack of vision and old mode of thinking might lead to it having a 
382 PAP, 19 September 2001, FBIS-EEU-2001-0919 
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bitter lesson to learn. After all, Poland and other CE states' full members of the EU will 
help detennine the organisation's relations with Russia and its CFSP towards Russia. 
Poland, for one, considers itself to be among the 'best experts on the East'. 18 3 
Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrates how Russian-CE relations haw developed in the 'soft' security 
area over the last decade. The main focus of the chapter has been on the evolution of 
economic relations between Russia and CE and the role the EU has played (as an external 
influence on the Russian-CE security complex) in forcing changes to the quality and 
character of these ties. 
As the chapter considered some of the main aspects of Russian-CE relations in the 
economic sphere, it became obvious that the energy dimension stands out prominently as 
the key element. CE's &pendence on Russia as its principal energy supplier, Russia's 
dependence on energy exports as the main national budget contributor, coupled with the 
rocky track-record of Russia-CE political relations gave the energy dimension a 
disproportionately large inportance In deten-nining the overall character of bilateral ties. 
As the security of energy supplies has wider implications for security and stability, it is not 
surprising that Russia-CE energy ties became increasingly politicised throughout 
the 
1990s. Lingering suspicion of each other, arising from the legacy of the past strongly 
inforined the perceptions of the two sides. As the chapter 
has shown, however, this does 
not mean to say that CE presented a uniform region with similar characteristics 
across the 
board. For various political and economic reasons, both internal and external 
to the states 
in question, Russia encountered varying degrees of readiness 
to cooperate. Poland, as one 




of the biggest economies in the region and an important transit route for Russian gas, had, 
perhaps, the most complicated and politicised dialogue with Russia in the eneray sector. 
Slovakia under the Meciar leadership, on the other hand, proved to be a more pliant 
partner. Russia's position in Slovakia's energy market was not affected, for example, by 
the political changes in the country. As we have seen, the EU played a important part in 
improving Russia 1) s image in the region in this respect: Russi I 'a's intensified dialogue with 
the EU, especially in the energy sphere, had a calming effect on the CE states. The EU's 
policy of making Russia a strategic partner in providing energy security made the CE 
countries more confident in their dealings with Russia. 
In terms of trade links, Russia and the CE states remain important partners. Of course, 
bilateral trade has significantly changed from the last days of the CMEA, with both sides 
redirecting their trade flows towards the EU. However, as has been pointed out on a 
number of occasions on these pages, Russia-CE's structural dependence on energy trade 
still makes them important trading partners. Not surprisingly then, Russia's exports 
overwhelmingly consist of energy and raw materials, whereas CE predominantly exports 
agricultural products to Russia. Such an import/export structure has led to CE 
accumulating a worryingly high negative trade balance with Russia. Russia, on the other 
hand, is concerned about the decreasing share of finished goods and machinery in its 
exports to the CE region. Yet all attempts to improve the structure of exports come up 
against economic weakness on both sides. In Russia, CE trade is hampered by the poor 
legal base and economic infrastructure, coupled with competition from stronger Western 
players. In CE, Russia faces increasingly more stringent quality standards adopted 
in line 
with EU laws that Russian exporters find hard to match. 
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As the chapter demonstrated, EU enlargement is bringing qualitative changes to Russia-CE 
economic relations, and more than ever before is a key external factor affecting Russia-CE 
security relations. For most of the 1990s, for mainly political reasons, Russia tended to 
prefer EU enlargement to that of NATO. However, as CE's membership in the EU comes 
closer and the effects of CE's integration with the EU begin to manifest themselves. 
Moscow becomes more aware of the underlying problems that the process might bring for 
Russia. Kaliningrad, as we have seen, has become the centre of Russia-EU-CE dialogue in 
the past two years. As was demonstrated earlier in the chapter, along with Kaliningrad 
becoming a 'litmus test' for Russia-EU and Russia-Poland relations, it has turned out to be 
a test of Russia's more general foreign and security policy orientation. Russia's response to 
the Kaliningrad problem has been a mixture of returning to old tactics of threats and 
demands on the one hand, and pursuing dialogue with all parties involved on the other. 
Such an approach caused a degree of irritation among some Poles, for instance, who, 
despite a marked improvement in bilateral political relations with Russia over the last two 
years or so, remain very sensitive towards Moscow's tendency of talking down to them or 
overlooking them altogether. 
Compared with the most of the 1990s, the accession of President Putin to power in 
Moscow heralded a marked shift towards a more economically determined foreign policy, 
complemented by warming relations with the West in general and Central Europe in 
particular. However, partly because Russian-CE relations in the last 
decade were marked 
by a great number of problems, both economic and political, and partly 
because Russian 
foreign and security policy underwent a shift towards a more Realist approach 
in the wake 
of NATO enlargement and the Kosovo crisis, the transition towards a more 
trusting 
relationship and open ties with the West is slow moving, 
despite President Putin's declared 
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goal of bringing Russia closer to Europe. Nevertheless, the progress made in the last three 
years towards getting Russia out of self- isolation politically, improving relations with the 





This thesis has analysed Russia's relations with the states of Central Europe throughout 
the last decade with regard to two key security sectors- military-political and 
economic. The evolution of Russian-CE relations in these fields has been affected and 
conditioned by a range of factors both internal and external to Russia and individual 
states of CE, and also by the evolution of the total external environment comprising 
Russia-CE security complex. As was indicated in Chapter 1, central to this analysis of 
relations between Russia and the CE states has been the pattern of amity-enmity, which 
emerges from historical and cultural interactions, past and current relations, elite and 
public perceptions. As we have seen in Chapters 3 and 4, mutual perception did have a 
considerable effect on the character of bilateral relations and reactions to each other's 
foreign and security preferences. Along with perceptions, the thesis shows how the 
growing weight of economic factors in Russian foreign policy played a key role in the 
evolution of Russia's perspectives towards Central Europe. 
It was inevitable that the collapse of the Soviet bloc, its military and economic 
structures, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union would among its other 
far-reaching 
consequences, transform not only relations between Russia and the 
West but also 
Moscow's ties with the former 'fraternal' states in Central Europe. The 
future of 
Russian-CE relations in the aftermath of these dramatic changes, be 
it in the economic 
or the political sphere, was however not immediately predictable. 
Nor was much 
consideration given to the place of these states in 
Russian foreign and national security 
policy. Given the circumstances and the exhilarated expectation of natural 
partnership 
with the West among relevant leaders of the 
first post-Soviet Russian government, it 
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was hardly surprising that the former 'allies' were given little attention in Russian 
foreign policy. Indeed, at the time when one of Russia's major challenges was to deal 
with the consequences of the divorce from its empire and adjust to its new status as the 
successor to the Soviet Union, fostering ties with the developed world to help its 
transformation, relations with Central Europe occupied a low place on the immediate 
agenda. 
Similarly, the states of Central Europe, led by governments that came to power on the 
basis of opposition to Soviet controlled local regimes, set out to re-direct their 
countries' national security and foreign policy towards integration with the West, an 
almost complete about face from Moscow. Russia's promotion of a new image as an 
entity different entirely from its Soviet predecessor - one basing its actions on 
universal democratic and human values - failed to impress many in Central Europe. 
The dramatic history of relations during the Cold War era left a heavy mark on the way 
the CE nations continued to perceive Russia. 
Thusý as has been shown, Russian-CE relations during the initial stage of post-Cold 
war transformation were marked by rapidly growing distance. In practical terms it 
meant that official exchanges rarely went beyond the ritual signing of ineffective new 
state treaties of friendship and cooperation. In the area of economic relations, contacts 
were drastically reduced, and there was, for example, a steep 
decline in bilateral trade. 
The impact of the collapse of the CMEA trading system on the two sides was not 
equal, however. Because of the CE states' strong structural 
dependence on Russian 
energy supplies, despite a noticeable 
fall in the volumes of gas and oil imported, these 
states continued to purchase large quantities of 
both from Russia. This structural 
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dependence protected Moscow from drastic fluctuations in its exports to the region. 
For CE, however, the transition to world prices for imported energy and payments in 
cash represented an economic shock. In addition, Russia easily found substitutes for 
goods traditionally imported from Central Europe, substitutes that were often cheaper 
and of better quality. Another factor that increased differentiation between Russia and 
the CE region was the latter's rapid economic reorientation towards the West as part of 
an effort to reform its economies, and other polices undertaken as part of a long-terin 
strategy of integration with the European Union and the West in general. 
As has been noted at various points in the preceding chapters, Russia's lack of 
attention to Central Europe, even during what became known in post-Soviet history as 
the 'romantic period' of relations with the West, despite their shared history, smacked 
to some observers of residual super-power arrogance. For Moscow these states were 
too small and unimportant, it seemed, in its grand project of integration with the West. 
Despite their own exclusive preoccupation with the West, for Central Europeans, 
Russia's almost complete neglect of the region in its vision of European post-Cold War 
security betrayed an unreconstructed vision of the world and their countries in 
particular. 
Internal political developments in Russia in the first years of its post-Soviet existence 
- the rise of conservative and neo-Communist political 
forces, failing economic 
reforms, violent conflict in Chechnya and the shift towards traditional 'great power' 
rhetoric - gave greater urgency to 
CE aspirations towards membership of NATO. This 
combination - growing anti-Westemism 
in Russia and the increasing determination of 
Central Europeans to join the transatlantic military alliance - had a predictable 
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outcome for Russian-CE relations. As we have seen, during the second (1994-1997) 
phase of Russian foreign policy, characterised by the promotion of a "consensus" on 
the key parameters of Russian national security and foreign policy based on a return to 
"great power" rhetoric, relations between Russia and the three states of Central Europe 
entered a period of controlled mutual antipathy. ' This antipathy was supported by 
revived perceptions of Russia in the CE states as an unreconstructed Soviet empire, in 
particular with regard to its dealings with former Soviet bloc states. 
The approach Russia adopted when it was confronted by the possibility of NATO 
moving closer to its borders was again reminiscent of old attitudes in so far as Moscow 
attempted to negotiate the fate of the CE states above their heads. ) negotiating directly 
with the key Western powers. The consequences of this approach, as we have seen, 
were manifold. Whereas Russian resistance to CE membership in the North Atlantic 
Alliance was based fundamentally on Moscow's fear of isolation in Europe - denial of 
an equal voice on the future of European security its reaction to the prospect of NATO 
enlargement propelled the CE region to the fore of Russian foreign policy priorities. 
The elevation of the region in Russian security considerations, within the framework of 
opposition to NATO expansion, seemed to reflect, however, on a straightforward 
geopolitical reading of the situation. Russia's threats of "adequate response", even 
though not supported by adequate resources, played into the hands of CE supporters of 
NATO enlargement. Russia's policy of negotiating with NATO over the heads of the 
CE states, further increased alienation between Moscow and the CE region. Thus as 
part of Russia's policy of anti-NATO enlargement, Central Europe became one of the 
key concerns of Russian national security and foreign policy. These concerns and the 
1 Russian-Slovak relations during this period [1994-1997], for many reasons illuminated upon in 
chapters 3 and 4, profoundly different to Russia's relations with the other three states - Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary. 
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policies undertaken to address them, as we have seen, failed to take into account the 
thinking behind the CE states' policies and thus failed to produce positive results. The 
policy that Russia adopted towards CE, itself aimed at addressing its security concerns 
and attempting to dissuade countries in the region from joining NATO, failed on many 
fronts. The repeated offers of security guarantees to be given to CE either by Russia 
and the West, or by the West alone, as an alternative to full membership in NATO, 
were flatly rejected by CE governments. On the whole, then, and quite predictably, 
Russia's explicit treatment of the countries in the region as objects of Moscow's anti- 
enlargement campaign, and not as equal partners, resulted in a further alienation of 
Central European states from Russia. 
As was pointed out in Chapter 1, despite underlying similarities in their policies 
towards Russia, the states of Central Europe exhibited some differences: Poland and 
the Czech Republic were the most distanced from Russia with a strong measure of anti- 
Moscow sentiment underlying their policies. Hungary followed a more measured 
"return to Europe" policy, careful not to cause too big a rift with Moscow. Perceptions, 
as we have seen, have played different roles in the case of different states, and the level 
of enmity has varied. It was inevitable, in the light of the post-World War 11 history of 
Moscow's relations with CE nations that antagonism and distrust of Russia would 
become more strongly embedded in some countries than in others. Russian-Slovak 
relations, of course, have also been influenced by historically fori-ned perceptions. 
However, we have seen that a number of other factors explain the warmth of 
Bratislava's ties with Moscow during the Meciar era. 
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This wan-nth contrasts with the general coolness of Moscow's ties with the other three 
CE states, especially during the second stage of Russian foreign policy. As was 
explained in Chapters 3 and 4, the "abnormal" degree of closeness between the two 
states at the time was largely due to the internal characteristics of Meciar's rule in 
Slovakia, in particular his economic power base and the general economic situation in 
the country. Good bilateral relations and uncharacteristically close ties between 
Moscow and Bratislava came to an end, after all, with the arrival of the new 
government in Slovakia in 1998. Bratislava's renewed policy of integration with 
NATO and the EU ensured that Slovakia began to have similar kinds of relations with 
Moscow as the other CE states. 
The 'loss' of Slovakia in 1998 coincided with the arrival of the third phase of 
Russian foreign policy. This period, as we have seen, was one of the most difficult in 
Moscow's relations with the West and, by extension, with Central Europe. The new 
period of coolness was brought about by the start of the Kosovo crisis in which NATO 
"invaded" Yugoslavia despite Russia's strong opposition. This crisis started almost at 
the same time as the three new NATO members, Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic, joined the alliance. Once again, Russia's political relations with the CE 
states deteriorated as Moscow put its ties with NATO on ice. These events threatened 
to worsen Russia-CE relations beyond anything seen before in bilateral relations. 
Indeed, for a period one could observe an almost complete lull in high-level official 
exchanges and derogatory commentary in the Russian media about the CE states' 
subservient relations with the West. 
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The hiatus in high level political relations, however, did not mean that Russian-CE 
relations in other spheres were completely neglected. Although the coolness in bilateral 
relations and what was seen in CE as Moscow's unconstructive stance on European 
security slowed up the building of the legal foundations for economic cooperation and 
did not help in the task of promoting a positive image of Russia, economic cooperation 
nevertheless moved ahead. As has been argued, Russia's strong position as an energy 
supplier and the importance of the CE area as a vital transit route to Western Europe 
were the key factors behind the resilience of Russian-CE economic cooperation. In 
addition, the long standing debt issue and CE states' persistent attempts to expand 
imports to the Russian market to level out trade imbalances played a part in stabilising 
some otherwise rocky bilateral relationships. 
However, there was another side to the picture. The very dependence of CE on 
Russia, mixed with growing misgivings about the future direction of Russian policy, 
taken in the context of hi stori call y-based unfading negative perceptions, tended to 
provoke additional frictions. After all, in thinking about international relations, the 
topics of energy supply, economic security and political influence are frequently 
closely intertwined. In the highly charged climate of Russian-CE relations the energy- 
security connection took on additional urgency, and it was not surprising that Russian- 
CE energy trade was vulnerable to the political volatility of bilateral relations. In a 
situation where CE was striving for integration with NATO and the EU it was natural 
and predictable that the states of region would desire to escape overwhelming 
dependence on Russian oil and gas. The Czech Republic and Hungary in particular, 
despite Moscow's protests, succeeded in diversifying their energy supplies to some 
extent. Despite strong domestic opposition, Poland, on the other hand, deepened 
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energy cooperation with Russia, agreeing to construct a major 'Yamal' gas pipeline 
across its territory, connecting Russian gas destined for Gazprom customers in Western 
Europe. The construction of the pipeline was not without controversy. Russia's 
position was strengthened, as we have seen, by support from its economic partners in 
the EU as well as the EU's own support for developing deeper long-term relations with 
Russia in the energy sector. The EU's commitment to establishing meaningful 
economic relations with Russia, for example through the Energy Dialogue, had a 
positive effect on stabilising Russian-Polish relations, not least by helping it to 
alleviate concerns in Warsaw about the threat of Russian domination of the Polish 
energy market. The positive influence of Russian-EU cooperation in calming CE states' 
anxieties about Russia's persistent economic influence is a good example of the 
growing salience of economic factors in regional relationships. For this reason we may 
conclude that successful Russian-EU relations have been crucial to improvements in 
Moscow's relations with CE. The joint participation of West European and Russian 
economic actors in various projects in Central Europe, for example, turned out to be 
very effective in addressing lingering suspicions aroused by Russia's economic 
presence. Examples were analysed in Chapter 4- joint Russian-German-French 
participation in the Slovak gas sector privatisation, as well as the 'Yamal' pipeline 
construction across Poland. Such collaboration, if continued in future with EU backing, 
could arguably bring about a gradual change of perception of Russia in the region and 
encourage CE states to expand their own economic cooperation with Russia, thereby 
positively contributing to the improvement in the political climate. 
In Moscow, the trend towards a more economically detennined foreign policy has 
been particularly evident since the arrival of the new president at the end of 1999. The 
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prominence given to economic factors has allowed Russian foreign policy to become 
more rational and realistic. It has eased the restoration of ties with NATO and the 
West, in particular with the EU, giving these ties more practical context. Russia's 
engagement with Europe promises to bring greater stability and predictability in 
Russian foreign policy. Although most would agree that Putin's long-term vision of 
Russia is still that of great power, and that the underlying strategy thus remains 
unchanged, the tactics by which this objective is to be achieved have certainly 
changed, as the evidence presented in this thesis helps to confirm. 
It seems that this change has been brought about by a shift in policy-makers' 
thinking, based on an understanding that international weight is directly dependent on 
economic strength. The new phase in Russian foreign policy, which began after Putin's 
accession, had a positive effect on Russian-CE relations, as we have seen. Interaction 
with the states of the region has intensified. Ties are characterised by a more 
pragmatic, business-like approach, less likely to be disturbed by political controversy. 
Although the argument could be made in terms of economic determinism, and 
Russian security and foreign policy thinking and writing gives some support to such 
interpretation. These changes have undoubtedly been helped by the arrival of a new 
generation of leaders in Russia. Relatively free from Soviet/imperial nostalgia, the 
current leadership, largely pro-Western (or at least Western-centric, as suggested by 
Bobo L02) finds it easier to compromise and achieve common ground with its 
counterparts in the West and Central Europe in particular. Such generational change 
means that mutual perceptions also likely to be fresher and less hostile, bringing about 
2 Bobo Lo, Russian Foreign Policy in Post-Soviet Era. Realitv, Illusion and Mythmaking (Basingstoke 
and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
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a positive shift in balance of the enmity-amity pattern in CE-Russian relations. As our 
close examination of Russia's stance on the Kaliningrad region's issue related to EU 
enlargement demonstrated, of course, some of the old tactics and perceptions have 
turned out to be quite durable. Similarly, even in the atmosphere of improving 
relations, opinion polls show that Central Europeans are still wary of Russia's 
economic presence. 3 
The terrorist attacks on the USA on II th September 2001, and their consequences, 
gave a further boost to Russia's rapprochement with the West and NATO in particular. 
Following the improvements in Russia-US relations, Russia and NATO expanded their 
cooperation, agreeing to establish a more meaningful partnership, using a new NATO- 
Russia Council, in which Russia was granted a greater say in matters relating to such 
new common threats as international terrorism. Yet again, however, in a further 
demonstration of the intractability of perceptions, even as many Western nations 
welcomed closer ties with Russia, many CE states expressed their concern about giving 
Moscow too much influence in the alliance's decision-making. 
What is important, however, is that Russia and the CE states have left the most 
difficult epoch in their post-Soviet history behind. Completion of the most dramatic 
and sensitive changes - NATO enlargement, and Russia's grudging acquiescence to 
further growth of the alliance - opened the way to a new era in Russia-CE relations. 
The increasing role of economic factors in detennining Russian foreign policy, along 
with improvements in Russia's relations with the West in general, with NATO and 
3 An opinion poll published in a Polish paper and quoted in Russia's Pravda showed that 51 percent of 
Poles are seriously worried about Russian large companies' investments in the Polish economy. 60 
percent of those polled expressed fear of economic dependence on Russia, while 32 percent explained 
their concern by fear of "dirty money" and Russian money or the re-emergence of Russian political 
influence. See Pravda on-line, 03 
October 2002, 
http: //english. pravda. ru/economics/2002/10/03/37647. html 
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with the EU, send positive signals to the CE states. As we have seen, Russian-CE ties 
have already improved substantially since 2000, with greater emphasis being placed on 
economic issues. 
Returning to the framework outlined at the beginning of the dissertation, looking at 
the Russia-CE security regional complex provides a useful framework through which 
to explore security dynamics in this constellation of states and to identify and assess 
changes in the pattern of regional security. Buzan's sectoral approach of security 
analysis, allows for a more structured study of security dynamics in a security complex 
- security sectors "serve to better understand a whole by highlighting some if its 
features". 4 The purpose of such disaggregating is to reduce the regional security 
complexity in order to facilitate the analysis. In the case of Russian-CE security 
complex the following three sectors were analysed - political, military and economic. 
The conscious choice made in analysing these sectors does not mean that the other two 
security sectors that Buzan identifies - societal and environmental - are absent in 
Russian-CE security complex. Omission of detailed analysis of societal and 
environmental aspects of security also does not mean that there is no connection 
between the security sectors. The highlighted security sectors were analysed to 
demonstrate the security dynamics between Russia and CE in the areas where the 
impact of insecurity and threat perception was most intense and 'visible', and where 
patterns of enmity-amity were most pronounced. As was observed in Chapter 1, the 
main value of the security complex theory is that it draws attention away 
from the 
extremes of national and global security and focuses on the region, where these two 
extremes interplay and where most of the action occurs. Security complex theory 
links 
4 Wojclech Kostecki, Europe After the Cold War. The Security Complex Theory (Warsaw: Institute of 
Political studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, 1996), p. 5 1. 
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studies of internal conditions in states, relations among states of the region, and 
relations among regions, relations between regions and global powers. 
A central feature for identifying a security complex is the ability of states to perceive 
their security as a common interdependent issue. Security perceptions coupled with 
other cultural, historical and geopolitical roots and relative geographical proximity are 
the main criteria for the identification of a security complex. The notion of externalities 
is also of great importance both in terms of determining a security complex and in the 
analysis of regional security dynamics. 
The above criteria appear largely adequate to identify Russia and the four CE states 
as a security complex. Historical roots and the knowledge of the contemporary driving 
forces of state and regional security dynamics allowed us to identify the Russian-CE 
complex with relative certainty. Kostecki's elaboration of security complex definition 
as "a political constellation of states which is constituted by their mutual security 
concerns and aspirations", gives further advantages to the analysis of Russian-CE 
5 
security relations based on security complex approach . The notion of mutuality of 
security concerns and security aspirations is particularly relevant to the Russian-CE 
security complex, as the security complexes, as understood by Buzan and et. al., are a 
product of not only rivalry but also of shared interests, and that they are defined not 
only by perceptions of common threats (real or potential) but by anticipation of future 
6 dangers as well. And as the thesis highlighted, expression of expectations and 
aspiration of the states in Russia-CE security complex played a significant role in 
driving the security dynamics and infon-ning their perceptions and security policies. 
Ibid., pp. 31-32. 
6 Ibid., p. 36. 
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Russia-CE region is united by many of the above aspects: it is an area of major 
political, military and economic transformations. The epochal changes, political and 
economic, and international ambitions and hopes, their incompatibility, coupled with 
the legacy of the past that informs their perceptions and formation of security policies 
both towards each other and outside this region - bind Russia and CE in a security 
complex. 
As Barry Buzan points out, regional security complexes come much closer to 
reflecting the operational enviromment of national security than do higher levels 
abstractions. 7 Furthermore, the regional security complex approach helps to capture the 
security dynamics and the interdependence operating in a region with relation to their 
impact, both intemally and extemally, on states and societies. In addition, it allows the 
examination of the security relations that exist within the region as well as explains the 
intricate consequences and intermeshing of the different security sectors throughout a 
set period of time. Such methodological foundation allows us to analyse the security 
managements adopted or to be adopted by the security complex actors. This thesis 
looked specifically at Russia's management of its security relations with the four other 
members of the security complex - Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary 
between 1991 and 2001, across three sectors - military, political and economic. 
The military security, as defined by Buzan, concerns with the two level interplay of 
the anned offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and states' perceptions of each 
other's intentions. Thus, in Russian-CE security complex, the military sector analysis 
7 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: an Agenda for International Securitv Studies in the Post-Cold 
War Era., 2nd edn (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 199 1), p. 146. 
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dealt with arms control and confidence building measures (CTE, OSCE), examination 
of the military nature of threat perception by both Russian and CE elites. The role of 
NATO and CE's desire to join it did play a major part in the evolution of Russia's 
mi tary defence policy. Various other external influences, related to NATO 
enlargement, but relevant to a wider European security environment - the Balkans and 
the Baltic area - featured prominently in Russian-CE security complex. All these were 
examined against a wider background of enmity-amity pattern of relations that 
informed their perceptions and policies. 
In the centre of political sector is the interplay of concerns about the organisational 
stability of states, system of government and the ideology. In Russian-CE security 
complex, these factors played prominently and are linked to the painful process 
democratic transformation in both Russia and CE states after decades of totalitarian 
control. The impact of these changes in the political climate on relations in the region 
provided an important foundation of the security dynamic. Russia's agonizing 
evolution as a democratic state reflected negatively on CE's perception of the country. 
Russia's compromises between the old and the new political elements helped to endure 
old perceptions in CE. 
The economic aspect of relations highlighted the security aspect of economic 
interdependence in a regional security complex. Given the enmity dominated pattern of 
relations, such security Interdependence proved to be highly politicised/securitIsed. 
Energy interdependence, especially in the gas sector, stands out in Russian-CE 
economic security. However, such a high degree of interdependence proved to be 
useful in promoting positive changes in Russian-CE relations. The involvement of 
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external actors - the EU and individual European states - was crucial in bringin, (-T 
changes to Russian economy and related practices and positively altering CE's security 
perceptions of Russia. 
Turning back to an overall evolution of Russia-CE relation in years between 1991 
and 2001 , evaluation of changes in enmity/amity pattern is informing. If the original 
pattern of Russia-CE relations at the beginning of the period under investigation was 
characterised by apathy and lack of mutual interest, then towards the middle of the last 
decade these relations shifted towards a predominance of enmity. A prolonged period 
of bitter disagreements over major issues connected with conflicting visions of the 
future of European security not only had a negative impact on the regional security 
atmosphere, but caused division in the overall European security debate. Having gone 
through major institutional re-adjustments and a crisis in European security, Russian- 
CE relations began to improve, however, towards the end of the 1990s. These changes 
we have attributed both to the conclusion of institutional changes in Europe, and a 
remarkable improvement in Russia's ties with the rest of the West, which in turn were 
fostered by internal changes in Russia and modification of its foreign policy, and the 
September I I"' events in the United States. Thus we have a picture of positive changes 
in Russia-CE relations being promoted by internal changes within those states and in 
the international environment. In turn, the shift towards a more constructive and 
amicable pattern of relations between Russia and the CE states makes the overall 
security environment in Europe more positively stable, predictable and durable. 
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